

The Life and Times of
HUMAYUN

Ishwari Prasad

First Published 1955
Reprinted with minor revision 1956

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THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HUMAYUN

ISHWARI PRASAD

M.A., LL.B., D.LITT., M.L.C.

*Formerly Professor of History and Political Science
Allahabad University*



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FOREWORD

PROFESSOR ISHWARI PRASAD has paid a most generous tribute in his preface to my own modest share in the begetting of this book. The need for a critical study of the reign of Humāyūn had long been apparent when I delivered my course of lectures; and my intention was to proceed, as time and opportunity allowed, with the preparation of such a study. This intention was never fulfilled. But the lectures served their purpose, for they aroused the interest of Dr. Ishwari Prasad in the ill-starred monarch with whom they dealt. Of that interest the present book is the fruit.

The author has written overkindly of any early encouragement I may have given to his career as a historian. I believed him to possess unusual qualifications for this career; and his work as my colleague amply supported the belief. He has since given the learned world convincing proof of his capabilities; and I am certain that this book will at once enhance his reputation and take its place among those solid contributions to historical scholarship of which his University, and indeed his country, may well be proud.

Rye House, Silchester,
31st January, 1944.

L. F. RUSHBROOK-WILLIAMS

As war was going on in Europe this short foreword was received by airgraph in 1944.

PREFACE

MANY YEARS ago Professor L. F. Rushbrook-Williams delivered a course of lectures on Humāyūn at the University of Allahabad. They were based largely on printed works and were meant for general audiences. The original typed MS. ran into 180 foolscap pages and the lectures were eight in number. After some time the Professor betook himself to other spheres of activity and the lectures were utterly forgotten. His historical researches were interrupted and he never found time to come back to them again.

When I suggested to him the possibility of constructing an up-to-date book on Humāyūn on the basis of his work, he readily agreed and wrote to me from Jāmnagar (Kāthiāwār): 'I am greatly looking forward to seeing what you have made of my material on Humāyūn. But for your efforts I do not suppose it would ever have gone to Press.'

The work on Humāyūn began and I tried to collect materials from various quarters in India and Europe. Through the courtesy of Pandit Amarnath Jha, Vice-Chancellor of Allahabad University, I obtained a number of rotographs and MSS. from the British Museum, the India Office Library, the Punjāb Public Library, the libraries of the Asiatic Society of Bengal and the Punjāb University, and utilised them in my researches. Much help was received from Maharaja Kumar Dr. Raghubir Singh of Sitamau to whom I am indebted for the loan of a few MSS. He was good enough to get some of them transcribed at his own expense for my use.

In this way every work of importance dealing with Humāyūn's life was consulted and an up-to-date history of his reign, based on original sources, was prepared. On the 14th March, 1939, Professor L. F. Rushbrook-Williams wrote to me: 'I am so glad to hear that Humāyūn will soon be ready. It will be a great book.' When I informed him of the completion of the task a few months back, he replied by airgraph in November 1943: 'I am so pleased, he (Humāyūn) is now ready. I should have liked to see the proofs. But I agree with you it is impossible in war time.'

This is the history of the present volume. The original MS. has now grown considerably in size; from 180 pages it has swelled to more than 500 foolscap sheets with elaborate notes and a chapter containing a critical examination of primary and secondary sources together with a number of charts, diagrams, maps, and illustrations. No pains have been spared to make the narrative complete, unbiassed and authoritative. Whether it is an up-to-date statement of the

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facts of Humāyūn's life or not is a matter which will be decided by those who are competent to judge, but one thing I can claim, and it is that I have done my best to make it as useful as possible. In certain places a departure has been made from orthodox histories, but whenever such an occasion has arisen I have taken good care to base my conclusions on facts contained in contemporary writings. Sometimes the different views have been discussed in the footnotes which will furnish much information to the advanced student, who can, with their help, pursue his researches further. No finality is possible in scholarship and no scholar can claim infallibility for the judgments formed and the views expressed. Those who come after me may perhaps have to modify or reject the views expressed herein, but they will not be able to brush aside summarily the conclusions which have been based on facts gleaned from the accounts of eye-witnesses or those who had opportunities of acquainting themselves with the events described by them.

Recently some scholars have worked on the history of Humāyūn's reign. One of them has already published his work; the researches of another are still awaiting publication. I am not afraid of incurring the censure pronounced by Johnson upon Blackwell that he chose a subject long since exhausted. The facts of history are always in a state of progress; they are being constantly added to and multiplied as new material comes to light; the interpretations also are not always the same. Every writer has the right of drawing his own conclusions from the facts which he investigates. I have adduced many new facts and after sifting them have carefully interpreted them. In these days there are two kinds of histories: one based on painstaking research conducted by specialists in Universities and the other dished up by enterprising amateurs for popular consumption. My aim has been to produce the first and not the second. How far I have succeeded in my attempt is a matter which scholars alone will decide. All that I can claim is that I have unearthed new facts and interpreted them according to the best of my lights without extenuating or setting down aught in malice.

There is another reason why I have bestowed five years' industry on this work. Originally, I was intended for the Bar, but it was Professor Rushbrook-Williams who, by taking me into the Research Department which he was organising in 1918-19, diverted my career. Since then I have devoted myself to history with a complete singleness of purpose and I must honestly confess that Clio has been unusually propitious to me. But whatever success I have achieved is in a large measure due to the kindness and encouragement that I

PREFACE

received from Professor Rushbrook-Williams in the beginning of my career. It was he who inspired me with a love for historical studies and kindled in me a passion for research. Soon after my appointment in 1919, he wrote to me from Simla: 'I hope you will make a solid contribution to historical knowledge.' I do not know whether his expectation has been fulfilled, but I can affirm with truth that in the pursuit of historical knowledge, I have striven to the utmost of my capacity and have scorned delights and lived laborious days. I shall be happy if this token of my gratitude is acceptable to Professor Rushbrook-Williams.

In a work of this kind diacritical marks are necessary for the convenience of readers who find it difficult to pronounce proper names and unfamiliar or technical terms. I have put marks on these and I have no doubt foreign readers will find them useful aids to pronunciation.

I am obliged to the Secretary, Khudābaksh Library, for giving me permission to reproduce the pictures in the *Khāndān-i-Timūriyah* which is a precious treasure belonging to that institution. The Kāshī Nāgarī Prachārīnī Sabha of Banaras have allowed me to consult some of their works and Rai Krishna Das of the Kalā Bhawan and Mr. A. B. Pandey of the Queen's College, Banaras, have been very helpful in obtaining photographs of contemporary portraits. I am thankful to the Vice-Chancellor for obtaining from the Jaipur Durbar a picture of Hamīdah Bānū Begam which is included in this volume.

The MS. of this work was given to the publishers in 1944 but for various reasons delay was made in publication.

January, 1955.

ISHWARI PRASAD

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A.F.	Abul Fazl
A.N.	<i>Akbarnāmah</i>
A.S.B.MS.	Asiatic Society of Bengal Library MS.
A.U.MS.	Allahābad University MS.
'Abbās	'Abbās Sarwānī, <i>Tārīkh-i-Sher Shāhī</i>
Āin	<i>Āin-i-Akbarī</i>
<i>Al-Badāonī</i>	Abdul Qādir Badāonī, <i>Muntakhab-ut-Tawārīkh</i>
B.M.MS.	British Museum MS.
Bāyazīd	<i>Tārīkh-i-Humāyūnī</i>
Bayley	<i>Local Muhammadan Dynasties of Gujarāt</i>
Elliot	Elliot & Dowson, <i>Historians of India</i>
Firishtah	Muhammad Qāsim Firishtah, <i>Gulshan-i-Ibrāhīmī</i>
Gulbadan	<i>Humāyūnāmah</i> , text and translation by Mrs. A. S. Beveridge
H.N.	<i>Humāyūnāmah</i>
I.G.	<i>Imperial Gazetteer</i>
I.H.Q.	<i>Indian Historical Quarterly</i>
I.O.MS.	India Office MS.
J.A.S.B.	<i>Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal</i>
J.R.A.S.	<i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain</i>
Jarrett	<i>Āin-i-Akbarī</i> II, III, English translation
Jauhar	<i>Tazkirāt-ul-Wāq'āt</i>
Khudābaksh MS.	Khudābaksh Oriental Library, Bankipore MS.
<i>Makhzan</i>	<i>Makhzan-i-Afghānī</i>
<i>Memoirs</i>	<i>Bābunāmah</i> , English translation by Mrs. A. S. Beveridge
Stewart	<i>Private Memoirs of Jauhar</i>
T.R.	<i>Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī</i>
T.S.	<i>Tārīkh-i-Sher Shāhī</i>
<i>Tabqā</i>	<i>Tabqāt-i-Akbarī</i>

CHAPTER I

HUMAYUN AS PRINCE

IT WAS in the citadel of the mountain kingdom of Kābul that Nasīruddīn Muhammad, better known to history by his surname Humāyūn, 'the fortunate,' first saw light. The circumstances of his birth were such as to ensure the infant a lofty destiny. He was the firstborn son of Māham,¹ favourite wife of Zahīruddīn Muhammad, nick-named Bābur, the finest gentleman, and the most attractive personality in all the varied pages of Asiatic history. A warrior, a man of letters, a *bon camarade*, and a born leader of men, Bābur stood out pre-eminently as a knight without fear and without reproach. He had already sustained with fortitude such a succession of Fate's buffets as have rarely fallen to the lot even of a prince exposed to such kaleidoscopic changes as characterised the politics of Asia in the middle ages. At the time when Humāyūn was born to him he had fought his way to a position stronger and better established than any he had yet occupied.

Left at the age of twelve ruler of Farghānā, a small principality which now falls within the boundaries of Russian Turkistān, Bābur had, after heroic struggles, lost all he possessed to relatives more powerful and less scrupulous than himself. Deprived of his paternal dominions, he had twice won by his own exertions the far-famed city of Samarqand on each occasion only losing it again by adversities too formidable for mortal man to resist. After wandering homeless and destitute, accompanied only by a few faithful followers clad

¹ Bābur does not say anything about Māham's parentage. Gulbadan says that Aka (a Turkish word for a senior lady) was related to the owners of the New Year's Garden in Kābul and this was made by Ulugh Beg Kābulī Mirānshāhi: *Vide* Mrs. Beveridge's note in the *Humāyūnāmah* C XVII, pp. 256-58. Abul Fazl writes (*A.N.* I, p. 285) that Māham Begam came of a noble family of Khorāsān related to Sultān Hussain Mirza. She was related to Shaikh Ahmad Jān. Bābur married her when he went to Herāt to condole with the sons of Sultān Hussain Mirza. Abul Fazl does not give the name of the lady's father. Mrs. Beveridge says (*Memoirs* I, p. 344) in a foot-note that it is difficult to find out to whose family Māham belonged. Bābur married her in 1506 and she bore him five children—Bārbul, Mihrjahān, Isān Daulat, Fāruq and Humāyūn. The first four died in infancy. She was with Bābur during the Transoxiana campaign (A.H. 916-20) and when the latter went to Hissār after his defeat by the Uzbeks near Kūl-Malik in Safar A. H. 918 (April and May A.D. 1512) he was accompanied by Māham and her children Humāyūn, Mihrjahān and Bārbul and the orphan Masuma and Gulrukh with her son Kāmran. (*Memoirs* I, p. 358. *Humāyūnāmah*, p. 91.) That she was not a Mughal may be accepted at once, for Bābur, who had a great dislike for the Mughals, would not marry a Mughal woman.

in tatters, he had by 1504, at length, succeeded in establishing himself in the kingdom of Kābul, which had belonged to his father's brother, Ulugh Beg Mirza. For four years before the birth of Humāyūn Bābur had lived in his mountain kingdom, battling against the intrigues of his hereditary foes, the Uzbegs, and suppressing with difficulty the rebellions of the turbulent Mongol mercenaries whose services were indispensable to him. For the moment, however, his worst troubles seemed to be over; he had just conducted a successful expedition to Qandhār; and finally, in token of his supremacy over the other living descendants of the house of Tīmūr, he had recently assumed the title of *Pādshāh* which we may perhaps translate as Lord Paramount.¹

In his *Memoirs*, Bābur notes with pride the birth of his son and heir on Tuesday, March 6, 1508:

'At the end of this same year A.H. 913 in the night of Tuesday the 4th day of the month of Zu'l Qa'da,² the Sun being in Pisces Humāyūn was born in the citadel of Kābul. The date of his birth was found by the poet Maulānā Masnadī in the words *Sultān Humāyūn Khan*, and a minor poet of Kābul found it in *Shāh-i-Firūz Qadr* (Shah of Victorious Might). A few days later he received the name Humāyūn. When he was only five or six days old, I went out to the Chār Bāgh to celebrate his coming into the world with a great feast. All the Begg, small and great, brought their presents on this occasion. Such heaps of silver *tankahs* were piled up as had never been seen before in any other place. It was a splendid feast.'³

About the early years of Humāyūn's life we know very little. Unlike his father he did not write his own memoirs and we have no record of any childish recollections. Bābur himself has nothing to tell us about his son's infancy; he prefers to deal with the infinitely more romantic and exciting story of his own adventures. In the very year that followed Humāyūn's birth, the father came within an ace of losing the throne owing to the revolt of the troops stationed in Kābul.⁴

¹ It was in the same year in which Humāyūn was born that Bābur assumed the title of *Pādshāh*. Up to that time Tīmūr Beg's descendants had been styled as Mirzas. *Memoirs* I, p. 344. Gulbadan says the same thing (*Humāyūnāmāh*, p. 90.) Before this he was known as Mirza Bābur and all his sons were called Mirzas.

² The 4th of Zu'l Qa'da will be March 6, 1508.

³ *Memoirs* I, p. 344.

⁴ This refers to the conspiracy of the Mughal Chiefs who formed a plot for Bābur's destruction. Their plan was not merely to renounce allegiance to Bābur but to restore Abdur Razzāq Mirza, the late king of Kābul, to his throne and to put him in possession of Qunduz and Khutlān.

Next year witnessed the outbreak of the struggle between Bābur's life-long foe, Shaibānī the Uzbek, and the powerful Ismaīl Safawī of Persia. This struggle was pregnant with fate for the infant Humāyūn, for at the end of 1510 the news of the defeat of Shaibānī in the battle of Merv led Bābur to dream his last dream of regaining his ancestral dominions and of occupying Samarqand once more. In the course of the next two years was to be settled the question whether Humāyūn was to find his fortune in the West or East, whether he was to sit on Tīmūr's throne, a prince of Central Asia, or whether his lot was to fall in those more eastern lands over which his house had as yet never borne sway.

Some little time before the battle of Merv, it would seem, Bābur's second son Kāmrān, destined to be Humāyūn's evil genius, was born.¹ When the news of the disaster which had overtaken the Uzbeks came to Kābul, the king promptly handed over the capital to his younger brother Nāsir Mirza, and in January 1511, set out with his wives and belongings to seek what fortune had in store. He took both Humāyūn and Kāmrān with him, despite their tender years, for he seems to have hoped that he was now on the point of realising his life-long ambition—the re-establishment of the empire of his great ancestor Tīmūr with Samarqand as its capital. But his hopes were foredoomed to failure.

The position in which he found himself was extremely difficult. The Uzbek power, though it had received a heavy blow, was far from being shattered, and was still too strong for Bābur's unaided resources. The King of Kābul was obliged to enter into a subordinate alliance with Shah Ismaīl in order to obtain the support required, and one condition upon which the Persian monarch insisted was the adoption by Bābur of Shiah tenets. The result was fatal. Bābur's rule over Samarqand and Bokhāra, which he regained with the aid of Persian troops, became gradually less popular.

Moreover as Bābur refused to adopt an attitude sufficiently humble to please Shah Ismaīl, he lost the support of his suzerain. His subjects were alienated, his allies were offended. Naturally, his foes came by their own again. Matters came to a head in the battle of Ghazdawān, a crushing defeat for Bābur and the Persians at the hands of the Uzbek leaders.

¹We do not find the date of his birth in the *Memoirs*, for he was born in a year of one of the *Bāburnāmah* gaps. It may be either A.H. 914 or 915 (A.D. 1508 or 1509). He was younger than Humāyūn and is mentioned by Gulbadan (p. 91) as one of those who went with Bābur to Samarqand in January, 1511 (Shawwāl A.H. 916).

After this battle which took place in November, 1512, Bābur retired once more to Hissār. Here he was very nearly assassinated in a conspiracy of some Mughal troops whom he had outspokenly accused of misconduct, barely escaping with his life in the darkness of the night.¹ This determined him to withdraw from Hissār into Qunduz. During the whole of 1513 we know little of his movements. Mirza Haider says that he remained most of the time in Qunduz, exposed to the greatest privation and misery. He bore all his distresses with his customary patience, but at last, despairing of his chances of recovering Hissār, he determined to withdraw to Kābul.

We do not know what became of Humāyūn and Kāmran while Bābur was undergoing the reverses of fortune which led to his expulsion from Transoxiana. But it is natural to suppose that at the first symptoms of serious trouble, the children were sent back to Kābul, where they would be safe under the protection of the good-natured but drunken Nāsir Mirza.


When at length in 1514 the adventurous king-errant returned unsuccessful to his capital, Humāyūn was, according to our reckoning, some six years old. For the next six years the boy lived quietly at Kābul with his tutors, seeing, as we gather from the *Memoirs*, but little of the father upon whom domestic cares sat somewhat lightly.

After Bābur's return from Samarqand were born two more sons, both destined to play a large part in the subsequent fortunes of Humāyūn. The third boy, 'Askarī was born in 1516, and the fourth, Hindāl, three years later.² With none of his brothers does Humāyūn

¹ This was in A.D. 1513. Bābur always looked upon the Mughals as a treacherous race.

² 'Askarī was so called from his being born in camp. He was the son of Gulrukh Begchik and full brother of Kāmran (*Memoirs* I, p. 364). Gulrukh is never mentioned in the *Memoirs*.

Gulbadan, *Humāyūnāmāh*, p. 90.



On March 4, 1519 Bābur received the news of Hindāl's birth. (*Memoirs* I, p. 385.) 'As the news came during the expedition into Hindustān, I took it

appear to have had much in common. In tastes and character he differed widely from the corrupt and selfish Kāmrān, being further set apart from him by the privileges and responsibilities that hedge round an heir-apparent almost from the moment of his birth. So far as the other boys were concerned, Humāyūn had little chance of their companionship. He was of an age which led to his being taken from the schoolroom just when they were entering it.

About Humāyūn's early education we have not much detailed knowledge; but from what Bābur says of his own training, combined with the fairly extensive information at our disposal concerning the condition of arts and letters in Central Asia at the time, we can construct a picture which admits little risk of serious error.

When Bābur returned from Samarqand, Humāyūn was, as we have seen, about six years old. At such an age, the education of a Turkī prince would have already begun; and from what we know of Bābur's love of learning, we may be sure that he procured for his son the best tutors available. The education of a child in Humāyūn's position comprised much besides reading and writing, instruction in history and in religion, the cultivation of a nice taste in literature and of a pretty wit in verse-making. He would be taught to become an elegant and fearless horseman, skilled shot, and a finished swordsman. In the pleasant meadows round Kābul he would receive his first instruction in hunting small game, while among the crags and defiles of the surrounding country he would be taught to track down quarry of a nobler sort. Even at an early age, Humāyūn showed signs of possessing unusual parts. He was naturally quick-witted, generous and sympathetic. Time was indeed to show that he was found wanting in those qualities of perseverance and mental balance which had brought the father triumphantly through misfortunes which would certainly have come near crushing the son. But if he lacked some of those kingly qualities which Bābur possessed, Humāyūn soon began to show traces of certain other characteristics which in his father were conspicuous by their absence. Most prominent among these was a highly developed imagination which, conjoined to a markedly mystical turn of mind, caused as omen and gave the name of Hindāl (taking of Hind).¹ Hindāl literally means 'of the dynasty of Hind'. For Hindāl's adoption by Humāyūn's mother, see *Memoirs* I, p. 374. 'All the children born of Humāyūn's mother had died and therefore she adopted Hindāl while he was yet unborn.' This is not quite correct. Several children of Māham after Humāyūn's birth had died and this led her to adopt Hindāl. Māham was a kind-hearted and affectionate lady. She took care of Gulbadan also and the latter always speaks of her in terms of gratitude and affection.

the young prince to favour the weird and the bizarre to the neglect of common-place matters which contribute to success in life. He had a marked inclination towards natural science, as then understood, particularly affecting astronomy and geography, which were intimately connected with his favourite studies and magic and divination. In later life he is said to have written mystical dissertations upon the nature of elements, and it is certain that he was always attracted towards occultism. He was currently reported to possess what would now be called second sight and, even when his fortunes had reached the lowest depths, he was looked upon as a person whom it was unlucky to molest. It is, therefore, hardly necessary to say that his genius was contemplative and other-worldly rather than practical.

A trifling incident which occurred when he was about ten years old is worth recording, not merely because it serves to illustrate the boy's turn of mind, but because it exercised a considerable influence upon his future career. In the year A.H. 923 (A.D. 1517-18), when Bābur was engaged in an expedition against Qandhār, he left Humāyūn in charge of the Kābul government. One day, as the prince was riding about 'in the forests, hills, gardens and meadows,' the fancy came into his head to take an omen. Calling his tutor, Maulānā Masīhuddīn Ruhulla, he told him that he intended to ask the first three persons he met what their names were and to take an omen from their replies. The Maulānā suggested that one person would be sufficient, but the prince persisted in his intention. After they had gone a little distance, they saw a man about forty years of age who, on being asked his name, replied 'Murād' or desire. After him came another person, driving an ass loaded with wood. When they enquired his name, he answered 'Daulat' or prosperity. Humāyūn thereupon remarked that if only the name of the third person chanced to be Sa'ādat, it would be at once a curious coincidence and a most excellent omen. Soon afterwards, a boy leading cattle came in sight; and when they asked him what his name was, he said 'Sa'ādat' or success.¹ Humāyūn was highly delighted, and not only remembered the omen as long as he lived, but also allowed it to influence his judgment on important occasions. We shall have opportunity before long to notice the part played by these three names in the fantastic court life he inaugurated at the commencement of his reign.

It was probably about a couple of years after this incident that Humāyūn, now between twelve and thirteen years old, was released from his tutors and sent out into the world to undertake his first

¹The story is related in the A.N. I, p. 643.

important charge. Some time about the year 1520 (A.H. 926)—the exact date is uncertain—died Mirza Khan, the son of Bābur's uncle, Sultān Muhammad Mirza. For some years Mirza Khan had been established in the kingdom of Badakhshān, which he had seized and held in defiance of the Uzbegs. He left as his heir a child named Sulaimān, who was taken by his mother to the court of Kābul that he might be educated along with his cousins, 'Askarī and Hindāl. Bābur was asked by the Badakhshānīs to make some arrangement for ruling them during the minority of their prince; and in compliance with this request, he determined to entrust the province to Humāyūn. Together with his father Bābur and mother Māham, who journeyed along with him to see him safely installed, Humāyūn set out for Badakhshān. After a few days, the king and queen returned to Kābul leaving the young prince in charge. For nearly nine years, from 1520 to 1529, with one interval of eighteen months between November 1525 and May 1527, Humāyūn sat on the throne of Badakhshān as a semi-independent ruler. His administration for the next few years was most probably mainly conducted through counsellors for him; although it should be remembered that at the age of twelve his father Bābur had been ruling as well as reigning. Humāyūn, however, was not only of a less masterful stamp, but was also a stranger to the people over whom he ruled. Besides, there is evidence to show that he kept in fairly close touch with his father while Bābur was in Kābul. The charge of Badakhshān was no sinecure, with the formidable Uzbek confederacy ever on the watch to seize it, and Bābur always regarded its retention as one of his most important cares. Fortunately the Badakhshānīs were brave and loyal, holding tenaciously to the representatives of their ancient royal house. Despite all difficulties, the rule of Humāyūn was a distinct success, and when it came to a conclusion, his subjects, as we shall see, testified their opinion of his abilities in no uncertain manner.

Meanwhile, events were gradually leading up to Bābur's triumphant fifth expedition to Hindustān—the expedition which was to place upon the throne of Delhi the most remarkable dynasty which India has ever seen.

That land had now been distracted with feuds for some years. The kings of Delhi had been with difficulty holding their own against the overwhelming power of the Rājputs. Now matters were made worse by the cruelty and arrogance of Ibrāhīm Lodi, who was fast driving the Afghan feudatories, upon whose swords his empire rested, into open revolt. Fearing the power of Daulat Khan, Viceroy

of the Punjāb, he summoned him to Delhi. Daulat Khan, who suspected that his life would be forfeited if he obeyed the summons, sent his son Dilāwar instead. Ibrāhīm was enraged, and openly menaced father and son with destruction. The Viceroy thereupon renounced his allegiance to Ibrāhīm, and sent his son to Bābur at Kābul, offering fealty and inviting his help against the king of Delhi. What Daulat Khan really wanted, as afterwards became apparent, was a free hand in the Punjāb uncontrolled by any political superior. This, however, was carefully concealed under the guise of schemes. Apparently it was suggested that Ibrāhīm should be deposed and his uncle 'Ālam Khan set up in his stead. Bābur evidently considered this as an opportunity to interfere in the politics of Hindustān; for in 1524 he embarked upon his fourth expedition of supporting 'Ālam Khan against Ibrāhīm.

Passing through the Khaibar, he crossed the Gakkar country reducing to temporary obedience the warlike tribes of that region. Fording the Jhelum and the Chenāb, he advanced to within a few miles of Lahore. He now discovered that there was an army of Ibrāhīm's in close proximity commanded by Bihār Khan Lodi, Mubārak Khan Lodi, and some other Afghan Amīrs, and that his ally Daulat Khan had been driven from Lahore and compelled to take refuge among the Baluchīs. Bābur promptly attacked and scattered the king of Delhi's army. The fugitives were driven into Lahore, and the town itself came under Bābur's control. The bazar was plundered and burned. After resting four days, the Kābul army moved south to Dipālpur, which was stormed. The garrison was put to the sword.

At Dipālpur Bābur was joined by Daulat Khan and his sons. That nobleman was greatly angered at Bābur's determination to keep Lahore in his own hands. Apparently his profession of allegiance to Bābur had been nothing more than an excuse for securing the alliance of the king of Kābul. Daulat Khan seems to have expected that Bābur would be a submissive tool in his hands. He evidently forgot that his own viceroyalty of the Punjāb, which he desired to see independent, was precisely that portion of Hindustān to which Bābur believed himself to have the best claim. Bābur on his part, taking the submission of the Afghan noble to be no empty formality, assigned him Jalandhar and Sultānpur instead of Lahore. Daulat Khan thereupon treacherously advised Bābur to divide his forces, sending part to Multan and keeping part with him. But Dilāwar Khan, who seems to have recoiled from the deceit, warned Bābur to be on his guard; with the result that Daulat Khan and his brother's

son Ghāzī Khan were arrested. Shortly afterwards they were released, and then they promptly fled to the hills. Their fiefs were conferred upon Dilāwar Khan. Bābur feeling that he required more adequate resources before he ventured further into such troubled waters, fell back on Lahore and then retired to Kābul. Dipālpur was given to the pretender 'Ālam Khan with the trusty Bābā Kushkeh to watch him. Lahore, with a considerable garrison, was put under Mīr 'Abdul 'Azīz, while Siālkot was held by Khusrau Kokultāsh.

No sooner was Bābur out of the way, than Daulat Khan showed his hand. Gathering a strong force, he captured Dipālpur, and drove out 'Ālam Khan. His first check, however, was received before Siālkot. A force of 8,000 men, which he had detached to attack the town, was defeated by Bābur's Lahore garrison. But shortly afterwards he scored a great success. Ibrāhīm Lodi had sent an army to reduce him to submission; and this army Daulat Khan succeeded in dispersing, part being won over and part being dismissed without a blow struck.

Meanwhile 'Ālam Khan had fled to Kābul, and informed Bābur of his misfortunes. Bābur then concluded a treaty with him agreeing to seat him upon the throne of Delhi on condition that he himself should receive Lahore and the country west of it in full suzerainty. 'Ālam Khan was sent to Hindustān, armed with orders to Bābur's generals in the Punjāb. The king of Kābul himself was unable to leave, as he had to go to Balkh, which the Uzbeks were besieging. Once in Hindustān, however, 'Ālam Khan lost his head, and was artfully won over by Daulat Khan, who feigned loyalty and sympathy. In consequence, 'Ālam Khan threw over the alliance with Bābur, brushed aside the remonstrances of Bābur's officers, and ceded the Punjāb to Daulat. Then, in conjunction with his new ally, he marched on Delhi, only to be disgracefully routed by Ibrāhīm in person. His army broke up, and he himself fled in terror.

In the autumn of 1525 all was bustle and activity in Kābul, where preparations were being made for the final effort. The boy Kāmrān was nominated regent during the absence of his father; and every available man was pressed into service. Meagre indeed were the resources of the mountain kingdom in comparison with the vast armies which had for centuries been a familiar spectacle upon the battle-fields of India. None the less, Bābur possessed one source of strength which was destined in the last resort to counterbalance his inferiority in numbers. His powerful artillery handled by his Turkish experts from the West, and his well-drilled matchlock-men were worth more to him on the day of battle than many legions.

But even so, Kābul had to be denuded of men that the expeditionary force might make a show of strength and that nothing might be lacking. Humāyūn was ordered to bring a contingent from Badakhshān to his father's assistance. That the project was not to his taste seems certain. His subsequent career shows that he had no lack of energy or ambition—at least between the opium debauches to which he afterwards became addicted and now, before he had contracted the fatal habit, while his vigour was still unabated and the lethargy of the drug not yet upon him, it might have been expected that he would have welcomed the prospect of so hazardous an expedition under leadership so gallant. But it was not so. Whether Humāyūn, weighing the issues more dispassionately than his father, realised to the full the overwhelming chances of failure, or whether, after some years of almost independent rule, he resented being recalled to serve in the company of men who had won their spurs before he was born, can only be conjectured. In favour of the latter surmise it should be mentioned that he was now at the somewhat difficult age of seventeen, a man in all matters that pertained to the exercise of sovereignty, but a boy still in his self-consciousness and readiness to take offence where no offence was intended. However this may be, his conduct caused Bābur great uneasiness. The king had left Kābul on November 17, 1525, and the day came and went when Humāyūn should have appeared at the head of the Badakhshānī contingent. For more than a fortnight the king was compelled to wait on his son's pleasure. Bābur was justifiably annoyed. As he says in the *Memoirs*: 'Seeing that Humāyūn was delaying unduly in presenting himself at the meeting place, I wrote several letters to him, putting pressure upon him. . . . When at length Humāyūn joined me, I did not fail to chide him sharply upon the lack of promptitude which he had displayed in coming.'¹

At last the prince arrived and on December 3 the united force moved off, only twelve thousand men all told, of whom at most seven thousand were effectives.

The news of the late occurrences in India compelled Bābur to alter his plans. He had long needed nothing to convince him that his original design of occupying the Punjāb was impracticable unless the central power of Delhi could be conciliated. Therefore as we have already seen, he was induced to lend his aid to the project of deposing Sultān Ibrāhīm and substituting for him 'Ālam Khan.

¹ Bābur says he wrote sharp letters to Humāyūn, lecturing him severely because of his long delay beyond the time fixed for joining him. Again he says, 'When Humāyūn came I spoke to him very severely.' *Memoirs* II, p. 447.

By this means he would kill two birds with a single stone. The Punjāb was to be the price of his assistance, and its guarantee was to be the control he would exercise over the aged, somewhat feeble, monarch he had placed upon the throne.

But the intrigues of Daulat Khan and faithlessness of 'Ālam Khan had modified the whole situation. Henceforth there could be no further question of the Lodi claimant, who had proved himself unworthy of the sacrifice of honest men's blood; Bābur was fighting for his own hand against all comers; primarily, because he conceived the Punjāb to belong to him by right; next, because he was convinced that the permanent occupation of the Punjāb entailed the conquest of Hindustān; finally, because the political situation seemed to offer the prospect of hard fighting and hazardous adventure, such as his soul loved.

As soon as he had passed the mountains, however, he fell sick. The occurrence was most inopportune, and he recognised in it the judgment of God upon his irregularities in the matter of wine. He resolved to mend his ways although as a matter of fact he did not keep his vow, and soon afterwards the attack of dysentery passed away. This was fortunate; for, having now embarked upon the most dangerous of his many perilous enterprises, he had need of all his powers of mind and body if he was to win through. When he arrived at the Kābul river, he learnt that Daulat Khan and Ghāzī Khan, with a force of twenty or thirty thousand men, were fast overrunning the Punjāb, and marching straight upon Lahore. It was at all costs necessary to prevent them from scoring so important a success at this juncture; so Bābur hastily despatched a messenger to his lieutenants in the town warning them that he was close at hand, ordering them to join him at all hazards, and strictly forbidding them to engage until he had come up. Meanwhile, he pressed on with speed. As he was passing the river Sind, he took the opportunity to number the forces which accompanied him in his dangerous ventures. Incredible as it may seem, the entire army with which he hoped to conquer Hindustān amounted to twelve thousand men all told, including good and bad, small and great, fighting men and camp followers.

On he pushed, however, regardless of danger, to the rescue of his threatened Begs. As he crossed the Jhelum, renewed rumours reached him as to the strength of the Afghans. It was further stated that Daulat Khan, determined to rid himself of the formidable prince whom he had hoped to use as a tool, had girded himself with two swords in token of his resolution to conquer or die. But, whatever

might have been the spirit of Daulat Khan, he was powerless to keep his army together when the rumour of Bābur's approach was noised abroad. The king of Kābul had crossed the Biās, and was blockading Milwat, when he was joined by Dilāwar Khan, who had once more deserted his father and brother for the service of the foreigner. Probably it was at this time that Bābur learned of the true condition of the opposing forces; at all events, he pushed on with a boldness that would have been foolhardy under ordinary circumstances. In this case, however, his rapid advance completed the confusion of Daulat Khan, whose army broke up in utter disorder, and fled to all quarters rather than encounter the invader. Daulat himself, with his immediate followers, could do nothing except offer a humble and undignified submission. The scene is described by Bābur as follows:

'Daulat Khan now sent a person to inform me that Ghāzī Khan had escaped and fled to the hills; but, if I would excuse his own offences, he would come as a slave, and deliver up the place. I, therefore, sent Khwājah Mīrān to confirm him in his resolution and to bring him out. His son 'Alī Khan accompanied that officer. In order to expose the rudeness and stupidity of the old man, I directed him to take care that Daulat Khan should come out with the same two swords hung around his neck, which he had hung by his side to meet me in combat. When matters had come this length, he still contrived frivolous pretexts for delay, but was at length brought out. I ordered the two swords to be taken from his neck. When he came to offer me his obeisance, he affected delays in bowing; I directed them to push his legs and make him bow. I then made him sit down before me, and desired a man who understood the Hindustāni language to explain to him what I said, sentence by sentence, in order to reassure him; and to tell him, "I called you father; I showed you more respect and reverence than you could have desired or expected. I delivered you and your sons from the insults of the Baluchīs. I delivered your tribe, your family, and women, from the bondage of Ibrāhīm. The countries held by Tātār Khan to the amount of three crores, I bestowed on you. What evil had I ever done you, that you should come in this style against me, with these swords by your side; and attended by an army, stir up tumult and confusion in my territories?"¹ The man, being stupefied,

¹ Mrs. Beveridge's rendering of this passage will be found in her translation of the *Memoirs* II, p. 459. The substance is the same.

Ghāzī Khan was fond of books. His library was seized by Bābur and the books were given to Humāyūn and Kāmran. *Memoirs* II, p. 460.

stammered out a few words, not at all to the purpose and indeed, what could he say in answer to such confounding truths? It was settled that he and his family should retain their authority in their own tribes, and possession of their villages, but that all the rest of their property should be sequestered. They were directed to encamp close by Khwājah Mīr-i-Mīrān.'

The first stage of Bābur's hazardous enterprise was thus brought to a close by the defeat of his enemies in the Punjāb. There still remained the more difficult task of subduing the Imperial forces of Delhi; and even this was child's play as compared with the business of reducing to submission the whole turbulent, distracted, faction-ridden kingdom of Hindustān. Bābur, whether he realised the difficulties before him or not, saw clearly that his best prospect of success lay in prompt action. 'Putting my foot in the stirrup of resolution, and taking in my hand the reins of faith, I marched against Sultān Ibrāhīm, son of Sultān Sikandar, son of Sultān Bahlol Lodi Afghan, in whose possession the city of Delhi and kingdom of Hindustān at that time were.'

As he advanced, he received various encouraging proofs that he was not friendless in the country of his antagonist. Two of the court circle, Arāish Khan and Mullā Muhammad Mazhab, sent him letters protesting their devotion to his cause. 'Ālam Khan arrived in a destitute condition to cast himself upon the protection of his late ally. While still at Kābul Bābur had received proposals from Rānā Sanga, the Rājput, or, to give him his real title, Sangrām Singh, that there should be a joint attack upon Ibrāhīm.¹ Bābur, however, fully realised how little confidence could be placed in such overtures as these. What replies he made to Sangrām Singh we do not know: it would seem that he returned a favourable answer, for he accuses him of treachery in not taking any steps to carry out the terms of the proposed alliance. But he must have been well aware that the Rājput confederacy, which would spring into unequalled eminence if any disaster overtook the dynasty at Delhi, had a direct interest in the failure of his enterprise, and was, by far, the most formidable of all the powers antagonistic to his conquest of Hindustān. The situation was fast becoming critical.

¹ According to the *Memoirs* (II, p. 529.) Bābur had received Rānā Sanga's proposals of help at Kābul, and not after he had started on his journey towards Hindustān. 'While we were still in Kābul, Rānā Sanga had sent an envoy to testify to his good wishes and to propose this plan: "If the honoured Pādshāh will come near Delhi from that side I from this will move on Agra".'

At length news came that Sultān Ibrāhīm, with the main body of Afghans, was on the march from Delhi while a powerful advance guard, commanded by Hāmid Khan, the *Shiqdar* of Hissār Fīrozah, was almost in touch with the little army of invaders. It was at this juncture that Humāyūn got his first experience of military operations on a large scale (Feb. 1526). Bābur detached the whole right wing of his force, stiffened it from the centre, and put it under the command of his son, with orders to attack and disperse the Hissār Fīrozah troops. The young prince's authority was probably little more than nominal, for along with him his father sent many of his veteran commanders, Khwājah Kalān, Sultān Muhammad Dulḍai, Khusrau Kokultāsh, Hindū Beg, and Muhammad 'Alī Jang-Jand—names which all readers of the *Memoirs* connect with Bābur's boldest and most successful operations.

The project was very well executed. A body of light cavalry was detached, and from it some hundred and fifty men of picked valour were selected. These were sent forward to engage the enemy, who were utterly taken by surprise at the boldness of so small a body. Hardly had the first blows been interchanged when the main guard of Humāyūn's little force appeared on a hill top, outlined against the sky. Thinking they were in the presence of a very great army, the *Shiqdar's* troops turned and fled. They were promptly pursued and suffered somewhat severely. A small detachment was sent to seize and occupy Hissār Fīrozah, while Humāyūn with the rest of his men marched back in triumph to Bābur, bringing with him some hundred prisoners and seven or eight elephants. Ustād Qulī and the matchlock-men were ordered to shoot the prisoners as a warning to others. The father was very proud of his son's success. 'This,' he says, jubilantly, 'was Humāyūn's first exploit and his first expedition. The whole affair was a most excellent omen of future success.'¹ How much of the credit of this expedition ought to be ascribed to the young man in nominal command, it is impossible to say. Probably a considerable share, for at last Bābur, who was no doting parent, chose to regard it as a personal triumph for his son, bestowing upon him in reward a crore of ready money presumably silver *tankahs*, as well as the *jāgīr* of Hissār Fīrozah, which was worth a crore a year. In addition, as marks of personal favour, the fortunate prince received a dress of honour of the first quality, and a valuable horse from the royal stables.

The army pressed on to Shāhābād, and here an interesting ceremony took place. The razor and scissors were applied to Humāyūn's face.

¹*Memoirs*, p. 466.

In accordance with the usual custom of the Chaghatāis the event was celebrated with great festivities, corresponding to those which occur when a Western prince attains his legal majority. In this case, however, the rejoicings must have fallen far short of the usual standard in such matters. The king of Kābul and his son were on a campaign which was too serious to admit of many distractions although it had indeed been found possible to arrange a rhinoceros hunt near Bikram. At this very moment came the news that the main force of Afghans had advanced to Pānīpat. Bābur, who knew that his one chance of success lay in an immediate and crushing victory, pressed on with determination to encounter his adversary.

Soon the two armies came in touch with one another. Bābur, after carefully surveying the ground, made his preparations with the utmost skill. Common country carts, collected from the district round about, were so disposed as to enable his slender force to occupy a length of line almost equal to that of the vast masses of the Afghans. By this means he was able to assure the effective operation of his two mainstays in the fight—his fire-arms and his flanking tactics. His preparations being complete, he advanced to provoke attack, keeping the village of Pānīpat on his right.

The Afghans, however, showed no disposition to take the offensive, and Bābur determined to gall them into action by a series of skirmishing attacks delivered by small bodies of light horsemen. When all was ready, he sent out some four or five thousand men to attempt a surprise attack on the night of April 19. They lost their way in the dark, and at dawn of the 20th found themselves quite close to the hostile camp. Humāyūn was now likely to get a second chance of showing his mettle, for he was despatched to cover the retreat of the little force. But the Afghans made no serious attempt to interfere with the retirement, and the two bodies, after effecting a junction, withdrew into camp. Next day, however, April 21, 1526 the decisive battle took place, and once again the crushing superiority of the new-fangled artillery to which Bābur pinned his faith was made amply apparent. Once again did the traditional valour of Asia succumb to the science of the West. The Afghans, confident in their superior numbers, delivered a series of fierce charges which came near to overwhelming their antagonists. But, opposed by the steady valour of the Chaghatāis, the van could make no headway. The wings and the reserve were driven in upon the centre by the desperate fighting of Bābur's flanking parties. Soon the whole Afghan army was herded into a vast mass, through which the powerful Turkish artillery blasted bloody lanes. Unable to fight, unwilling to fly, the forces of the

Sultān of Delhi crumbled away. Ibrāhīm Lodi was left dead upon the field, buried beneath the heaped-up corpses of his best and bravest followers. His empire passed to the stranger.¹

In the battle, Humāyūn was in command of the right wing which had to bear the first fury of an attack delivered by overwhelming numbers. The young man seems to have acquitted himself well. That his father was pleased by his prowess cannot be doubted in the light of the important trust that was bestowed upon him so shortly afterwards.

No sooner was the field of Pānipat fairly won, than Humāyūn was despatched to Agra to seize the treasure and the royal residence there situated. The inhabitants made their submission, but requested the prince not to lead his army into the fortified area. Unwilling to employ violence, Humāyūn contented himself with occupying the faubourg and blockading the fort, in order to prevent the escape of important personages or of any portion of the treasure. While he was waiting for his father to come and deal with the situation, chance threw in his way a rich prize. In the fort were the children and household of Bikramājīt, Rājā of Gwālīor, who had been compelled to place his dearest possessions under the power of Sultān Ibrāhīm as hostages for his good faith. Bikramājīt fell on the Pānipat field beside his lord; and the dead man's relatives, having now nothing to lose by escaping from Agra, desired to return to their own country. As they were leaving the town, they were arrested by Humāyūn's guards, and kept under careful supervision. But the prince's orders against plundering had been strict, and no attempt was made to deprive the captives of the possessions they had brought with them. Either in gratitude for the humanity of their treatment or in the hope that the favour of the prince might be purchased, they presented Humāyūn with a large number of precious stones. Among these was a great diamond, now generally identified with the Koh-i-Nūr, the price of which was reckoned by contemporary opinion at the daily expenditure of the entire world.

Just a fortnight after the battle of Pānipat, on May 10, Bābur came to the outskirts of Agra, where he was dutifully received by his son. Humāyūn offered to his father the great diamond which he had polished, but Bābur, with the generosity which gained for him the nickname of *qalandar*² (mendicant) at once gave it back again. With

¹ For a detailed account of the battle of Pānipat see Rushbrook-Williams' *An Empire Builder of the Sixteenth Century*, pp. 129-38.

² On the mosque built by Bābur at Ajodhia there is the following line in

the arrival of the victor of Pānipat, the town and fort of Agra surrendered unconditionally; and six days later, Bābur made a state entry into the place and established himself in the palace of the sovereign he had defeated and slain. The next day saw the distribution of the treasure. The riches of five kings came into his hands, but he gave away everything. The nobles of Hindustān represented that in India it was thought disgraceful to expend the treasures of bygone kings, and that while people usually kept on adding to them, the Emperor had on the contrary given them all away.

Humāyūn, with whose conduct in the campaign, despite the unfortunate delay in starting, his father seems to have been particularly pleased, received a gift of 70 lakhs (*dāms*) from the royal treasury, as well as a private hoard which had not been counted by the official receivers.

After the briefest interval for rest, the invaders set themselves down to the difficult task of conquering a country which bristled with forts held by independent chieftains. Bābur adopted the principle, which has so often been successfully carried out by other princes similarly circumstanced, of making grants of land still unconquered to his chief followers and then despatching them with a small force to reduce to order their new possessions. In the general distribution, the valuable district of Sambhal, estimated at one crore and thirty-eight lakhs, was assigned to Humāyūn. Apparently his father needed him at headquarters, for he was not allowed to undertake the conquest of his district in person. Instead, the veteran Hindū Beg, who seems to have been attached to Humāyūn's staff, was despatched to effect the expulsion of the then occupant, Qāsim of Sambhal.

Just at the time when some half-dozen small expeditions had been despatched, came the news that danger was imminent from two quarters. On the one hand the Afghans, led by two powerful heads of clans, Nāsir Khan Lohānī and Ma'arūf Farmūlī, had seized Qanauj, and were advancing to dispute the command of the Doāb; on the other, the Rājput confederacy under the great Rānā Sangrām Singh of Mewār, were giving unmistakable signs of their intention to make a bid for the supremacy of Hindustān. A council of war was held,

the inscription: 'Bābur, the *qalandar*, is well known in the world as king.' *Qalandar* is not uncommon in Muslim history. Qutbuddīn Aibek was known as a *qalandar*. Bābur himself felt like a *darvesh* as the following lines shew:

Though I be not related to dervishes,
Yet am I their follower in heart and soul.
Say not a king is far from a dervish.
I am a king but yet the slave of dervishes.

and it was decided that the Afghans should first be dealt with, as they were nearer at hand. Bābur apparently intended to command the expedition himself, but at the last moment Humāyūn came forward with the remark: 'Why should the Emperor go in person? I myself will undertake this service.' His offer was accepted; Sultān Junaid Barlās and Mahdī Khwājah were recalled with their troops to strengthen him, their respective expeditions against Dholpur and Etāwah being for the moment abandoned. Humāyūn, having collected his forces, marched straight upon the rebels, who were now encamped at Jājmau forty or fifty thousand strong. When he got within twenty miles of the place where they lay, the prince detached a scouting party under Mumin Ātkah to collect information. The scouts apparently gave themselves more to the task of gathering booty than to their proper business, for not only did they fail to bring back any intelligence, but in addition they allowed the enemy to get wind of Humāyūn's advance. The mere news of the approach of the victors of Pānīpat was enough to cause the Afghans to withdraw in panic-stricken haste across the Ganges. Another and more business-like scouting party brought news of this, and Humāyūn, advancing quickly, seized Jājmau and pushed on to Dalamau, where he received the submission of an important chief named Fatch Khan Sarwānī who had been high in favour of the late Sultān Ibrāhīm. After sending this man back to his father, Humāyūn boldly crossed the Ganges and took possession of Jaunpur, thus striking a blow at the very centre of disaffection. Realising the importance of ending the campaign in the north before Sangrām Singh could strike an effective blow from Rājputāna, Humāyūn, regardless of the disparity in numbers between his own and the enemy's forces, advanced with all speed on Ghāzīpur, where Nāsir Khan Lohānī was now encamped. The Afghans did not wait for his approach, but promptly retreated across the Gogra. Humāyūn sent a detachment in pursuit which kept them on the move, and plundered Kharīd and Bihār. He then retraced his steps in obedience to an urgent summons from his father, leaving Mīr Shah Husain in Jaunpur and Shaikh Bāyazīd in Oudh. Recrossing into the Doāb, and receiving on his way the submission of Kālpi he joined his father at Agra on January 6, 1527. Although he had not succeeded in bringing the Afghans to a decisive engagement, he had injured their prestige and had driven them out of the districts they menaced. The little campaign had been distinctly well managed, and was regarded as an excellent omen for the great struggle with Sangrām Singh. That Humāyūn received his due meed of praise we cannot doubt, but his success did not fill him with any desire for

further victories. On the contrary, he was now thoroughly weary of fighting. Still a boy in years despite his varied experience of men and manners, he had not yet attained to his full physical strength. To him the climate of India was extremely trying, accustomed as he was to the temperate skies of Badakhshān. He longed to be back in his appanage, away from the nerve-racking turmoil of empire building. This feeling was shared to the full by his contingent of Badakhshānī troops. Like the majority of non-professional soldiers, they were used to a short-term period of service, not more than one or two months in the year. They had now been away from their native country more than fourteen months. Having already experienced one hot weather in India, they were most anxious to avoid a repetition of the unpleasant experience. There seems little reason to doubt that his own feelings, combined with the protests of his men, led Humāyūn for the moment to forget his duty, and to ask for leave at the very beginning of the campaign against Sangrām Singh, certainly the moment when his services could least be spared. Like the rest of the dissatisfied nobles, however, Humāyūn reluctantly agreed to face the Rājput̃s on condition that his leave should be sanctioned immediately after the battle.

The two armies met on March 16, 1527 at Khānuā, about 10 miles from the spot where Akbar's palace city of Fatehpur Sikri was afterwards to stand. Here Bābur's veterans were confronted by the most splendid chivalry in the world, and the sheer disparity in numbers would have appalled any army less experienced. As it was, the northerners would have gone into the battle a beaten army, had it not been for the undaunted bearing and magnetic enthusiasm of their king. When the crash of conflict came, the Rājput̃s, despite their immense superiority in numbers, were out-manoeuvred by the superior skill of their antagonists. The issue was for long in doubt. But once more the applied science of the modern world mastered the undisciplined valour of the middle ages. Again and again the headlong charges of the Rājput̃ horse came within an ace of submerging the handful of Mughal troops. But each charge was repulsed and, at length, attacked in flank and rear by Bābur's cavalry, shattered in front by the concentrated fire of his deadly ordnance, the great host of the Rājput̃s broke and fled. Humāyūn seems to have commanded the right wing, although how much power of independent action he was allowed may well be left an open question. Once again the wing where he was posted bore the brunt of the first and severest shock, and once more acquitting himself valiantly, he played his full part in the fight which ruined the hopes of the

Rājapūts and placed the new dynasty securely upon the throne of Hindustān.

After the battle, the imperial army advanced on Alwar, and received the submission of the fort. All the treasure found therein was bestowed upon Humāyūn as a reward for his gallant bearing in the last engagement. Shortly afterwards he received what probably pleased him more—permission to go home with his troops. On Sunday, April 16, 1527, he took leave of his father, and after receiving a robe of honour and many marks of favour, he started back on his return journey. On the way, he acted in a manner which not only exposed him to severe criticism at the time, but which also has prejudiced him, somewhat extravagantly, in the eyes of subsequent generations. As he passed Delhi, he broke open some of the houses in which the treasure was stored, and helped himself forcibly to the contents. It is difficult at first sight to guess the motives for this action. He cannot have been short of money, since he had received a crore at Hissār Fīrozah, seventy lakhs and an uncounted treasure at Agra, and all the spoil of Alwar fort. The explanation, however, is not far to seek. It seems certain that Humāyūn, in common with the majority of Bābur's court circle, declined to look upon the operations in Hindustān in any other light than a raid on a grand scale which would inevitably be terminated, at no distant date, by a sudden and hasty withdrawal to Kābul. The prince must have talked with many who could recall his father's three occupations of Samargand, and he probably thought he foresaw another instance of a grandiose scheme leading on to disaster. What wonder that he should try and carry off with him what he could? Such considerations as these suffice to explain, if they do not entirely condone, Humāyūn's action. Bābur, as might be expected, was greatly annoyed when he heard of it, and wrote to his son a sharp letter.¹ The Emperor seems to have been disappointed, more perhaps at this evidence of his son's attitude towards the whole question of the occupation of Hindustān, than at any shortcomings in the way of filial obedience. Plainly the offence was not looked upon as very serious, for Bābur's anger did not last long. Only four months after Humāyūn had left, a certain Beg Muhammad Ta'alluqchi was sent to Badakhshān with a horse and a robe of honour for him.²

How Humāyūn spent this time in Badakhshān on his return we can only conjecture. Probably he thought himself entitled to a rest after the fatigues of the campaign in Hindustān; we shall see that there are reasons for believing that his conduct of business was not marked by

¹ *Memoirs* II, p. 583.

² Ta'alluqchi probably means land-holder.

extreme energy. But he certainly was popular with his subjects, who seem to have given him little trouble, and to have felt complete confidence in his abilities.

Towards the end of 1528, just about the time when Beg Muhammad Ta'alluqchi, after delays which Bābur regarded as inexplicable, was getting back to India, Humāyūn announced with pride the birth of his first son, whom he called by the somewhat ill-chosen name of Al-Amān. The letter which Bābur wrote in reply to this intelligence has been well described as 'frank, fault-finding and affectionate.' The Emperor begins, after warm congratulations and loving messages, by commenting upon the name of his newly arrived grandson. Al-Amān means 'protection,' but unfortunately the common people pronounce it Alāman or Ilāman, words which signify in Tūrki 'a robber' and 'I do not feel' respectively; to put it mildly, an unfortunate ambiguity. Himself a fine writer of prose and verse, he finds fault with Humāyūn's style and asks him to be simple and clear. He writes : 'Thy remissness in letter-writing seems to be due to the thing which makes thee obscure, that is to say, to elaboration. In future write without elaboration; use plain, clear words, so will thy trouble and thy readers' be less.' He further blames him for his carelessness in despatching business; it was only a month's journey from Hindustān to Badakhshān and yet the messengers sent by the Emperor to his son sometimes take a year to return. Again he chides him for repeating so often in his letters 'I wish to be alone'—an ill thing indeed for a king as well as for his habit of using such far-fetched expressions in his writings that they are difficult to understand. After this paternal admonition, Bābur proceeds to deal with business of greater importance. Having just heard of the recent successes gained by Shah Tahmāsp of Persia over the Uzbegs, the Emperor had determined to make another attack upon his old enemies. Accordingly, he draws up in his letter a plan of campaign for Humāyūn. He informs him that his brother Kāmrān and the Kābul Beks have been put under his orders, and commands him to undertake an expedition against the Uzbeg chiefs in Hissār, Samarqand or Merv, as may seem most fitting. He counsels him to show greater energy, for indolence and laziness accord not at all with the exercise of sovereignty. 'If you desire to please me,' he goes on to say, 'you must put aside your taste for solitude, and that uncouth disposition which makes you fly from the society of others . . . Instead of allowing your younger brothers and the Beks to assert their independence, you must make them wait upon you twice a day, so that you can take counsel with them on whatever happens.' Finally,

Humāyūn is adjured to act handsomely towards Kāmrān, that 'correct and worthy young man'—a command which Humāyūn loyally obeyed to his abiding sorrow—to work hand in hand with Khwājah Kalan, and to try by all the means in his power to win the heart of Sultān Wais.¹

From this letter it appears that Humāyūn was depressed and ill in Badakhshān; that his disposition was fanatical, inclined to melancholy and averse to action. It may well be that it was at this time that he began to acquire the habit of eating opium, which in the course of the next four or five years, gained such a firm hold upon him. To this habit his father's cousin Mirza Haider, a frank and honest observer, ascribed all the disasters which subsequently overtook him: 'In consequence of intercourse with sensual and profligate men who served him, particularly Maulānā Muhammad (Farghari) Parghali and others of like nature Humāyūn contracted some bad habits. Among these was his addiction to opium. All the evil which has been set down to the Emperor, and has become the common talk of the people, is attributable to this vice.'²


If we are right in believing that Humāyūn's opium-eating began in Badakhshān, possibly in consequence of a natural reaction to the loneliness of his post after the stir and excitement of the Indian campaign, it must be admitted that his powers of action were not yet affected. On the receipt of his father's letter he appears to have acted with considerable vigour, and his management of the campaign was remarkable for its ability. He arranged for the operation of three forces against the Uzbegs; the first, under Shah Qulī, the younger brother of Sultān Wais, was to march on Hissār; the second, under Tarsūn Muhammad Sultān, was to advance by Tirmiz to Kabadian; the third under Humāyūn himself, was to strike quickly at Samarqand. Despite able management, the campaign proved a failure, apparently because the forces employed were inadequate. Shah Qulī entered Hissār; but Tarsūn Muhammad Sultān got into difficulties and a contingent that could ill be spared had to be detached

¹ Sultān Wais was a son of Bābur's paternal uncle, Mahmūd, and his maternal aunt (i.e., his mother's half-sister), Sultānā Nigār Khānam.

The reader will find this interesting letter in the *Memoirs* II, pp. 624-27. Bābur admonishes his son not to neglect the work chance has brought and quotes Nizāmī :

He grips the world who hastens;
Empire yokes not with delay;
All else, confronting marriage, stops,
Save only Sovereignty.

² T.R., p. 469.



MUGHAL EMPIRE

to his assistance. The Uzbeks, with their peculiar doggedness, assisted by the loose political organization which rendered it impossible to strike them, gained ground and recovered all that they had lost. In 1529 both parties were ready for peace, and hostilities were dying down. Bābur's health began to show signs of decline and he could not fulfil his intention of marching to his northern dominions in person. Humāyūn came from Badakhshān and was, after some time, sent to his *jāgīr* at Sambhal, and there he fell seriously ill. Bābur was much upset by his illness and performed the famous act of sacrifice to save his life. Humāyūn recovered and Bābur, who was already ailing, became rapidly worse. There was a sudden, acute disorder of the bowels, which the doctors were quite unable to remedy, and they said that they had discovered symptoms of the same poison with which Buwā Begam, Sultān Ibrāhīm's mother, had before attempted to take Bābur's life.

The dying man was in great pain, longing restlessly for the return of Hindāl, his dearly loved, but his mind remained clear to the last. The day after Humāyūn's arrival Bābur felt death draw near. He called Khalīfah Qambar 'Alī Beg, Tārdī Beg, Hindū Beg and other Amīrs together, and spoke his last words to them: 'For years it has been in my heart to surrender my throne to Humāyūn, and retire to the Gold-scattering Garden. By the Divine Grace, I have obtained in health of body all things but the fulfilment of this wish. Now, when I am laid low by illness, I charge you all (*Wasīyat mīkunam*) to acknowledge Humāyūn as my successor, and to remain loyal to him. Be of one heart and mind towards him, and I hope to God that Humāyūn will also bear himself well towards men.'¹

He then turned to Humāyūn, and delivered to him a message intended for his private ear. 'Humāyūn, I commit you and your brothers and my kin and your people to God's keeping, and all of them are confided to you. . . . The cream of my testamentary directions is this: Do naught against your brothers, even though they may deserve it.'² Right loyally, to his own sore despite, was Humāyūn to obey his father's dying charge.

Three days later, on Monday, December 26, 1530, Bābur passed away. The death was kept a secret, lest riots should break out in the interregnum. But after a time one of the Hindustāni nobles, Arāish Khan remarked that this course might produce the very consequences it was designed to obviate. And he said, 'It is not well

¹ Gulbadan, pp. 108-9.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 108-9.

to keep the death secret, because when such misfortunes befall kings in Hindustān, it is the custom of the bazar people to rob and steal; God forbid that Mughals not knowing, they should come and loot the houses and dwelling places. It would be best to dress some one in red, and to set him on an elephant, and let him proclaim the Emperor Humāyūn.'

This was done; the people were reassured by the proclamation, and prayers were offered for the welfare of the new ruler, and on Thursday, December 29, 1530 Humāyūn ascended the throne without opposition or disturbance of any kind.¹

Bābur was buried in the Arām Bāgh popularly known as Rām Bāgh at Agra and his body was afterwards taken to Kābul by his Afghan wife, Bibī Mubārikah. There he was buried in a beautiful spot which was the resting place of many of his dead relatives. A simple tomb was built for the maintenance of which adequate provision was made by Māham Begam.

¹ The dates of Bābur's death are variously given.

Gulbadan—Monday, 5th Jamād I, A.H. 937.

A.N.—6th Jamād I.

Tabqāt—5th Jamād I.

Firishtah—5th Jamād I.

The 5th Jamād corresponds to Sunday, December 25, 1530 but the week-day is expressly mentioned by the royal authoress. She is more likely to remember the day. Humāyūn mounted the throne on the 9th and this is supported by Khwāndamīr who was present but the day given by him is Friday. If the week-day of Gulbadan is correct, then the date on which Humāyūn sat on the throne will be 9th Jamād I which is equivalent to Thursday, December 29.

For a discussion of the date see Hodiwala's *Historical Studies in Mughal Numismatics*, pp. 262-63.

CHAPTER II

KHALIFAH'S CONSPIRACY

AN INTERESTING episode which occurred towards the close of Bābur's life was the intrigue set on foot by Khalīfah Nizāmuddīn 'Alī to set aside Humāyūn and the other princes from the succession and to place on the throne Mahdī Khwājah,¹ the Emperor's brother-in-law (*dāmād*) who was married to his sister Khānzādah Begam. The plot deserves to be noted because its author was the chief minister of the state and had rendered good service to Bābur. He had held important ranks and enjoyed his master's confidence. He was well connected; his younger brother Junaid Barlās was married to one of Bābur's sisters and his daughter Gulbarg Begam was married to Shah Hussain Arghūn, the ruler of Sindh. His son Muhibb 'Alī was also married in the Arghūn family. Great was the prestige of Khalīfah at this time and every body knew that he was the Emperor's supreme confidant and adviser. Indeed the title of 'Friend of the Hazrat Sultān and the pillar of the Khāqān's empire' which was bestowed upon him after the battle of Khānuā indicates the degree of esteem in which he was held by Bābur. It appears from the entries in the *Bāburnāmah* that to the last he was with his master guiding and counselling in matters of state. It is technically correct to call this attempt of the Khalīfah a conspiracy but in reality it was in the nature of what Mrs. Beveridge calls 'a rumour of a plan of supersession of Bābur's sons by Mahdī Khwājah at the instance of Mir Khalīfah.' Probably Bābur's failing health in 1529-30 encouraged such a design. He was greatly disappointed at Humāyūn's failure against the Uzbeks and had recalled Hindāl, his youngest son whom he loved dearly. He deserved to have a son by his side for, he said, he was growing old. But in the same message he announced his intention of visiting his northern dominions in person and suggested that peace should not be made until he arrived. It appears, however, that the suggestion arrived too late to be acted upon. According to Ahmad Yādgār, when he heard of Sa'id Khan's invasion of Badakhshān and 'Abdul

¹ Mahdī Khwājah was the son of Khwājah Mūsā and the third husband of Bābur's full sister Khānzādah Begam. From Khwāndamīr we learn that he was a Saiyyad and belonged to the religious house of Tirmiz. In A.H. 916-17 he is described in a life of Ismā'il Safavī as Bābur's *Dewan Begi* and was sent to Bokhārā with 10,000 men. He commanded the left wing at Pānipat and was treated liberally by Bābur. At Khānuā he was stationed in the left wing of the Mughal army. Later he was appointed *Jāgīrdār* of Etāwah and held that fief when Māham Begam journeyed through the country on her way from Kābul to Agra. In 1530 Mahdī had served Bābur for eleven known years. Gulbadan, Appendix B, pp. 298, 301.

'Azīz's rebellion, he proceeded as far north as Lahore but he left that place on March 4, 1530, and his intention of marching to Kābul and Transoxiana was interrupted by the strife in the east and also by his declining health. We learn from Gulbadan that he felt much depressed at this time and thought of giving up the world and retiring to a place of seclusion to pass his days in eremitical solitude. The strenuous exertions of a busy life had told on his iron frame, and although he showed, at times, readiness to put down rebellion and disorder, it is clear that he was no longer the same vigorous and intrepid man as he had been in his former days.

In striking contrast to his former purity of life, he now began to display an inordinate longing for the daughters of the Philistines, as represented by two Circassian girls who had been sent to him as a present by Shah Tahmāsp.¹ To these girls, if Shaikh Zain is to be believed, he became greatly attached. Indeed, during these last two years of Bābur's life, his mental vigour unquestionably became seriously affected.

Towards the closing years of Bābur's life occurred the conspiracy formed by Khalīfah Nizāmuddīn 'Alī which had for its object the setting aside of Bābur's heirs, and their replacement on the throne by Mīr Muhammad Mahdī Khwājah, at this time *Jāgīrdār* of Etāwah. About this individual, remarkable as it may appear, very little is known with certainty. He was a high noble who had been in Bābur's service for some ten years, belonging by birth to that aristocracy of religion which so often inter-married with the bluest blood in the state. He was the husband of Bābur's full sister, Khānzādah Begam and is often mentioned in the latter portion of the *Memoirs* always in connection with the nobles of the most exalted rank. It appears that Khalīfah, Bābur's life-long friend and counsellor, now possessed of absolute power through the Emperor's growing feebleness of mind and body, designed to set this man upon the throne, to the exclusion of Bābur's sons.

The story of this intrigue may be briefly told. At this time Humāyūn was in Badakhshān. He had been there for the greater part of nine years fighting against the Uzbeks and had at one time felt very depressed as is shown by the letter in which Bābur admonished him.² All of a sudden, he left Badakhshān some time in

¹ The two slave girls sent by Shah Tahmāsp were Gulnār Aghāchah and Nārgūl Aghāchah in A.H. 933. They became recognised ladies of the royal household. Gulbadan mentions them several times as taking part in festivals and family discussions. *Memoirs*, p. 689.

² *Memoirs*, p. 628.

1529 in spite of the remonstrances of the inhabitants and on the 8th of June reached Kābul, where he met Kāmrān and Hindāl. He asked Hindāl, though the latter was under orders to go to Agra, to take his place in Qilah Zafar while Kāmrān was to maintain a tight grip on Kābul. He reached Agra in July of the same year to the great surprise of the court and presented himself before his father.¹ No satisfactory arrangement had been made for the government of Badakhshān. Sa'īd Khan of Kāshgar had invaded the country and laid waste the environs of Qilah Zafar, destroying men and cattle.² The Uzbek danger still loomed on the horizon and Bābur in his anxiety for the safety of his dominion asked Mīr Khalīfah to go there but he 'delayed to obey'. He then asked Humāyūn but he also expressed his unwillingness and added that he dared not disobey the royal command but he 'would not voluntarily exile himself.' At last Sulaimān Mirza was sent to take charge of Badakhshān. Bābur seems to have been worn out by all this worry and wished to resign the kingdom to Humāyūn, now evidently returned to favour again.³ But he was persuaded to desist from his purpose, and the importance of the episode lies merely in two things; first it shows that Bābur was now in a feeble state of health, and secondly it proves that Humāyūn had by his personal charm of manner as well as his dutiful behaviour completely secured his hold upon his father's affections.

Shortly afterwards Humāyūn was sent to Sambhal with a large force to complete the settlement of his *jāgīr*. Here he remained for six months apparently in great content, but at the end of that period when the hot weather of 1530 was beginning, he fell dangerously ill. When Bābur learnt of this, he ordered that the prince should be brought to Delhi and thence by boat to Agra. But when Humāyūn arrived in Delhi, his condition was so critical that his companion, the dissolute Maulānā Muhammad Parghali, sent an urgent message to Māham, then pleasure-seeking with her husband at Dholpur: 'Humāyūn Mirza is ill and in an extraordinary state. Her Highness the Begam should come at once to Delhi, for the Mirza is much prostrated.' Māham started forthwith to meet him and found him at Muttra. By the time he arrived in Agra his mind was wandering, and when Gulbadan Begam and her sisters visited him, they found he was delirious. Bābur was deeply distressed when he saw his son's condition. Not long before he had lost a younger boy, Alwar,

¹ This was about July 7, 1529 when the presents of Humāyūn and Māham were offered to the Emperor at Agra. *Memoirs*, p. 687.

² T.R., p. 388.

³ Gulbadan, p. 103.

and doubtless his apprehensions were of the worst. When all ordinary medical remedies proved unavailing, the Emperor took counsel with the wise men of religion. A distinguished saint, Mīr Abu Baqā, pointed out that according to old tradition, the sacrifice of the most precious possession of a sick man had been known occasionally to ransom him back to health. Bābur remarked that he was himself his son's most precious possession, and announced his readiness to sacrifice himself for Humāyūn. The hearers remonstrated horror-stricken, and suggested that as a substitute, Humāyūn's great diamond should be sold, and the proceeds given to the poor. But the Emperor was immovable in his resolve. Having fortified himself with special prayer, he walked three times round Humāyūn's couch, and exclaimed aloud that he had borne away his son's malady in his own person.

By this rite, in which faith prevails even to-day among some Asiatic nations, Bābur believed that he had ransomed his son from death. Humāyūn did recover, and the Emperor long ailing, as we have seen, looked upon his life as forfeit.¹ Some of those who tell this famous story, make it appear that Bābur died at once. This is contrary to fact. Humāyūn left Agra and went back apparently to his *jāgīr*. Evidently he found no grave cause for anxiety in his father's health, and saw no necessity for remaining. The Emperor continued sickly for two or three months, but there seemed no immediate danger of his health. Suddenly, however, he took a turn for the worse. Humāyūn was hastily summoned from Sambhal by an express sent by Khalīfah himself.² He was shocked at the change which had come over his father in the course of a few months, and said to the doctors: 'I left him well; what has happened all at once?' It was between the time when Humāyūn recovered from his serious illness, and the time when he was recalled to his father's death-bed that the conspiracy to which Khalīfah lent his aid was formed.

¹ Gulbadan says (p. 105) that the Emperor fell ill that very day but it appears from her narrative that he was already suffering from depression of spirit. Mr. S. R. Sharma attributes Bābur's death to the poison given him by Ibrāhīm Lodi's mother and regards this story as a fabrication. He relies on Gulbadan's testimony. She says: 'When they felt His Majesty's pulse, they came to the opinion that there were symptoms of the same poison as that given him by Sultān Ibrāhīm's mother....' 'But the symptoms of this illness were like that one's, seeing that day by day he lost strength and became more and more emaciated. Every day the disorder increased and his blessed countenance changed.' *J.R.A.S.*, 1926, pp. 297-99. Gulbadan, *H.N.*, p. 180.

² Gulbadan says (p. 105) Humāyūn came from Kalinjar but other authorities say that he was at Sambhal. The latter statement seems more likely.

In discussing the nature of the intrigue, some fascinating problems present themselves. These are: Was there a conspiracy at all and, if so, when was it formed? Why did Humāyūn leave Badakhshān so suddenly? What was the Khalīfah's motive? Why did the intrigue fail?

The only authority that gives a somewhat detailed account of the episode is Nizāmuddīn Ahmad Bakhshī, author of the *Tabqāt-i-Akbarī* who completed his work sixty-three years after Bābur's death in 1593. There is an air of unreality about it and we would have dismissed it summarily had it not been for the support which it receives from other sources like the *Akbarnāmah*, the *Salātīn-i-Afghānā* and the versified *Humāyūnāmah* of which a copy exists in the British Museum. The author of the *Tabqāt-i-Akbarī* writes: 'At that time (at the time of Bābur's death) Muhammad Muqīm Harvi, father of the author of this work was in the service of Bābur and had been promoted to the rank of Mīr Bayūtāt. Amīr Nizāmuddīn Khalīfah who was chief pillar of the state, for certain reasons which occur in the affairs of the world, feared the succession of Humāyūn to the throne. And when he was not in favour of the succession of the eldest son, how could he agree to the elevation of the younger ones? As Mahdī Khwājah, brother-in-law (*dāmād*) of Bābur, was a generous, liberal and intrepid (*jawān*) man, the Khalīfah who was very friendly to him decided to place him upon the throne. He declared that all should go to Mahdī Khwājah to pay him homage. Mahdī accepted the role and began to assume royal airs.'¹

This is supported by Abul Fazl who must have been informed of the truth by reliable persons: 'When His Majesty Gītī Sitānī Firdaus Makānī was in a highly critical condition, Mīr Khalīfah on account of some suspicion (*tawāhhum*) which he entertained towards Humāyūn, and because it is the nature of mankind, took a short-sighted view of things and wished to place Mahdī Khwājah upon the throne. The Khwājah, too, from his evil disposition and lack of understanding, gave way to vain thoughts and coming every day to the Durbar created a disturbance.'²

According to the versified *Humāyūnāmah* it was the Khalīfah who opened the door of disturbance.³ It appears from this work that there were some at Kābul who did not consider Humāyūn fit for

¹ *Tabqāt*, p. 28.

² *A.N., A.S.B., Text*, p. 117.

(*Har roz darbār āmadah hangāmah hajūm garm mī-sākht.*)

³ *H.N. (in verse), B.M. MS.*, p. 24.

kingship and doubted his capacity for the leadership of Turkish Amīrs. Ahmad Yādgār, who copies the *Tabqāt*, writes : 'When the Emperor died, Khalīfah Nizāmuddīn, who administered the empire at the time, dreaded the prince on account of certain matters and was unfavourable to his succession. The other princes were at a distance. As Mahdī Khwājah, brother-in-law of Firdaus Makānī was a generous young man, the Khalīfah wanted to place him upon the throne.'¹

The statements of these writers show that Khalīfah intended to set aside Bābur's sons and place Mahdī Khwājah upon the throne. Khalīfah's disappearance from politics after Bābur's death, though not conclusive, is corroborative evidence of the existence of a plan of this nature. The plan was confined to Khalīfah alone and there is nothing to show that any of the leading Amīrs were taken into confidence by the aged minister. It seems as if Khalīfah had decided without consulting any one to give the throne to Mahdī Khwājah who does not figure as an active participant in the intrigue. Thus, the so-called conspiracy is reduced in the ultimate analysis to a ministerial plan which in essence amounted to an intention to supersede Bābur's sons.

Mrs. A. S. Beveridge has thrown out a hint that probably Bābur intended such a supersession. She observes: 'Reading the *Akbar-nāmah* alone, there would seem to be no question about whether Bābur ever intended to give Hindustān, at any rate, to Humāyūn, but, by piecing together various contributory matters, an opposite opinion is reached, viz., that not Khalīfah only whom Abul Fazl names perhaps on Nizāmuddīn Ahmad's warrant, but Bābur also, with some considerable number of chiefs, wished another ruler for Hindustān.'²

'I suggest that the plan concerned Hindustān only and was one considered in connection with Bābur's intended return to Kābul, when he must have left that difficult country, hardly yet a possession, in charge of some man giving promise of power to hold it. Such a man Humāyūn was not.'³

From these remarks Professor Rushbrook-Williams has concluded: 'So intimate had always been the connection between Khalīfah and his master, that we are at first tempted to think that Bābur himself may have encouraged the scheme in view of the fact that many of Humāyūn's actions, particularly the looting of the Delhi treasure-

¹ *Tārīkh-i-Shāhī*, A.S.B., Text, pp. 130-31.

² *Memoirs*, p. 702.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 705.

houses and the indolent administration of Badakhshān, had in late years given him great offence.¹

This view is entirely untenable. Soon after Māham's return from Kābul, Bābur paid a visit to the Gold-scattering Garden and had a fit of depression. He said he wanted to retire after making over the kingdom to Humāyūn. He always had a high opinion of Humāyūn's talents though paternal admonitions were administered from time to time to keep him on the right path. It is true Bābur strongly disapproved of Humāyūn's action in looting the Delhi treasures, but he was pardoned soon afterwards, for after the battle of Khānuā we find him restored to favour again and richly rewarded. Further, he had given a good account of himself in the campaigns that followed this victory and his past misconduct must have been completely overlooked. That Bābur intended the prince to be his successor cannot be doubted in face of the clear testimony of Gulbadan Begam and his own death-bed pronouncement. His treatment of Humāyūn after his return from Badakhshān shows that he held him in esteem and intended him to be his heir. On the contrary, he was displeased with Mahdī Khwājah as the entries in the *Bāburnāmah* show.²

The following passages in Gulbadan's narrative throw light on Bābur's intentions: 'A few days later he made an excursion to the Gold-scattering Garden (Bāgh-i-Zar-afshān). There was a place in it for ablution before prayers. When he saw it he said: "My heart is bowed down by ruling and reigning. I will retire to this garden. As for attendance, Tahīr, the ewer-bearer will amply suffice. I will make over the kingdom to Humāyūn."'

When Humāyūn fell ill, Bābur became sad and pitiful. Māham Begam said: 'Don't be troubled about my son. You are a king; what griefs have you? You have other sons. I sorrowed because I have only this one.' His Majesty rejoined: 'Māham! although I have other sons, I love none as I love your Humāyūn. I crave that this cherished child may have his heart's desire and live long, and I desire the kingdom for him and not for others, because he has not his equal in distinction.'³

¹ *An Empire Builder of the Sixteenth Century*, p. 171.

² *Memoirs*, pp. 688-89.

See Mrs. Beveridge's note 2 on p. 688 of her translation of *Bāburnāmah*. From the *Tārīkh-i-Gwāliarī* (B.M. MS. Add. 16, 709, p. 18), we learn that the Khwājah (Rahīmdād) and his paternal uncle Mahdī Khwājah had displeased Bābur. Rahīmdād had resolved to take refuge with the ruler of Mālwa and to make over Gwāliar to a Rājput Zamindar of that country. Upon this Muhammad Ghaus went to Agra and secured forgiveness for Rahīmdād from Bābur.

³ *H.N.*, p. 21.

When Bābur's illness increased and his blessed countenance changed, he is reported to have called his chiefs together the next day and made his intention clear that he wanted Humāyūn to be his successor.¹

In giving an account of Humāyūn's affairs just before his flight to Irān, Gulbadan writes that Khānzādah Begam was sent by the Emperor to Qandhār to point out to Kāmrān and Hindāl the need for unity and co-operation. Kāmrān insisted on the *Khutbah* being read in his name. Hindāl is reported to have said: 'In his lifetime His Majesty Firdaus Makānī gave his throne to the Emperor Humāyūn and named him his successor. We all agreed to this, and up till now have read the *Khutbah*.' Dildār asked Kāmrān to ascertain the truth about the *Khutbah* from Khānzādah Begam. At this the lady said, 'If you ask me, well! as His Majesty Firdaus Makānī decided it and gave his throne to the Emperor Humāyūn, and as you, all of you, have read the *Khutbah* in his name till now, so now regard him as your superior and remain in obedience to him.'² From this it is clear that Bābur had meant Humāyūn to be his successor.

That Khalīfah acted contrary to his master's declared intentions cannot be denied. It is difficult to guess his motive. But it is clear that it was his dislike for Humāyūn which made him embark upon such a hazardous course. Abul Fazl is right in saying that he took a short-sighted view of things as sometimes happens in worldly affairs when men of ability and experience make mistakes and act from motives which defy analysis.³ Even Nizāmuddīn is not explicit and does not tell us the grounds for the minister's 'dread and suspicion.' Beveridge suggests that perhaps Mīr Khalīfah was afraid of Humāyūn's addiction to opium and was displeased at his leaving Badakhshān with such suddenness. The use of liquor and intoxicating drugs was common in that age and it could scarcely be regarded as a disqualification for the assumption of royal dignity. In Rājputāna the use of opium is a recognised practice even among men of high rank and carries with it no loss of dignity or prestige. It is suggested that Khalīfah was convinced of Humāyūn's utter worthlessness but this again is a baseless assumption. Humāyūn's career had so far been brilliant; he had taken part in his father's campaigns and is always mentioned in the *Bāburnāmah* as occupying important positions on the field of battle. Some writers have exalted Khalīfah's

¹ H.N., p. 24. Gulbadan's passage is reproduced on page 23.

² *Ibid.*, p. 161; Text, p. 62.

³ A.N. I, p. 277, note 1.

personal dislike for Humāyūn into a reason of state but there is no warrant for such an untenable hypothesis.

It is difficult to accept Dr. S. K. Bannerjee's view that Khalīfah acted from the best of motives, that his political conscience was satisfied and that, by setting aside the Princes of the royal blood, he was furthering the interests of the state.¹ The reasons for Khalīfah's choice of Maḥdī given by the same author are purely conjectural and no useful purpose will be served by discussing them.

Another interesting problem that arises in connection with this intrigue relates to the time when it was begun. Erskine says that it was a death-bed conspiracy.² While the Emperor 'lay at the last extremity,' Khalīfah indicated his intention to the nobles and many of the principal men of the army 'waited on Maḥdī Khwājah as their future sovereign.' There is little doubt that the final scenes were worked out when Babur's disorder was at its height.³ According to Professor Rushbrook-Williams, the conspiracy began while Humāyūn was yet in Badakhshān where he is said to have heard of the plan to supersede him.⁴ He writes that it was in the summer of 1529 far removed from the politics of the court that Humāyūn received the news which caused him the gravest anxiety. According to the same distinguished writer, there is strong presumptive evidence that it was his mother Māham, who was now journeying in 'leisurely fashion' from Kābul to join her husband in Agra, that bade him return.⁵ It is definitely assumed that she 'obtained intelligence of the plot to set him aside' while travelling through the Etāwah district which was held by the rival candidate Maḥdī Khwājah. It is difficult to accept this view. The intrigue does not seem to have begun while Humāyūn was in Badakhshān. Nor does it appear that Māham Begam was apprised of it in the Etāwah country. According to the entries in the *Bāburnāmah*, Bābur was in Etāwah on June 22 and 23, 1529 and reached Agra on the 17th Shawwāl (June 24, 1529). Māham Begam reached Agra in the night of 20th Shawwāl i.e., June 27, 1529 which shows that she must have reached Etāwah some time after Bābur's departure. The earliest date on which she could have arrived is June 24. If she learnt of the conspiracy about this time it was not possible for her to inform Humāyūn in distant Badakhshān of the Khalīfah's plans so as to

¹ *Humāyūn Bādshāh*, p. 19.

² *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* I, p. 514.

³ *A.N., A.S.B., Text*, p. 117. Beveridge's Translation I, p. 277.

⁴ *An Empire Builder of the Sixteenth Century*, p. 170.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 171-2.

enable him to reach Agra on or before July 7, 1529. The offerings of Māham and Humāyūn were presented to the Emperor at Agra on July 7. Thus it is clear that Māham had at her disposal only 13 or 14 days during which she could send a message to Humāyūn in Badakhshān asking him to come to the capital at once. A fortnight or so was obviously insufficient for a journey from Etāwah to Badakhshān and from Badakhshān to Agra. Mīr Khalīfah may have had in his mind the idea of displacing Humāyūn and his brother, but it never became manifest until Bābur's illness became serious about December, 1530.¹

From Humāyūn's peremptory departure, it has been inferred that he was aware of the plot and it was this which made him leave Badakhshān in spite of the remonstrances of the inhabitants who lived in perpetual dread of the Uzbeks. Why did Humāyūn leave his charge? Abul Fazl says he felt desirous of meeting his father and this desire was so strong that he could not suppress it.² From Ahmad Yādgār's account it appears that the prince was called by Bābur. He relates the following story:

'One evening the king was in his cups and summoned Muhammad Humāyūn. When that offspring of the royal tree came into the presence, His Majesty overpowered by the wine, had fallen asleep on the pillow. The *Shāhzāda* remained there standing motionless with his hands joined. When the king awoke from sleep at midnight, he beheld him standing and said, "When did you come?" He replied, "When I received your commands." The king then remembered having sent for him, and was much gratified and said, "If God should grant you the throne and crown, do not put your brothers to death, but look sharply after them." The *Shāhzāda* bowed down to the ground and acquiesced in all that His Majesty said.'³

¹ Bābur died at the end of December 1530 and Gulbadan says that he kept bed for two or three months. It was probably in December that his illness took a serious turn. *H.N.*, p. 105.

² *A.N.*, *A.S.B.*, Text, p. 114.

³ *Tārīkh-i-Shāhī*, p. 128. From this we may conclude: That Bābur had broken his vow of not drinking wine; that he had called Humāyūn from Badakhshān; that he was gratified at his arrival; that he intended him to be his successor. But the truth of the story is open to serious doubt. Professor Rushbrook-Williams in a foot-note (*Empire Builder*, p. 174) values Ahmad Yādgār's authority, for, he says, his own father was in the service of Mirza 'Askari. This is wrong. This is what Nizāmuddīn Ahmad says in the *Tabqāt* about his father and Ahmad Yādgār, who copies him, has reproduced this passage also. *Tabqāt*, p. 37; *Tārīkh-i-Shāhī*, p. 143.

Mirza Haider, who is a contemporary, writes that Humāyūn was actually called by his father and among later writers he is supported by the author of the *Tārīkh-i-Khāndān-i-Tīmūriyah* who positively states that Humāyūn was called by Bābur and Hindāl was appointed to the charge of Badakhshān.¹ Erskine doubts the *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī* and for good reasons. Probably Bābur would not have called the prince without making adequate arrangements for the government of Badakhshān and he would not have asked him to go there again if he wanted him to be near him. Again, we learn, from the *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī*, that Bābur had recalled Hindāl Mirza after the death of Alwar and it is not likely that a sagacious ruler like him would have withdrawn both boys at the same time.² We need not doubt Humāyūn's genuine desire to see his father and enjoy the amenities of court life at Agra. He may have grown tired of remaining in far-off Badakhshān where the Uzbegs constantly gave trouble. If the intrigue started at this time, and if Māham Begam knew of it, why did she proceed in 'leisurely fashion' from Kābul to Agra reaching there after five months?³ As the prince's mother, interested in his succession more than any one else, she ought to have hurried at once to Agra to checkmate the plans of her son's enemies. That she was leading Bābur to talk of him with affection just at the time of the prince's arrival is not conclusive evidence of the fact that the Emperor was displeased with him or that she had knowledge of the conspiracy. There is nothing to show Bābur's displeasure at Humāyūn's coming and Abul Fazl writes: 'At this time the darling of the Sultānate, Mirza Anwar (Alwar) had just died and His Majesty was deeply grieved on that account. The coming of His Highness Jahānbānī was therefore a great comfort to his heart. His Highness Jahānbānī remained for a while in atten-

¹ T.R., p. 387. *Khudābaksha*, Transcript, A.U.M.S., p. 153. This does not seem to be correct because Bābur asked both Humāyūn and Khalīfah to go to Badakhshān. Hindāl was too young to shoulder such a responsibility. On the contrary, it appears from the *Akbarnāmah* (I, p. 270) that Bābur was so full of grief at the death of Prince Alwar that he had recalled Hindāl to be near him.

² T.R., p. 389. Bābur loved Hindāl dearly, says Gulbadan. When he was about to die, he repeatedly said: 'Where is Hindāl? What is he doing? When will he come? How tall has he grown?' He was shown a coat of Hindāl to give him an idea of his growth. Again and again he expressed regret at not being able to see Hindāl. H.N., p. 106.

³ She started from Kābul on the 10th of 1st Jamad, 935 i.e., January 20, 1529 and reached Agra on the 20th Shawwāl or June 27, 1529. Thus the Begam's journey from Kābul to Agra occupied nearly 5 months.

dance on him and the Emperor many times declared that Humāyūn was an incomparable companion.¹

Apart from Abul Fazl's testimony, there are other facts to show that Bābur was not offended with Humāyūn and that the latter had no knowledge of Khalīfah's intentions at the time of leaving Badakhshān. Neither Māham nor Humāyūn is reported to have mentioned the subject to Bābur or complained to him of Khalīfah's conduct after their arrival in Hindustān. Soon after Māham's arrival Bābur paid a visit to the Gold-scattering Garden and announced his intention of retiring from the world and leaving the kingdom in Humāyūn's charge. Humāyūn was asked to go to Sambhal but if he had been aware of the plot he would have refused to leave the court at such a critical moment. If the conspiracy had extended over such a long period as the one suggested by Professor Rushbrook-Williams it would have become known to many members of the court circle and steps would have been taken to deal with it. Lastly, Bābur's sacrifice for his son, when he fell seriously ill, shows his love for the latter and there is no evidence of the Khalīfah resisting the Emperor's wish in this matter. If he had decided to supersede him, he would have certainly dissuaded Bābur from offering his life.

After Humāyūn's arrival Bābur asked Khalīfah to go to Badakhshān, but the astute minister 'delayed to obey'. From this it has been inferred that he wished to remain at court to complete the plan he had conceived. A close study of the circumstances does not lead to such inference. It is probable that Khalīfah refused to go for two reasons. First, that he had reached the age of superannuation and was not physically quite fit to undertake the government of such a difficult and distant charge as Badakhshān. Secondly, he judged it better to be near the Emperor who was declining in health and vigour.

The plot did not fail; it fizzled out. We have no means of knowing what Khalīfah actually did to effectuate his intentions beyond merely expressing or declaring them. It was a mistake on his part to contemplate a change in succession by placing a man like Mahdī Khwājah upon the throne. We may well doubt the Khwājah's suitability to become the Emperor of Hindustān. It is true he was descended from the Saiyyads of Tirmiz and belonged to that aristocracy of religion which had been united by marriage with the bluest blood in the state. He had been in Bābur's service for several years and is mentioned in the *Bāburnāmah* along with princes of royal blood, either Tīmūrid or Chaghatāi, and is given a permanent place in the list of officers. He

¹ A.N. I, pp. 272-3; Text, p. 115.

was a brother-in-law of Bābur and, according to Nizāmuddīn, a *jawān* i.e., possessed of physical vigour and energy. But in spite of his high connections he cannot be pronounced to have been a fit person to sit upon the throne of Hindustān. He was a man of crazy temper and luckily it was his folly that decided the issue. Thinking that he was supported by the most powerful minister of the realm, he began to give himself the airs of a king and coming to the *darbar* every day created disturbance. His conduct alienated the sympathies of those few who might have thought of countenancing Khalīfah's sinister move. It was Mahdī's indiscretion and rashness which made Khalīfah abandon the whole plan. The story is related by Nizāmuddīn Ahmad:

'It happened one day that Mīr Khalīfah went to see Mahdī Khwājah who was in his pavilion. Mīr Khalīfah and Muhammad Muqīm Harvi, father of the author, were the only persons present with the Khwājah. When Mīr Khalīfah had sat for a while, the Emperor Bābur in the pangs of his disease called him. When Mīr Khalīfah came out of Mahdī's pavilion, the latter accompanied him to the door and stood in the middle of it and the author's father respectfully stood behind him. As Mahdī Khwājah was a crazy man, being unaware of my father's presence, he stroked his beard when Khalīfah had gone, and said, "Please God, I will flay thee, old man." Turning round he saw my father, and being greatly agitated said, "O Tājik! the red tongue destroys the green." My father took his leave and departed. He went hastily to Mīr Khalīfah and said, "In spite of the fact that there are such able princes as Humāyūn Mirza and his brothers, you have shut your eyes against royalty and desire to transfer the sovereignty to another house. Now see what will be the result of it." ' ¹

Muqīm Harvi at once went to Khalīfah and reported to him Mahdī Khwājah's words and told him that it was extremely unwise to transfer the sovereignty from Bābur's house to another. Khalīfah was terribly annoyed; he at once sent an express summoning Prince Humāyūn from Sambhal and gave an order that Mahdī Khwājah should be interned in his house and that no one should pay him a visit or have any kind of communication with him. He was forbidden to attend the *darbar*.

¹*Tabqāt*, pp.28-29. The passage in the text is: *Zubān-i-surkh sar-i-sabz mīdihad barbād*. Professor Rushbrook-Williams' translation runs thus: 'Often the red tongue has given the green head to the winds.' He explains it by saying that freedom of speech had brought venerable green-turbaned followers of the Prophet to the penalty of decapitation. Sir Henry Elliot's translation is: 'O Tājik! the red tongue uses its sharp point to no purpose.' It is an allusion to the fate of the parrot in the *Tūtīnāmāh* of Nakshabi, a collection of stories and apologues. *Empire Builder*, p. 177. Elliot, Vol. V, p. 188.

Humāyūn returned post-haste from Sambhal and found his father still alive but extremely weak.¹ The dying Emperor called his chiefs together and bade them acknowledge Humāyūn as his successor. Khalīfah and the other nobles who had stood by him through many of the chances and changes of fortune loyally accepted the decision.

Khalīfah's plot was bound to fail. In Bābur's family succession had always devolved on sons. Strangers were never asked to occupy the throne to the exclusion of lawful heirs. Besides, a prince alone could command the loyalty of Mughal Amīrs who would have never approved of a man like Mahdī Khwājah. When Humāyūn had left Badakhshān in charge of Hindāl, the inhabitants were much assured by the presence of the Prince although he was only a boy of eleven years of age.² Such was the homage paid to a man of royal descent among the Tīmūrids. Mahdī Khwājah was certainly inferior to Humāyūn. The latter was a young man of charming manners, fine literary tastes and had proved his prowess in battle. The foibles and weakness of his character which marred the success of his later life had not yet appeared and it is not fair to allow our judgment to be influenced by our knowledge of his subsequent career. Humāyūn had completely gained Bābur's favour and would have succeeded in frustrating the intrigue even if it had assumed a serious aspect. Māham's influence would have also been cast on the side of her son, and careful as she was in handling political issues, she would have created a strong party to back his claim. Khalīfah at last realised the impossibility of accomplishing his design and took the only course open to a statesman loyal to the empire. The intrigue was the outcome not of dread and suspicion so much as of prejudice and lack of far-sightedness. That it was soon forgotten is clear from the fact that

¹Gulbadan says Humāyūn returned from Kalinjar, but most of our authorities agree in saying that he was at Sambhal. (*H.N.*, p. 105.) Nizāmuddīn says Humāyūn came on the death of Bābur, but this is not correct. Gulbadan is more reliable in this respect. In another place Gulbadan puts the following words in the mouth of Hindāl in speaking to Kāmrān: 'In his lifetime His Majesty Firdaus Makānī gave his throne to the Emperor Humāyūn and named him his successor. We all agreed to this and up till now have read the *Khutbah* in his name. There is no way of changing the *Khutbah*.' (*H.N.*, p. 161) Again Mirza Haider writes: 'As his (Bābur's) end approached, he entrusted all the Amīrs and people of the world to Humāyūn Mirza (whom he had recalled from Badakhshān) and his own soul to the Creator of the world.' *T.R.*, p. 402.

²When Hindāl went to Qilah Zafar, it is said, the Amīrs who had offered to join Sultān Sa'īd of Kāshgar changed their minds. Such was the effect of the presence of the Prince. *T.R.*, p. 388.

Mahdī Khwājah was not deprived of royal favour and though Khalīfah himself disappeared from history his sons were employed in the administration.¹

In an able and scholarly note appended to her translation of the *Bāburnāmāh*, Mrs. A. S. Beveridge suggests the substitution of Muhammad Zamān Mirza for Mahdī Khwājah.² None of our authorities offer even the slightest hint to justify such a replacement. Mrs. Beveridge's arguments may be briefly summed up. Mahdī Khwājah was not a Tīmūrīd and did not belong to a ruling dynasty. He was not a *dāmād* of Bābur nor was he a *jawān*. It is inconceivable that Khalīfah would place upon the throne any man not a Tīmūrīd.

Muhammad Zamān was a Tīmūrīd and a *dāmād* being married to Masūmah Sultān Begam; he was a *jawān* and fulfils the qualifications attributed to Mahdī in the *Tabqāt*. He was the eldest son-in-law of Bābur, and a young man being thirty five years old. He was given the sovereign status by Bābur in April, 1929.³

Bābur's outlook on Hindustān was different. Kābul, not Delhi, was his chosen centre. For several years before his death he had wished to return to Kābul. If Bābur had pushed on as far as Samarqand, the empire would have been divided and Humāyūn would have obtained a seat in the ancestral region and Hindustān would have been given to Bābur Pādshāh's *dāmād*. She infers from the circumstances of the closing years of Bābur's life that Humāyūn and his brothers were not to govern Hindustān.

The plan was changed by the sequel of Humāyūn's illness which led to his becoming Pādshāh. His illness, recovery, and Bābur's illness all made Humāyūn's life seem divinely preserved. It was the imminence of death which defeated all plans and Humāyūn was mounted Pādshāh.

With these arguments Mrs. Beveridge supports her preference of Muhammad Zamān to Mahdī Khwājah. She has freely drawn upon

¹ Khalīfah probably died before the expulsion of Humāyūn from India in 1540, because his wife Sultānam was with the royal ladies and made her pilgrimage shortly after the flight to Sind. Khalīfah's complete disappearance from history is strong, though not conclusive, evidence of the intrigue which is attributed to him. His sons Muhibb 'Alī Khan and Khālid Beg continued in the service of the State. Mahdī Khwājah was completely pardoned. Khānzādah Begam continued to occupy a high position in the palace. From Gulbadan's account of Hindāl's marriage with Mahdī's sister it appears that the Emperor had forgotten the past and bore no ill-will towards him. He took part in the marriage feast and sanctioned arrangements on a magnificent scale.

² *Memoirs*, pp. 704-8.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 662.

her imagination in establishing her preconceived thesis. Mahdī Khwājāh, though not a man of royal descent, belonged to a stock with which royal marriage was permitted. *Dāmād* means brother-in-law also and the appellation *jawān* is used not in the sense of young but of possessing physical fitness and vigour. The reason why Khalīfah chose Mahdī is that he was friendly with him and his relationship to Bābur through his sister qualified him for the high office. Muhammad Zamān was not given sovereignty as Mrs. Beveridge suggests. The entry in the *Bāburnāmāh* is to the effect: 'He was presented with a royal head-to-foot, a sword and belt, a *tīpūchāq* horse and an umbrella. He also was made to kneel (*yūkūnduruldi*) for the Behār country.'¹

This had been done in other cases too and by no means can be construed as conferring a right to the throne. Her suggestion that in the disposition of territories which Bābur had planned with Khalīfah he would have given Hindustān to Muhammad Zamān is entirely against Gulbadan's testimony cited before. Bābur's genuine sentiments towards Humāyūn made themselves manifest during the latter's illness and it is not correct to say that it was owing to the 'imminence of death' that he was declared Pādshāh. Why the *dāmād* was dropped is not because of his threat to flay alive the old minister but because the latter saw the futility of the whole plan. The desire to make provision for Masūmāh, however commendable, is scarcely a sufficient excuse for disinheriting lawful heirs and perpetuating civil war and strife in the empire.² An intention of this kind cannot be attributed to Bābur. He liked the climate of Kābul, it is true, but he knew the difficulty of conquering his ancestral regions. If Humāyūn was unfit to hold Hindustān, surely the transmontane regions would be more difficult still to maintain.

¹ *Memoirs*, p. 662.

² The following may be cited as an instance of Mrs. Beveridge's bold speculation in history: 'If Mehdi or any other competent man had ruled in Delhi, by whatever tenure, this would not necessarily have ruined Humāyūn or have taken from him the lands most coveted by Bābur. All Bābur's plans and orders were such as to keep Humāyūn beyond the Hindūkush, and to take him across the Oxus.' *Introduction to Gulbadan's H.N.*, p. 27.

CHAPTER III

THE EARLY DIFFICULTIES AND COURT ORGANISATION

THE FIRST hours after Humāyūn's accession to the throne were occupied with the usual rejoicings. The great court officials brought their *nazars*, and were confirmed in their offices, services, lands and residence, while a whole boatload of gold was distributed to the populace — a step which must have done much to win the affection of the common people. The new Emperor, with the natural kindness of heart that marked him, could find time even on the day of his accession to visit his relations and to commiserate with them on their recent bereavement. Just at this time arrived Hindāl, so eagerly and vainly longed for by the dying Emperor. Humāyūn, who had a particularly warm corner in his heart for his youngest brother, welcomed him with great affection.

When the more intimate requirements of family life had been satisfied, Humāyūn was at leisure to devote himself to the public affairs which demanded attention. The first thing to be settled was the distribution of the various provinces among the Emperor's brothers; for the Mughal rulers, unlike their contemporaries in France and England, had as yet not realised the dangers of the appanage system. At a period when the growth of centralised government was hardly dreamed of, the appanage system might conceivably have been a good thing. When the choice lay between distributing great tracts of territory either to members of the royal family or to great nobles, who had no blood connection with the throne, the decision of a mediæval monarch could not be long in doubt. At least his kinsmen might be expected to realise that their interests were in the long run bound up with the prosperity of the throne, but the same was hardly to be expected of the 'over-mighty subject'. But in this respect, unfortunately, practice and theory did not go hand in hand. European experience of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had shown that of all dangers to the stability of government and the peace of the realm, none could compare in magnitude with the selfishness of members of the blood-royal, who possessed appanages carrying a power but little inferior to that of their sovereign. The reign of Humāyūn was to show that in India the same thing held good. The Emperor's troubles sprang mainly from the members of his own family: and he himself it was who provided them with the resources which they employed in a manner so fatal to the Royal power. It must be remembered, however, that the distribution of provinces to members of the blood-royal was a tradition of the Tīmūrids, and

Humāyūn would have been considered an unorthodox innovator had he ventured to depart from it. The consequences were nonetheless fatal. To Kāmran were given Kābul and Qandhār, provinces which he had already held for some time. 'Askarī received Humāyūn's old *jāgīr* of Sambhal, while to Hindāl fell the rich district of Alwar or Mewāt; Mirza Sulaimān was confirmed in possession of Badakhshān.

The next step was to conciliate the great military leaders and the army who seem to have taken the opportunity to put forward exaggerated claims to reward. But Humāyūn promptly took measures to restore discipline with the satisfactory result that 'everyone who breathed dissatisfaction . . . bound the girdle of service upon the waist of obedience.'

Having curbed the nobles, the Emperor tried to obtain the good-will of the Shaikhs, Saiyyads, Qāzīs, philosophers and men of letters. He did not ignore the agriculturists and tenants who were liberally treated. Care was taken to protect the rights of merchants on whom depended the progress of the Indian trade with the far-off countries of Asia. [Their taxes were reduced and much hospitality was shown to them. The interests of artisans and tradesmen were equally safeguarded.] They were required to pay reasonable rates and duties with the result that their prosperity increased and the manufacturing industry received an impetus.¹

[Humāyūn was not long to be left in peace.] With the death of Bābur, the forces of disorder, for a brief time repressed by the terror of his name and prestige of his warriors, threatened once more to break into disastrous activity. In the eastern provinces the Afghans, despite the defeats inflicted upon them by the late Emperor, still retained much of their power. A representative of the last dynasty was still at large: and Mahmūd Lodi, a brother of Ibrāhīm Lodi, poor creature though he was, possessed, in addition to able lieutenants, a name round which the Afghans could rally. The largest *jāgīrs* were still in their possession; they were powerful in the eastern districts, and Mahmūd's cause was championed by such redoubtable fighters as Biban and Bāyazīd who were still thinking of regaining their lost power. [At present, the great safety of the Mughals lay in the disunion and jealousy of the Afghan tribes: but already the man who was for the time to weld these tribes into a united nation was gaining the military and administrative experience with which he was at last to hurl the Tūrki dynasty back to the place whence they had come.

¹ Khwāndamīr, *Humāyūnāmāh*, B. M. MS.

Down in Gujarāt, Sultān Bahādur Shah, a monarch of strong personality and restless intelligence, had for long been strengthening himself in the hope of making a bid for the suzerainty of Rājputānā when the hand of death should have removed the great Bābur. Rich, as few princes of his day were, through his command of 'the gates of India' and of the overseas trade from the West, secure in the affection of a prosperous and enterprising people, he was particularly dangerous to Humāyūn owing to his policy of employing his immense wealth to finance Afghan opposition to the Mughals. He provided Sher Khan, as we shall see, with enormous sums in order to foster the anti-Mughal movement which arose from the direction of Bihār.

To crown all, the new Turkish dynasty had been in Hindustān less than five years; it had no claim upon the affection or the allegiance of the mass of the population: it held its position in the face of formidable competitors more by virtue of the reputation it had acquired at Pānipat and Khānuā than by any marked superiority in resources. In the last resort, as we shall see, it was not external enemies, but internal divisions, which were to prove for the moment a fatal setback to the domination of the Mughals. Had Humāyūn been without a rival, it is quite possible that, weak as he was, he would have been too strong for Sher Khan, his Afghan foe: but in certain men of Tīmūrid blood he found opponents who caused 'perpetual disturbance' during the whole time he was in Hindustān. Such were Muhammad Sultān Mirza and Muhammad Zamān Mirza, both grandsons of the great Sultān Husain Mirza Baiqarā of whom frequent mention is made in the *Memoirs*.¹ These men had come to India in Bābur's train; they had been given great estates from which they drew the resources they employed to gall the son of their benefactor. Muhammad Zamān Mirza was particularly formidable. He had been a great favourite of Bābur who had given him a daughter in marriage, and he had held high military commands, including the governorship of Bihār. Then there was Saiyyad Mahdī Khwājah,² a commander

¹ Muhammad Sultān Mirza was a grandson of the late Sultān of Khorāsān by a daughter. Muhammad Zamān Mirza was the son of Bādi-uz-Zamān Mirza, son of Sultān Husain Mirza, to whom Bābur had married his daughter Masūmah whose mother, also called Masūmah, had died in childbed. The *Humāyūnāmāh* in verse (*B.M.MS.*) says that in Muhammad Zamān's circle Humāyūn's competence was doubted and it was said that he was neither a general nor an administrator. Muhammad Zamān was drowned in the Ganges at Chausā in 1539.

² Saiyyad Mahdī Khwājah was the son of Mūsā Khwājah and third husband of Bābur's sister Khānzādah. He has been mentioned in the previous Chapter.

in the Mughal army, for whom Khalīfah had at one time tried to secure the succession to the throne of Delhi. But Humāyūn's worst enemy was bound to him by closer ties than mere cousinhood. For, in Kāmran, his brother, the Emperor found a crafty, selfish antagonist who never hesitated to put his own immediate advantage above the very existence of the family to which he belonged. Quite soon after the beginning of his reign Humāyūn was to have bitter proof of this.

The news of Bābur's death found Kāmran in Kābul. His power was now well established there, and his favourite brother 'Askari, upon whose support he could generally count, had joined him. With a shrewd knowledge of his elder brother's easy kindness, and of the embarrassments which awaited a newly enthroned sovereign, Kāmran promptly made over Kābul to 'Askari, gathered an army and marched down into the Punjāb (1531). He gave out that he was coming to congratulate his brother and to pay his respects as a loyal servant should. But Humāyūn knew his brother too well to attach any importance to these loyal addresses. Being as yet entirely unprepared for any appeal to force, he despatched a messenger to Kāmran, informing him that Peshāwar and Lamghān had been added to Kābul and Qandhār, and requesting him to retire to his own dominions.¹ The Mirza, however, took no notice, but pressed on to Lahore, and coolly proceeded to besiege the place, which was strongly held for Humāyūn by the gallant Mīr Yūnis 'Alī. So formidable were the defences, and so unflinching the loyalty of the governor, that Kāmran, despairing of being able to take the place by ordinary methods, had recourse to stratagem. Artfully feigning to be violently enraged against a confidential officer, Qarāchah Khan, he inflicted upon him in open Durbar a previously concerted slight. The rumours of the breach between master and man were carefully fomented, and soon it was the common gossip of Lahore that Qarāchah Khan's life was in jeopardy. Hence the governor was not at all surprised when Qarāchah Khan, with a small following, craved admittance to the town, feigning that he

¹ Dr. S. K. Bannerjee defends Kāmran's action by saying that his *jāgīr* should have been increased, for Bābur had laid down the rule thus: 'As thou knowest, the rule has always been that when thou hadst six parts, Kāmran had five; this having been constant make no change.'

Peshāwar and Lamghān had been added to his *jāgīr*, but he was not satisfied. He concealed his true intentions and marched towards the Punjāb. Humāyūn rated his false poetic effusions too highly and in spite of his hypocrisy made to him the further grant of Hissār Fīrozah. Dr. Bannerjee quotes from the *Akbarnāmah*, but omits the words that reveal Kāmran's real designs. *Memoirs*, pp. 625-6. *Humāyūn Bādshāh*, pp. 53, 56. A.N. I, p. 291; Text, p. 125.

had fled from the wrath of Kāmṛān, and now desired only to show his loyalty to Humāyūn. Mīr Yūnis 'Alī allowed his entrance, and, as time went on, admitted him by degrees to greater and greater intimacy. At length at a banquet, Qarāchah Khan contrived to isolate the governor from the loyal troops, and to surround him with the men introduced from Kāmṛān's camp. Suddenly throwing off the mask, he placed Mīr Yūnis 'Alī under close arrest, seized a gate, and admitted the besiegers. Kāmṛān occupied the whole town, took it under his protection, and offered to continue Mīr Yūnis 'Alī in the office of governor: but that loyal servant respectfully replied that he preferred to serve under Humāyūn, and departed unhindered with many marks of esteem. Master of the chief town in the Punjāb, Kāmṛān proceeded to overrun the whole country as far as the Sutlej. With an extraordinary effrontery, based upon an intimate acquaintance with his brother's character, he sent an embassy to Humāyūn, praying to be confirmed in the territories he had seized. The Emperor, who was beginning to realize the power of the Afghans, the discontent of the Mirzas, and the far-reaching schemes of Bahādur, decided to make the best of a bad job. Accordingly, he graciously confirmed to Kāmṛān the possessions which had been seized with the strong hand giving as a public reason the alleged wishes of his father. In reality, he acquiesced in the *fait accompli* because he had neither the power nor the inclination to dispute it. Kāmṛān, for his part, professed immense gratitude, and composed an ode in praise of his brother.¹ (Thereupon, Humāyūn, with a generosity that can only be characterised as insane, bestowed Hissār Fīrozah upon the aspiring poet.)

The importance of Kāmṛān's new possession can hardly be over-estimated. He had planted himself directly between his brother

¹ For Kāmṛān's ode see the *Indian Antiquary*, vol. XLIII (1914). pp. 219-24 The English translation is as follows :

May thy beauty increase every moment, may thy fortune be blessed
and auspicious!
The dust which rises up in thy path let it be the collyrium of my
fascinated eyes.
The dust which rises from the path traversed by India, let its place
be in the eyes of Majnūn.
Let there be like me a hundred slaves wearing rings in their ears
like Darius and Farīdūn.
He who did not move round thee like a pair of compasses let
him remain outside the circle.
Oh Kāmṛān, so long as this world exists let Humāyūn remain
King of the world.

The ode was not an expression of gratefulness but a cloak to hide the craftiness of his nature.

Humāyūn and the cooler regions beyond the Khaibar whence was derived the fighting material upon which the permanence of Mughal dominion in India depended. He was in a position to divert the stream of adventurers, with strong arms and ready swords, who came to fill the gaps in the Mughal ranks which were made by the climate of Hindustān. In short, Kāmran was able, by merely stopping where he was, to cut the taproot of Humāyūn's military power. The last acquisition of Hissār Firozah, which gave him command of the new military road from Delhi to Lahore, put the finishing touch to the whole disastrous situation.


It is difficult to see what Humāyūn could have done at the moment, for his hands were quite full. Had he been a man of small affections and great energy, he would doubtless have employed one of his brief periods of respite in reducing his brother to order. But he was improvident, content to enjoy the brief success of the moment without looking ahead, and generous, always ready to believe the best of his relations, even when disastrous experience should have hardened his heart. Moreover, he was sadly handicapped by the promise, made to his dying father, that he would attempt nothing against his brothers no matter what provocation they gave him.

The first problem which called for Humāyūn's attention was one which arose from the intrigues of Bahādur Shah of Gujarāt. In order to form a correct estimate of Bahādur's ability, power and resources it is necessary to make a brief survey of the kingdom of Gujarāt which was to become a great source of trouble to Humāyūn. It was after the break-up of the Tughluq empire towards the close of the fourteenth century that Gujarāt became independent under Majī-ul-Mulk who assumed the royal title of Muzaffar. He founded a dynasty which produced a number of remarkable rulers like Ahmad Shah I and Mahmūd Shah Bīgada. Muzaffar II, who came to the throne in 1511, was a brave and generous prince who fought long and hard against the Rājput states of Idar, the Muslim rulers of Mālwa and Rānā Sanga of Chittor. He had eight sons of whom Sikandar was the eldest. To each of them he assigned a *jāgīr* but Bahādur seems to have been most dissatisfied with his father's arrangements. He was given the villages of Kenj (18 miles from Ahmedābād), Koha (20 miles from Mahmūdābād) and Nabtah in the vicinity of Bātoḥ which was set apart for the maintenance of the tomb of Saint Qutb-ul-Qutab. Bahādur came under the influence of the Shaikhs of Islām, particularly of Saiyyad Shah Shaikhji, the head of the Bokhārī Saiyyads of Gujarāt. Not satisfied with his father's treatment, the prince left his *jāgīr* and passing through Dungarpur, Ajmer and Mewāt reached Delhi where

he was received well by Ibrāhīm Lodi.¹ Hindustān was stirred at this time by Bābur's invasion and when Bahādūr reached Delhi Ibrāhīm was preparing to fight against the Mughal conqueror. Abū Turāb says that Bahādūr was present at the battle of Pānīpat but it is clear from the *Bāburnāmah* that he took no part in it, for Bābur writes: 'He had sent dutiful letters to me while I was near Pānīpat; I had replied by royal letters of favour and kindness summoning him to me. He had thought of coming, but, changing his mind, drew off from Ibrāhīm's army towards Gujarāt.'²

Bahādūr became popular among the Afghan nobles who were tired of Ibrāhīm's tyrannical rule and it is said that even a plot was formed to place him upon the throne of Delhi. These developments made Ibrāhīm jealous of the Gujarāt prince and his growing coolness led to the departure of the latter for Jaunpur, the nobles of which place had secretly invited him to come and assume the sceptre of the

MUZAFFAR SHAH II (1511-26)



Sharqi kingdom. It was on his way to Jaunpur that Bahādūr came to know of the turn affairs had taken in Gujarāt. His father had died and was succeeded by Sikandar who was murdered after a few months at Champānīr in May, 1526. Imād-ul-Mulk Khushqadam, the principal supporter of Sikandar, had planned the deed on his exclusion from the chief ministership and had raised to the throne a minor son of the deceased king, who was only a stripling of six years, under the title of Mahmūd II. Evidently Khushqadam's intention was to exercise sovereignty himself in the name of the puppet king and satisfy his ambition. But the nobles and the Bokhārī Saiyyads had kept Bahādūr informed of what was happening in Gujarāt. On his homeward journey he was joined by his brothers Chānd Khan and Ibrāhīm Khan at Chittor. The first, probably fearing a cruel fate, decided to remain at the Sisodia court and afterwards

¹ We learn from the *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī* that Muzaffar had nominated Sikandar as his heir during his lifetime. Sikandar became jealous of Bahādūr and meditated his destruction. On coming to know of his brother's designs Bahādūr decided to go to Delhi with a few faithful attendants. Bayley, p. 303.

² Bahādūr seems to have been treated well but soon coolness sprang up between him and Ibrāhīm. Bābur clearly says that he was received by the Afghan king 'without honour'. *Memoirs*, p. 534.

fled to Mandu where the Khilji king gave him shelter; the second went with Bahādur whose *entourage* had now grown considerably in numbers. From all sides adherents poured in and the small force sent by Khushqadam was unable to intercept his progress. He reached Patan without difficulty and was crowned on July 6, 1526 and soon after held a *darbar* at Ahmedābād at which many nobles were present. He celebrated his second coronation at Champānīr in August, 1526 and exacted terrible vengeance from the miscreants who had brought about the death of his brother. But even after this he did not feel that he was secure on the throne of Gujarāt and one by one killed all his brothers with the exception of Chānd Khan who had sought shelter at Mandu. He demanded his surrender but the Khilji Sultān refused and this led to the rupture of alliance between Gujarāt and Mālwa.

Firmly seated on the throne, Bahādur engaged himself in carrying out his ambitious designs. He organised a large army which contained 10,000 foreign mercenaries. He helped Imād-ul-Mulk of Berār against Nizām-ul-mulk Bahri and captured Ahmadnagar in 1528. He went to war with Sultān Mahmūd Khilji of Mandu in order to obtain redress for the Rānā of Chittor and Salhadi Purbiya, advanced into the Bāgar country and entered Mandu at the head of a large force. He was disposed to treat the Khilji chief leniently, but the latter's ungovernable temper roused Bahādur's fury and he was ordered off to the custody of Asaf Khan. Bahādur's triumph was complete; the Khilji Sultān was virtually a prisoner in his hands and his kingdom was annexed to Gujarāt. The *coup de grace* was given by the proclamation of Bahādur's name in the *Khutbah* at Shahīdābād on March 31, 1531. Similar success awaited him in the Deccan; the Nizāmshah and the ruler of Khandesh acknowledged him as their superior and agreed to his name being read in the *Khutbah*.

Bahādur was now in possession of a large army. It was greatly strengthened by the employment of two Turkish captains, Amīr Mustafā who was given the title of Rūmī Khan after his success against the Portuguese in 1531 and Khwājah Safar called Šalmani. The growing power of the Portuguese was a source of anxiety to Bahādur and he exerted himself to put an end to their raids though in 1534 he had to enter into a treaty with them by which Bassein and the adjoining territory were ceded to them. During the first eight years of his reign Bahādur had greatly increased his power and prestige and was now ready to try conclusions with the Mughals.

Humāyūn's task was difficult. He had to deal with a rival who

was both cable and unscrupulous) Master of a rich kingdom and vast resources, the astute Bahādur desired to extend the sphere of his influence towards Rājputānā. He had perceived with pleasure the practical dissolution of the Rājput confederacy after the crushing defeat inflicted upon it by Bābur at Khānuā. The Rājputs had, since the beginning of the sixteenth century, been a standing menace to the kingdom of Gujarāt: but now the tables were turned, and it seemed possible that Gujarāt might acquire domination over at least a portion of Rājasthān. Bahādur Shah had for long been sapping the power of Chittor, and so quietly had he worked, that Humāyūn found the situation decidedly delicate. Unless Gujarāt were to be allowed to deprive Delhi of the suzerainty of Rājputānā, some decisive action must be taken.

The Emperor accordingly decided to open his campaign against Bahādur by attacking (1531) the great fortress of Kalinjar in Bundelkhand. This position commanded the approach to Mālwa, a kingdom practically tributary to Bahādur, affording an obvious starting point for operations against Gujarāt. Kalinjar was in the possession of a Rājput chief of the Chandela clan, and its seizure would enable Humāyūn to confine Bahādur's power in at least one important direction. Accordingly, the Emperor sat down before the place, and commenced siege operations. For about a month the resistance was stout and sustained; but at the end of that period, the garrison became distressed, and seeing that Humāyūn was in earnest, the Rājā agreed to pay tribute and admit the superiority of Delhi.¹ Thus Humāyūn had scored the first hit in the duel with Bahādur.

The Emperor was not at all sorry that an accommodation had been arranged so speedily, for couriers were now bringing him disquieting news about the Afghans. Those two redoubtable warriors, Bīban Khan Jilwānī and Shaikh Bāyazīd, archrebels or shining patriots, according as one adopts the view of the Mughal or of the Afghan historians, were once more upon the war-path, nominally in support of the puppet Sultān Mahmūd Lodi, really to acquire whatsoever they could capture with their stout swords. Taking advantage of the Emperor's absence in Bundelkhand, they had reappeared from Bihār, crossed into the Eastern Provinces, and had taken Jaunpur after expelling the Imperial governor, Sultān Junaīd Barlās. So great was the prestige of Mahmūd's name that even Sher Khan found it difficult to

¹ The Rājā is said to have offered to Humāyūn twelve *mans* of gold. It is clear that this early success was of much political importance. Humāyūn assumed the title of *Ghāzī*, Champion of the Faith.

resist his advance.) He was granted a *firmān* promising to give him the province of Bihār just as Sikandar Lodi had bestowed it upon Daryā Khan. But already rumours were afloat that the *jāgīrdār* of Sasram was in league with the Mughals and it was the personal request of Sultān Mahmūd, assisted by A'zam Humāyūn Sarwānī and Ibrāhīm that induced him to join the Afghan forces. On hearing of this coalition Humāyūn, who seems to have understood the art of arranging forced marches, turned to meet them, and descended upon them with great celerity at a time when they imagined him to be occupied elsewhere. Crossing the Ganges, he came up with them at Daurah¹ on the Guntī, and inflicted a heavy defeat upon them. Not only was the army dispersed, but Shaikh Bāyazīd himself along with Ibrāhīm Yūsuf Khail was slain. Many prominent nobles who escaped from the slaughter fled to Gujarāt, where they were well received by Bahādur. Among the fugitives were Fatch Khan, Qutb Khan, and 'Umar Khan Afghan Lodi, who were taken into high favour. For the moment, the power of the Afghans was broken. 'Abbās Sarwānī clearly affirms that the completeness of the victory was due in a large measure to the treachery of Sher Khan, who had gone over to the Emperor at a critical moment with all his men. Jealous of the power of Bīban and Bāyazīd, and realising that the lack of unanimity was bound to prove fatal to the Afghan cause, he privily sent a message to the imperial general, Hindū Beg, agreeing to withdraw his troops when battle was joined.² This he did, and the ruin of his friends resulted. Humāyūn at least had no cause for dissatisfaction; he had inflicted upon the elusive Afghans the worst defeat they had received for years.

¹ The battle of Daurah was fought in July 1531 and not in 1532 as Dr. S. K. Bannerjee says. Gulbadan writes: 'Six months after the death of His Majesty Firdaus Makānī Bīban and Bāyazīd advanced from the direction of Gaur.' Humāyūn marched from Agra in June 1531 to chastise the rebels and the narratives of Gulbadan and Jauhar confirm the view that the battle was fought in 1531. Bannerjee, *Humāyūn Bādshāh*, p. 42. Gulbadan, p. 112.

Daurah is situated on the Guntī about 48 miles north of Jaunpur. Among the distinguished men who fell in this battle the names of Bāyazīd and Ibrāhīm Khan Yūsuf Khail are prominently mentioned.

² Dr. Qanungo in his *Sher Shah* disbelieves the statement of 'Abbās which is supported by Nizāmuddīn, Badāonī and Firishtah. His arguments are as follows: (1) It is absurd to say that the rebel chiefs could force Sher Khan, then lord of Chunār and virtual master of the vast tract of country south of the Ganges, from Chunār to Bihār. (2) 'Abbās's account is a mere invention and the other historians have copied from him. (3) The imputation of treachery was due to a current tradition among the Afghans attributing the failure of this last great national effort to treachery. (4) It is certain beyond doubt that Sher Khan was not present at the battle of Daurah, for he did not want to play

Sultān Junaid Barlās was once more restored to command of the Eastern provinces, and all for the moment remained quiet. The Emperor, instead of following up his success at once and inflicting a crushing blow upon the Afghans when they were already demoralised, returned to Agra, where, on December 19, 1531, he celebrated the anniversary of his ascension to the throne with great pomp and magnificence. He gave a sumptuous entertainment, and distributed no fewer than 12,000 *Khilats*, of which 2,000 were ornamented with jewels.

Humāyūn had indeed good reasons for feeling pleased with the results of the first year of his reign. He had won a point against Bahādur Shah; he had given the Afghans a sharp lesson. Not yet had he realised to the full the dangers of his position. Had he done so, he would have strained every nerve to turn these small successes into lasting achievements. Either the Kalinjar or the Daurah enterprise might well have proved the starting point for a quick blow which would have paralysed once and for all the strength of Bahādur or of the Afghans. But Humāyūn's eyes were not yet open. Time had yet to reveal the selfishness and treachery of Kāmran, the patient, underground working of that same Farīd who at Daurah played traitor to his own side, and the general insecurity of the foundations upon which the Mughal power was based.

In Agra, Humāyūn wasted a great deal of time in indolence and opium dreams. His sister Gulbadan says he stayed there for about a year.¹ (This, considering the difficulties of the situation, would be inexcusable if it were true; but as a matter of fact, after eight months, Humāyūn was once again taking vigorous action. Even this waste of time was, of course, bad enough, considering that the Emperor

second fiddle to the other Afghan leaders. He had at this time no conception of national interests and national freedom. (5) Even a modern writer like Elphinstone omits mention of this treachery in his account of Sher Shah.

'Abbās's account of this episode is too detailed to be a mere invention. The modern biographer of Sher Shah is offended with 'this eulogist of Sher Shah who has unintentionally done the greatest harm to his hero's character and reputation.' The details of how Sher Khan was induced to join are given at length by 'Abbās. It was a great effort of the Afghans and there is every likelihood of Sher Khan having agreed to throw in his lot with the rest of his tribesmen. The omission of this fact by Elphinstone or even by Abul Fazl is not conclusive evidence of Sher Khan's innocence. Dr. S. K. Bannerjee in his *Humāyūn Bādshāh* refutes the arguments of Dr. Qanungo and accepts 'Abbās's version. Campos also speaks of Sher Khan's treachery. T.S., A.U.M.S., p. 96. Qanungo, *Sher Shah*, pp. 73-5. Bannerjee, *Humāyūn Bādshāh*, pp. 44-6. Campos, *History of the Portuguese in Bengal*, p. 36.

¹Gulbadan, *H.N.*, p. 115.

was confronted by enemies who never slumbered, but were quick to take advantage of any intermission in his activities in order to steal a point in the game. To Bahādur Shah, as we shall see, the lethargy of Humāyūn during the early months of 1532 proved invaluable. It is fair to say that in the intervals of amusing himself with his opium and with his family the Emperor, during these early months of 1532, was organizing an army which should follow up his first success against the Afghans. It must have been during his residence at Agra that Humāyūn planned and executed that fantastic arrangement of Court ceremonial which still excites the wonder of the reader.¹ Being still strongly influenced by the omen which he had taken in his youth, he arranged all his Court circle into the three-fold division, based upon the names of the three peasants he had encountered upon that occasion. The royal brothers and relations, the nobles, ministers, and military men were termed *Ahl-i-Daulat* or 'men of prosperity': men of letters, religious leaders and law officers, were called *Ahl-i-Sa'adat*, or 'men of success': while poets, singers, musicians, architects, painters and men of beauty and elegance were classed as *Ahl-i-Murād* or 'officers of desire'. Each of these classes was assigned to a leader who was to supervise the work of his charge. Khwāndamīr writes in the *Qanūn-i-Humāyūnī* that the King had three arrows made of gold and each of these pertained to the three classes *Daulat*, *Sa'adat* and *Murād*. The arrow of *Daulat* was entrusted to Shujāuddīn Amīr Hindū Beg Bahādur who looked after the affairs of officers, ministers and soldiers. The arrow of *Sa'adat* was assigned to Maulānā Parghali or Farghali who managed the affairs of the learned including the administration of Sayūrghāl lands. The arrow of *Murād* was entrusted to Amīr Uvais Muhammad who looked after buildings and other things of pomp and pageantry, which made for royal splendour and glory. The three divisions were distinguished by a special order, the Order of the Arrow.²

There were twelve gradations in each division, distinguished by the fineness of the gold of which the arrow-head was composed, and a man's position in his division was determined by the quality of his arrow. The Emperor, as the head of each division, and chief of the Order of the Arrow, held an arrow of pure gold of the twelfth and highest fineness. The gradations ranged down from the eleventh

¹ It appears from Khwāndamīr's account that these Court arrangements were in full swing in 1532-33. He was with the King at this time and writes from personal observation. Indeed he is the only contemporary writer who describes Humāyūn's fantastic organisation in such detail.

² H.N., B.M. MS. (Eng. Trans.), pp. 26-7. A.N. I, p. 645.

arrow, which was held by the Emperor's relations and the great officials, to the first, which was held by the palace guards. Further, each gradation had three qualities, high, middle and low.

Khwāndamīr gives a detailed account of these arrows. Each arrow was associated with a particular class of men.

The Twelfth—Humāyūn himself.

The Eleventh—Brothers and relations of the Emperor.

The Tenth—Shaikhs, '*Ulamā* and learned men.

The Ninth—Amīrs of the State.

The Eighth¹—*Mūqarrawān*, i.e., men who lived near the King and held *mansabs*.

The Seventh—Other *mansab*-holders.

The Sixth²—Chiefs of tribes and Uzbegs of good character.

The Fifth—Young men (*bekah jawānān*).

The Fourth—*Tahvildārs* (treasurers).

The Third—Young men of the *jīrgās*.

The Second—*Munshīs* or writers.

The First—Gate-keepers, Camel-keepers, etc.

The other arrangements of the Court were akin to this fantastic scheme. The Government departments were divided under a classification corresponding to the four elements.³ Under 'Fire' came the military department; wardrobe, kitchen and stable were reckoned as 'Air'; the cellar, as well as canals and irrigation came under the heading of 'Water'; while buildings, agriculture, and land grants were termed 'Earth'. The officials of each department had to dress in the appropriate astrological colour.

The days of the week were similarly classified according to their mystical significance: and no business could be done except on the day appropriate for it. Thus, Sundays and Tuesdays were court days, upon which all Government business was transacted, because Sunday

¹ In the English Translations (p. 32.) the eighth arrow is given to intimates (courtiers) and to headmen.

² About the sixth arrow the text says: *ba sar khayādan qabāyal wa jūzbeḡiyāns khujistah shumāyal*. Elliot and Dowson translate this as 'harem and well-behaved female attendants'. (V, p. 123.) The fifth is assigned to *begā jawānan* which is translated as 'young maid servants' by Elliot. (*Ibid.*, p. 123.) A full account of these arrows is given in the *B.M.M.S.*, p. 133 (b).

³ In Khwāndamīr's text they are called *Ātashī* (fire), *Hawāī* (air), *Ābī* (water) and *Khākī* (earth). The first was entrusted to 'Abdul Mulk (Amid-ul-Mulk in the *Bibliothica* text and the English Translations), the second to Khwājah Lutfullah, the third to Khwājah Hasan and the fourth to Khwājah Jalāluddīn Mirza Beg. Each officer was required to wear a prescribed dress. The *Amir-i-Ātash* used to dress himself in red.

belongs to the Sun, to which is attached the fate of rulers and kings, and Tuesday is the day of Mars, the patron of warriors and brave men. On a similar principle, Thursdays and Saturdays were devoted to pious purposes and to receiving visits from learned men, because Saturn is the protector of the religious, and Jove of the learned. On the other hand, Mondays and Wednesdays were given up to pleasure and jollity, while Fridays were devoted to holding councils and assemblies.

There are several other fantastic inventions described by Khwāndamīr:

1. Four large boats were set on the river Jumna and on each of them was a square house of two storeys and elegant design. The barges were so joined that the houses faced each other. Festivities were held here and titles were conferred upon the nobles. The titles mentioned by Khwāndamīr are indicative of Humāyūn's love of grandeur. Some of the persons honoured were these:

Shaikh Wahīduddīn Abul Wajd — *Amīr-us-Shu'arā* (Poet Laureate).

Maulānā Shihābuddīn Ahmad Muammāi — *Amīr-us-Zurfah* (Lord of Witty persons).

Amīr Hasan — *Amīr-us-Salāt* (Lord of Prayers).

Ziāuddīn Nūr Beg — *Amīr-us-Zakāt* (Lord of Alms).

Amīr Razā — *Amīr-us-Som* (Lord of Fasting).

Amīr Ayūb Toshakchi — *Amīr-i-Haj* (Lord of Haj).

Amīr Qāsim Muhammad Khalīl — *Amīr-i-Lutf* (Lord of Favours).

Amīr Bābā Aishak Āqā — *Amīr-i-Ghazab* (Lord of Wrath).

Amīr Shah Husain — *Amīr-i-Farāghat* (because of his corpulence).

Khwāndamīr — *Amīr-ul-Akhhār* (Lord of Recorders).

2. Shops were arranged on these boats and Khwāndamīr writes that when His Majesty went from Delhi to Agra in 1532-33 accompanied by his officers, a bazar of this kind was made and carried down the Jumna.

3. A garden was also made on the boats.

4. A moving bridge made of wood and iron, so solid that troops could pass on it.

5. A moving palace of three storeys (*Qasr-i-Rawān*) was erected and the ladders to the upper storey were so constructed that they could be opened out or shut according to convenience. Khwāndamīr writes an ode in praise of it.

6. A tent which had twelve towers.

7. Besides these things Khwāndamīr mentions among the Emperor's inventions a Cap called the *Tāj-i-Izzat* which was of different colours

for the King and the nobles, a garment called *ulbāqcha* which reached to the waist and was put on the cloak and a 'carpet of mirth' of enormous size (the *Basāt-i-Nishāt*) on which could be seated 1,400 persons.

Another practice which the Emperor recommended was the wearing of clothes each day corresponding to the colour of the planet of that day. These are described at length by Khwāndamīr. As there were many flies in the country of Hindustān, the practice of glass goblets was introduced.

Another interesting innovation introduced by the Emperor was the beating of drums. These were five in number:

(1) The drum of *Sa'ādat* which was beaten before *fajir* (before sun-rise) prayer; (2) the drum of *Daulat* which was beaten at sunrise; (3) the drum of *Murād* which was beaten in the evening; (4) the drum of Joy (*naqārrah-shādiyānah*) which was beaten on the first and fourteenth night of every month; (5) the fifth was the most important of all called the drum of Justice (*tabl-i-'adal*) which was placed near the *Dewān-i-Khānah* so that aggrieved persons might be able to beat it and lay before the King their complaint. If the matter was a trivial one, the drum was struck only once; twice, if the complaint related to '*alūfah*¹ (allowance of a soldier); thrice, if a man's goods were stolen by a thief or seized by a high-handed miscreant; and four times, if a murder was committed. Khwāndamīr praises the King's justice by saying that none except this drum was struck by a rod during his reign.

Humāyūn was particular about the etiquette of the court) and it was about this time that he introduced the *kornish* and *taslīm* which Abul Fazl describes thus: "The salutation called *taslīm* consists in placing the back of the right hand on the ground, and then raising it gently till the person stands erect, when he puts the palm of his hand upon the crown of his head, which pleasing manner of saluting signifies that he is ready to give himself as an offering.' This mode of showing respect to royalty was adopted by Akbar afterwards.²

After the defeat of Bīban and Bāyazīd Humāyūn came to Agra and stayed there for about a year. In Shawwāl A.H. 939 (April-May, 1533) Māham suffered from a disorder of the bowels and on the 13th Shawwāl she 'passed from this transitory life to the eternal home.'³ The court went into mourning and after forty days (in June-July, 1533)

¹ The phrase used in the text is *adamī wasūl-i-'alūfah* which means default in the payment of wages.

² Blochmann, *Ain* I, p. 158.

³ 13th Shawwāl, 939 (May 8, 1533).

Gulbadan says, 'They let two months slip by in one another's company, in

the Emperor set out for Delhi to construct the *Dīn Panāh* of which there are no traces in existence now. The plan was discussed at Gwālīor in Sha‘ban A.H. 939 (February-March, 1533) and the ministers had given their consent. What the Emperor wanted to do now was to carry into effect the grand architectural designs that he had formed. On a hill near the Jumna at a distance of 3 *krohs* from Delhi in the middle of Muharram A.H. 940 (August 1533) the foundations of the new city were laid in an auspicious hour fixed by the astrologers. The Emperor was the first to place a brick with his own hand and he was followed by the courtiers and grandees of the state. Khwāndamīr, who gives an elaborate description of the city, writes that in the latter half of Shawwāl A.H. 940 (May 1534) the walls, bastions, ramparts and gates were nearly finished.¹ The Emperor issued a command that his birthday should be celebrated with great pomp and splendour in the new city.

After the completion of the *Dīn Panāh* Humāyūn returned to Agra. Gulbadan speaks of two feasts held at this time in the royal palace which is called by her ‘the mystic house’ or ‘the house of *tilism*’ (*‘Imārat-i-tilism*) of Khwāndamīr. The mystic house and the festivities

Gwālīor and then set out for Agra, where they reached in February, 1534 (Sha‘ban, A.H. 940). This date is not correct as has been pointed out by Mrs. A. S. Beveridge in her note (I) on page 116. Taking together all the statements of Gulbadan about the movements of the Emperor we get the following order of events:

Visit to Gwālīor in Sha‘ban, 939—April, 1533.

Return to Agra and Māham’s illness—Shawwāl—April, 1533.

Death of Māham—13th Shawwāl—May 8, 1533.

Forty days of mourning—beginning of June.

Departure for Delhi—Forty days after Māham’s death.

Foundation of *Dīn Panāh*—Muharram, 940—July, 1533.

According to Gulbadan, Māham died before Hindāl’s marriage feast, for she says: ‘When Mirza Hindāl was married, my lady (Māham) was living but there was delay in arranging the feast.’

¹ *B.M.MS.* The site of the new city is described by Khwāndamīr as ‘a raised area adjacent to the banks of the stream of Jūn, and from where the distance to the city may be estimated at three *krohs*.’ Eng. Trans., p. 61.

The first of Shawwāl, 940 begins on April 15, 1534 and therefore the date referred to by Khwāndamīr will be sometime in May.

The city of *Dīn Panāh* was destroyed by Sher Shah and among the ruins of old Delhi it is hardly distinguishable. (Percy Brown, *Cambridge History of India*, IV, p. 525.) Khwāndamīr mentions other buildings constructed by Humāyūn, but none was so grand as the *Dīn Panāh*. These are: (a) a building of chiselled stone in the fort of Gwālīor (939); (b) a building of magic called *Tilism-i-‘imārat*, probably a large hall for purposes of holding festivities (940); (c) a palace in the fort of Agra.

held therein show the bizarre character of Humāyūn's arrangements and innovations and give us an idea of the splendour in which basked the chosen of the gods.¹ Young men, beautiful maidens and skilled musicians took their seats in the tank in the middle of which the palace was erected. On a throne bedecked with jewels sat Khānzādah Begam, and the Emperor, and around them were numerous ladies of exalted descent.² Gulbadan mentions the names of eighty-seven and remarks that many others were present at the mystic feast which was held by the Emperor's command. Rich largesses were distributed among those present and so lavish was the imperial bounty that 'no one received less than 100 or 150, and those in the tank especially received a great deal.' A woman's bazar analogous to the fancy bazar of later times was set up on boats which were gaily decorated. The denizens of the palace sincerely admired the fantastic schemes of the Emperor and Gulbadan's comment on these arrangements is significant: 'In short every one was astonished and amazed who beheld what gift of invention the great God had bestowed on the blessed mind of His Majesty.'³

The mystic feast was followed by another which was held in honour of Hindāl's marriage with Sultānām Begam, a sister of Mahdī Khwājah, husband of Khānzādah Begam.⁴ Māham had taken a deep interest in the welfare of the young lady from the time of her birth, and though she was no longer alive to take part in marriage-festivities, the idea originated with her. Her place was now taken by Khānzādah Begam, who had taken charge of the Princess at the age of two and loved and treated her as if she were her own child. Gulbadan's account of the marriage feast gives us a vivid idea of the social life and customs of the Tīmūrīds and throws much light on the tastes, fashions and manners which were assiduously cultivated within the sanctuary of a Turkish household.

Being a woman deeply interested in the activities of her sex,

¹ For the details of the mystic house and mystic feast (*Jashna-i-tilism*) see Gulbadan's *H.N.*, pp. 118-26.

² Khānzādah is called *Ākā Jānam* or the dearest lady and Māham is invariably spoken of as *ākām* or 'my lady' by Gulbadan. These are Turkish words.

³ Gulbadan, p. 45.

⁴ It appears from Gulbadan's narrative that this feast was held towards the close of 1534. After describing the feast the royal authoress says, 'The Emperor set out for Gujarāt shortly afterwards in prosperity and safety. It was on the 15th Rajab, 941 (January 20, 1535) that he decided to go to Gujarāt.' Again she says, 'On the 14th Sha'ban, 941 (February 18, 1535) he left the Gold-scattering Garden and marched for Gujarāt to attack Bahādur.' Jauhar's date 944 (1537) for Hindāl's marriage is incorrect. *A.N.*, pp. 47-9.

Gulbadan describes with minuteness the organisation of the feast and the rites and ceremonies which pertained to it. Her account brings into clear relief the human side of Humāyūn's character, his love of magnificence and his tender solicitude for the welfare of the elder ladies of the royal family. When the younger ladies protested against his neglect of them he replied, 'You all know that I have been to the quarters of the elder relations of you all. It is a necessity laid on me to make them happy. Nevertheless, I am ashamed before them because I see them so rarely.'¹

An unbiased study of the mystic house and the feasts described before leaves upon the mind the impression that kings and queens lived in a beautiful but artificial world of their own and seldom thought of the toiling millions who made their luxury possible. They drowned care in perpetual carouse and failed to appraise correctly even the danger which was to sweep away the Tīmūrīds from the throne of Hindustān.

¹*H.N.*, p. 131; Text, p. 48. Begā Begam's protest was somewhat firm. She told the Emperor that there was no thorn in the way to her house.

For an account of Hindāl's marriage feast see *Ibid.*, pp. 126-31; Text, pp. 45-6.

CHAPTER IV
*THE AFGHAN DANGER AND WAR WITH
BAHADUR SHAH*

THE RUIN of Bīban and Bāyazīd had raised to a position of the first importance Farīd Khan, already mentioned, whom we can call by his better known title of Sher Shah. In a later chapter we shall have to spend some time in tracing the antecedents and following the career of this remarkable man, but here it is sufficient to say that, combining rare administrative and soldierly qualities with an utter lack even of such scruples as generally characterised men of his time and race, he had long set before himself the task of uniting the Afghans for the expulsion of the Mughals. This end he pursued with a cool and calculating patience, looking neither to the right nor to the left, always watchful, always cautious, never resting. Humāyūn, who was not blind to the formidable qualities of the man who was about to stand forth as the chief enemy of his house, determined to measure swords with him.

At the present moment Sher Khan, by a combination of faithful service and cold-blooded treachery, had, in himself, the chief power in the kingdom of Bihār. The principal seat of his strength was the great fortress of Chunār on the Ganges, into the possession of which he had come in a somewhat romantic manner.¹ Before the Mughal invasion, Chunār had been held for Ibrāhīm Lodi by Tāj Khan Sārang Khānī. Tāj Khan was much in the power of his favourite wife, a lady of exceptional beauty and strength named Lād Malikah. This lady was attacked one day by Tāj Khan's eldest son by another wife, and the father, coming to rescue his wife, was killed in self-defence by the youth. Lād Malikah, who was as clever as beautiful, had endeared herself to the dead man's troops, and held her own for some time despite the efforts of the sons to displace her. At last she offered herself and her castle to Sher Khan, on condition that he would treat her well and give her vengeance upon her husband's assassins. Sher Khan was naturally delighted to win such a lady and such a fortress.² He readily gave the required promises which he seems to have duly observed.

Humāyūn determined to attack Chunār, to seize the fortress and

¹ The fort of Chunār lies 16 miles south-west of Banaras and 18 miles east of Mirzāpur.

² 'Abbās Sarwānī relates at length the story of the acquisition of the fortress of Chunār by Sher Khan. The intermediaries who arranged the plan with Sher Khan were Mīr Ahmad, Ishāq and Mīr Dād, three Turkoman brothers

to humble its owner. Accordingly, in the autumn of 1532, he left Agra with an extremely formidable armament and advanced to the siege. An advance party had already surrounded the fortress, and cut off its communications with the outer world. Unfortunately for Humāyūn, Sher Khan himself had been given time to escape. Putting his son Islām Khan (also known as Jalāl Khan) in command of the fortress, he himself had retired to the hills with a strong party. He conducted a series of small raids and night attacks, with which he hoped to wear out the patience of the besieging force. But the odds against him were too heavy and Humāyūn's grip was too secure. After the blockade had been maintained for four months, it became evident that the fortress must eventually fall. But as the Emperor's ill luck would have it, bad news coming from the side of Gujarāt, he became alarmed at the progress of Bahādur, and did not possess sufficient singleness of purpose to carry through the task he had taken in hand. If he had only known it, fate was never again to give him such an opportunity of striking Sher Khan to his knees. As it was, the Afghan leader, informed by his spies of the Emperor's anxieties, put forward attractive terms of composition. He offered to make formal submission and profession of allegiance, and to send his younger son Qutb Khan, also known as Abdul Rashīd, with an Afghan contingent, to accompany the Emperor in his march against Bahādur Shah.¹ But in return, he must be allowed to keep the fortress of Chunār. Humāyūn accepted these terms and raised the siege. Sher

who enjoyed the confidence of Tāj Khan. Mīr Dād was the man who conducted the negotiations with Sher Khan. When Sher Khan was admitted into the fort, his marriage with Lād Malikah was quickly celebrated. She gave her newly wedded husband a present consisting of 150 valuable jewels, seven *mans* of pearls, 150 *mans* of gold and many other articles and ornaments. Subsequently Sher Khan acquired possession of the *parganās* near the fort of Chunār and after this he further added to his resources by inheriting sixty *mans* of gold from Gauhar Kushain, widow of Nāsir Khan. (*T.S., A.U. MS.*, pp. 85-9.) These unscrupulous methods greatly enriched Sher Khan and helped him to equip himself with the sinews of war. Later Sher Khan won the favours and treasures of Fath Malikah daughter of Mian Kālāpahār Farmūlī (sister's son of Bahlol) who was married to Shaikh Mustafā. The treasures of Kālāpahār had passed to Fath Malikah as her *tarkah*. She had 600 *mans* of gold ashrafis. By offers of friendship and goodwill Sher Khan secured her and she remained with him for some time. When he invaded Bengal, he laid his hands upon the treasures of the Bibī. *T.S., A.U. MS.*, pp. 102, 107.

The above text says she was married to Shaikh Mustafā's son.

¹ Sher Khan agreed to furnish 500 Afghan troops but when the Emperor suggested that Jalāl Khan should be their commander he demurred on the ground that he himself needed the services of the Prince in fighting his enemies. The Emperor did not press the matter and accepted Sher Khan's terms.

Khan with an undiminished power and prestige, made such good use of his time during the next few months, that he did not leave a single enemy of his alive in the kingdom of Bihār.¹

This was one of the critical moments of Humāyūn's reign. He had thrown away a great opportunity with both hands. Had he persevered in the siege and taken Chunār, he would have cut away the very foundation of Sher Khan's rising power, and would have undone long years of work carefully prepared. It is not too much to say that, if Chunār had been captured, the Mughals would never have been expelled from India. In justice to the Emperor it must be admitted that the news from the south was sufficiently serious to have given anyone pause.

Bahādur Shah had long nourished a grievance against the false and feeble Mahmūd II of Mālwa, who had attempted to foster civil war in Gujarāt by supporting Bahādur's younger brother Chānd Khan.² For some time Bahādur had been intriguing with the principal nobles of Mālwa, employing his vast wealth to make himself practical controller of the destinies of the little kingdom. Mahmūd, not content with having made an enemy of the powerful Bahādur, must needs commit several wanton acts of aggression against the territories of Ratan Singh, Rānā of Chittor.

At the beginning of 1531, Ratan Singh reinforced by Salhadi of Raisin³ and Sikandar Khan of Siwās marched into Mālwa. Bahādur, who had been waiting for such an opportunity, proceeded at the head of a large army into the Bāgar country where he was met at Samilah by Prithirāj, the Rājā of Dūngarpur, who embraced Islām. A little later the envoys of the Rānā of Chittor, Dūngarsī and Jairāj waited upon Bahādur and informed him that Sharzah Khan the Commander of Mālwa, had plundered the Rānā's territory and that Sultān

¹Abbās Sarwānī clearly says this and describes at length the measures devised by Sher Khan to win the sympathy and support of the Afghans. Elliot, IV, p. 352.

²Chānd Khan had first gone to Chittor and from there to Māndū and was hospitably received by Mahmūd II. At this time Razī-ul-Mulk, a discontented nobleman of Mālwa, fled from Bahādur's court to Agra and tried to persuade Bābur to assist Chānd Khan in getting the throne of Gujarāt. Bahādur was deeply incensed at this and his wrath was aggravated by Mahmūd's attacks on the Rājput princes with whom he was on friendly terms.

³This is the same Salhadi who fought with Rānā Sanga at Khānuā. He was afterwards overpowered by Bahādur Shah of Gujarāt and compelled to embrace Islām. The Muslim chroniclers write him as Salāhuddīn.

Raisin is situated at 23° 20'N. and 77° 47'E., 22 miles from Bhopal and 12½ miles by metalled road from Salāmatpur station on the Central Railway. *Central India State Gazetteer Series, Bhopal State*, III, p. 113.

Mahmūd meditated the death of Sikandar Khan of Siwās and Salhadi who had sought shelter with their chief. Dreading a coalition of Rājput Chiefs and Bahādur, the Sultān of Mālwa sent his plenipotentiaries, Daryā Khan and Quresh Khan, to offer his submission. Bahādur suggested that they should meet at Sambiah whither he proceeded, accompanied by Sikandar Khan, Salhadi, Dalpat Rao, the Rājā of Dhar, the Rājā of Bāgar and the Rānā's envoys. The Sultān of Mālwa put off the interview on one pretext or another. Deeply incensed at this lack of straightforwardness, Bahādur resolved to attack Māndū and his resolve to do so was strengthened by the malcontents who had gone to him to complain of the conduct of their master.

Bahādur pushed on to Māndū and after a short siege captured the fort on March 28, 1531. Finding resistance impossible Mahmūd capitulated, and he was ordered to be taken as a captive to Gujarāt. But at Dohad, when a Rājput warrior attempted the rescue of the Sultān from the Gujarātis, he was killed in the mêlée that ensued and his sons were carried to Muhammadābād and thrown into prison. The kingdom of Mālwa lay at the mercy of the invaders and they partitioned it as follows: the capital with the provinces in the north and west was annexed to Gujarāt; a small portion of territory was given to the Rānā, and the disaffected nobles of Mālwa who had gone over to Bahādur were confirmed in their *jāgīrs*.¹

Encouraged by the bold enterprise, Bahādur turned against Salhadi, the Chief of Raisin. The head and front of his offence, in the eyes of this unscrupulous and audacious ruler, according to the author of the *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī*, was that he kept Muslim women in his harem and, therefore, deserved to die. Twelve thousand Deccanis, 'skilled in sieges and mining', advanced against the fort to blow up its walls by means of gun powder. Salhadi, realising the danger that stared him in the face, valued safety more than honour and offered to surrender the fort and become a Musalmān. Bahādur accepted the offer but even after Salhadi's abandonment of his faith the siege did not come to an end. His valiant brother Lakshman Sena gallantly defended the fort and Salhadi's younger son attacked a royal outpost in Birsiah with 2,000 horse. The Sultān, on hearing the news, flew into a rage and declared that if Salhadi had not embraced Islām, he would have ordered him to be hacked to pieces.

¹According to the *Arabic History of Gujarat*, the date of this annexation is A.H. 937 (A.D. 1531). According to this authority (p. 196) the *Khutbah* was read in Shādiabād (Māndū) in Bahādur's name on the 12th Sha'bān, 937 (March 31, 1531). The date given in the *Tabqāt* is the 12th Ramzān, 938 (April 18, 1532).

Meanwhile the garrison was reduced to sore straits and sent word to Bahādur that the chief Rānī Durgāwatī refused to stir out of the fortress without holding a consultation with Salhadi. This request was granted and Malik 'Alī Sher escorted Salhadi into the fort. The Rājput̃s who had assembled in council to think out the ways and means of defence levelled furious reproaches at him: 'Why should you wish to live and, through fear of death, to cast your honour to the winds? Death is a thousand times better than this. We, men, will perish by the sword, and our women by the *jauhar*, that is, in the flames. Do you also, if you have the spirit, join us in this resolution.'

Stung by these reproaches, Salhadi agreed to join the forlorn hope of Raisin. Before giving battle to the foe, the Rājput̃s committed *jauhar* and hundreds of Rājput̃ānīs of pure blood and spotless honour perished in the flames. Salhadi died fighting after the manner of his tribe and thus saved himself from eternal disgrace. The conquered country was conferred upon 'Ālam Khan Lodi who had been expelled from Kālpī by Humāyūn and sought shelter at the court of Gujarāt. With the laurels of victory on his brow, Bahādur returned to his country.

He was now at the height of his power. Ahmadnagar acknowledged his supremacy: the kings of Khāndesh and Berār served in his armies, and he had secured several considerable successes over the Portuguese. Wealth increased his pride and he began to live in great pomp and pageantry. Feeling strong enough to embark upon his scheme of wresting from Delhi the supremacy of Rājput̃ānā, he turned suddenly upon his late ally, the Rānā of Chittor and proceeded to invade his dominions. Matters were in this condition when the Emperor, abandoning the siege of Chunār, returned to Agra to prepare for an expedition against Gujarāt.

Bahādur Shah, who did not feel ready to meet Humāyūn in the field owing to the unexpectedly stout resistance of the Rānā of Chittor, determined to keep him away as long as possible. Accordingly, while he sent a stately embassy to Agra, bearing messages of fervent loyalty and pacific intentions to the Emperor, he secretly despatched large sums of money to the Afghans in Bihār, arranging that, directly Humāyūn showed any serious intentions of marching south, such disturbances were to break out upon his eastern border as would effectually keep him at home. The Emperor was probably not deceived by fair words, but as he also needed time to complete his preparations, he showed the ambassador many tokens of esteem, and showered upon his master every possible mark of distinction.

Finally, the envoy was sent back with numerous protestations of goodwill. This was at the end of 1532.

Humāyūn's preparations for attacking Bahādur were subject, as that crafty prince had foreseen and ensured, to many interruptions. The first of these distractions came from the clique of Tīmūrid nobles, whose dissatisfaction and ingratitude we have already had occasion to notice. Upon the most formidable of these, Muhammad Zamān Mirza, the late Emperor had, as we have seen, showered favours. Although Humāyūn does not seem to have given him any cause for complaint, he was restless and dissatisfied. The Emperor soon became suspicious of him, for it became evident that he was conspiring with his cousin, Muhammad Sultān Mirza, and his cousin's son, Ulugh Mirza. These three worthies, it seems, took money from Bahādur Shah, and convinced him of the ease with which Humāyūn could be expelled, for the discipline of the army had grown lax; the nobles were disaffected and the Afghan menace had seriously jeopardised the interests of Bābur's dynasty in India. The Emperor accordingly encamped in strength at Bhojpur on the Ganges and despatched Yādgār Nāsir Mirza, the son of Bābur's youngest brother Nāsir Mirza, to Bihār to beat up the quarters of the malcontents. The move was so unexpected that it was completely successful: the three were helpless. It does indeed seem, from the story which Abul Fazl gives of a fight, that they resisted arrest, but their resistance was quickly overcome.¹ The arch-conspirator, Muhammad Zamān Mirza, was sent to Biyānā with instructions that he was to be blinded. But this was done in such a way that his sight remained uninjured. He succeeded in winning over his keeper, Yādgār Taghāi Beg, and with the help of a forged pass, the two fled together to Gujarāt. Muhammad Sultān Mirza and his sons Ulugh Mirza and Shāh Mirza, also managed to escape from their gaolers. That there was treachery at work seems evident. Indeed

¹A.N. I, p. 289. Abul Fazl says Muhammad Zamān Mirza, Muhammad Sultān Mirza and Walī Khūb Mirza were made prisoners. Muhammad Zamān was sent to Biyānā and the other two were blinded.

Gulbadan says (p. 114) that Muhammad Zamān Mirza had killed the father of Hājī Muhammad Kūkī and was contemplating rebellion. He was called and imprisoned in Biyānā in the custody of Yādgār. Yādgār's men sided with him and let him escape (1533).

The Emperor ordered that Sultān Muhammad Mirza and Nai (Wai) Khūb Sultān Mirza should both be blinded. Nai Khūb lost his sight but the man who was asked to blind Muhammad Sultān did not injure his eyes. A few days later Muhammad Zamān Mirza and Muhammad Sultān Mirza with his sons effected their escape.

Gulbadan Begam says frankly that 'uncle Yādgār's men' sided with the rebels and let them escape. However this may be, there can be little doubt that many of the men about Humāyūn would have been very reluctant to witness the blow struck at the power and prestige of the great nobles by the ruin of men like the Mirzas; it would have made the throne far too strong for their taste. The ultimate result was that Humāyūn's carefully prepared *coup* came to nothing. Indeed it would have been better if he had not acted so skilfully. As the Mirzas had not had time to organize resistance, so none of their preparations for rebellion had been disarranged: and directly Muhammad Sultān Mirza made his appearance at Qanauj after his escape, he was warmly welcomed and found himself in a short time at the head of 6,000 men.

Meanwhile Bahādur in the south had been occupying the time so well that he had completed his preparations to invade the territory of the Rānā, and to lay siege to Chittor itself (A.D. 1532). The offence of the Rānā was that he had marched to the help of the chief of Raisin. Bahādur sent Muhammad Khan Asīrī and directed Khudāwand Khan to proceed from Māndū against the fort of Chittor. When the two generals arrived in the vicinity of Mandsur, they were met by the *vakīls* of the Rānā who informed them that their master was willing to give up the Mālwa territory, to pay tribute and acknowledge Bahādur's suzerainty. The Rānā's cause was greatly weakened at this time by defections in his camp. Owing to Rānā Vikramājīt's wicked conduct Rānā Sanga's nephew Narsinghdeva and Medinī Rāo of Chanderi had gone over to Bahādur and kept him informed of the plans of the Rājput. The Sultān rejected the terms and pressed on the siege. Despite his large army the Rānā did not offer serious resistance and Tātār Khan, the Gujarāt commandant, plundered the suburbs of the fort and captured two of the seven gates. A number of Rājput chiefs fled to their *jāgīrs* without offering resistance.¹ Bahādur boasted that his army was large enough to capture four forts like Chittor and ordered Rūmī Khan to rain fire on the beleaguered garrison. In this hour of distress Rānī Karmāvatī implored Humāyūn for assistance, but in vain.² The Emperor, who desired

¹ *Vir Vinod*, Pt. II, p. 27. Even the names of the runaway chiefs are mentioned in this work.

² According to Tod, the Rānī sent a bracelet (*rākhi*) for Humāyūn who became her brother, pledged to her service. He goes on to add that Humāyūn proved a true knight and fulfilled his pledge by expelling Bahādur from Chittor. He girt Vikramājīt with a sword and restored him to his capital. This account is not supported by Muslim historians. The Rānī undoubtedly begged Humā-

no better excuse, marched in the direction of Bahādur's dependency, Gwālior, which was bound to Gujarāt by a subsidiary treaty and remained there for two months. He is reported to have received a letter from Bahādur in which the latter informed him that he was engaged in a religious war with the infidels and that he would have to answer for his conduct on the Day of Judgment, if he offered help to Vikramājīt. The powerful imperial force, however, was immediately obliged to return owing to the outbreak on the eastern border which Bahādur had so carefully prepared. The Rānā, in despair, was compelled to come to composition with Bahādur on terms ruinous alike to his pride and his pocket. He was compelled to restore the Mālwa territory, which he had seized, to pay an immense sum of money,¹ and to surrender a famous crown and belt of great historical interest, which had formerly belonged to Qutb Shah of Gujarāt and had been captured by Mahmūd I of Mālwa in 1452, and had been taken from Mahmūd II of Mālwa by Sangrām Singh in 1519. Bahādur then retired (March 24, 1533) desiring to make some final preparations for the struggle with Humāyūn, which he now saw to be inevitable.

The court of Gujarāt was now the acknowledged refuge for all who feared or hated the Mughal dynasty. It had become the centre from which plots were devised against Humāyūn's rule. Among the most dangerous of the refugees, who sought Bahādur's active interference against the Emperor, was Tātār Khan Lodi, son of 'Alāud-dīn Lodi. He had been imprisoned by Bābur in the great fortress of Qilah Zafar in Badakhshān, but had contrived to escape. He made his way back to India. Arriving in Gujarāt only a little time before, Muhammad Zamān Mirza also threw himself upon Bahādur's hospitality. Tātār Khan spared no pains in persuading his host that the imperial army had become pampered and pleasure-loving, and was no longer to be reckoned as a serious fighting force. The empire of Delhi, he said in effect, was at the disposal of Bahādur. Another notable antagonist of the Mughals who found security with Bahādur

yūn's help, but the latter does not seem to have effectively intervened to save Mewār from Bahādur. The humiliating treaty imposed upon the Rānā by Bahādur shows how hard pressed and helpless he was at the time. Tod, *Annals*, edited by Crooke, I, pp. 365-6. Bird, *Mirāt-i-Alimadī*, p. 247. Ojha, *History of Rajputana* II, pp. 708-9.

¹ The sum of money mentioned in the *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī* is one hundred lakhs of *tankahs*. Along with this the Rānā had to yield a hundred horses with gold-worked bridles and ten elephants as tribute. The same authority says that Bahādur accepted these terms, for he remembered the kindness of the Rānā who had saved his life when he was a fugitive at the court of Chittor. *Arabic History of Gujarat* I, p. 229.

was 'Ālam Khan Lodi, who, after being expelled from Kālpī as a result of Humāyūn's victory at Daurah, was warmly welcomed in Gujarāt and assigned the new-conquered fortress of Raisin. Accordingly, when Muhammad Zamān Mirza arrived in Gujarāt, he found that the Sultān was definitely, though secretly, committed to hostilities with Humāyūn. He had, by lavish bribery, succeeded in attracting a large number of mercenary troops from Delhi to Gujarāt, and felt confident in his ability to defeat the victors of Pānipat and Khānuā.

It was impossible that Humāyūn could remain long in ignorance of the intrigues which were being planned in Bahādur's court. The king of Gujarāt, by harbouring escaped prisoners, had committed a breach of the treaty obligations governing the relations between the two monarchs. The Emperor wrote a courteous letter, reminding Bahādur, who declined to comply with the request, alleging that distressed persons of high birth could be sheltered by princes without any detriment to treaty obligations, and mentioning that in the time of Sikandar Lodi, 'Alāuddīn had been sheltered by Muzaffar of Gujarāt. But Humāyūn was not to be put off, and grimly falling in with his correspondent's historical mood, pointed out that the ruin of Sultān Bāyazīd Ilderim of Rūm was due to nothing else but his folly in sheltering fugitives from the wrath of Tīmūr and in refusing to give them up when called upon to do so.¹

Bahādur, being now convicted of bad intentions, threw all disguise to the winds and pushed on his preparations with great vigour. He gave Tātār Khan twenty crores to hire mercenaries; he despatched 'Ālam Khan Lodi with a strong force to make trouble in the Kalinjar direction; Burhān-ul-Mulk Banyām, father of Tātār Khan, was sent off to the Punjāb to cause confusion there also. The main attack, which was to be made by Tātār Khan when he had hired his army, was to be a thrust towards Agra. Meanwhile Bahādur, still unwilling to take the lead in opposing Humāyūn, advanced once more upon

¹ This letter is reproduced in the *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī* (Fazlullah Lutfullah's translation), pp. 181-2. Also *Bombay Lithograph*, pp. 237-8. To Humāyūn's letter Bahādur sent an insolent reply and at the end asked him to banish pride from his mind. This correspondence on Bahādur's side was carried on by a certain Mullā Mahmūd Munshi who had been at one time in the service of Humāyūn, but had been dismissed by him. As he cherished a grudge against the Emperor, he often dipped his pen in gall and used offensive expressions. The author of the *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī* writes that the calamities which befel, Sultān Bahādur were due to the scribblings of this insolent man. One letter was drafted by this Munshi when the Sultān was drunk and it was sent to Humāyūn. An attempt was made to withdraw it but in vain. *Bombay Lithograph* pp. 241-2. *Arabic History of Gujarat I*, pp. 231-2.

Chittor, ready, if matters turned out well, to support his allies with his full strength or, if they were defeated, to disclaim all responsibility in the matter. In connection with Bahādur's cunning policy, it is interesting to note that the whole enterprise was bitterly denounced by his more experienced councillors; they called it bootless treaty-breaking, and they thought that the whole plan of campaign amounted to nothing better than an unskilful dissipation of forces which, if united, might have proved adequate to a very great enterprise.¹ The event showed they were right in their calculations. Humāyūn, after settling the Afghan trouble in the usual way, that is, by driving the rebels over the frontier into Bengal, had taken advantage of Bahādur's first retreat from Chittor to plan an expedition to the east. He found that it would be necessary to subdue Bengal if he was ever to deal successfully with the Afghans. At present, the rebellious nobles simply made it a base for their hostile operations and used it as an invincible sanctuary when those operations proved unsuccessful. Accordingly, in 1534, after elaborate preparations had been made, Humāyūn determined to conduct a punitive expedition against that somewhat disorderly region. It was very fortunate for him that his advance was slow, for, when he had got as far as Qanauj, he received intelligence which made him return to Agra post-haste. Tātār Khan had worked with such energy and had expended to such good purpose the money supplied by Bahādur, that he had contrived in a short while to gather an army of 40,000 men. With these he pushed on hard, hoping to surprise Agra.² The first thing that Humāyūn knew about the enterprise was the arrival of the disconcerting intelligence that Tātār Khan had captured Biyānā and was advancing fast. Almost at the same time he heard that Bahādur had renewed the siege of Chittor, which was on the point of falling. The Rānā had learnt no lesson from the disaster which had befallen him recently and his ill-treatment had induced his chief vassals to join the ranks of the enemy. Treachery was rife among the Rājput̃s and indeed they had no presentiment of the ruin that was in store for them. Further post brought Humāyūn intelligence of disturbances in the Punjāb

¹ A.N. I, pp. 296-7. Abul Fazl says Bahādur lent a willing ear to the Lodis who claimed the throne of Hindustān and did not heed the consequences of violation of engagements.

² The plan of Bahādur, according to the *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī*, was that Tātār Khan was to march upon Delhi by way of Biyānā and take possession of it. At this Humāyūn would either draw off his forces to oppose Tātār Khan or allow him to capture Delhi. Once master of Delhi, Tātār Khan would be able to raise a large army to oppose the Emperor and thus Sultān Bahādur's purpose would be served. *Bombay Lithograph*, p. 243.

and Kalinjar, and he suddenly realised that the moment was extremely critical. At this juncture he acted with praiseworthy decision. Rightly judging that Tātār Khan's force represented the main strength of the attacking party, he determined to crush it at once. Hurrying back to his threatened capital, he quickly despatched a force of 18,000 picked cavalry, under his most trusted leaders, Mirza 'Askarī, Hindāl, Qāsim Husain Sultān, Mīr Faqīr 'Alī Zāhid Beg, and Dost Beg to encounter the invader. The event was fortunate beyond his highest expectations. No sooner did the imperial forces draw near than the troops of Tātār Khan, with the usual reluctance of mercenary warriors to risk their skins, deserted in crowds. Of the 40,000 men who had taken Tātār Khan's money, a scant 3000 remained to do the work for which they had been paid. The rebel leader, unable to fight successfully and too proud to fly with ignominy was brought to an engagement at Mandler (Mandrāel).¹ The author of the *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī* writes that the Sultān had asked him not to risk an engagement, but he disobeyed his orders in the belief that Humāyūn and Bahādur would be disabled in the struggle that was going on between them and he would find it easy to secure the reins of power at Delhi with the help of the Afghans.² After a desperate resistance, he was slain with 300 of his officers, and his force entirely dispersed. Biyānā with its dependencies at once returned to the Emperor's allegiance.

Humāyūn was relieved from the immediate danger, but he began to realise that before he could tackle the problem of the Afghans and Bengal, Bahādur Shah must be encountered and destroyed. He was too wealthy, too ambitious, and too clever not to be dangerous in the highest degree. It is perhaps astonishing that Humāyūn should not have arrived at this conclusion long ago; but it must in fairness be remembered that his temperament was the reverse of suspicious, and that much of Bahādur's work had been done underground. The cardinal error which Humāyūn had so far made was in not crushing Sher Khan when he had the opportunity. The Gujarāt enterprise, so far from being a vain-glorious and ill-timed display of power, as some historians have tried to show, was in point of fact an indispensable preliminary to the security of the kingdom of Delhi.

Having once made up his mind to encounter Bahādur, the Emperor acted quickly. His preparations did not occupy much time, as the

¹ Tieffenthaler describes Mandler (I, p. 174) as 2 miles west of the Chambal. It is in what was formerly Karauli State, south of Agra and not far from Biyānā.

² The *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī* clearly says Tātār Khan's bad faith brought about his destruction.

army had been upon the point of marching into Bengal when the news of Tātār Khan's advance had compelled its return. From November 1534, until January 1535, the army was mustering in full strength at Agra, and at the beginning of February all was ready. The Emperor then set out in person. Marching in the direction of Mālwa, where he intended to strike his first blow against Bahādur, he came to the strong fortress of Raisin on the Betwā, which, as we have seen, had recently been subdued by Bahādur. The garrison, aware of the hopelessness of resistance, represented that they were the Emperor's servants, and were to be reckoned as holding the fort for him. They pointed out with truth that when once the fate of Sultān Bahādur was settled, the fort would lose its importance. Humāyūn, bent on the pursuit of bigger game, accepted their reasoning and submission, and passed on without more ado. Moving rapidly, he shortly arrived at Sārangpur¹ on the Kāli Sind, where he encamped, having without resistance penetrated to the very heart of Mālwa territory.

Sultān Bahādur was thunderstruck by the Emperor's action. Up to the very last, he had been deluding himself that the extensive military preparations in Agra had been intended for use against the Afghans, and with the curious blindness to which over-clever men are sometimes liable, he was convinced that no blame could attach to him for his share in the recent rebellion because he himself had not taken up arms against the Emperor. Thinking himself immune from all consequences, he was busily engaged in the siege of Chittor (1534) without troubling himself about his personal safety. When the unwelcome news of Humāyūn's activity reached him, his counsellors represented that the Rānā of Chittor was now so far reduced in power that the siege could be resumed at any time, and that Bahādur would do better to consider how he would meet the imperial army. But the Sultān of Gujarāt, with an accurate knowledge of Humāyūn's character and prejudices, accepted Sadr Khan's advice that it would be better to push on the siege, for the Emperor would never attack an army engaged in war with the infidel; or, even if he did, it would be easy to abandon the Rājput and attack the Mughals.² Accordingly, Bahādur wrote to Humāyūn that he should wait and with a quixotic sense of duty, which calls for wonder rather than admiration, he remained idle while his enemy was concluding the siege.³

¹ In what was formerly Dewās State in Central India, 80 miles from Indore. Abu Turāb Walī, *History of Gujarāt*, p. 13.

² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

³ The author of the *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī* writes (Bayley, pp. 381-2) that Humāyūn reflected thus: 'Sultān Bahādur is besieging Chittor. If I at this time oppose

On hearing of Bahādūr's march from Māndū towards Chittor, Rānī Karmāvatī begged the chiefs to forgive the faults of their inexperienced ruler and to gird up their loins in the defence of their country. Her appeal produced an immediate effect and the chiefs resolved to fight. But thinking that the supplies were insufficient they decided to send the Rānā (Vikramāditya) to Bundi and to make Rāwat Bāgh Singh Vice-Mahārānā during the period of the siege. They posted themselves at the various gates and Rāwat Bāgh Singh took up his position at the outer gate called Bhairavapol. The battle began and the choicest warriors of Mewār resolved to die in defence of their fatherland.

But Sultān Bahādūr Shah's powerful artillery, directed by an Ottoman engineer, Rūmī Khan and handled by Portuguese gunners, gradually proved too much for the defence of Chittor. A section of the wall was pounded to fragments and finally a mine was sprung, which resulted in a practicable breach. On March 8, 1535, the fortress was stormed amidst scenes of fearful carnage; the orthodox rite of *jauhar* was performed by the Rājput̃s in their despair and immense booty fell to the victors. Every clan lost its chief and the bravest of its men. Tod describes the scene in these words :

'The bravest had fallen in defending the breach now completely exposed. Combustibles were quickly heaped up in reservoirs and magazines excavated in the rock, under which gunpowder was strewed. Karnāvatī (Karmāvatī), mother of the prince, and sister to the gallant Arjun Hāra led the procession of willing victims to their doom and thirteen thousand females were thus swept at once from the record of life. The gates were thrown open, and the Deolia chief, at the head of the survivors,

him, I shall really be rendering assistance to the infidel, and such a proceeding is not in accordance with the law of the Prophet and with religion, therefore there must be a delay until this matter is disposed of.' Tod, *Annals*, edited by Crooke, I, p. 365.

Jauhar also says that, when Humāyūn was at Narwar, he received an *arzdāsh*t (petition) from Bahādūr Shah to the effect that he was engaged in besieging Chittor, a stronghold of the infidels, and that he should be excused for the time being. He added that he would carry out the command of the Emperor after finishing the siege.

Hāji-ud-Dabīr writes that Bahādūr mentioned five causes of war in his letter (*arzdāsh*t): (1) foundation of a new kingdom; (2) protection of a kingdom acquired; (3) attack on a tyrannical kingdom; (4) the desire for conquest; (5) plunder, unwarranted attack etc. Bahādūr added that he was induced by none of these motives. He was engaged in a *Jehād* and his sole desire was to add to the glory of Islām. *Arabic History of Gujarat* I, p. 230.

with a blind and impotent despair, rushed on his fate'.¹

Humāyūn, who had been hovering uneasily about while the toils were closing round Chittor, was at Ujjain when the final tragedy took place. On receipt of the news, he marched north at once to meet his enemy. Bahādur on his part seems to have tried to slip back to Gujarāt: at any rate he moved in a southerly direction. If he intended to escape, Humāyūn was too quick for him, for the armies came into touch near Mandsur.² An advance-guard of imperial horse, although not strong enough to inflict serious damage, rushed Bahādur's camp, and drove in the pickets, causing great confusion. Again there were divided counsels in the camp of Bahādur. Two of his principal officers, Tāj Khan and Sadr Khan gave what was probably sound advice namely, that battle should be joined with Humāyūn while the Gujarātī troops were still confident and exulting after their recent exploit at Chittor. But Rūmī Khan, the engineer officer, whose counsel was now at a premium through the skill he had displayed in the recent siege, pointed out that in a pitched battle it would be difficult to employ to full advantage the splendid artillery train which he commanded. The proper course, he said, was to fortify a laager of wagons, deplete the enemy with long-range fire, and finally disperse him when his *morale* was damaged. 'We have a grand park of artillery,' Rūmī Khan is reported to have said. 'When we have such a force of fire-arms, what is the sense in sword play? Fighting with arrows and swords has its own proper place.' So the counsel of Rūmī Khan carried the day, and the Gujarātī army settled themselves down inside an impregnable fortification to wear out the patience of the imperialists.

But all these tactics were going to be neutralised by the treason of Rūmī Khan himself. The brave general had a grievance against Bahādur. The latter was willing to make good his promise of placing

¹ Tod, *Annals*, edited by Crooke, I, p. 364. The Rājput annals give exaggerated accounts of the victims who perished in this *jauhar*. Nainsi's *Khyāta* (Part I, p. 55) says: 'Rānī Karmeti (Karmāvatī in Tod) committed *jauhar*. Four thousand Rājputs perished and about 3000 children were taken out of wells and tanks. Seven thousand women ended their lives with their children by drugging themselves with opium and innumerable men and women were made captives.' According to the *Vir Vinod*, thirty-two thousand Rājputs were killed and thirteen thousand women perished in the flames along with the Queen mother. The siege ended on March 8, 1535. (Part II, p. 31.) This is known as the second Sākhā or Sakā of Chittor. Though the figures cannot be relied upon, it is certain that this *jauhar* like others must have been a frightful thing.

² It is situated north-west of Mālwa in the former Gwālior State on the bank of the river Sipra.

him in command of the fortress but his nobles and chiefs dissuaded him from doing so. At this Rūmī Khan secretly opened correspondence with Humāyūn suggesting to him the means of defeating the Gujarāt army. He advised him to send his light horse to hover round the ramparts of carts and not to allow any person either to go in or out. The result of this would be to starve the enemy into submission.¹

Nothing could have suited Humāyūn better. He adopted the obvious and effectual course of encamping at a comfortable distance from his enemy, and sending out swarms of light horse, who hovered round, cut off supplies, and poured into Bahādur's camp showers of arrows to which no effective reply was possible. The Gujarātīs, who were imperfectly equipped with defensive armour, dared not venture far from their entrenchments for fear of the Mughal arrows. Before very long their grain, fodder and fuel became exhausted. There was great distress in the camp. The horses became so thin and lean that the flesh of four did not suffice for two men. The price of grain rose to four or five *tankahs* a *sir*. Bahādur tried to secure through the *banjārās* one million bullock loads of grain but the traitor Rūmī Khan again apprised the Emperor of his master's plan. The contingent which escorted the *banjārās* was scattered by Mīr Buska, his sons Kark 'Alī and Tātār Beg and other Amīrs, and the grain was carried to the imperial camp. The army lost all courage and the hope of success grew fainter and fainter.² Frequent skirmishes took place in which the Emperor's men were uniformly victorious. On one occasion, a party of young officers of Humāyūn's army, some two hundred in number, sallied forth flushed with wine and meat and scattered a body of several thousand Gujarātīs. From the time of this 'Combat of Friends' the besieged steadily lost heart, and before long they were afraid to quit their entrenchment at all. One solitary success did they score, when, on April 4, 1535, Muhammad Sultān Mirza and a band of five or six hundred men, succeeded in discovering an imperial detachment within range of the Gujarātī guns, which inflicted severe loss upon them. Before long the discouragement of the besieged became so evident that Humāyūn

¹ The *Mirāt-i-Sikandari* (Bombay Lithograph, p. 245) clearly says that Rūmī Khan's treason began before the battle of Mandsur. Erskine (II, p. 55) says the same thing. Abul Fazl (*A.N.* I, p. 304) does not say anything about this treasonable correspondence and says that after the battle of Mandsur Rūmī Khan entered His Majesty's service and received a robe of honour. Jauhar writes that Humāyūn ordered his army to cut off the supplies of Bahādur so as to starve him into submission. *I. O. MS.*, p. 19.

² Bayley, p. 384. Jauhar, p. 19.

considered it would be safe to attempt a direct assault. But as the weeks slipped by, Bahādur, desperately afraid of being caught in a trap, gradually came to the conclusion that it would be better to steal away. On April 25, on the very eve of Humāyūn's projected assault, Bahādur Shah ordered the heavy artillery, the pride of his heart, to be destroyed.¹ He himself, with a few followers, took the Agra road to mislead pursuers, and then doubled back to the nearest point on the road to Māndū, where his escort, 20,000 strong, was waiting for him, commanded by the trusty Sadr Khan and Imād-ul-Mulk Khāsākhail.² Muhammad Zamān Mirza went off to Lahore, where he had good hope of stirring up trouble which might ultimately cause Humāyūn considerable annoyance. But, as time was to prove, Kāmīrān was far too strong for him.

The imperial army, when they advanced to the assault, found a camp empty of all save plunder. The booty was immense, but Humāyūn was eager to give Bahādur no opportunity of making good his escape, and hurried on after him. While Yādgār Nāsir Mirza, Qāsim Sultān and Mir Hindū Beg followed up the broken army, Humāyūn in person directed the pursuit of Bahādur. The road ran through difficult country, but such was the vigour of the imperial troops who mistook the covering force under Sadr Khan for Bahādur Shah's personal escort that only at the cost of most desperate fighting did that gallant officer manage to secure the safe retirement of his master. Thanks largely to his personal skill and bravery, Sadr Khan was just able to enter Māndū with the remnant of his force. Several of Bahādur's best men joined Humāyūn including the artilleryman Rūmī Khan who was received into greater favour.³ The author of the *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī* writes that his desertion made the Gujarātis tremble as if the day of judgment had arrived.

The imperial army hurried up in hot haste and pressed the siege of Māndū with vigour. The fortress was formidable enough although it suffered from the defect, common to Indian strong places,

¹ The *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī* speaks of two large mortars known as Lailā and Majnūn. Bayley, p. 385.

² Bahādur was accompanied by five followers among whom were Muhammad of Khāndesh and Mallū Khan Qādir Shah of Māndū. The remaining three according to Abu Turāb's history were Aljih Khan Dutānī and two horseguards. Abu Turāb Walī, *History of Gujarāt*, p. 15.

³ From Abul Fazl's account it is clear that Rūmī Khan joined the imperialists after the battle of Mandsur. The imperial camp was at Nalchā (3 miles north of the Delhi gate of Māndū) where Rūmī Khan waited upon the Emperor. (*A.N.* I, p. 304). Erskine suggests (*II*, p. 55) that on no better ground than the want of success which attended his advice did Rūmī Khan desert his master and join the imperialists. Rūmī Khan's conduct was condemned by the Gujarāt soldiery.

of possessing an *enceinte* so extensive that no ordinary garrison could man it adequately.¹ Bahādur's men were, however, too discouraged by the recent disaster to show much resistance. Soon the Sultān found himself hard pressed, and in despair offered terms of peace. He agreed to surrender the whole kingdom of Mālwa, if he were confirmed in Gujarāt and Chittor.² The proposals were tentatively accepted, but no regular engagement was entered into. When the garrison rashly relaxed their vigilance, a body of two hundred imperialists succeeded in entering the town by escalade, seized the nearest gate, and opened it to their comrades outside. Bahādur Shah, roused from sleep by Mallū Khan of Māndū surnamed Qādir Shah, the officer in command of the defences, contrived with great difficulty to cut his way into the citadel, accompanied by only two attendants. Here he might well have held out for a considerable time, but he did not venture to stay. In the night he had his horses lowered from the wall by ropes, and descending from the ramparts with a few attendants, he rode hard for Gujarāt. Abul Fazl says he was joined on the way by Bhūpat Rai, son of Salhadi, with nearly 20 horse-men, but the author of the *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī* positively asserts that the fort of Māndū was betrayed through the treachery of Bhūpat who was seduced by Rūmī Khan, the artilleryman now in the imperial service.³ As Bahādur was passing an imperial outpost, he was recognized by an Uzbek named Būri who pointed him out to Qāsim Husain Sultān, but as this nobleman had once served Bahādur, he chose to ignore the information. The fugitive monarch escaped

The author of the *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī* relates the story of the parrot, which he heard from his father, who served as librarian to Humāyūn at this time. After the victory when Humāyūn held a durbar Rūmī Khan came in and on seeing him the parrot cried out, 'Scoundrel Rūmī Khan! the traitor Rūmī Khan!'. The parrot had heard these words uttered by the soldiers and it repeated them. When these words were translated to Humāyūn he said to Rūmī Khan who was visibly ashamed, 'If a man had uttered these words, I would have ordered his tongue to be drawn out but what can be done to this animal.' *Bombay Lithograph*, p. 248.

¹ For a description of the fort see *History of Māndū by a Bombay Subaltern*, originally published in 1844. Also *Archaeological Survey Report*, 1912-13, pp. 148-51.

² This agreement is referred to by Abul Fazl (*A.N.* I, pp. 304-5). A. F. says Maulānā Muhammad Parghali on His Majesty's side and Sadr Khan on behalf of the Sultān sat down together in the Nīli Sahī to conclude the terms of the treaty. The *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī* does not speak of these negotiations.

³ *A.N.* I, p. 305. Bayley, pp. 387-8. Rūmī Khan reminded Bhūpat of the wrongs which Bahādur had inflicted on the house of Raisin. Bhūpat's father was deprived of Raisin by him and forced to embrace Islām. Gulbadan's account is very brief. *H.N.*, p. 131.

to the great fortress of Champānīr, where he was joined by some 1500 men. Fearing the worst, he gave orders that as much of his treasure as possible was to be transported to the island of Diu.

As Humāyūn's camp was three miles away from the Delhi Gate of Māndū, at a place called Nalchā,¹ the Emperor did not hear of the escalade, which was entirely unpremeditated, until next morning. When he rose up in haste, he found that fighting was still going on, although the gallant Sadr Khan who was in charge of the remnant of the garrison had been forced to retire into the citadel. For four days he held out there while the imperial troops plundered the town below. At the end of that time, seeing that further resistance was hopeless, the garrison surrendered and were admitted to quarter. Sadr Khan was received with particular favour, and taken into the imperial service, the Emperor himself warmly congratulating him on the gallantry with which he had twice covered the retreat of his late master.² Only one act of vengeance was executed. 'Ālam Khan Lodi, grand-nephew of Sultān 'Alāuddīn, Sultān Sikandar's brother, was seized and hamstrung as a double-dyed traitor, who had proved false to his salt.³

The Emperor pushed on with 30,000 horse in the direction of Champānīr while the camp followed stage by stage. He arrived in the neighbourhood of the fortress long before he was expected, and encamped by Imād-ul-Mulk's tomb near the Pīpli Gate. Bahādur Shah, whose nerve was now thoroughly shaken, decided not to risk another siege. Accordingly, on the news of Humāyūn's approach, he gave final instructions for the defence of the fortress, ordered the town of Muhammadābād-Champānīr, which surrounded the fortress, to be fired and fled to Cambay. Humāyūn acted with the

¹ Nalchā is a small village 25 miles from Mhow and 16 miles south of Dhār. It is the headquarters of the *parganā* of the same name. It is mentioned in the *Ain-i-Akbarī* (Jarett, II, 112) as one of the twelve mahāls of the *Sarkār* of Māndū G. I. *States Gazetteer Series*, Vol. V, Pt. A., p. 508.

² This is A.F.'s account. (A.N. I, p. 306). The *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī* says Sadr Khan was badly wounded and put to the sword.

³ 'Ālam Khan with three hundred of his men was killed at the instigation of Rūmī Khan.

The same authority says that Humāyūn in the hour of victory clad himself in red garments and ordered a general massacre so that streams of blood flowed in every street and lane in Māndū. Naturally Abul Fazl would prefer to be reticent about such conduct. The Emperor desisted from carnage and plunder only when a noted musician of Bahādur, Manjhū by name, was presented to him. He was delighted to hear his song and at once put on the green garments. Manjhū obtained the release of several of his friends but he himself afterwards fled and joined Sultān Bahādur. *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī*, pp. 192-3.

greatest vigour. He arrived on the spot in time to give instructions for extinguishing the flames; he appointed Hindū Beg and the bulk of the army to conduct operations against the citadel, and himself with only about a thousand picked horse as escort, rode hard in pursuit of Bahādur. With such ardour did he press on, that as the king of Gujarāt went out from one side of Cambay town, Humāyūn entered it from the other. Bahādur took ship to Diu, after setting fire to a fine fleet of 100 warships he had prepared to overawe the Portuguese, lest the Emperor should make use of them to follow him overseas. The Emperor, having, as it were, driven his adversary out of India, encamped upon the seashore, and rested after the fatigues of the pursuit. Apparently this was in the beginning of 1536.

While Humāyūn was at Cambay with his small escort, he was exposed to an attack which, but for a fortunate accident, might have terminated the history of his reign then and there. Two of Bahādur's officers, Malik Ahmad Lād and Rukan Dāūd, determined to take vengeance for the misfortunes inflicted upon their master. Accordingly, they arranged that the Emperor's camp should be suddenly attacked in overwhelming force by a body of the savage tribesmen who inhabited the neighbourhood. The Koli and Gowar chiefs lent a ready ear to a scheme which would afford such a prospect of rich plunder, and a night attack was duly planned.¹ Fortunately for the Emperor, among the camp servants there happened to be a youth who had been captured in the vicinity of Cambay, and who had been detained as a hostage. His mother heard of the project, and fearing for her son's life, came to the imperial camp to buy her son's liberty with her information.² The soldiers at first laughed at the old woman, but in the last resort took her to the Emperor, to whom she told her tale. Her son was duly released, and arrangements were made for meeting the surprise attack. The royal camp was not moved, but the whole force withdrew from it, and took up their position a little way off. Just before dawn next day five or six thousand Kolis and Gowars (Gawars of Abul Fazl) suddenly descended upon the royal camp, and started to plunder. The royal troops, drawn up on an eminence near by, charged and scattered the attackers after some sharp fighting. Even when themselves

¹ The term Koli, meaning clansman, clubman or boatman, is applied to the middle classes of the military or predatory Hindus of Gujarāt. The Gowars are not mentioned in the *Bombay Gazetteer*, but they also seem to be a tribe akin to the Kolis. From the raid which they made upon the imperial camp it appears they were a wild tribe. They are mentioned along with Bhils. *Bombay Gazetteer* IX, Pt. I, pp. 237–9.

² Gulbadan makes a brief mention of this incident. *H.N.*, p. 132.

surprised instead of their intended victims the tribesmen fought so savagely that several men of eminence were slain. Among those whose death was particularly regretted was the gallant Sadr Khan, now a trusted servant of the Emperor. Humāyūn had a further cause for grief in the loss of some valuable books, his inseparable travelling companions. Among these was a magnificently illustrated *Zafarnāmah*, which was ultimately recovered to be the pride of Akbar's library.¹

As a revenge for this treacherous attack, the town of Cambay, which was probably as much surprised by it as Humāyūn himself, was plundered and burnt. This must have been some time in March, 1536. The Emperor then retraced his steps to Champānīr which endured a siege of four months. The commandant, Ikhtiyār Khan, conducted the defence with the greatest courage and resolution. The chief difficulty, from the point of view of the besiegers, was the impossibility of making the blockade complete, owing to the impenetrable jungle which grew up to the very walls of the fortress. Local wood-cutters, who had paths of their own for traversing thickets and brakes that would defy a corps of pioneers, used to bring corn and ghee to the foot of the walls to sell to the garrison. It seemed at one time that the siege might be indefinitely prolonged, for the artillery of the besiegers could make but little impression on the defences and the garrison could not be starved out. But after some four months, Humāyūn himself observed a party of peasants, just returned from bringing provisions to the foot of the ramparts, emerging from a thicket. They were arrested and as they gave unsatisfactory replies to the questions addressed to them they were beaten until they revealed the secret path to the foot of the wall. On a moonlight night, while the attention of the garrison was distracted by a fierce attack in another quarter, an escalating party climbed up the sheer face of the rock by means of spikes driven into the smooth surface. Humāyūn himself took part in the enterprise, and was the forty-first man who mounted. In this way some three hundred men scaled the ramparts. The little band of heroes

¹ Erskine, apparently borrowing his account from Abul Fazl, takes this book to be Sharafuddīn's *Zafarnāmah*. Abul Fazl says, when the Gowars plundered the royal camp, many rare books were lost and among these was the *Timūrnāmah* translated by Mullā Sultān 'Alī and illustrated by Ustād Bihzād which now adorns the National Library. Mr. Beveridge suggests that *Timūrnāma* is properly the title of a poem by Hātifi, i.e., Abdullah, the sister's son of Jāmih Erskine, *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p. 62. A.N. I, 309-10 (309 note 2).

made a concerted dash upon the rear of the garrison, which was engaged in holding the threatened portion of the wall against the heavy attack. With all the advantages of surprise in their favour, the escaladers succeeded in seizing a gate, and admitting their comrades outside. The brave commandant Ikhtiyār Khan cut his way into the citadel, but surrendered next day. He was treated well, in compliment to his gallant bearing and his great accomplishments, but the garrison were put to the sword as traitors to their overlord, the Emperor.¹

These events took place in the week of July 19, 1536 or by the Hijra reckoning the first week of Safar, A.H. 943.

The quantity of treasure which fell into the hands of the imperialists with the fortress of Champānīr seems to have been almost incredible. The place had long been one of the chief storehouses of the immensely wealthy Bahādur Shah, who had had no time to remove more than a portion of the wealth it contained. Jauhar has a story that 'Ālam Khan, one of Bahādur's principal officers, was, at Humāyūn's suggestion, invited to a banquet and well plied with drink, whereupon he revealed the secret of a vast hoard concealed in a large tank of ornamental water.² So great was the treasure that the shield of each man in the army was heaped with gold and jewels in proportion to his rank. Another treasure of bullion in bars, found about the same time, was not divided, but was kept for the Emperor's private use.

The fall of Champānīr, and the capture of so much treasure had a most unfortunate effect both upon the Emperor and the army. Instead of prosecuting his advantage, settling the affairs of Gujarāt, and then turning promptly to deal with the Afghan menace he remained idly near Champānīr, giving gorgeous and extravagant entertainments on the banks of the Du Ruya Tank. The natural consequence was that discipline in the army became extraordinarily relaxed. The following incidents give some idea of the disorder

¹ Abul Fazl says that Ikhtiyār Khan was a man who besides his knowledge of politics was conversant with mathematics and astronomy. He was a poet and composer of riddles. *A.N.* I, p. 312.

² Jauhar writes that when 'Ālam Khan came to pay his respects to His Majesty, the officers present suggested that he should be tortured so as to reveal the hidden treasure that lay in the fort of Champānīr. But the Emperor forbade recourse to harsh measures and advised them to arrange a banquet. Jauhar, *I.O. MS.*, pp. 20-21.

Abu Turāb Walī writes that out of this treasure one lakh eighty thousand Mahmūdī coins, which are equal to seventy five thousand rupees, were given to his father and uncle. *History of Gujarat*, p. 27.

which prevailed. One evening a party of palace underlings, armour-bearers, clerks, librarians, and so forth, were drinking in the Hālūl Garden,¹ and reading the *Zafarnāmah*. Following the example of the forty chosen companions of Tīmūr, of whom they had just read, these four hundred in a most valiant mood set out to conquer the Deccan.² Next morning their flight was discovered; they were pursued and brought back. Unluckily for the would-be knights-errant it was Tuesday, and Humāyūn, clad in blood-red, was seated upon the throne of Mars, administering criminal justice. Extremely incensed at what had taken place, and unbalanced by the influence of drugs, the Emperor ordered various savage mutilations to be inflicted upon them. At the evening prayers the Imām on duty foolishly read the chapter of the Qurān which relates the ruin brought upon the Masters of the Elephant by their attempt to destroy the sacred building at Mecca. Humāyūn, who took the passage as a reflection upon himself, had the Imām trodden to death by an elephant for hinting at tyranny. Maulānā Parghali interceded to save the Imām's life but in vain. It is only fair to say that later, when he had time to repent, the remembrance of these deeds filled him with bitter remorse.

While Humāyūn was idling and allowing his army to fall to pieces, the country west of the Mahindri³ still held out for Bahādur. The imperialists, glutted with the booty of Champānīr, had not troubled to collect the revenue of the country they had subdued. A plucky officer, named Imād-ul-Mulk, actually succeeded in forwarding to Bahādur the taxes which the peasants had gathered in readiness for the collection. He then went to Ahmedābād with a small escort of 200 horse, and, by lavishly distributing land and money, soon collected 30,000 men in the name of his master. Mujāhid Khan, the governor of Junāgadh, joined him with 10,000 more.⁴

Bahādur Shah sent him 500 European soldiers, borrowed from

¹ Four miles from the modern city.

² Abul Fazl relates an interesting story. He says these men read of the forty companions of Tīmūr. One day he took from each a couple of arrows and after tying them asked each of them to break the bundle. Then he opened the bundle and began to give each two arrows which they broke at once. Tīmūr told his men that if they were united they would be irresistible wherever they went. With this idea in their mind these men of Humāyūn girt up their loins with courage and went forth to conquer. *A.N.* I, p. 314.

³ This is a river of western India which is regarded by the Bhīls and Kols as their mother, and the latter make pilgrimages to some places on its banks. *I. G.*, Vol. XVII, pp. 11-12.

⁴ *A.N.* I, pp. 312-3.

the Portuguese viceroy, Nuno d'Acuna, as the price of permission to fortify the settlement of Diu.¹

The gathering of this force at last aroused Humāyūn from his lethargy. Leaving Tārdī Beg in charge of Champānīr, he marched straight on Ahmedābād. The advance guard came on in three bodies, right, centre and left, commanded respectively by Yādgār Nāsir Mirza, 'Askarī Mirza, and Hindū Beg. At midday, when it was intensely hot, the Gujarātīs sallied out of the town. They advanced with such speed that 'Askarī, who was in the line of attack, had no time to array his forces, and was obliged to fall back into a thorn-brake after abandoning his baggage. The Gujarātīs, without troubling to notice the right and left wings of the advance guard, fell to plundering; whereupon 'Askarī, his supporters having come up, advanced out of his thorn-brake and utterly destroyed the enemy. This was the first ruin of Bahādur's hopes: the town of Ahmedābād surrendered, and the whole kingdom was now in Humāyūn's power.

Next day Humāyūn advanced to Ahmedābād, encamping at Sarkhej some way off in order to save the town, which had been given to 'Askarī, from plunder. The question then arose as to what was to be done with Gujarāt. Hindū Beg and the most experienced of Humāyūn's counsellors advised the Emperor to keep a couple of years' pay for troops out of the treasure, to replace the rest, and to reinstate Bahādur as a vassal. This was undoubtedly sound advice. Bahādur's power for working mischief was largely gone and, being popular with his subjects, he could have been relied upon to keep them quiet. But Humāyūn, not unnaturally perhaps, desired some more tangible result for the ardours he had undergone. He decided to keep the kingdom under his own officers, and to make it a dependency of Delhi. 'Askarī was to rule in Ahmedābād with the title of the viceroy, and was to be supported by Hindū Beg with a powerful force. The other portions of the kingdom were distributed among the great nobles, on the general understanding that they were to be responsible to the viceroy. Pātan was given to

¹ These facts are somewhat differently related in the *Arabic History of Gujarāt*, I, p. 257. Bahādur attacked the Lord of Jagat who made his submission. When he returned, he found that the Portuguese had begun to fortify Diu with stones. He kept quiet saying to himself, 'Happy God will cause something to happen after this.' (*Ibid.*, I, p. 258). The *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī* says the same thing. The *farangīs* had begged Bahādur to grant them land equal to a bull's hide but they extended and fortified it. This made him very anxious and he began to look about for an excuse. *Lithograph Edition*, pp. 256-7.

Yādgār Nāsir; Broach, Navasāri and Sūrat to Qāsim Husain Sultān; Cambay and Baroda to Dost Beg; Mahmūdābād to Mir Būska.¹ Having settled the affairs of Gujarāt to his own satisfaction, Humāyūn determined to insure the permanence of that settlement by administering the *coup de grace* to Bahādur. He was preparing to follow the Sultān to his last refuge in Diu and he had actually reached Dandūqa, a place some thirty *kros* from Ahmedābād, when he received sudden tidings of disaster from the east.

The long absence of Humāyūn in Mālwa and Gujarāt had now begun to bear its natural fruit. Deprived of the Emperor's personal presence, the lieutenants who should have maintained the prestige of their master became supine and cowardly. Everywhere the forces of disorder gained in strength and sedition began to raise its head. The arch-rebel Muhammad Sultān Mirza, undeterred by the disasters which had overtaken his fellow-conspirators in Gujarāt, had been actively engaged with his two sons in fomenting disturbances in the east. So successful had he been that he was now master of all the country from Qanauij to Jaunpur. Sympathetic revolts promptly broke out in the Doāb, and even in the immediate neighbourhood of Agra itself. This was bad enough, but worse was to follow. Couriers came from newly-conquered Mālwa with the tidings that Sikandar Khan and Mallū Khan, two Afghan nobles of the locality, had burst into the territory of Hindia on the Narbadā river.² The *jāgīrdār*, Mihtar Zambūr by name, together with such imperial troops as happened to be in that region, had been compelled to take refuge in the fortress of Ujjain, which was the centre of imperial authority thereabouts. The librarian, Darvesh 'Alī Kitābdār³ had made a gallant resistance to the efforts of the besiegers, but when

¹ A.N. I, p. 317. The *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī*'s version is as follows: Humāyūn left 'Askarī at Ahmedābād, Qāsim Beg at Broach, Yādgār Nāsir Mirza at Pātan and Bābā Beg Jalāir at Champānīr. He himself went off to Agra by way of Asīr and Burhānpur. According to the *Arabic History* (I, p. 258) the settlement was as follows:

Ahmedābād—Mirza Hindāl, 'Askarī and Hindū Beg.

Nehrwala Pātan—Yādgār Nāsir Mirza.

Broach, Sūrat, Navasāri—Qāsim Husain Khan.

Champānīr—Bābā Beg Jalāir.

² Hindia is in the Hoshangābād district in the C.P.

³ Erskine calls Darvesh 'Alī governor but in the *Akbarnāmah* he is described as *Kitābdār*, a librarian. Mr. Beveridge translates *Kitābdār* as librarian. I do not know on what authority Erskine uses the word governor for him. It is certain he was among the garrison and offered a heroic resistance to the invaders. Erskine, *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p. 79. A.N. I, p. 318.

he was killed by a chance shot, the defenders lost all heart, and the place surrendered.

This news was of sufficient gravity to make the Emperor abandon his scheme of settling accounts with Bahādur Shah. He retraced his steps in the direction of Māndū, making over Gujarāt to 'Askarī as he passed through. But either he did not fully realise the importance of the situation, or, as is perhaps equally probable, he was suffering from the effects of opium. For, instead of marching to the centres of revolt as quickly as possible in order to catch and destroy the conspirators before they should have time to disperse, he lingered on his journey, going by way of Cambay, Baroda and Broach. As might have been expected, the news that he was on the move was sufficient, for the moment, to quiet dissatisfaction; and when, at length, he arrived in Māndū, after a leisurely interval, he found nothing but protests of loyalty, which were as profuse as they were hypocritical. Humāyūn, indeed, found the surroundings so pleasant that he could not tear himself away, and there he lingered for a considerable time, enjoying himself and granting *jāgīrs* with a lavish hand to his favourites.

The result was disastrous. No sooner was Humāyūn's back turned, than the country, which he had just left, rose in revolt. The Emperor did not realise that, situated as he was with enemies on all sides, his one chance of success lay in quick movement. His resources were immensely superior to those of his antagonists, but so sluggishly did he move that all the advantages of his superiority were thrown away. Like Alexander standing upon the bull's hide, the weight of Humāyūn's presence merely subdued the region where it happened to be resting at the moment. When he removed himself, opposition gathered strength by a series of lightning dashes. If Humāyūn had punished sternly all traces of past dissatisfaction without regard to protestations of present loyalty, then the whole history of his reign would have been different.

The disadvantages of the plan of action which he adopted soon became simply apparent. Hardly had the imperial army left the border in Gujarāt when a strong reaction in favour of Bahādur Shah set in. The castle of Sūrāt still held out for him; and in his island refuge of Diu he could concert his plans without let or hindrance. Most important of all, he had still a powerful war-fleet, which cruised up and down the coast of his dominions, carrying guns and muskets. He was only awaiting his opportunity which he found in the absence of Humāyūn. The castle of Sūrāt gave him a base of operations and his first step was to seize the town. His partisans rose, his fleet rendered

valuable assistance, and in a short time he was master of Sūrat. The population rallied round him, and he soon advanced to Broach, forcing Humāyūn's *jāgīrdār*, Qāsim Husain, to retire to Champānīr, and subsequently to Ahmedābād, in the vain hope of finding assistance. Cambay was shortly afterwards recovered by Bahādur, and the affairs of the imperialists began to take on a critical aspect. The viceroy, realising the danger, summoned Yādgār Nāsīr to a conference at Ahmedābād. This step, though perhaps inevitable, was unfortunate in its consequences, for Yādgār Nāsīr, somewhat naturally, took his troops with him as escort, and in his absence Pātan was surprised and taken by a body of men representing fragments of Bahādur's former army.

At Ahmedābād, all was in the direst confusion. 'Askarī was jealous of his dignity as viceroy, while the Mughal nobles insisted that he, like themselves, was but a vassal of the Emperor. He could not secure obedience to his orders, and in this difficult position, his temper suffered. He imprisoned his own foster brother, Ghazanfar by name, for making a remark derogatory to his dignity in the course of an intimate conversation. The result was that at this juncture, Ghazanfar deserted to Bahādur with 300 men, and revealed the disunion of the imperialists. Had 'Askarī been strong enough to ignore the jealousies of the great nobles, who should have been his principal support, he might yet have made head against Bahādur. The king of Gujarāt was, it is true, enthusiastically received by the population in general; but the imperialists, besides holding the two keys to the country, Ahmedābād and Champānīr, had enough troops to enable them to detach 20,000 men to watch Bahādur. The king of Gujarāt, determined to put his fortune to trial, had now advanced with a small force to within sight of his capital.

For weeks previously, it appears, 'Askarī and Hindū Beg had been sending express after express to Humāyūn at Māndū imploring him to send them decisive orders, if he did not send them help. But nothing whatever could be got out of him, and the two most energetic men among the imperialists in Gujarāt grew very uneasy. Hindū Beg, blunt soldier that he was, decided that a do-nothing Emperor was no master for him. He strongly urged 'Askarī to declare himself independent, for he thought that only by doing so could he induce the inhabitants to join him and stimulate the soldiers to nobler and more daring action. 'Askarī, after some hesitation, refused at first to adopt this course, but in a council meeting which he held to consider the situation it was determined to cut loose from the Emperor altogether. As Humāyūn persisted in remaining at Māndū, deaf to all their

requests for orders and assistance, it was hopeless to resist Bahādur in the field. If the empire of the Mughals was to be preserved, the council said, the Gujarāt army of occupation must seize the treasure of Champānīr, march on Agra, and there declare 'Askarī Emperor and Hindū Beg Wazīr.

While these deliberations were going on, the imperial troops had been drawn up at Asāwal to confront Bahādur. At the end of three days, when the council had come to the decision related above, the Mirza and his nobles suddenly retreated without fighting. So rapidly did they march that they abandoned even their private wearing apparel, in addition to all their military baggage and stores. Rapidity, indeed, was essential to their success. Hurrying in chase of them Bahādur contrived to bring the rear to action, but was severely checked by Yādgār Nāsir at Mahmūdābād,¹ and compelled to abandon the pursuit. However, he had the satisfaction of knowing that his attack had thrown the force into considerable confusion, with the result that in crossing the Mahindrī river many were drowned.

Now if Humāyūn was lethargic, his spies were not and he received very early intelligence of the treason that was meditated. This served at last to rouse him. He collected his army and marched in such a way as to intercept the conspirators when they moved on Agra. He also got into communication with Tārdī Beg, the governor of Champānīr, warning him against what was on foot. The consequence was that 'Askarī, on his arrival at Champānīr, was not allowed to enter the fort. In vain did he plead that his army was in dire straits, and that an advance from the treasury was an absolute necessity. Tārdī Beg resolutely declined to surrender a particle of his trust. The conspirators persisted in their request; they invited the commandant to present himself at a conference which was to consider the position of affairs, intending that he should be seized and kidnapped directly he set foot outside the walls. But when he was actually on his way to the meeting, he suddenly became suspicious, and retired immediately to the fort. He then peremptorily ordered the army to move beyond the range of his guns, and when they hesitated, he opened fire upon them. Disappointed at the failure of the first part of their plan, the Mirzas drew off and marched on Agra. This entailed the downfall of the imperialists in Gujarāt, as Champānīr was the only place that held for Humāyūn, but 'Askarī and his followers were now reckless of consequences. Unfortunately for their design, however, they were

¹ Hājī-ud-Dabīr writes an account of this battle and says that Bahādur defeated the Mughals. He dismounted from his horse and thanked God for the victory vouchsafed to him. *Arabic History of Gujarāt* I, p. 259.

intercepted by the Emperor in person as they crossed the territory of Chittor. Resistance was hopeless, and the Mirzas, seeing no other course of action open to them, feigned loyalty and submission. Humāyūn, somewhat weakly, professed himself satisfied, and bestowed lavish presents. This was doubtless due to a growing realization of the difficulties of the situation in which he was now placed.

The fate of Gujarāt may be briefly told. Directly Bahādur Shah heard of the retreat of the army, he crossed the Mahindrī, and advanced to Champānīr. Resistance was out of the question; Tārdī Beg abandoned the fortress and joined Humāyūn at Māndū just in time to set out with him to intercept the conspirators. Gujarāt was lost after an occupation of nearly nine months. Unfortunately for Bahādur, though he had won his kingdom, he did not live long to enjoy it. The Portuguese, who had afforded him considerable help in return for lavish promises, suspected him of a desire to avoid his obligations. He on his part seems to have considered that the Portuguese were over-greedy. Be that as it may, he was hoping to kidnap their viceroy at a meeting which had been arranged, but Nuno d'Acuna feigned illness, so that Bahādur had perforce to visit him. Fearing lest he should himself be seized, the king of Gujarāt attempted to escape; but a confused brawl broke out, and he was drowned in the scuffle. So great was his popularity that his subjects refused to believe news of his death, and for the next few years there were many reports of his appearance at several places in Gujarāt and the Deccan. The Muslim historians are unanimous in blaming the Portuguese, but it appears from the account of the *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī*, which cannot be charged with inventing a falsehood in a matter like this, that the Sultān wanted to kidnap their viceroy at a meeting which had been arranged. He sent Nūr Muhammad Khalīl, one of his attendants, to the *farangīs* with instructions to use every means in his power to bring the captain to him. This indiscreet agent, it is said, under the influence of liquor, disclosed the whole plan to the Portuguese, whereupon Nuno d'Acuna feigned illness.¹ The account given by Abu Turāb also shows that Bahādur suspected the intentions of the Portuguese. They had collected war materials and about five or six thousand men, whereupon Bahādur summoned their governor to his presence. The latter feigned illness and Bahādur, knowing that he was making vain excuses, went

¹ Bahādur's coming to Diu roused the suspicions of the Portuguese and they planned treachery. Nūr Muhammad was evidently guilty of disloyalty towards his master, for he did not make a true report to him.

The Portuguese had become a considerable naval power. They possessed 150 ships. The author of the *Mirāt* writes that the hostility between Bahādur

himself in a boat, accompanied by seven persons. His servants told him that the hour of breaking the fast of Ramzān was near and that the visit might be postponed but Bahādur did not listen to their advice.¹ He went to pay a visit to the viceroy accompanied by five or six nobles, to enquire after his health but from the demeanour of the Portuguese he at once suspected foul play and hastened to depart. The viceroy requested him to stay till some presents were shown to him. At this the Portuguese rushed in on every side and a fight ensued. When the Sultān got near to his boat, he was killed with a sword by a Portuguese. Abul Fazl supports the *Mirāt* and says that the treachery of the Portuguese was premeditated. They thought an excellent prey had fallen into their clutches and that it would be foolish to allow it to slip out of their hands. The Portuguese boats closed in upon him and in the fight that ensued the Sultān and Rūmī Khan threw themselves into the sea and were drowned.² Hājī-ud-Dabīr, who is a valuable authority for the history of Gujarāt, substantially corroborates the account of the *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī*. He writes that the Sultān, despite the warnings of his courtiers, went to pay a visit to the Portuguese governor who feigned illness and said that he could not move. The Sultān sat near him, but suspecting foul play, at once hastened to depart. At a signal the Portuguese ships surrounded the Sultān's barge and a fearful scene was enacted. He struggled bravely but a Portuguese thrust his spear into his breast at which he fell down into the sea and was drowned.³ Firishtah also supports this account and says that the Sultān's death was due to the attack of the and the Portuguese was due to the fact that the latter had come by a letter in which the Sultān had asked the rulers of the Deccan to join him in seizing the ports which were in the possession of the Portuguese. *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī*, I.O. MS., Bombay Ed., p. 258.

The names of the nobles who accompanied Bahādur are given in the *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī*. They are Malik Amīn, Shān Farūqī (not quite clear), Shujāh Khan, Langar Khan, son of Qādir Shah of Māndū, Alap Khan, Sikandar Khan and Kans Rai, brother of Medinī Rai.

¹ Abu Turāb Walī, *History of Gujarāt*, p. 32.

² *A.N.* I, p. 323. Abul Fazl clearly says the Portuguese meant treachery. They wished to get some ports from him when he was well within their clutches. But he writes that the Sultān was drowned; he does not say he was killed by a Portuguese with a sword.

³ *An Arabic History of Gujarāt*, edited by Sir Denison Ross, I, pp. 261-2. It is clear from Abu Turāb's account that the Portuguese meant treachery. The bugle was sounded at the appointed hour; the boats collected, a fight ensued, and the Sultān fell into the sea. This is based on Rūmī Khan's version. Another version is that the Sultān fell into the waters and when he raised his head, a *farangī* struck him with a spear. He fell down and was drowned. *History of Gujarāt*, p. 34.

Portuguese assassin.¹ A Dutch account of the 17th century is in substantial agreement with the *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī*. It says that Bahādur's death was resolved on beforehand and when the Portuguese governor gave the signal, his men rushed towards the king and slew him.² The Sultān died, according to the *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī* on February 13, 1537 after a brilliant career full of adventure and strife.

A close examination of the statements of the various Muslim chroniclers leaves no room for doubt that there was suspicion on both sides. Bahādur wanted to curb the power of the Portuguese who had strongly fortified their settlements and had set up a kind of *imperium in imperio*. The Portuguese on the other hand wanted to secure the utmost advantage for themselves by seizing the person of the Sultān. Fearing lest he should be seized, Bahādur attempted to escape but a confused brawl broke out and under a dagger thrust he collapsed and was drowned in the scuffle.

Thus perished Bahādur, king of Gujarāt, who is described by historians as a brave, warlike and generous ruler of high ambitions and winsome manners. His character presented an admixture of opposing

¹ Briggs, *Rise of Muhammadan Power in the East*, IV, p. 131. Briggs writes a lengthy note (IV, pp. 132-42) on Bahādur's death and sums up by saying that each party wanted to seize the other; that the followers of both parties were aware of the intentions of their masters. It was by chance that a brawl broke out which blew the embers of suspicion and mistrust into a blaze, and produced the melancholy result which has been related.

² *A true and exact description of the most celebrated East Indian Coasts of Malabar and Coromandal as also of the Isle of Ceylon* by Philip Baldaeus, Minister of the Word of God in Ceylon, printed at Amsterdam, Volume III, p. 59 (1672), '... It was not long before Bahādur went into his boat again in order to return, but was no sooner got into it and making the best way to the shore, when Nonnius giving the signal to his men and exhorting them to do their duty, they leaped into boats kept for the purpose and following that of Bahādur attacked him on all sides. The king exhorted his men to fight. A desperate fight followed and the Portuguese were in danger of losing their prey, Souza himself being slain in the first attack.'

'The bravery of a servant of Bahādur deserves special mention. He wounded with eighteen arrows as many Portuguese till he was killed by a musket shot. In the meantime three boats armed with Turks were sent from the shore to help Bahādur but having most of them killed and the king's galley struck upon a bark, he leapt into the sea and sorely wounded did swim to the galley of Tristan Pavia and begged his life which he would have granted but, just as the king was entering the vessel, he was slain by a seaman who knocked his brains out with a club. This was the unfortunate end of Bahādur, one of the most potent kings of Asia, who not long before had been a terror to all the circumjacent countries.' The account of the *Mirāt-i-Ahmadī* is a copy of the previous works, James Bird, *History of Gujarāt*, p. 250.

qualities. Kind-hearted and generous, he was ferocious in dealing with his enemies and slew them without ruth. He was fond of displaying the trappings of royalty and like many an eastern monarch loved magnificence and power. He was lavish in his gifts and it is said that musicians received so abundantly from him that his minister had to substitute inferior coins for those with which he rewarded them. At one time his power was so great that his *Khutbah* was read in Gujarāt, Burhānpur, Māndū, Ajmer, Kālpī, Biyānā and several states of Rājputānā which were made to feel the force of his arms.¹ The death of such a powerful enemy rid the empire of Delhi of a danger which had long occupied its attention and strained its resources.

Disorder prevailed in Gujarāt and Muhammad Zamān Mirza, the Mughal refugee at Bahādur's court, succeeded in winning the confidence of the Queen mother to such an extent that she intended to adopt him. He thought of punishing the Portuguese, but on realizing their power he abandoned the project. Assured of palace support, the Mirza collected 12,000 men, caused the *Khutbah* to be read in his name and began to behave as a king. But he was expelled by Imād-ul-Mulk with the help of the nobles of Gujarāt who proclaimed Mirān Muhammad Shah of Khāndesh, a nephew (sister's son) of Bahādur, as king of Gujarāt.² But his reign lasted only for a short time; after six weeks he was succeeded by Muhammad Khan, another nephew of Bahādur Shah.

The reason why the history of Humāyūn's exploits in Gujarāt has been detailed to this extent may perhaps require a word of explanation. The reason briefly is this: the Emperor's absence in Mālwa and Gujarāt combined with the loss of prestige which resulted from his failure in those regions were the two factors which made possible the Afghan national revival of which an account will be given in the next chapter.

¹ Hājī-ud-Dabīr, the historian of Gujarāt, writes with some exaggeration that his *Khutbah* was read in Gujarāt, Burhānpur, Māndū, Ajmer, Kālpī, Biyānā, Baglānā, Jalor, Nagor, Junagarh, Khankhot, Raisin, Ranthambhor, Chittor, Idar, Rādhānpur, Ujjain, Mewāt, Satwas, Abu and Dasūr. These places give an idea of Bahādur's extensive kingdom. *Arabic History of Gujarāt* I, p. 263.

² Imād-ul-Mulk soon collected a force of 40,000 men and won to his side the nobles of Gujarāt by offering them all kinds of inducements. Meanwhile a message came from Mirān Muhammad Shah Burhānpurī that he had been nominated heir to the throne by his late uncle and that he was entitled to his possessions by virtue of his will. After Muhammad Zamān's expulsion the *Khutbah* was read in the name of Mirān Muhammad Shah. Abu Turāb Walī, *History of Gujarāt*, p. 38.

CHAPTER V

THE AFGHAN REVIVAL—EARLY CAREER OF SHER SHAH

AFGHAN historians themselves are unanimous in ascribing the beginning of Afghan power in India to the policy of Sultān Bahlol Lodi. That monarch was the nephew of Sultān Shah Lodi, surnamed Islām Khan, who, in the time of Mubārak Shah, held the *Sarkār* of Sirhind. To this charge Bahlol himself succeeded, and before long his power and ability became so marked as to expose him to the jealousy of those who claimed to sway the policy of the feeble Sayyid Sultān of Delhi, 'Alāuddīn. It was a time of great confusion, when the whole of Hindustān was split up among a number of separate rulers, each being, for practical purposes, autonomous in his own dominions. In consequence Bahlol, by his superior address and greater military genius, found little difficulty in persuading the inhabitants of Delhi to receive him as king, while the nominal Sultān was induced to resign.¹

But Sultān Bahlol had no easy task before him. He was exposed to the jealousy not only of monarchs like Sultān Mahmūd, whose ancestors had established the Sharqī dynasty of Jaunpur, but also of powerful nobles of his own family, like Daryā Khan Lodi, who regarded themselves as being his equals in power. Bahlol saw at once that, unless he could set his royal authority upon a thoroughly national basis, the crown must fall at last from the heads of his descendants, as it had fallen from the heads of the many preceding dynasties whose rise and decay made up the previous political history of Hindustān. On the other hand, if he could establish his throne upon a basis of national feeling, blood kinship, and pride of race, there seemed every prospect that his family would continue to rule for many generations. This reasoning on the part of Sultān Bahlol is clearly indicated by the phrase of the author of the *Tārīkh-i-Salātīn-i-Afghānā*.² Bahlol remarked that the sovereignty of Hindustān ought to be held by an

¹ The story of Bahlol's early life is related by the author of the *Makhzan-i-Afghānī* who bases his account on the *Tārīkh-i-İbrāhīm Shāhī* and the *Tārīkh-i-Nizāmī*. As governor of Sirhind, Bahlol exercised absolute power, but Qutb Khan, the son of Islām Khan, in a refractory spirit went to Sultān Muhammad at Delhi and complained against Bahlol. He despatched Hājī Shaidānī, surnamed Hissām Khan, against him and in the battle that followed Hissām Khan was defeated and driven back to Delhi.

² This phrase is *Sin-i-bā wiqār-i-kadevar-i-bāsabāb*. It means an experienced and respected leader of the tribe.

experienced leader of tribes; and he himself was distinguished among Indian monarchs by the number of his tribes and clans. The whole nation of the Afghans, poor and indigent though they were, being his relatives and brethren, he entertained the wish to send for them and assign to them estates in Hindustān so that they might make head against his powerful enemies and grasp the kingdom of Hind.

The Afghans themselves being very ready to fall in with his scheme, he sent *firmāns* to the headmen of each tribe and clan to come and assist him in the establishment of his authority. Accordingly, large numbers came from the hilly regions lying to the west of Sirhind, and put their swords at his disposal. The result was two-fold—complete triumph over his most formidable adversaries, like Mahmūd of Jaunpur; and the ultimate settlement in Hindustān of large numbers of excellent fighting men whose fortunes were intimately bound up with the fortunes of his own family. The process was, of course, a gradual one. It was difficult to induce a whole nation to leave the freedom of their native hills, and adopt even a semblance of the more peaceable life of the plain-dweller. But as the Afghan warriors grew more and more accustomed to serving Bahlol in his wars in Hindustān, they gradually became attracted by the idea of settling in a rich and fertile country under the rule of the most prominent prince of their own race, and within a short time the land was full of Afghan settlers who had migrated along with their wives and children. According to 'Abbās Khan, the author of the *Tārīkh-i-Sher-Shāhī*, Bahlol gave a formal command to his nobles to assist him in encouraging the migration: 'Every Afghan who comes to Hindustān from the country of Roh¹ to enter my service, bring him to me. I will give him a *jāgīr* more than proportioned to his deserts, and such as shall content him; but if he for reasons of kindred and friendship prefers remaining in the service of any one of you, do you provide for him to his satisfaction, for, if I hear of one Afghan from Roh returning thither again for want of a livelihood or employment, I will resume the *jāgīrs* of that noble who may have refused to entertain him.'² The result of this practice soon became apparent. To continue the quotation: 'When the Afghans of Roh heard of it, and saw the favour and affection of the king towards them, they began every day, every month and every year, to arrive in Hindustān and received *jāgīrs* to their heart's content.'³

¹ According to the *Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī* the country of Roh extended from the neighbourhood of Bajour to Sībī in Bhakkar and from Hasan Abdāl to Kābul and Qandhār. *T.S., A.U. MS.*, p. 141.

² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

There can be no question whatever of the political wisdom of Bahlol's plan. It was not merely that he was adopting the well-known maxim of new rulers, that is, to make it the interest of as many people as possible that the new regime should endure; he was in addition making a far-sighted use of the two strongest bonds which then held society together, blood-kinship and pride of race, in order to place his power upon a thoroughly national basis. Earlier rulers had, indeed, dimly perceived the necessity for some such step, and had given a warm welcome to adventurers of their own race who came to seek service in Hindustān. But Bahlol was the first to carry out the idea methodically and on an adequate scale and it is this which makes his reign so important. As a result of his policy, the Afghans were established so solidly at the top of the political structure of Hindustān that their power became practically unassailable. To the sense of blood-kinship and to pride of race, there was joined a pride of power, a consciousness of great position and great responsibility which at length assumed almost all the imposing properties of caste feeling. Community of race, community of interest, community of religion, were the solid, almost impregnable buttresses of Afghan power.

There was, however, one weakness in the Afghan polity and through this, at length, came its downfall. The strength of the dominant people lay in their unity, and the preservation of that unity was the most important function of the king. But on the other hand, their independent temper, their obstinacy, their reluctance to admit the superiority of the ruling clan made it difficult in the extreme. Unless handled with extreme tact, flattered, cajoled and conciliated, the Afghan warriors became sulky, insubordinate or frankly mutinous. As a consequence the personality of the prince became a factor of the very greatest importance. A ruler who was clever at humouring their prejudices could find in them such bold warriors and faithful servants as existed nowhere else in India; on the other hand, an arrogant and tactless sovereign, who partook somewhat of their own temper, not only received no assistance from them, but found them irreconcilable, treacherous, and dangerous in the extreme.

Now Sultān Bahlol perceived this very clearly, and deliberately adopted a habit of life calculated to conciliate his wayward compatriots. Not only did he always abstain from any ostentation which might offend the free and independent tribesmen upon whose swords his power rested, but in addition he made a point of deferring in every way to their prejudices and whims. This line of action, of which many somewhat humorous illustrations are given in the ordinary text-books, has often been mistaken, especially by European

historians, for weakness. But it was not weakness at all, it was a policy deliberately planned and carried out to achieve a particular end, which, in fact, it did achieve. As long as Bahlol lived, he received from the Afghans support so loyal and so effective that he was powerful as no other ruler in Delhi had been for a century or more. And this achievement is the more wonderful in the light of the great losses in revenue and territory which the Sultān had suffered in the course of the previous fifty years. The founder of the dynasty, in short, was a truly national monarch, ruling over a nation of willing subjects. As such his power was irresistible.

His son, Sultān Sikandar, while not a man of Bahlol's political sagacity, had sense enough to see clearly where his own interests lay. He ruled his people with tact and firmness, extending considerably the territories inherited from his father. He did not, however, perceive that in this very extension there lurked an element of danger. He found it convenient to place large tracts of territory under nobles nearly akin to himself; but he was not wise enough to take proper precautions against the growth of over-mighty vassals. The consequence was that at his death he bequeathed to his successor Ibrāhīm a situation which might very well have taxed the wisdom of Bahlol himself. The old difficulties of ruling the turbulent, independent Afghan warriors still persisted, and there now existed, in addition a small body of extremely powerful nobles of royal blood, whose, immediate interests were often opposed to those of the ruler of Delhi, and who had not the wit to perceive that, in the long run, the weakness of their monarch entailed the ruin of their nation and of themselves.

It was under these circumstances that Ibrāhīm succeeded to the throne of Delhi. He was the last man in the world for the position at this particular moment. Though personally brave to rashness, he was cruel, haughty and destitute of tact. He attempted to make himself absolute, with the result that he offended the tribesmen upon whom his empire depended: he attempted to repress the powerful nobility by acts of cruelty and bloodshed, with the result that he drove them into open sedition. In short, he completely destroyed for a moment the unity of the Afghans upon which their national position and his personal power depended. By his savage cruelty he drove into revolt first Daulat Khan, the viceroy of the Punjāb, and secondly, his own uncle 'Alāuddīn. These men in their desperation brought down Bābur of Kābul, involving the whole Afghan polity in sudden ruin.

The temporary overthrow of the Afghan rule at Pānipat came as

a thunderclap to the bulk of the nation. There was a bitter feeling that the fight had not been fair; that the resources of the Afghans had never been matched against those of the Mughals. But with the death in battle of Ibrāhīm, the essential weakness of the Afghan political fabric asserted itself with fatal results. There was a continued series of revolts under local leaders like Biban and Bāyazīd; there was much irregular fighting, and much conspicuous bravery; but there was no unity of purpose, no central point around which the resources of the nation might rally. The so-called Sultān Mahmūd who ruled in ephemeral fashion in Bihār never commanded the allegiance of any considerable portion of the nation. Indeed the root of the trouble lay in this fact; the mistakes of Ibrāhīm, combined with the disasters resulting therefrom, had so far destroyed the unity of the Afghans that they had split up into mere congeries of petty clans. Not until there should arise a national leader strong enough and fortunate enough to reduce these clans to obedience by force and by address, would it be possible for the Afghans to regain the position which they had lost not, as one of their leaders frankly admitted, 'by the force of the Mughals, but by their own divisions.' This, then, was the situation which confronted that remarkable character, Farīd, surnamed Sher Khan, afterwards Sher Shah, first monarch of the new Afghan empire built up by his own exertions.

The grandfather of Sher Khan, and founder of the family fortunes, was a certain Ibrāhīm Khan Sūr, whose original home was near Peshāwar. In the reign of Bahlol Lodi, he came with many others of his nation to seek service in Hindustān. With him came his son Mian Hasan Khan, the father of Farīd. For some time, it seems, they were retainers of a powerful nobleman of their own tribe, Mahābat Khan Sūr, to whom Sultān Bahlol had given, among other *jāgīrs*, the *parganās* of Hariānā and Bahkāla in the Punjāb. Ibrāhīm and his son settled down in the *parganā* of Bajwārā. After some time, Ibrāhīm left Mahābat Khan, and entered the service of Jamāl Khan Sārang Khāni, who held Hissār Ferozah and who conferred upon him several villages in the *parganā* of Nārnaul for the maintenance of forty horsemen. In this place was born his grandson Farīd, the Sher Khan of history.¹ Not long after the birth of his eldest son, it

¹ The exact date of Sher Khan's birth cannot be ascertained. 'Abbās Sarwānī says he was born in the time of Bahlol Lodi who died in 1488. Probably he was born in 1486. Dr. Qanungo accepts this date and uses it in calculating the age of Sher Shah. Dr. Parmātmā Saran dissents from this view and says that he was born in December 1472. He relies upon two works besides internal evidence furnished by 'Abbās Sarwānī's history. These are Sir Saiyyad Ahmad's

seems, Mian Hasan Khan Sarwānī, a high noble of Bahlol's court, who bore the title of Khān-i-A'zam 'Umar Khan was made governor of Lahore by the Sultān and given *jāgīrs* in Sirhind. Hasan Khan, in his turn, received from his master some villages in the *parganā* of Shahābād.¹

A story is told of Farīd which indicates his precocious courage and determination even at an early age. As a very young child he said to his father, Hasan Khan, "Take me before 'Umar Khan and say for me—Farīd Khan wishes to serve you; order him on any duty of which he is capable.' At first his father refused the request on the score of his tender years, recommending him to wait for some time. The boy was not discouraged by his father's refusal but went to his mother, an Afghan lady of considerable force of character, asking her to use her influence with his father. This she did, with the result that Hasan Khan to please Farīd and his mother, took the child to 'Umar Khan. The governor, flattered and amused at the little boy's request, gave him a hamlet of the village of Mahāwali, and promised to employ him when he was old enough. Both father and son were delighted, and when Farīd got home he said to his mother. 'My father would not take me save at your request, and now Masnad-i-'Alī has given me a village in *parganā* Shahābād.'²

Some time after this, Ibrāhīm Khan Sūr died at Nārnaul and his son Hasan Khan requested leave of absence to condole with relations and retainers, saying that he would return to the service of 'Umar Khan. But that nobleman generously declined to stand in the way of his advancement, saying to him: 'Your father's retainers now all look

Asār-us-Sanādīd and the *Jām-i-Jām* compiled in the time of Bahādur Shah. Both are later works and much reliance cannot be placed upon them. Qanungo, (*Sher Shah*, p. 3.) *Hindustani* (Journal published by the Hindustani Academy, U.P.), Vol. III, pp. 200-05.

¹ The *Makhzan* says that a district of Shahābād called Bhowlī was settled upon Hasan. Dorn, *History of the Afghans*, p. 81. (English translation of the *Makhzan*).

Abul Fazl writes that Ibrāhīm Sūr was a horse-dealer and his native place was Shamlā in the territory of Nārnaul. His son Hasan gave up trade and took to the military profession. For a long time he remained in the service of Raimal, the grandfather of Raisal, a *darbārī* of Akbar. The family seems to have frequently changed service. (*A.N.* I, p. 327.) According to 'Abbās, Ibrāhīm had come from a place which is called in the Afghan tongue Sharghari (or Nasarghari) and in the Multānī dialect Rohri and this is a part of the Sulaimān range. It is six or seven *kros* in length and is situated on the edge of Kamālpur. *T.S.*, *A.U. MS.*, p. 7.

² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

to you; you will be able to obtain your father's *jāgīr* or even a larger one than your father's was. I am not so unjust to my own tribe as to keep you on a small *jāgīr*.' He then sent for Jamāl Khan, the overlord of the deceased Ibrāhīm, and strongly recommended to him the son of his old retainer. The result was that Hasan Khan received his father's *jāgīrs* and soon rose into high favour with Jamāl Khan.

The next step in the rise of the family was taken after the death of Sultān Bahlol. His successor, Sultān Sikandar, conquered Jaunpur from his brother Bārbak Shah, and conferred the whole *sūbah* upon Jamāl Khan, ordering him to maintain 12,000 horsemen and to assign them *jāgīrs*. Jamāl Khan, who had found in Hasan Khan a loyal servant and a sagacious counsellor, took him along with him to the new charge, and assigned to him in *jāgīr* the *parganās* of Sahasram, Hājīpur, and Khāspur Tāndā near Banaras for the maintenance of 500 horsemen. Unfortunately for Farīd, his home life was not happy; he was indeed his father's eldest son, but he and his next brother Nizām were born of an Afghan mother who no longer commanded the affections of her husband.¹ Hasan Khan was extremely fond of his slave girls, by whom he had six sons, and was particularly attached to one of them, the mother of the two boys named Sulaimān and Ahmad. This woman was jealous of Farīd's precedence over her own sons, and always did her best to poison Hasan Khan's mind against him. The young man was of a stern and self-reliant temper, so that high words often passed between father and son. When Hasan Khan's new prosperity came upon him, Farīd naturally expected to receive a *jāgīr* of some value. But so coldly did his father treat him, that Farīd left his home and went to Jamāl Khan in Jaunpur. Hasan Khan, apparently regretting what had happened wrote to his overlord, asking him to appease Farīd, if possible, and send him back, but if he remained implacable, to see the boy instructed in religious and polite learning. Farīd declined to return but set himself to study with ardour at Jaunpur, then a centre of culture and learning. He devoted much attention to Arabic, the sacred tongue of his faith, and also to histories of past kings of Hindustān. He studied with thoroughness the commentaries of Qāzī Shihābuddīn on the *Kāfiyah*² (a treatise on syntax) and studied

¹ According to 'Abbās, Hasan had eight sons. Farīd Khan and Nizām Khan were born of an Afghan mother; 'Alī and Yūsuf of another, Khurram and Shādī Khan of a third and Sulaimān and Ahmad of a fourth. (*Ibid.*, p. 11.) The *Makhzan* agrees except in one point. It says Sulaimān, Ahmad and Mudāhīr were born of one mother and Shādī Khan, who was born of the fourth wife, had no brother. Dorn, *History of the Afghans*, p. 81.

² The *Al-Kāfiyat-fi-l-Nahnavis* a manual of Arabic grammar composed by

after the fashion of the day, the *Sikandarnāmah*, the *Gulistān*, *Bostān* and other works. He was particularly careful to frequent the society of religious and learned men, well knowing the vast influence they exerted upon the minds of all ranks of his countrymen.

He remained in Jaunpur, cultivating valuable friendships and pursuing his studies, for some years. At the end of that time some kinsmen took the opportunity, when Hasan Khan was in Jaunpur, to reproach him somewhat sharply for having treated a young man of such promise so badly for the sake of a slave girl. They could guarantee, they said, that if Farīd were entrusted with the charge of a *parganā* he would acquit himself very well. The suggestion was particularly opportune, as Hasan Khan had been commanded to attend upon his master, and would be obliged to spend much time in Jaunpur itself. He readily agreed to give Farīd charge of his own two *parganās*. The young man took over charge with some reluctance, not because he feared to assume the responsibility, but as he frankly said, because directly his father saw the face of the slave girl, he would do whatever she told him, and the *parganās* would be given to Sulaimān and Ahmad.

For some time, it appears, father and son remained together at Jaunpur, and Hasan Khan gradually became proud of his son's intellectual vigour and great force of character. When at length he despatched him to the administration of the *parganās*, he had given him the fullest power at his own request, to grant or to resume *jāgīrs* at his discretion, together with a solemn declaration that no act of his should be reversed. Accordingly, Farīd proceeded to his first position of trust with a good heart.

It was not long before the extraordinary administrative capacity, amounting to positive genius, of the young man made its mark upon the *parganās* entrusted to him. The rule of his father had, at least of late, been supine and careless, so that Farīd soon found much to amend. In the main, it was the old story of extortion on the part of the headmen, patiently borne by the cultivators lest worse things should befall. The government dues were estimated in proportion to each year's crop, and the measurement of the crop was performed by a body of crop-measurers, who extorted heavy sums, and the state was robbed at every turn. The revenues wrung from the peasantry went into the pockets of the collectors, and not into the treasury. This was not all, however; there was a certain number of thoroughly refractory persons, who, taking courage from the slack-

Jamāluddīn bin Abu Amar Usmān, generally called Ibn-ul-Hajib who died in 1248. It is not clear whether Farīd read the original or the Persian translation of Qāzī Shihābuddīn Jāmī. *I.O. Catalogue*, 1313.

ness of the administration, had utterly declined to pay their taxes, and had resisted collection by force. The major portion of these offenders were small zamindars, but sometimes also whole villages had banded themselves together to evade their obligations. Further, it was no uncommon thing for the rebellious to make a comfortable living by robbing their more law-abiding neighbours. The new administrator resolved to reduce this chaos to order. He started by issuing from Sahasram a *firmān* bidding all the *muqaddams*, *patwārīs* and soldiery assemble. He impressed upon the soldiers the necessity of promoting contentment among the people which could be done by showing kindness and encouraging cultivation. Further he asked them to give up extortion and threatened to punish severely disobedience and rapaciousness. He then addressed them briefly, explaining the policy which he proposed to adopt, and the powers he possessed of enforcing it. The principal features of his plan were: first, the encouragement of the peasantry; secondly, the exact determination of state rights and their strict enforcement; thirdly, the maintenance of order. Then he turned towards the peasantry and explained his policy in regard to the settlement of revenue. He gave the headmen their choice, as to whether the payment should be in coin or kind. Having determined this matter he gave formal leases of their obligation. He further fixed the fees of the corn measurers and of the tax collectors, effectually preventing extortion by announcing that the accounts were to be audited in his own presence, and by threatening the heaviest penalties for petty oppressions.¹ In the actual collection of the revenue, he laid down and enforced the cardinal principles of easy assessment rigidly. 'It is right for a ruler,'

¹The text of 'Abbās runs thus: 'I have given you to-day the option. Make your choice. Some cultivators accepted the *jarīb* and others *ghallā* or payment in kind. Farīd obtained *qabūliyats* from the tenants (ryots) and fixed the *jarībānā* (charges of measurement), *muḥassalānā* (charges of collection) and provisions for *muḥassals*. No extra charge was to be made. If you will charge in excess from the ryot, the amount so taken will not be deducted at the time of settling your accounts. You must know that the accounts will be adjusted in my presence and that only legitimate expenses will be recovered from the ryot. You will pay the proper dues (*zar wājibī* and *sabābī*)—the revenue for *kharīf* during *kharīf* and the revenue for *rabī* during *rabī* because the arrears of revenue lead to the desolation of *parganās* and bitterness between the *āmils* and tenants. The duty of the officer (*hākīm*) is to be lenient at the time of *jarīb* and to take into consideration the actual produce, but at the time of collection he must realise the dues with great rigour.'

Jarīb here means fixing of rent by measuring the area under crop. Obviously the choice of the peasants was between measurement and sharing of produce. Mr. Moreland calls this the mode of assessment and says that some wished to pay

he is supposed to have said, 'to show leniency to the cultivators at the time of measurement (*jarīb*), irrespective of the actual produce; but when the time of payment comes he should show no leniency, but collect the revenues with the utmost strictness.' He declined to permit arrears to accumulate as they had done in the past much to the detriment both of the treasury and the cultivators, but announced that the government dues for the spring harvest would be collected in the spring, and for the autumn, in the autumn. Finally, declaring that it was his fixed intention to watch over the prosperity of the cultivators he invited them to bring complaints directly to himself for consideration and remedy.

The system of forced labour and many other vexatious imposts, to which the cultivators had hitherto been subject, were abolished. In every village an officer was appointed to guard the rights of the people. Partly owing to the care with which Sher Shah treated the peasantry and partly owing to the disorder which prevailed in the country, about a thousand cultivators came from other lands to settle on his *jāgīr* and engaged themselves in cultivation.¹

The next step was the restoration of order throughout the *parganās*. For this purpose, so far had matters gone that a regular body of troops was necessary. His father's principal advisers urged him to wait until Hasan Khan himself could be approached; but Farīd had his own way of doing business, and felt that decisive action

by measurement, and others by sharing and Farīd allowed them to do so. This was Farīd's method of assessing the revenue. In his *jāgīr* both systems of measurement and division of crops seem to have been prevalent.

The passage in the *Makhzan* runs as follows: 'The choice today rests entirely in your hands. You may, if you like, have the *jamā* (assessment) fixed after the *jarīb* (measurement) of the cultivated lands. Some accepted the *jarīb*, others chose the *khirāj* and executed *Khat-i-Qabūliyat* (letters of agreement). The *jarībānā* and *muḥassalānā*, i.e., the charges on account of management and collection were also fixed at this time. This being done, he told the *muqaddams* and *sharikdārs* that at the end of each harvest he would call the big and small cultivators and scrutinise the assessment and the expenses of collection. If a pice more is exacted than what is fixed today, he would deal severely with the *muqaddam*.' T.S., A.U. MS., pp. 21-2. *Makhzan-i-Afghānī*, I.O MS. Moreland *Agrarian Systems of Moslems in India*, p. 69.

¹*Daulat-i-Sher Shāhī* MS. The author of this book, who was an intimate friend of Farīd, relates a curious story of the abduction of the daughter of a Rājput of Mārwar by Farīd. Evidently, he had come to settle in Bihār. His name was Jai Singh, a man of the Rathor tribe, whom Farīd threw into prison for remonstrating with him. Jai Singh, on his release, attempted to kill Farīd and in the scuffle that ensued the author of the *Daulat-i-Sher Shāhī* also took part. Jai Singh was killed and his daughter was so over-powered with grief at her father's death that she ordered a fire and burnt herself.

must be taken at once. He mustered all the soldiers who were left in the *parganā*, and supplemented their numbers by such Afghans and men of his own tribe as were without *jāgīrs*. He promised them a free hand with all the plunder they might collect from the rebels, together with ample rewards of land for distinguished conduct. He also put them in a thoroughly good humour by distributing such clothes and money as he could lay hands upon. He borrowed horses for his men from the villages, every one of which could provide two or three. By this means, in a very short time, he had raised and equipped a body of some 200 cavalry.

The first objects he selected for attack were the villages which had declined to pay their dues. Before long, he had taken all the principal places, and had made a clean sweep of the women, children, cattle and movables. The men had for the most part taken to the jungle. To his soldiers he handed over the cattle and plunder; but he kept the women and children in honourable confinement. With these hostages in his hands, the work of negotiation was easy. The refractory villagers were perforce compelled to give in, and provide pledges for their future good conduct lest their wives and children should be sold to defray the debt they owed to the state.

There were some villages, however, situated in the remoter places, which were so rash as to take no warning by the fate of the others. These Farīd determined to extirpate, being convinced that, as they were peopled by bandits and robbers, they could never fall into line as part of a well-ordered *parganā*. Accordingly, he set to work to collect a force adequate to the task in hand. Leaving half his soldiers to collect the revenue after the new plan and to perform other local duties, he took the remainder with him to stiffen the army he was raising from the land-holders. He ordered that one half of the able-bodied men of each village should come to him, bringing what arms and horses they had. He then set out upon his first military enterprise.

His plan of action on this occasion reveals all those qualities of cautious design and careful execution which were to be responsible for his subsequent triumphs on many a battle-field. Advancing against each rebel village in turn, he erected a mud fort on the outskirts of the jungle surrounding it. He then sent out bodies of light horse to scour the neighbourhood, and to isolate the village completely, giving them orders to kill all the men they met, to seize the women and children, to destroy the crops, to carry off the cattle, and to prevent all attempt at cultivation. Meanwhile, his footmen cleared a path through the jungle, and when it had been pushed far

enough, he erected another fort, closer to the village. In this way, working methodically and quickly, he approached nearer and nearer until finally he attacked and took the place. He wisely declined to listen to any offers of submission from the now terrified rebels, saying to his men: 'This is ever the way with these fellows; they fight and oppose their ruler, and if they find him weak, they persist in their rebelliousness; but if they see that he is strong, they come to him deceitfully and humble themselves and agree to pay a sum of money, and so they persuade their ruler to leave them alone; but as soon as they find an opportunity, they return to their evil ways.' Accordingly, he put all the men to death, gave the women and children to his soldiers to sell or keep as slaves as they preferred, and brought other people to inhabit the village.¹

A few sharp lessons such as this proved quite sufficient to reduce the remaining villages to order. The obstinate zamindars were terrified into submission, while peaceful persons were protected and encouraged, so that in a very short space of time both *parganās* prospered exceedingly. Soldiers and peasantry alike were contented and quiet, and both classes united in praise of the young ruler. When Hasan Khan returned from his duty of attendance upon Jamāl Khan, he was delighted at his son's achievement, and determined to entrust him with the permanent management of the districts.

Unfortunately, no sooner had he reached his home than Hasan Khan fell under the influence of his favourite wife, and Farīd's position was threatened.² His father openly admitted that the administration of the *parganās* was excellent and that he had no fault to find; but he said pathetically that he must allow Sulaimān and Ahmad to manage the districts for a short time in order to save himself from daily and nightly vexation. He could not live much longer, he said, and after his death the *parganās* would go to Farīd. But meanwhile Ahmad and Sulaimān must rule them. He tried to find

¹Farīd's attempts to punish the recalcitrant zamindars are described at length both in the *Tārīkh-i-Sher Shāhī* of 'Abbās and the *Makhzan*. T.S., A.U. MS., p. 27.

²Sulaimān's mother was sorely cut up at the exclusion of her sons and employed all the arts of a woman to bring about estrangement between Hasan and Farīd. She was distressed beyond measure and completely non-co-operated with her husband. Hasan's weakness asserted itself again and he resolved to placate her by depriving Farīd of the management of the *jāgīrs*. The infatuated husband was unnerved by her threat to commit suicide and kill her sons in his presence if he did not yield to her wishes. Fully convinced of Farīd's talents, he decided to take the unpleasant step simply to make his home-life peaceful and quiet. T.S., A.U. MS., p. 31.

a pretext. To justify his action Hasan tried to discover some fault in Farīd's management and angry words passed between father and son. The latter offered to give up his stewardship immediately and bore the trial philosophically, saying that the *parganās* belonged to his father, who must do what he pleased with them. The young man set out for Agra to seek his fortune at the capital leaving his brother Nizām to watch over his interests. On his way there he passed through Cawnpore, which formed part of the *jāgīr* of Azīm Humāyūn Sarwānī. Among the retainers of that nobleman was a certain Shaikh Ismail, whose father had been a Sūr of Farīd's own tribe. He decided to attach himself to Farīd who, accompanied by Shaikh Ismail and a certain Ibrāhīm, also destined for high position, pushed on to Agra. Looking round for someone to whom he could attach himself, he decided upon a commander of 12,000 horse, then in high favour with Sultān Ibrāhīm Lodi. He soon attracted the nobleman's attention, and told him the story of his father's infatuation and its effects upon his own fortunes. The *parganās*, he said, were being ruined by mismanagement, but if the king would grant them to him and to his brother Nizām, the two of them would, in addition to the service now performed by Mian Hasan, serve the Sultān with 500 horse in whatever place he ordered. Daulat Khan, accordingly, represented the state of affairs to the king, and requested that the *parganās* might be turned over to Farīd. But Sultān Ibrāhīm, being in sententious mood, merely remarked: 'He is a bad man, who complains against and accuses his own father', and declined to move in the matter. Daulat Khan consoled Farīd as best he could, promised to help him and to watch over his interests. The young man was very disappointed but remained where he was out of respect for his patron.

Matters were in this condition when Mian Hasan died¹ and Farīd's wisdom in leaving his brother Nizām upon the spot soon became apparent. The two sons of the favourite wife, Sulaimān and Ahmad, made a determined attempt to seize the succession. Sulaimān actually placed Hasan's turban on his head and behaved as his successor *de jure*. Nizām, however, remonstrated sharply with him, pointing out that he was not the eldest son, that from henceforth he would be dependent upon Farīd's bounty, and that it behoved him, now that his father was dead, to be more careful how he acted. His brother's plain-speaking evidently found an echo in the hearts of those about Sulaimān, for he gave up his pretensions and found it best to make a show of being willing to serve Farīd.

Nizām promptly communicated the state of affairs to his elder

¹According to the *Daulat-i-Sher Shāhī*, Hasan died of a fall from his horse.

brother. When Daulat Khan heard the news from Farīd, he bade him be of good cheer, and told him that he need not be anxious about Sulaimān's pretensions. The nobleman was as good as his word. He not only procured *firmāns* for the two *parganās* and gave them to Farīd but also obtained for him leave to go to the *jāgīr*. Farīd, therefore, set out gladly and, as might have been anticipated, relations, as well as his father's tenants and soldiery, duly recognised his succession to his father's dignity. Sulaimān, however, despising his brother's offer of a large *jāgīr* could not bear to acknowledge his inferiority, and fled to the powerful nobleman who ruled the *parganā* of Chaundh.¹ This man, Muhammad Khan Sūr Daūd Shah Khail by name, held a command of 1500 horse and had formerly been on bad terms with the late Mian Hasan. Thinking that by supporting one brother against the other, he could secure a predominant influence in their family affairs, he made Sulaimān very welcome. He advised him to be patient for a while, telling him that as long as Sultān Ibrāhīm held his position, there was little to be done for the moment, but that, owing to that monarch's tyranny and oppression, negotiations had already been made to bring Bābur and the Mughals down upon him. If he conquered in the inevitable warfare, then Sulaimān must go to him with letters designed to undermine Farīd's credit. On the other hand, if he were himself conquered, the *firmāns* would be so much waste paper, and Farīd might easily be turned out.

The first step in the struggle for the *parganā* was taken by Muhammad Khan Sūr. He sent his *vakīl* to Farīd, offering his intervention, and stating in scarcely veiled terms that he would deal hardly with the party which was bold enough to refuse it. Farīd's reply was tactful and firm; he admitted the power and prestige of the intermediary, and stated his readiness to respect his brother's rights in every possible way. He would give Sulaimān and Ahmad, he said, as large a *jāgīr* as they could possibly require, but he firmly declined to divide with them the government of the *parganās*. This, of course, was just why Muhammad Khan Sūr wanted to get rid of Farīd, and put in his place vain, weak Sulaimān, who would give him control of the two *parganās* himself. Accordingly, he remarked that, as Farīd Khan would not give a share quietly, he would compel him to do it by force. News of this came to Farīd before long, and caused him considerable anxiety. Muhammad Khan Sūr was far too powerful a man to be opposed with impunity. The only thing

¹Chaundh was a *parganā* of Rohtās in Bihār. The *parganā* town of Chaundh lies about forty miles west of Sahsaram. *Ain* II, p. 157.

to do was to seek a protector for himself. He decided that, if the Mughals were victorious in the struggle, he would put himself in the service of the son of Daryā Khan Lohānī, named, from the country he ruled, Bihār Khān.

Not long afterwards came the news of the battle of Pānipat, which caused much grief and indignation among the Afghans. Farīd acted with speed; Sultān Ibrāhīm Lodi was killed; his title to the *parganās* rested merely upon the deceased monarch's grant; and it behoved him to find himself a powerful protector. According to his plan, he presented himself to Bihār Khan, who was shortly afterwards set up by the Afghans of the east as Ibrāhīm's successor and entered his service. He employed himself so diligently and so skilfully in the business of Bihār Khan, or to give him his new title, Sultān Muhammad that before long he became indispensable. He was given free access to Sultān Muhammad in public and in private, and zealously devoted his wonderful organizing abilities, unhampered by formality, to his master's service. He accompanied him everywhere, and it was at his side that Farīd won his title of Sher Khan. While master and servant were on a hunting expedition, a tiger suddenly leaped from the brake and confronted them. Farīd, who was a skilful and dashing swordsman, promptly cut it down and despatched it. Sultān Muhammad, delighted at the spectacle, bestowed upon his follower the title of Sher Khan and, as a signal mark of his confidence, deputed him as manager of the affairs of his infant son, Jalāl Khan.

This interlude of peace was not of long duration; Sher Khan's enemies were not idle. Taking advantage of his protracted absence on his own estates Muhammad Khan Sūr contrived to undermine Sher Khan's position with Sultān Muhammad, pointing out that Sultān Ibrāhīm had called him a bad man, that his brother Sulaimān was being unjustly deprived of his rights and finally that Sher Khan was suspected of favouring Sultān Muhammad's rival in the leadership of the Afghans, the late Sultān Sikandar's son, who was now entitled Sultān Mahmūd. Such, however, were the services that Sher Khan had rendered to his master, that Sultān Muhammad, despite this calumny and back-biting, declined to judge him unheard and would not bring pressure upon him to divide the *parganās*, so that Muhammad Khan Sūr's main enterprise came to nothing. But having failed to secure his object by artifice, that nobleman determined to have resort to force. He had little doubt that, in the unsettled state of affairs which then obtained, owing to the overthrow of the Afghan government and the early difficulties of the

new Mughal dynasty, he would be able to seize the two *parganās* without exciting the opposition of anyone powerful enough to do him injury. With the idea of putting himself as much in the right as possible and perhaps in accordance with some suggestion of Sultān Muhammad that he should act as mediator, he sent his own confidential servant Shādi Khan to Sher Khan, remonstrating with him for taking possession of both *parganās* to the exclusion of his brothers. Shādi Khan set out at length with the message given him by his master; Sher Khan was as firm as ever. He pointed out that the ancient Afghan custom of equal division in all respects which prevailed in Roh could not obtain in a civilized country like Hindustān, in which country the land belonged to the king and not to the tribe. Besides, in the Afghan society which was entirely feudal, primogeniture had long been a recognized fact. To Muhammad Khan's reproaches Sher Khan replied that it was customary among the Afghans that the estate of a deceased nobleman passed to such member of the family as was distinguished by intelligence, courage and sagacity above the other claimants. The rule which governed the present case was one enunciated by Sikandar Lodi, disallowing the partitioning of *jāgīrs* and military retinue among all the sons of a deceased *jāgīrdār*. Sher Khan then proceeded to carry the war into the enemy's country by declaring that Sulaimān had carried off all the money and goods left by Mian Hasan, without regard to equity. 'Hitherto,' he is supposed to have said to Muhammad Khan's envoy, 'out of regard for my relationship with you, I have said nothing, but whenever Sulaimān may quit you, I shall reclaim my share of the patrimony from his. . . . It does not become you to say, "Give up Tāndā and Malhar¹ to Sulaimān". I will not give them up. If you take them by force and give them to him, it is in your power to do so. I have nothing more to say.'

This plain-spoken statement of the right of the case roused Muhammad Khan to fury. He would at least get the satisfaction of employing his superior force against the young man who had practically accused him of tyranny. He ordered his confidential servant Shādi to take every available man, seize the *parganās* of Tāndā and Malhar, and make them over to Sulaimān and Ahmad. If Sher Khan resisted, he was to be overcome forcibly and his men dispersed. A large force was to be left to support Sulaimān and Ahmad, lest Farid should be tempted to make any subsequent attempt at their ejection. As soon as Sher Khan heard of this he realised that for the moment

¹Tāndā and Malhar are situated near Banaras.

he was defeated, but he was determined not to be deprived of his rights without a struggle. Accordingly, he hastily despatched an urgent message to his faithful servant Malik Sukhah, father of the more famous Khawās Khan, informing him of the army that was advancing against the *parganās* and bidding him make what resistance he could. He seems to have hoped that the resistance which Sukhah could put up might at least delay matters until he could either bring up more troops, or else secure help from another quarter. But he reckoned without the strength of Muhammad Khan, which, in view of the shortness of the time available for organizing the slender forces of the *parganā*, was such as to render resistance fruitless. As Muhammad Khan's army approached, Sukhah gallantly marched out of the city of Tāndā to offer battle; but the faithful *shiqdār* was defeated and killed. Sher Khan's forces, being completely routed, dispersed, and the triumph of Sulaimān was complete.

The utter defeat of his lieutenant and the ruin of his little army, disconcerted the whole of Sher Khan's preparations for resistance, and for the moment he was at a loss to know what line of action he should pursue. Some of his adherents advised him to go to Sultān Muhammad, but he shrewdly judged that his former patron would never quarrel with the powerful Muhammad Khan over such a small matter. Further, even if Sultān Muhammad could be induced to take action, the most he would do would be to suggest a compromise; and Sher Khan, smarting under the high-handed appeal to force, which had deprived him of his rights, felt that the time for compromise had gone by. He desired an ally who was not only sufficiently powerful to humble Muhammad Khan but who would have no scruples in employing his strength for the purpose with these conditions, and that was the newly created government of the Mughals. Tradition says it was Sher Khan's brother, Nizām, who first urged that recourse should be had to the powerful Sultān Junaid Barlās,¹ high in favour with the Emperor Bābur, and younger brother to the prime minister, the great Mīr Khalīfah; but even if the suggestion emanated from Sher Shah himself, it would be difficult to condemn him for treachery to his race. The first essential to the success of those schemes of national regeneration, which must at this time already have begun to present themselves to his mind, was the acquisition of a recognised position among his own people,

¹Abbās says Nizām suggested this step and Sher Khan at once agreed thinking that it would give him an opportunity of revenging himself upon Muhammad Khan Sūr and driving him out of Chaundh.

and if this acquisition could only be achieved by the aid of those who were to be his principal antagonists, the price must be paid. Accordingly, Sher Khan went to Patna and there opened negotiations with Sultān Junaid Barlās through an intermediary. Having obtained a safe conduct, and permission to present himself, he waited upon the Mughal nobleman, and won his favour. Following the general policy of his race, which was to show kindness to all who exhibited a conciliatory temper, Junaid Barlās took Sher Khan under his protection, and gave him a large force to assist in the recovery of his *parganās*. So adequate was the support thus afforded that Muhammad Khan and Sulaimān, despairing of attempting resistance, fled to the hill district of Rohtās. Sher Khan made use of the Mughal soldiery so skilfully that he not only recovered his own *parganās* and conquered those of Muhammad Khan, but also took possession of several which had previously belonged to the crown.

In the hour of his triumph, Sher Khan gave evidence of his remarkable political sagacity. He restored the confidence of his own people by conciliatory messages, and as soon as the Afghans in general, attracted by promises of lavish *jāgīrs*, began to rally round him, he dismissed his Mughal allies with compliments and presents. Further he wrote to his former adversary, Muhammad Khan, saying in effect that the times were difficult for loyal Afghans, and suggesting that alliance and friendship would be highly profitable to both parties. Accordingly, Muhammad Khan came down from the mountains, regained possession of his *parganās*, and remained from henceforth bound to Sher Khan by the closest ties of gratitude. Sher Khan, having made his submission to the Mughal authorities, and having been confirmed by them in his estates, was obliged to attend at Court. He appears to have lived at Agra for some time, studying the military methods of the Mughals which he admired, and their method of conducting business which he condemned as corrupt and inefficient. He served through the Chanderi campaign and came in contact with the Emperor.¹ It was evidently while he was at this time brought

¹Abbās Sarwānī heard from his uncle Shaikh Muhammad that Sher Khan was present at the siege of Chanderi. It was there that he saw with his penetrating eyes the defects of the military organization of the Mughals. In describing the siege of Chanderi, Bābur makes no mention of Sher Khan. But soon afterwards in recording the events of February 1529 he writes that, when he was in the east, he heard the news that Mahmūd Khan Lodi had collected 10,000 Afghans, that he had detached Bāyazīd and Bībān towards Gorakhpore and that Sher Khan Sūr, whom he had favoured the year before with the gift of several *parganās* and had left in charge of that country, had joined the Afghans. The *Memoirs* do not make it clear what favours had been shown to Sher Khan, but it is certain

into intimate contact with the Mughals that he deliberately formed the intention of expelling them from India, and with an impudence rare in him talked fairly openly about it. He saw the relative strength of the Afghans and Mughals and came to the conclusion that the latter were in no way superior to the former in single combat or in battle and that the Afghan empire had been ruined not because of lack of bravery and skill in fighting but because of disunion and dissensions. The Mughals lacked discipline; their kings put too much reliance upon their chiefs and ministers and the latter could invariably be seduced by gold. Their greed made it impossible for them to be faithful to their masters and distinguish between friend and foe. So fully convinced was he of the weakness of the Mughal position that he felt confident of uniting the Afghans under his banner and of driving the Mughals out of India. Most people, even those of his race, tried to pass the matter off by laughing at him; but the Emperor, who had already been impressed by his personality, took a more serious view. He had told Junaid Barlās, when the latter introduced Sher Khan to him, that the Afghan seemed a clever man and his looks 'betokened the qualities of greatness and mightiness'. The Emperor felt inclined to arrest him, but he was dissuaded from doing so by Mīr Khalīfah, the Wazir, who feared much turmoil and strife among the Afghans in the imperial camp as a result of this

that he had put himself in touch with Bābur. Again in recording the events of March 1529, when Bābur was somewhere near Ghazipur in the east, he says: 'On Thursday (21st) Mahmūd Khan Nūhani waited on me. On the same day dutiful letters came from Bihār Khan Bihārī's son Jalāl Khan, from Sher Khan Sūr, from 'Alāul Khan Sūr and from other Afghan Amīrs.' Elliot, IV, p. 330. T.S., A.U. M.S., pp. 56-7. *Memoirs* II, pp. 651, 659.

Sher Khan was appointed deputy to Jalāl Khan by Bihār Khan, and after his death, in collaboration with his wife, Dūdū, he managed the affairs of Bihār with great success.

¹ 'Abbās writes that one day Sher Khan dined with the Emperor. A solid dish was placed before him and, being an Afghan rustic, he did not know how to eat of it. So he cut it into pieces with his dagger to the amusement and surprise of the guests present. On seeing this Bābur observed to Khalīfah: 'Keep an eye on Sher Khan; he is a clever man, and the marks of royalty are visible on his forehead.' Abul Fazl, who is hostile to Sher Khan, puts these words into the mouth of Bābur: 'Sultan Barlās, the eyes of this Afghan indicate turbulence and strife-mongering; he ought to be confined.' The author of the *Makhzan* also supports 'Abbās. The dish is called *āsh māhīchā* in the text. Elliot, IV, p. 331. T.S., A.U. M.S., p. 59.

This incident is differently related by Hasan 'Alī Khan, the author of the *Daulat-i-Sher Shāhī* who was present with Sher Khan in the imperial camp. He says that, when the dinner was over and the drinking bowl began to go round,

It is said, indeed, that Sher Khan only escaped arrest and imprisonment by suddenly absenting himself from his *jāgīrs* on the excuse of urgent private business. Here, as he well knew, he was comparatively safe, the Mughals being far too busy to arrest on suspicion individuals of resources as slender as those of himself.

According to 'Abbās, Sher Khan, on reaching his *jāgīr*, sent a handsome present to Sultān Junaid and apologised for his sudden departure from Court. He said he was compelled to come to his *jāgīr*, for Muhammad Khan Sūr and Sulaimān had informed Sultan Muhammad that he had allied with the Mughals and with their help had seized their *parganās*. He made protestations of loyalty and promised to be a 'grateful servant' of the Emperor. He was evidently playing a double game. He wished to keep the Mughals in the dark about his real intentions, for soon afterwards he took counsel with his brother Nizām and told him that he had no faith in the Mughals.

But the shrewdness of Bābur was disconcerting; and Sher Khan determined to betake himself again to his old protector Sultān Muhammad, the ruler of Bihār.

Sultān Muhammad, who had been grieved and troubled by the loss of a servant so capable as Sher Khan, welcomed him back warmly, and reinstated him in his position as deputy or lieutenant for Jalāl Khan, the heir apparent. After some time Sultān Muhammad died and his son being of tender years, Sher Khan became virtual ruler of the kingdom, an office which he filled with conspicuous success. Among the most brilliant of his achievements was the delivery of the country from the aggressive designs cherished by the king of Bengal, Nusrat Shah. That monarch had long desired to add Bihār to his already extensive dominions, and now that Sultān Muhammad was dead, and his successor a child, the opportunity for carrying out his scheme seemed to have arrived. Sher Khan on his part, had not been idle, but had contrived to cultivate the friendship of a

Sher Khan lost self-control and leaning towards him said, 'If it pleases God, I will expel the Timūrids from Hindustān and re-establish the power of the Afghans.' This was communicated to Bābur by Nāsir Qulī and his brother who were asked to keep an eye on Sher Khan and to cast him into prison next morning. Luckily Husain 'Alī came to know of this and informed Sher Khan of what was going to happen. Both took swift horses and fled from the camp. Later he sent an apology to Junaid Barlās and wrote to him that his flight was due to the fear of the other nobles from whom he apprehended danger. Ahmad Yādgār calls the dish that was served *kās-i-māhichā*. As there was no spoon, Sher Shah took out his knife and began to cut this delicacy with it. Bābur saw this and quietly said to Junaid: 'This Afghan is a strange fellow! I apprehend mischief from him.' *Tārīkh-i-Shāhī*, p. 180.

powerful Bengali nobleman, Makhdūm 'Ālam, governor of Hājīpur. In consequence, when Nusrat Shah despatched a large army under Qutb Khan, governor of Mungher, to invade Bihār, Makhdūm 'Ālam refused to join in the enterprise. Sher Khan, when he heard of the approach of the Bengal army, realised that the situation was serious. 'With the army of the Mughals on one side of us, and the army of Bengal on the other,' he is reported to have said to his men, 'we have no resource save in our own bravery.' His men supported him enthusiastically and after making all preparations for a sturdy resistance, he marched out to encounter the enemy, whose forces were far superior to his own. At the outset of the action, fortune favoured the Bihār troops, for an arrow, shot by Habīb Khan Kākar, nephew of Shah Ismā'īl, who had joined Sher Khan on his first journey to Agra, struck and slew Qutb Khan, the leader of the opposing army. After obstinate fighting, the Bengali troops were utterly defeated, and immense booty fell into the hands of Sher Khan. This booty he kept for himself and for his own men, not distributing it even among the Lohānīs, the tribe of Sultān Muhammad and Jalāl Khan. The consequence was that he gained a great reputation as an Afghan champion, but at the same time the covert opposition of the Lohānīs made his position very difficult. And when Nusrat Shah, indignant at the failure of Makhdūm 'Ālam to support the Bihār expedition, sent a force against him, Sher Khan had to stand idly while his friend was killed, his hands being tied by Lohānī hostility. He did, however, contrive to send one Mian Hansū Khan¹ with a small force to the help of the governor of Hājīpur, with the result that the ill-fated nobleman, in gratitude, made over to Sher Khan all his property, saying, 'If I am victorious, I will claim my property, if not, better you should have it than any other.' The death of Makhdūm 'Ālam considerably increased Sher Khan's private resources.²

At this time the power which he exercised in Bihār, and particularly the influence he exerted over the young Jalāl Khan, excited much opposition among the court circle. The Lohānīs, disgusted to find that Sher Khan was employing his newly acquired land and property for enlisting retainers for himself instead of for purchasing their good offices, did their best to undermine his position with his boy master. Sher Khan was not blind to their intentions, and he was well aware that his assassination was being planned. He took every precaution against exposing himself without a powerful guard;

¹ Mian Hansū, surnamed Daryā Khan, was married to Sher Khan's own sister. T.S., A.U. MS., p. 64.

² *Ibid.*, p. 64.

and thanks to his new resources, he was soon so strong as to make an actual appeal to violence sheer madness on the part of his enemies. But unfortunately for himself Jalāl Khan became jealous of Sher Khan and while professedly anxious to get him out of the way, the young ruler of Bihār, finding that Sher Khan was too prudent to be assassinated and too efficient to be removed conceived the mad idea of flying to Bengal, and enlisting the aid of Bengali troops to secure the expulsion of the too powerful regent. The Lohānī nobles, frightened by the disunion which prevailed in their ranks, advised him to take this step and asked him to exchange the kingdom of Bihār for a *jāgīr* in Bengal. This, of course, was just what Sher Khan desired. He felt that the kingdom of Bihār had nearly fallen into his hands. In the face of Bengali opposition, the Afghans of Bihār forgot their quarrels, and gladly accepted Sher Khan as their leader. He collected large forces, and putting the country of Bihār at his back, fortified a position right in the track of the advancing army. Ibrāhīm Khan, the Bengali general, attacked Sher Khan's position for some time without making any impression, but nonetheless became full of rash confidence. Both sides agreed to meet in open battle; and Sher Khan determined to employ the old but effective stratagem of feigned retreat and a force in ambush. A body of veteran Afghan cavalry retired in pretended disorder before the Bengali horse, and drew them away from the infantry and guns. Sher Khan, with the main force of his men, fell upon the remainder of the Bengali army and inflicted severe losses upon it. The Bengalis had been broken, and they had little chance to rally successfully. At last, they were utterly defeated and Sher Khan remained master of the field. He greatly added to his treasures and seized abundant munitions of war. He occupied himself at once with the administration of the country and warned the Afghans against unjust and oppressive conduct. He looked into the business of the *parganās* himself with meticulous care, put down tyranny with a high hand and won the loyalty and devotion of the troops by regular payment and fair and impartial treatment. This great success not merely ensured the independence of Bihar but also placed Sher Khan among the half dozen to receive the offer, which we have already noticed, of the hand of Lād Malikah and of the possession of the fortress of Chunār.¹

¹ The fort of Chunār is mentioned in the *Aīn-i-Akbarī* in *Sūbah* Allahabad. It is described as a stone fort on the summit of a hill, scarcely equalled for its loftiness and strength. Chunār is now in the Mirzāpur district. The fort is built on an outlier of the Vindhyan range, a sandstone rock jutting into the Ganges and deflecting the river to the north. Jarrett, II, p. 159. Hunter, I. G., X, pp. 333-4.

Unfortunately for him, just at the time when he was on the point of being recognized as nominal as well as actual ruler of Bihār, there appeared a rival with whom it was obviously impossible to cope. This was none other than Sultān Mahmūd, the son of Sikandar Lodi, who, after the death of his rival Sultān Muḥammad, Sher Khan's friend, was now the only official Afghan candidate for the Sultānate of Delhi. Sultān Mahmūd, after the ruin of his hopes by the crushing defeat of Khānuā, had taken refuge in Chittor, whither the Mughals had not so far felt strong enough to follow him. At length the Afghans of the east invited him to come to Patna, where they promised him enthusiastic support. He accepted their invitation, and soon found himself in a strong position. A'zam Humāyūn, his father-in-law, 'Isā Khan, Ibrāhīm Khan, and, above all the two greatest fighting Afghans of high birth, Mian Bīban Jīwānī (son of Mian Attā Sāhū-Khail, governor of Sirhind) and Mian Bāyazīd Farmūlī, rallied round him. Bīban and Bāyazīd had long been a thorn in the side of the Mughals; and their daring raids, penetrating on occasions as far as Lucknow, had greatly harassed Bābur. Sher Khan found that his schemes for seizing the leadership of his nation had suffered another postponement; and he had to submit to the loss of all Bihār except his personal possessions in Sahsaram.¹ He did, however, obtain from Sultān Mahmūd a *firmān* bestowing upon him the kingdom of Bihār as soon as Jaunpur and the districts to the west should have been reconquered by the Afghans. Just at this time, the Mughals suffered a great loss by the death of Bābur, who, though his mind and body had alike weakened during the last eighteen months of his life, possessed a name worth many legions. In his place stood Humāyūn, generous, indolent, and easy-going, hampered fatally by three unruly brothers and a growing addiction to opium. It was probably Bābur's disappearance that inclined Sher Shah to make use again of the Mughals in order to secure his predominance over his own people. As he doubtless foresaw, the jealousies, which naturally sprang up between the more active members of Sultān Mahmūd's party, such as Bīban and Bāyazīd, and himself, soon came to a head. He was accused of being in confederacy with the Mughals and when, in 1531, the Afghan army under the two redoubtable leaders marched on Jaunpur, they first swooped down upon Sher Shah, and forced

¹ It is clear from 'Abbās's narrative that Sher Khan found it impossible to offer any resistance because of the undoubted superiority in numbers of his opponents. He presented himself before Sultān Mahmūd and had to witness the appointment of Bihār territories among the Afghan nobles. *T.S., A.U. MS., p. 91.*

him, reluctant as he was, to join them.¹ This led to their own destruction.

It must not be supposed that Sher Khan's opposition to the proposed expedition was due solely to his jealousy at being superseded in the leadership of the Afghans. He clearly recognised, and pointed out to his intimates, that the project was foredoomed to failure for the same reason which had all along proved the ruin of the Afghans—want of unity among the leaders. He greatly disliked the idea of frittering away national resources in such a manner and his own personal feelings induced him to bring about the ruin of his rivals. At first all went well; Jaunpur was occupied after the expulsion of the Mughal garrison, and the Afghans advanced on Lucknow. Here they were opposed by the Emperor himself, and Sher Khan saw clearly that the enterprise was doomed. Not unnaturally he compassed his own salvation and the ruin of his rivals, by sending a letter to Hindū Beg, declaring that he had been compelled against his will to accompany the expedition, but that his heart was not in it, and that he would hold off on the day of battle. It was an act of sheer treachery on the part of Sher Khan. Humāyūn gladly responded to the overture, and bade Hindū Beg write back that if Sher Khan carried out this line of action, it should be for his advancement.

We have already seen how the forces came to action at Daurah on the bank of the Guntī, how Sher Khan drew off at the critical moment, with the result that Mahmūd's army dispersed, Bāyazīd was slain, and the back of Afghan opposition was broken. Mahmūd, himself an indolent and unambitious person, abdicated his claims and settled as a *jāgīrdār* at Patna, while of the powerful nobles who had placed him on the throne, all who were not slain were broken and discredited.

The result of this act of treachery on the part of Sher Khan must have exceeded his fondest expectations. He was now beyond question the most prominent man of Afghan blood, and the way was open to him for obtaining recognition as national champion. Having made use of alliance with the Mughals, as on a previous occasion, to further his own ends, he had no scruple whatever in passing into open opposition. We have seen how, as sign and seal of his importance, he became the object of attack by the Emperor in person. The abor-

¹ Sher Khan's capacity for finesse is clearly manifest in these transactions. He feigned loyalty to Mahmūd and at the same time felt reluctant to join him. At last he was pressed by A'zam Humāyūn and 'Isā Khan Sarwānī to reinforce them and to march towards Jaunpur. Though he was with the Afghan army, he secretly negotiated terms with the Mughals. T.S., A.U. MS., p. 94.

tive siege of Chunār confirmed Sher Khan's position in the eyes of his nation. The Emperor's absence in Mālwa and Gujarāt enabled him to crush his opponents, strengthen his adherents, and gather an immense amount of treasure. He gathered his wealth, indeed, from two principal sources: in the first place he took large bribes from Sultān Bahādūr to stir up opposition to the Emperor, but having received the money, he put it in his treasury and did nothing; in the second place he regularly directed plundering raids into the countries north of the Ganges which were in a state of great confusion owing to the intrigues of Sultān Muhammad Mirza and his son. Gradually, Sher Khan's power grew; his professed policy of favouring Afghan blood, his care for their lives on the battlefield, his lavish generosity—all combined to attract towards him the best and most vigorous members of his race throughout India.¹ On the death of Sultān Bahādūr, the Afghans who were in his service went over to Sher Khan who received thereby a great accession of strength. Little by little his genius and his reputation overcame the scruples of those who had previously been deterred by his humble birth from serving him; and at length nobles like A'zam Humāyūn Sarwānī, Mian Bīban Qutb Khān Mochi Khail, Ma'arūf Farmūlī and A'zam Humāyūn, the eldest son of Sultān 'Ālam Khan, were proud to be counted as his retainers. There was no longer any question as to the identity of the Afghan national leader. He was entirely master of northern Bihār by 1536, and so secure was his position that he determined to acquire fresh reputation and resources by an attack upon the neighbouring kingdom of Bengal. Accordingly, in 1537, he first reduced Patna, then defeated the Bengal army at Sūrajpur, and seized the whole of southern Bihār.² He defeated the new king of Bengal, Mahmūd Shah by name, in several actions, shut him up in his capital of Gaur, and laid siege to it. Sher Khan himself was now called away by the revolt of some zamindars in Bihār, but the siege was ably pushed on by his son Jalāl Khan, and his best general, Khawās Khan, the son of the faithful but ill-fated Sukhah. Matters were in this condition when at the end of 1537, Humāyūn, now returned

¹ The measures adopted by Sher Khan were drastic. He compelled those who had taken to asceticism to enlist as soldiers and put to death those who refused to do so. He threatened the Afghans with death in case they refused to enrol themselves in his army. *T.S., A.U.M.S.*, p. 102.

² Abul Fazl writes (*A.N.* I, p. 328) Sūrajgarh is in the Mungher district at the east end. Abul Fazl places Sūrajpur at the boundary of the territories of the ruler of Bengal. Beveridge in a footnote (p. 328) regards this as a slip of the author for Teliagarhī in the Santhal Parganās. This is not correct. Jarrett, II, p. 116 and note.

from Mālwa and Gujarāt to Agra, determined to take action against him.

It cannot be too strongly insisted upon that it was the Emperor's absence in the south during five critical years that really gave Sher Khan his chance. When Humāyūn abandoned the siege of Chunār and marched upon Bahādur, Sher Khan was, for all his reputation, a small landholder with a strong castle. But at the end of five years he had become a prince in all but blood, acknowledged leader of the Afghan nation by his triumph over all rivalry and opposition, and master of resources which, if they were not equal to those of the Emperor, at least made doubtful the result of a struggle between Mughal and Afghan. The enormous wealth he had seized from Fath Malikah, the daughter of Mian Kālā Pahār Farmūlī, a nephew (sister's son) of Sultān Bahlol greatly enriched him and furnished him with the sinews of war for his ambitious enterprises.¹ Finally, the new prince had embarked upon an aggressive war in Bengal, and was rapidly pushing it to a triumphant and glorious conclusion.

Although, as we have seen, the Emperor had retired from Mālwa with the express intention of attending to affairs in the east, yet he seems to have wasted nearly twelve months in Agra.² He did, indeed, send Hindū Beg to Jaunpur to make enquiries about Sher Khan, but the astute Afghan sent such loyal messages and such magnificent presents that the Mughal nobleman was reassured. Either Hindū Beg was deceived by Sher Khan's protestations of loyalty and good will or he deliberately avoided sending a correct report to the Court. At all events he did not exert himself to ascertain the true state of

¹ Fath Malikah was the only child of her father. She was married to Shaikh Mustafā, a young man of doubtful paternity. After Mustafā's death she was protected by Bāyazīd who had fought against Bābur with great pertinacity. But when he was slain in battle, the lady found herself in great difficulties. The Rājā of Patna began to oppress the Afghans and fearing his predatory raids, Fath Malikah fell into the clutches of Sher Khan. By an artifice, which is mentioned by 'Abbās Sarwānī, he brought under his control the Bībī as well as her accumulated hoard. When Sher Khan invaded Bengal he took from her 300 *mans* of gold to equip his army. *T.S., A.U. MS.*, pp. 106-7.


The incident is related differently in the *Makhzan*. The princess lived upon the revenues of her dower and placed herself under the Mughals. At this Sher Khan was so offended that he seized her wealth and granted her only a maintenance allowance for the remainder of her life. The treasure, according to one estimate, consisted of six hundred *mans* of pure gold besides coins and other valuable things.

² The Emperor wasted about twelve months at Agra and for six months he was held up before the fort of Chunār. Gulbadan says (p. 133) that he spent at Agra as much as a year.

affairs. Humāyūn despised Sher Khan but recognized that he was not so harmless as he made himself out to be. Accordingly, the Emperor set his army in order, and prepared for action, but with his usual indecision, hesitated whether he should attack Bahādur or Sher Khan. Finally, it was the news from Bengal which made him realise the seriousness of the position in the east; and from the moment when he determined to march into Sher Khan's sphere of influence, the struggle between the two men took on the proportions of a death grapple of nations. Sher Shah, when he heard that Humāyūn intended marching eastward, sent a protest. He had, he said, loyally observed his agreement not to raid the territories to the west of his own, and not to interfere with the Emperor in any way. Why then should the Emperor come and molest him? But the time for such finesse was over. Humāyūn's mind was made up that the ambitious Afghan's designs in Bengal must be met and crushed. According to the latest intelligence, Gaur was on the point of falling, and the treasures it contained would constitute a most serious accession of strength to Sher Khan's already formidable resources. The situation was by no means hopeful. Sultān Junaid Barlās's death had left the eastern provinces in a state of confusion which was aggravated by Sher Khan's rapid successes in Bengal. Humāyūn did not march immediately to the east, for his heart was still set on the conquest of Mālwa and Gujarāt and his hopes were revived by the offer of help which came from Burhān Nizām Shah of Ahmadnagar. But the Afghan menace was too serious to be overlooked and the Emperor at once despatched his officers to collect troops for the campaign. He entrusted the government of the chief provinces to his nobles; Delhi and Agra were placed in charge of Mīr Fakhr 'Alī and Mīr Muhammad Bakhshī respectively; Kālpī was given to Yādgār Nāsir Mirza and Qanauj with its neighbouring territory to Nūruddīn Mirza, a son-in-law of Bābur's. Having finished his preparations, the Emperor marched to the east with his brothers 'Askarī and Hindāl and on his way was joined by Muhammad Zamān Mirza who had been granted pardon for his disloyal behaviour in the past.¹

¹ When the imperial party drew near Chunār, it was joined by Muhammad Mirza. A reconciliation was brought about by the Mirza's wife Masūmah Sultān Begam, half-sister of Humāyūn, at Agra and a pardon was secured. She was the daughter of Masūmah, daughter of Sultān Ahmad, who had married her cousin Bābur. *A.N.* I, p. 330.

It was during this period of Humāyūn's stay at Agra that Hindāl's marriage was celebrated. Gulbadan Begam has given an elaborate account of the feast that was held to celebrate the marriage. From this account we obtain a glimpse of the social life of Mughal princesses. *H. N.*, pp. 118-30.



HUMAYUN'S WARS WITH SHER SHAH

The first question which came up for settlement was whether the imperial army should first capture the fort of Chunār or march straight to Bengal where the Afghans had become very powerful. Humāyūn chose the former course despite the advice of Khān-i-Khānān Yūsuf Khail, who suggested that the possession of the abundant treasures of Bengal would place Sher Khan in a highly advantageous position. But as ill luck would have it, the Emperor somewhat fatuously decided first to lay siege to the fortress of Chunār and his decision was seconded by Rūmī Khan, the artillery engineer.

Rūmī Khan tried to obtain information about the fortress through an Abyssinian slave Kalāfat whom he caused to be brutally flogged. In this distressed condition the slave went to the Afghans, complained of Rūmī Khan's conduct and offered his services to them. They expressed much sympathy, dressed his wounds and allowed him to acquaint himself with the strong and weak points of their defence. The stratagem succeeded well enough and Rūmī Khan directed his operations according to the information supplied by the slave. The beleaguered garrison offered a gallant resistance and about 700 of the imperial troops were killed. Next day they surrendered and, according to Jauhar, Rūmī Khan ordered the hands of 300 artillerymen to be cut off—an atrocious mode of revenge which drew a sharp rebuke from Humāyūn.¹ The fort was entrusted to Rūmī Khan but other officers grew jealous of him and his end was hastened by poison.

For six months Humāyūn was occupied in the siege of Chunār. Sher Khan utilised this opportunity to push on the siege of Gaur and bring the whole of Bengal under his sway. Gaur had already become a doomed city and Sher Khan had made his grip very sure. By the time the Emperor advanced to the river Son, he heard that the greater part of Bengal as well as Bihār had accepted Sher Khan as overlord. The fears of the Khān-i-Khānān were amply justified. The feeling of the older men in the Mughal camp was that Gaur should have been invaded first. But Humāyūn had disregarded this advice and reaped the disastrous consequence.

Sher Khan had hastily retreated to Bihār to punish some refractory

¹ According to Abul Fazl it was Mu'ayyid Beg Duldai, a confidential officer, who tampered with the imperial order and added the words that they should be maimed. The same authority adds that such was the usurpation of authority which he displayed and was therefore censured. (A.N. I, p. 332.) Jauhar attributes the cruel deed to Rūmī Khan. Nizāmuddīn says the gunners of the fort were maimed by the Emperor's orders. Badāonī's account is very brief and does not add much to our knowledge.

zamindars, leaving Gaur to Jalāl Khan and Khawās Khan.¹ The latter fought with great courage and displayed amazing feats of valour. Sultān Mahmūd came out to fight but he fled and his sons were taken prisoners and Gaur with plenty of booty fell into the hands of Jalāl Khan.

As a visible sign of the reality of these bad tidings, Mahmūd Shah himself, the now exiled king of Bengal, came to seek shelter with the Mughals. After soliciting too late the succour of the Portuguese, he had fled from his doomed capital, leaving behind him all his insignia of royalty. Humāyūn's compassion was aroused by the spectacle of a brother-prince in distress, and he determined to do his best for him. He sent his envoy to Sher Khan, asking him to give up the insignia of royalty and offering him in return any *jāgīr* he might choose. Sher Khan seems to have contemplated accepting the proposals, for, according to the best informed authorities, he announced that he would surrender Bihār, pay an annual tribute of ten lacs, and surrender the insignia of royalty, on condition that he was allowed to retain Bengal and that the imperial army returned to Agra. Humāyūn considered this arrangement for some time, but was finally dissuaded from accepting it by the entreaties of the exiled king of Bengal.² The Afghan authorities, indeed, claim that he had already agreed to the conditions, when the distress of Mahmūd Shah induced him to break his word. Sher Khan charged Humāyūn with breach of faith and recounted with a keen sense of disappointment the services he had rendered to the latter. Be this as it may, the Emperor determined to advance against Sher Khan, despite the fact that the rains had already set in.³

Every moment which the negotiations gave him was a clear gain to Sher Khan and his general Khawās, and he was himself endeavouring to find a refuge to replace the fortress of Chunār which had slipped from his grasp. For some time he had been attracted by the great castle of Rohtās, and had cultivated friendly relations with the Rājā to whom it belonged. When he heard of the news of the

¹ *Riyāz-us-Salātīn* (Eng. Trans.), p. 139.

² Humāyūn was asked by the Bengal envoys not to trust Sher Khan. They added that the Afghans were not very powerful in the country and that their king would help the Emperor in driving them out of Bengal. *T.S.*, p. 120. *A.N.* I, p. 333.

³ 'Abbās says (*Tārīkh-i-Sher Shāhī*, p. 120) that the Emperor accepted these terms and sent a horse and a *khilāt* to the envoy for Sher Khan. When those things were presented, he was much delighted and said that he would adhere to the terms settled. The *Riyāz-us-Salātīn* says (p. 140) that Sultān Mahmūd, fleeing wounded, came to the Emperor and requested him to invade Bengal. He was the last independent king of Bengal and died at Colgong in 1538.

fall of Chunār, he begged the Rājā's permission to convey his family into the fortress of Rohtās. At first, the Rājā granted his request but later on seeing his comparative weakness in men refused to fulfil his promise. Sher Khan, as usual, held out a threat to the Rājā that he would make peace with Humāyūn and then invade his territories with the help of the Mughals. At last the Rājā was persuaded to consent through Chūrāman, a Brahman counsellor whom Sher Khan had bribed.¹ The end of the story may be imagined. Sher Khan's troops, when they were once inside the fort, drove away the Rājā's guards by force.² The Afghan leader now prepared to remove his possessions to Rohtās, so that secure in the knowledge that his family and his treasures were safe, he could devote himself with a quiet mind to the task of checkmating the schemes of the Emperor.

Humāyūn's plan of campaign was simple, and, so far as it went, adequate. While a strong force marched upon the hilly district of Jhārkhand,³ where Sher Khan was posted with his troops, Mirza Hindāl crossed the Ganges and advanced on Hājīpur, while the Emperor himself, with the bulk of the troops, pushed forward in the direction of Bengal. Another party consisting of Muḃid Beg, son of Sultān Mahmūd, Jehāngīr Qulī son of Ibrāhīm Bāyazīd, Mīr Nūrkā, Tārdī Beg, Barrī Barlās, Mubārak Farmūlī and others with a contingent of 3,000 horse was despatched to march fourteen miles in advance of the imperial army. Sher Khan, who seems to have been taken by surprise at the rapidity of the Emperor's movements was very nearly captured close to Patna, as he was reconnoitring with a small body of cavalry. He owed his escape to the gallantry of Saif Khan and a few courageous men, who held the pass of Gugārgaḥ while their chief made good his escape.⁴ Sher Khan,

¹ According to the *Tārīkh-i-Sher Shāhī* Chūrāman was given six *mans* of gold by Sher Khan.

² This is another instance of Sher Khan's treachery and ingratitude. He broke his plighted word and disregarded his obligations towards the Rājā. The *doli* story discarded by 'Abbās is confirmed by other Afghan historians. They all describe at length the stratagem which Sher Khan employed to eject the guards and obtain mastery of the fortress. Abul Fazl supports the Afghan writers. 'Abbās says he made enquiries about this from leading Afghan Amīrs, but they contradicted the story. (Text, pp. 117-18).

³ Jhārkhand is the name given to the jungle tract of Chotā Nāgpur and Bīrbhūm. Jhārkhand is differently written by different historians.

⁴ Saif Khan Achā Khail Sarwānī was seen by Sher Khan taking his family towards Rohtās. Dorn writes his name as Yūsuf Khan. Sher Khan asked him to turn back, for the Mughals were near at hand. But he remained firm and expressed his determination to hold the pass. He and his men bravely checked the

satisfied that Humāyūn would advance through the Telia Garhi pass¹ between Bihār and Bengal, sent Jalāl Khan, Khawās Khan and 13,000 picked troops to hold the defile as long as possible so that the business of removing the treasures of Bengal to Rohtās might be completed without fear of interruption. He then intended to let Humāyūn force his way into Bengal, seize the passes behind him, occupy Bihār, and thus cut off all his enemy's communications with his base.

When the imperialists reached the pass, a reconnoitring party under Jehāngīr Qulī went forward to observe the enemy's works. Jalāl Khan, observing their lack of caution and disregarding his father's instructions, suddenly sallied out upon them at the head of 6,000 horse and drove them back with immense slaughter. Mubārak Farmūlī, Abul Fath Langā and many others were slain in this engagement. A heavy downpour of rain accompanied by a storm made the situation extremely difficult. Bairam Khan resisted the enemy with great valour, but he was overpowered. All attempts to force the pass by direct assault failed; storms and bad weather hampered the operations of the imperial army; and when at length conditions improved, it was found that the Afghans, acting on the orders of Sher Khan, now safe with all his treasures in Rohtās, had fallen back and joined their leader.² Jalāl Khan had also left Garhi and gone to Rohtās where his father was securely entrenched. Accordingly, Humāyūn, after sending Hindāl and a portion of the army back to Jaumpur with instructions to hold the line of communication, himself advanced and occupied Gaur without opposition, (June 1538).³ The city was found in a miserable condition; the streets

Mughals at the entrance of Gugārgarh. He was captured and produced before the Emperor who praised his gallantry and spared his life. *T.S.*, pp. 126-8.

¹ This is the 'gate of Bengal'—a pass between that province and Bihār. It has a hill on one side and the Ganges on the other. It is the Teliagarhi or Tiliagully of our maps. In Rennell's map it is Terriagully. It is distinct from the Siclygully (Sakrigali) pass. For a description of this pass see Erskine's *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p. 145 and *I.H.Q.*, 1940, pp. 105-117. The attention of the reader is drawn to an article on 'Routes old and new from Lower Bengal up the Country,' by C.E. A.W. Oldham in *Bengal Past and Present*, Vol. 28, (1924), pp. 21-36.

² Jehāngīr's force was overpowered by superior numbers and was compelled to fall back upon the imperial army at Kohlgam (Kahlgram of Jāuhar, Colgona of Abul Fazl, Kohlghanu of Gulbadan) between Bhāgalpur and the pass.

³ According to 'Abbās, soon after the abandonment of Garhi by Jalāl, the Emperor sent a part of his force under Mirza Hindāl to Agra and himself proceeded to Gaur. Abul Fazl, after describing the defeat of the Mughals, writes that Mirza Hindāl who had been appointed to Tirhut and Purniya was at his own request allowed to go so that he might come with proper equipment to

were strewn with corpses and the inhabitants were in a state of wretchedness owing to the rigours of war and the depredations of the Afghans. Steps were taken immediately to afford relief to the population and to improve the sanitary surroundings. Then the Emperor set about the reduction of the country and partitioned it into *jāgīrs*. But beyond this he did nothing to consolidate the conquest he had made. Jauhar writes that he was so completely immersed in pleasure that he did not emerge from his private apartments for one month and the men of his army could not even see him.¹ Gaur was renamed Janatābād.

With almost incredible carelessness the Mughals took no pains to conciliate the inhabitants or to establish the new regime upon a sound footing. They seem, indeed, to have been intoxicated with the ease with which they had brushed aside the opposition of Sher Khan and seized the fruit of his labours. Had Humāyūn been energetic and Hindāl loyal, all might yet have been well. But the Emperor, sunk for the most part in opium dreams, shut himself up and refused to transact business, while Hindāl took the opportunity, afforded by his brother's isolation, to play the king on his own behalf. He threw off his allegiance and marched on Agra.

Through the rains of 1538 and the cold weather of 1538-39 Humāyūn idled away the precious moments. On the other hand Sher Khan was not idle. He was employed in seizing the passes, interrupting all communications between Gaur and Agra, and organizing his resources for the final struggle. For weeks at a time no news came from the capital to the imperialists in Bengal. Hindāl's treacherous desertion of the eastern marches had placed the Emperor's communications at Sher Khan's mercy. The Afghan had seized Banaras and executed the imperial governor; the Mughals had been driven out of Bahraich by Haibat Khan Niāzī, Jalāl Khan Jālū and Sarmast Khan Sarwānī, and the whole country from Kanauj to Bahraich and Sambhal had passed into the hands of the Afghans; Khawās Khan had undertaken a punitive expedition against Mahāratha, a forest chief, who used to raid the country of Bihār and carry off the baggage from the Afghan camp.²

take his share in the Bengal campaign. It is clear from all accounts that soon after Hindāl was at Agra where he unfurled the banner of rebellion against his brother. Erskine follows Abul Fazl. *T.S.*, p. 130. *A.N.* I, pp. 334-5. Erskine, *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p. 149.

¹ Jauhar, *MS.*, p. 30. 'Abbās writes that he shut himself up for three months and did not grant audience to anyone. *T.S.*, *I.O. MS.*, p. 130.

² Sher Khan not only defeated and expelled the Mughal governors but he

Besides this, Sher Khan had closely blockaded Jaunpur, and had utterly defeated a body of imperial reinforcements who were tardily making their way eastward to Bengal. No supplies, no troops, and, above all no news, reached the Emperor. At length intelligence somehow filtered through which filled every one with uneasiness. Rumours of Hindāl Mirza's disloyalty¹ reached the Emperor, who promptly despatched Shaikh Bahlol,² a man of great eminence for his learning and piety, to recall the prince to a sense of duty. Then again silence wrapped the affairs of the west for some weeks when suddenly, in March 1539, came the astounding news that Hindāl had put Shaikh Bahlol to death on the frivolous pretext that he was in league with the Afghans, that Sher Khan was master of Mungher, Banaras, Sambhal, and indeed, of all the country west of Bengal as far as Sambhal and Qanauj. To add insult to injury, Afghan officers had actually collected the revenue for both the autumn and the spring harvests in all these parts.

also seized and collected the revenues of the territories thus vacated. This greatly added to his resources.

¹Gulbadan does not say much about her brother's treachery and desertion. She was full sister of Hindāl and her silence can be easily understood. She only writes (p. 134): 'He (Humāyūn) was comfortably and safely in Gaur, when news came that some of the Amīrs had deserted and joined Mirza Hindāl.' Hindāl was only nineteen years of age at this time and may have, like many other Mughal princes, regarded the crown of Delhi as well within his reach.

²Some write Shaikh Pūl. Gulbadan, Abul Fazl, Badāonī and 'Abbās write Shaikh Bahlūl. Erskine writes Shaikh Bhūl. The Allahabad University text of the *Tūrikh-i-Sher Shāhī* (p. 130.) has Bahlūl.

The Shaikh was the elder brother of Muhammad Ghaus and claimed descent from Shaikh Farīduddīn Attar. Mirza Haider speaks of Shaikh Pūl as a man who had a great passion for the occult sciences, for magic and conjuration. He is said to have taught the Emperor that incantations and sorcery were the surest means for the attainment of an object. *T.R.*, p. 398. Beal, *Biographical Dictionary*, p. 265.

CHAPTER VI

THE BATTLE OF CHAUSA (1539)

HUMAYUN, roused to action at last, determined at any cost to return to his own dominions. Needless to say, Sher Khan was entirely prepared for him, and with the exception of Khawās Khan, who was watching the troublesome freebooter named Mahāratha Cheeroo,¹ the whole available force of the Afghans was collected at Rohtās, ready to strike. For the first time since the days of Sultān Bahlol Lodi, the nation looked to one man as a leader. Sher Khan's appeal to the Afghan chiefs met with an enthusiastic response. A'zam Humāyūn publicly declared that the Afghans would drive the Mughals out of India if they acted under the leadership of one man and impressed upon them the need for united action. There was no longer any question of divided purpose; members of the old noble families as well as the newest recruits from the hilly homes of Roh, united to serve and obey a single master-mind. The whole people were filled with confidence in their leader and in themselves, and they burned to measure swords against the Mughals from whom, in their former disunited state, they had suffered defeat so often. Sher Khan, delighted at the temper of his men, marched down from the Rohtās country, and placed himself across the path which Humāyūn must follow in attempting to reach his own country.

Very different was the spirit which infected the army of the Emperor. Sapped and enervated by their residence in the relaxed climate of Bengal, disgusted with their continued inaction, and out of patience with their unpractical, indolent master, their one idea was to reach in safety their own homes. It was found extremely difficult to get anyone to accept the governorship of Bengal. It was offered to Zāhid Beg, but he sarcastically enquired if the Emperor could not find some place more pleasant than Bengal in which to do away with him.² At last it was determined to leave the gallant but headstrong Jehāngīr Qulī Beg, with 5,000 horse, to hold as much of the country as he could.

¹ The Cheeroos are an aboriginal people who were dominant in the country now comprised in the Shahābād district before its occupation by the Aryans. Mahāratha seems to have been a man of considerable power who harried the country and robbed the inhabitants of their goods. (*Shahābād District Gazetteer*, pp. 11-20.) The Cheeroos or Cheerohs are mentioned by Abul Fazl as the principal zamindars in Rāmgarh, Chai Champā and Pundag in Patamau.

² Jauhar, *I.O. MS.*, p. 31. Abul Fazl says Zāhid 'took up the presumptuous ways' of an old servant, absconded and joined Mirza Hindāl. (*A.N. I*, p. 341.)

From the very first, the Emperor's retreat was dogged by misfortune. He had sent Dilāwar Khan Lodi, the Khān-i-Khānān, to Mungher to hold it against the Afghans but he was overpowered and very nearly captured by Sher Khan's intrepid general Khawās Khan. The gates of the town were stormed and it passed easily into the enemy's hands. Humāyūn found himself in a dangerous predicament. The monsoon set in early, so that torrential rains and deep mud made the progress of the army very slow. The pass of Telia Garhi was again strongly held; Humāyūn was compelled to offer 'Askarī Mirza, who led the van, any boon to induce him to force it. 'Askarī took counsel with his officers and they were amazed to learn that he wanted money, some valuable articles of Bengal, some elephants and a few eunuchs. Erskine rightly observes that such a demand was a melancholy symptom of the degradation of the court and times of Humāyūn.¹ Dissatisfied at this exhibition of sordid selfishness, the chiefs told 'Askarī of the danger that threatened them all, and advised action to be taken betimes to combat it. They suggested three demands—increase of the army, increase of allowance and a large sum of ready money. Humāyūn readily agreed to these terms.² When at length the Mirza fought his way, though at a heavy cost, and occupied Kohlgam (Colgong), he sent back the ill news that Sher Khan with a large force was advancing from Rohtās, and had assumed the title of Shah.

Sher Khan on hearing of Humāyūn's return from Bengal returned to Rohtās. The tactics he wished to follow were these: if the Emperor marched against him he would not risk an engagement; he would turn southwards to Jhārkhand and from there proceed to Bengal. If the imperialists marched towards Agra, he would press from behind, cut off the supplies, and if possible make a surprise attack at night. As the imperial army pushed further, the Afghans obtained more evidence of the inefficiency and weakness of the Mughals and as Abul Fazl says, 'they waxed audacious.'³ He had made up his mind to

Humāyūn was deeply offended at his behaviour and resolved to put him to death. Zāhid was married to the sister of Begā Begam, one of Humāyūn's wives. She interceded with Humāyūn to obtain forgiveness for him but in vain. Despairing of pardon Zāhid fled to the Upper Provinces along with two other officers, Hājī Muhammad Kūkā and Zīndar Beg. He was put to death by Mirza Kāmran at Ghaznī in 1547.

¹ Erskine, *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p.164. Jauhar, *I.O.MS.*, pp. 32-33. When 'Askarī was asked to express his wishes, he replied, 'I want money, some of the valuable manufactures of Bengal, some fair maidens and a eunuch.' Another text adds 'some young elephants' also.

² Jauhar, *I.O. MS.*, p. 33.

³ *A.N.* I, p. 341.

deal with the imperialists with his usual coolness and skill.

Humāyūn advanced slowly and steadily up the left bank of the Ganges, until he came opposite to Mungher¹ and here he found 'Askarī and the advance guard waiting for him. At this point, on hearing of the approach of Sher Khan from Muhammad Zamān Mirza, he held a council of war and asked his chiefs whether it was advisable to cross the Ganges. They advised that the army should remain on the same bank and, following the same route by which it had come, proceed to Jaunpur from where, after recruiting its strength, it might advance towards the enemy.² But Mu'ayyid Beg in whom the Emperor confided too much at this time offered the imprudent suggestion that the army should cross to the right bank lest Sher Shah should boast of having turned the Emperor from the ordinary road.³ This advice was unfortunately accepted. The Emperor advanced from Patna to Monia at the confluence of the Son and the Ganges. Jauhar who is an eye-witness of these events writes that Sher Khan put himself in the rear of the Mughals, hovered on their flanks and kept them constantly engaged in skirmishes.⁴ The Afghans seized the boats and the pieces of ordnance which were used at Chunār. Humāyūn was much perplexed but what could he do in these circumstances? He pushed on and on the fourth day reached Chausā.⁵

¹ Mungher is 100 miles south-east of Patna in Bihār.

² Jauhar, *I.O.MS.*, p. 33. Abul Fazl writes that it was represented to the Emperor that the army had travelled a long distance and was without equipment and it was therefore unwise to march against the foe and 'to hasten to the field of battle' but these views were not accepted. The Emperor crossed the Ganges and marched against the enemy. *A.N.* I, p. 342.

³ The *I.O.MS.* of Jauhar's *Tazkirāt* says that Pahalwān Beg and Muhammed Qurr 'Alī urged the contrary but in vain. (Also *A.N.* I, p. 342.) Jauhar writes: 'When fate descends, the eyes of prudence become blind.' Gulbadan supports Jauhar: 'He was coming by that side of the Ganges (i.e., the left bank) opposite Mungher, when his Amīrs represented, "You are a great king. Return by the way you came lest Sher Khan should say: 'Forsaking his road of advance, he took another of retreat.'" The Emperor returned to Mungher, and brought many of his people and his family by boat up the river as far as Hājipur-Patna.' (*H.N.*, p. 135.) Mrs. A. S. Beveridge in her note 3 (*H.N.*, p. 135) writes that Mu'ayyid Beg Dul dai Barlās urged this foolish point of honour which led to the disaster at Chausā. He was a cruel and ignorant man but a favourite of Humāyūn. The Emperor's followers rejoiced when he died.

⁴ *I.O.MS.*, p. 34.

⁵ Jauhar describes the stages in the Emperor's march :—

1. First day—An order was given that the soldiers should keep themselves well equipped with arms and get ready for the march.
2. Second day—It was suggested that the two armies should meet each other and fight with arrows and guns.

It was here that Sher Khan appeared in great force to try conclusions with the Mughals.

The Afghan leader had pitched his camp directly in the Emperor's path at a village called Bihiyā¹ to the east of Chausā at Buxar. Both armies were on the same side of the river Ganges, but between them flowed a small stream called the Karamnāsa, of which the banks were so steep that it could not be crossed except at the usual ford.² According to Sher Shah's usual habit his camp was afterwards strongly entrenched and secured by formidable earthworks. But as he had reached the spot almost simultaneously with the imperial army, his preparations for the battle were not complete when Humāyūn arrived. Qāsim Husain Sultān suggested immediate attack while the Afghans were still tired from a long march, having traversed about thirty-six miles that day³ but Mu'ayyid Beg expressed the opinion that the attack should be deferred till the next day and, as misfortune would have it, his advice was again accepted by the

3. Third day—The news was brought that the boat which carried the gun called *Kohkushān* which had dismantled a bastion of the fort of Chunār was seized by the Afghans.


4. Fourth day—The Emperor ordered that the troops should be ready. In a short time they were on the road to Chausā. They had not yet encamped when a cloud of dust was seen rising towards the east. It was Sher Khan's army coming to fight with the Mughals. *Tazkirat*, I.O.MS., A.U. Transcript, p. 34.

Chausā is a village in Buxar sub-division (Bihār) situated on the Eastern Railway close to the east bank of the Karamnāsa river, four miles west of Buxar town.

¹ Bihiyā is said in the *Akbarnāmah* (I p. 342) to be in the dependency of Bhojpur which is in the Shahābād district. Bihiyā is now situated on the Eastern Railway, 382 miles from Calcutta in the Shahābād district. It is wrongly called Shuya in the *Makhzan*. Dorn, *History of the Afghans*, p. 118. (English translation of *Makhzan*). Bihiyā is mentioned in the *Bāburnāmah*. On pages 662-67, we have the following entry: 'In April 1529 Bābur rode to visit Bhojpur and Bihiyā, thence went to the camp.'

² 'Abbās writes: 'Sher Khan then marching on and selecting an advantageous place, a large village with a stream of water running between himself and the Emperor, entrenched himself there. The breadth of the stream was 25 yards.' (T.S., p. 134.) Abul Fazl is more explicit: 'Thus was it that contrary to the advice of ministers, the army marched against the Afghans, and came face to face with Sher Khan at the village of Bihiyā (Fathpur-Bihiyā) which is a dependency of Bhojpur.. There a black river called the Karamnāsa (Kanbas in the text) flowed between the two armies.' (A.N. I, p. 342.) The *Makhzan* is in agreement with 'Abbās on this point: 'Both armies encamped on one bank of the Ganges beside which a stream ran, that it could not be crossed without a ferry; and the bed of it was so filled with mud and clay, that the men as well as the horses and camels stuck in it. Here the guards of both armies encamped.'

³ Jauhar, I.O.MS., p. 34.



BATTLE OF CHAUSA — POSITION 1

Emperor to the great chagrin of his more prudent counsellors. Had the Emperor followed the sound advice tendered by the latter, the history of India might have been different. It was decided to cross the Karamnāsa; a bridge was built over it and the army encamped on the other side without fighting. While Sher Shah strengthened his fortifications on every side, Humāyūn wasted his time in sending express after express to Agra for reinforcements and supplies. This was in April 1539. The Mughal army was in a wretched plight, having been greatly weakened by long marches and disease. Men and beasts both were exhausted and their sufferings were unbearable. Many horses had died and the troopers were seen trudging their weary way on foot to an uncertain destination.¹ There was no prospect of a speedy termination of this misery, for the enemy with whom they had to deal was as vigilant and brave as he was unscrupulous. It was impossible to move forward or to change position without courting disaster. \

It must have been, while the Emperor was at Chausā, that he first heard full particulars of what had been happening at Agra during his long absence. Hindāl, young and irresponsible, had slighted his important duty of safeguarding communications, and had marched to Agra, where he occupied the imperial palace and issued *firmāns* as though he were *pādshāh* himself. He remained for some time in this condition of school-boy truancy, but was temporarily recalled to his senses by the advance of Sher Khan on Jaunpur. Mīr Fakhr 'Alī, the governor of Delhi, remonstrated with him severely, pointed out the danger in which he was involving his whole family and persuaded him to send troops to Jaunpur. While Hindāl was hesitating, a body of discontented nobles, who slipped away from Bengal, presented themselves, and informed him that they were now committed to hostilities with the Emperor.² If Hindāl would assume the


¹ Mirza Haider writes : 'The Emperor had lost all his horses in Bengal, and the strength of his army was wasted; the rainy season too had come on.' (*T.R.*, p. 470.) Again the same authority writes that Humāyūn's situation was desperate. He came from Bengal to Jūsā (Chausā) and Pāik and sent repeated messages to the brothers to come. Kāmran set out towards the east, but he was dissuaded by his officers from risking his troops. In some histories the scene of battle is said to have been at Chapa Ghat on the Ganges—a place not far from Chausā. Pāik or Bāik of Haider Mirza is not mentioned by any Indian writer and cannot be identified. *Ibid.*, p. 470.

² Among these malcontents were Khusrau Beg Kokultāsh, Hājī Muhammad (son of) Bāba Qushqa Zāhid Beg, Mirza Nazar who had fled from Bengal and come to Nūruddīn Muhammad who had been left in charge of Qanauj. They had opened correspondence with Mirza Hindāl who had replied through his confidential adviser Muhammad Ghāzī Tughbaī. He informed Yādgar

imperial dignity, they said, they would support him. Otherwise they would set up Kāmṛān. Accordingly, Hindāl agreed to revolt. But at this moment came the venerable Shaikh Bahlol, (or Shaikh Pūl) with message and advice from Humāyūn. Again the changeable Hindāl wavered; he requisitioned stores and equipment, and seemed upon the point of marching against the besiegers of Jaunpur. But before anything could be done, another disloyal nobleman, the governor of Qanauj, arrived. He persuaded Hindāl to have Shaikh Bahlol arrested and executed on the absurd charge of treasonable correspondence with the Afghans.¹ Having burned his boats by the murder of a man of such sanctity, Hindāl marched on Delhi. Meanwhile the loyal Fakhr 'Alī, who, together with Yādgār Nāsir Mirza, had been waiting at Kālpī to join in his march to relieve Jaunpur, grew suspicious, and on learning what his real intentions were succeeded by a great effort in throwing himself into Delhi and in shutting the door upon him. After a further period of hesitation, Hindāl decided to besiege the town. The loyal nobles within it sent messages to Mirza Kāmṛān, who now enjoyed a very high reputation owing to his successful administration of his extensive possessions. Already, on hearing of the disorders of Hindustān

Nāsir Mirza and Mīr Fakhr also of these developments. (*A. N. I*, pp. 336-37.) Gulbadan says that these discontented noblemen took advantage of the Emperor's absence in Gaur and instigated Hindāl who was a youth of 19 to revolt against him. *H.N.*, p. 134.

¹ Gulbadan positively states (*H.N.*, pp. 134-5) that Shaikh Bahlol concealed armour and horses, accoutrements and military stores in an underground place and would have loaded them on carts and sent them to Sher Khan and the Mirzas. Mirza Hindāl did not believe it and sent Mirza Nūruddīn Muhammad to enquire into the matter. He found the armour and accoutrements and had the Shaikh killed. Abul Fazl speaks of a conspiracy among the officers who desired that the Shaikh should be publicly put to death. He writes that, according to the suggestion of Mirza Nūruddīn Muhammad, the unbecoming proposal was ratified and by Hindāl's orders the Shaikh was beheaded. Badāonī says the Mirza at the instigation of some *muftīs* put to death Shaikh Bahlol, the elder brother of Shaikh Muhammad Ghaus of Gwālior, who was one of the chief sorcerers of the time and enjoyed the confidence of Humāyūn. Erskine also thinks that the Shaikh was killed on a 'shallow' pretext. From Abul Fazl's narrative it appears that the Shaikh 'confounded' the schemes of the Amīrs and they conspired to get rid of him. Nūruddīn Muhammad seized the Shaikh in his house by Hindāl's orders and taking him across the river ordered him to be beheaded. The author of the *Tabqāt* clearly says that the Shaikh was executed on the pretext of being in league with the Afghans, but in reality his death was brought about by the Amīrs who wanted to widen the breach between Mirza Hindāl and the Emperor. All authorities agree in saying that the suspicion to which Gulbadan alludes was ill-founded. The death of the Shaikh was due to the instigation of nobles who egged on the young prince to commit



BATTLE OF CHAUSA — POSITION 2

he had set out with 10,000 men, and the messenger for Delhi met him on the road. Gulbadan says Kāmran thought of sovereignty and with 12,000 fully equipped horsemen, he proceeded to Delhi.¹ As he advanced, Hindāl retired, first to Agra and then to his own *jāgīr* of Alwar. He was soon afterwards induced by his mother to offer his submission to Kāmran and return to Agra.² It soon became evident, however, that Kāmran had no idea of doing anything except playing for his own hand. At first, he professed loyalty, arranged a reconciliation with Hindāl and advanced slowly against Sher Shah. Message after message from Humāyūn urged the brothers to prompt action, but Kāmran's advisers persuaded him that he would be foolish to risk his own troops in his brother's service. Kāmran was blinded by his own ambition and he was persuaded by the fugitive Amīrs to believe that the time for rendering aid to the Emperor was past and that he should preserve his resources for a future campaign in his own interest. They argued that if the Emperor defeated Sher Khan, they would be prepared to meet him on the field of battle; on the other hand if he was worsted, they would be in a position to dictate their own terms to the Afghan who would scarcely venture to think slightly of them because of their military equipment. Accordingly, Kāmran and Hindāl left Humāyūn to his fate.

From April to June Humāyūn and Sher Shah confronted each other.³ The Emperor could neither force an action upon the Afghans who well knew that his situation was becoming daily more desperate, nor could he cross the river in the face of the enemy. On

treason against his brother and Emperor. *A.N.* I, p. 338. *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 459. Erskine, *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p. 163. *T.R.*, p. 470.

¹ *H.N.*, p. 137.

² Hindāl's mother Dildār Agāchah Begam was deeply grieved over her son's conduct. When she heard that Hindāl had the *Khutbah* read in his name, she put on a black dress as if she were in mourning. The Mirza enquired why she had put on such a dress and the lady replied as Abul Fazl says 'out of her foresight': 'Why do you regard me? I am wearing mourning for you; you are young (he was only 19) and have from the instigation of irreflecting sedition-mongers lost the true way; you have girded your loins for your own destruction.' *A.N.* I, p. 339.

³ Jauhar says the two armies faced each other for nearly two months. Haider Mirza, Nizāmuddīn, Badāonī and Firishtah write three months, i.e., from April till 26 June 1539. The chronology of Muslim chroniclers is highly defective, but a close examination of Humāyūn's movements and the meagre dates supplied by our authorities lead to the conclusion that the period was certainly more than two months. Erskine, following Jauhar, writes nearly two months. Jauhar, *I.O.MS.*, p. 34. *T.R.*, p. 470. *Tabqāt, Bibliotheca Indica*, p. 43. Firishtah, *Lucknow Ed.*, pp. 217-8. *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 459. *A.N.* I, pp. 335, 341, note I.

the other hand, in the perpetual skirmishes which took place, the Mughal troops displayed their valour to considerable advantage. The result was that to neither leader was the idea of an agreement repugnant, although the Afghan troops themselves seem to have been anxious to fight. Both camps were actively negotiating for a settlement. Shaikh 'Azīz was sent by Humāyūn to ascertain the wishes of the Afghan leader who was directing, with his sleeves rolled up in the heat of June, the construction of forts and entrenchments.¹ The preliminary terms of peace were quickly arranged, and a treaty was drawn up by which Sher Shah was to possess all Bengal, as well as his old *jāgīr* in Bihār, was to recognize Humāyūn as Lord Paramount, and was to read the *Khutbah* and strike coins in his name. On the other hand Humāyūn was to confirm Sher Shah in these possessions, and was to give up to him the fortress of Chunār. In order to safeguard the imperial prestige, it was arranged that Sher Shah should at once retreat two or three days' march, and that Humāyūn should make a show of pursuing him. These terms were principally the work of a certain Shaikh Khalīl,² who acted as intermediary. Authorities differ as to whether he was an envoy of the Emperor or of Sher Shah but are agreed that he used the knowledge he acquired in the course of passing from one camp

¹ *Al-Badāonī* I, pp. 459-60. Sher Shah is reported to have sent the following message to Humāyūn through the Shaikh: 'You yourself desire war, but your army does not; I on the other hand do not desire war, but my army does; for the rest the decision is the King's.'

² From 'Abbās's account it appears that Shaikh Khalīl was sent by the Emperor to Sher Khan on a diplomatic mission. Jauhar says that Shaikh Khalīl, who was descended from the holiest of saints, Farīd Shakarganj of Pākpatan, was sent by the Emperor to Sher Khan to negotiate the terms of the treaty. Badāonī says that the Shaikh was sent by Sher Khan who acknowledged him as his spiritual guide. Abul Fazl only says, 'Sher Khan, out of craft, sometimes sent influential persons to the sublime court to knock at the door of peace, and sometimes cherished wicked thoughts of war.' Firishtah writes that Khalīl was sent by Sher Shah with a deceitful intention. Erskine writes that Humāyūn was compelled by necessity to send one Mullā Muhammad Barghiz (or Parghari) to treat with Sher Khan. He was probably the same man whom Badāonī calls Mullā Muhammad 'Azīz. He asked him to tell the Emperor that he was anxious to avoid war, but his troops were not. Then he gave instructions to Shaikh Khalīl whom he called his Murshid and sent him to Humāyūn to negotiate the terms of peace. A certain Mullā Muhammad Parghari is mentioned by Mirza Haider and is described as an unprincipled man who tried to gain his evil ends by all kinds of means. According to the *Makhzan*, Shaikh Khalīl was an envoy of the Emperor. Jauhar, *I.O.MS.*, p. 33. *A.N.* I, p. 343. *T.R.*, pp. 398-9. *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 460. Dorn, *History of the Afghans*, pp. 118-9. Firishtah, *Lucknow Ed.*, pp. 217-8. Erskine, *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, pp. 168-9.

to the other, to persuade the Afghan that it was to his interest to fight. Sher Khan treated the Shaikh with great courtesy and dwelt upon the devotion of the Afghans to his ancestor, the holy sage of Pākpatan and begged him to give the right advice in such a crisis. Deeply touched by his lavish hospitality and rich presents, the Shaikh told him that it was a most propitious moment to begin the fight, for the imperial army was devoid of horses; the majority of the Amīrs had been expelled from their fiefs and the Emperor's brothers were disloyal and meditated treason. He went on to add that the Emperor would soon afterwards disregard the treaty and go back upon his plighted word. Whether the agreement between the leaders had been formally ratified is uncertain; it is clear that Humāyūn imagined that there would be no fighting.¹ Both camps prepared to break up, and Sher Khan sent off his best troops two or three days' march along the road to Bihār. Suddenly, however, he recalled them, and at daybreak on June 26 he attacked the imperial camp on every side.² The Afghan force was divided into three sections—one was led by Sher Khan himself, the other by his son Jalāl Khan and the third by his trusty general Khawās Khan. Shaikh Khalīl sent word to the Emperor from Sher Khan's camp asking him to be on his guard against a surprise attack, but no heed was paid to his warning. The Mughal army was carelessly scattered about the camp and the soldiers were arranging to return to Agra. The Emperor himself had no knowledge of the designs of the Afghans and Muhammad Zamān Mirza was utterly negligent in keeping watch. Taken utterly by surprise, charged on flank and rear, and cut off from their natural line of retreat by the seizure of the boats on the river bank, the Mughal army became involved in utter ruin. Humāyūn, fighting gallantly, was wounded in the arm, swept from the field, and half-drowned as he attempted to swim his horse across the Ganges. He owed his life to a water-carrier, who helped him to support himself upon an

¹ Badāonī says that the agreement was ratified by an oath on the Holy Book and that Sher Khan had already decided to act treacherously. This is in agreement with 'Abbās. Jauhar says the treaty was concluded and the Emperor was obliged to comply with his demands. Stewart's MS. probably had 'insolent demands'. Two things are quite clear—one, that Sher Khan resolved to break the treaty and in the long speech, which 'Abbās puts into his mouth, are given *seriatim* the reasons which led him to do so; the other, that the Emperor was taken unawares by the sudden advance of the Afghan army. *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 461. T.S., p. 138. Jauhar, I.O.MS., p. 35.

² The rout of Chausā took place on Thursday, June 26, 1539 (9th Safar, A. H. 946). At this event Sher Khan expressed his joy by writing a verse which is reproduced in Badāonī's history. I, p. 461.

inflated *masak*.¹ Meanwhile the slender bridge had been broken down by the press of fugitives, and the Afghans were patrolling the river with spears and matchlocks, slaying the fugitives without mercy. Many officers of distinction and nearly seven or eight thousand² of the best Tūrki troops perished; Muhammad Zamān Mirza, Maulānā Muhammad Parghari, Maulānā Qāsim 'Alī Sadr along with many others were drowned in the stream. The imperial harem suffered a grievous loss and Gulbadan Begam mentions the names of several ladies of note of whom no trace could be found in spite of a diligent search.³ They were either killed or drowned in the river. Humāyūn's queen Hājī Begam⁴ fell into the hands of the enemy but she was honourably treated by the Afghan victors. An order was issued that no Mughal woman should be made a captive or enslaved and that the families of officers left behind should be conducted safely to the camp of the Empress. After some time the noble lady was conveyed to the fortress of Rohtās and thence to Agra, escorted by Husam Khan Nīrak. The Mughal loss in war material was equally heavy; the whole camp equipment, stores, baggage and artillery, fell into the hands of Sher Khan. Rarely in the whole course of history has perfidy been so completely successful.⁵

¹ The name of this water-carrier is given by Jauhar as Nizām. Gulbadan says his name was Nizām or Sambal. According to Jauhar, the Emperor on reaching the bank of the river said to him: 'I will make your name as famous as that of Nizāmuddīn Auliya, and you shall sit on my throne.' Gulbadan corroborates Jauhar and says (p. 140) that for as much as two days the Emperor gave power to that menial. Abul Fazl also calls the water-carrier Nizām and says the King promised to give him royalty for half a day. (*A.N.* I, p. 344). According to Jauhar the King allowed him to sit on the throne for two hours.

² Firishtah, *Lucknow Ed.*, p. 218.

³ Among those who disappeared at Chausā were, Ayashā Sultān Begam, daughter of Sultān Husain Mirza, Bachaka, a Khalīfah of Bābur's, Begājān Kūka, Aquqa Begam, Chānd Bībī, who was seven months with child and Shād Bībī, the last three of whom belonged to Humāyūn's harem. The first was the wife of Qāsim Husain Sultān Uzbek; the second belonged to Bābur's household and had escaped with him from Samarqand in 1501. The term Khalīfah, applied to a woman, would mean a woman servant of a higher status. The third was Begā Begam's daughter who may have been about eight years only. Gulbadan, pp. 136-7. Mrs. Beveridge's note 2, p. 136.

⁴ Hājī Begam is the same as Begā Begam. She was a daughter of Yādgar Beg who was a brother of Sultān 'Alī Mirza, father of Kāmran's wife, Gulrukh. Gulbadan calls her Begā Begam. It cannot be said how long after the battle of Chausā she was restored to Humāyūn. Another view is that she was sent direct to Agra. She was more than seventy years of age when she died in 1581 shortly before Gulbadan's return from Mecca.

⁵ Abul Fazl calls the battle an 'affair of deceit'. (*A.N.* I, p. 345.) Gulbadan's narrative creates the same impression. She writes: 'Then—such was God's

The defeat of Chausā was due to causes which can be analysed with precision. That treachery played a great part in deciding the issue of the battle cannot be denied. Even Afghan historians admit that Sher Khan had acted in violation of his plighted faith and attacked the Mughals when they were least prepared for action. So great was the confusion caused in the army by Khawās Khan's sudden appearance that the Emperor, who was having his ablutions, had scarcely time to remove his harem to a place of safety. The officer who was guilty of culpable negligence on that fateful night was Muhammad Zamān Mirza, who did not keep watch as directed and went away to sleep, leaving the camp in an unguarded condition. The imperial troops were not well organised. The malarious climate of Bengal had sapped their strength and they did not feel the same enthusiasm for fighting as their opponents. Their arrogance too did them serious harm. They held the Afghans in contempt and underestimated the strength of Sher Khan's army. The Emperor, though a valiant soldier, was outgeneralled by his antagonist. The latter's superior tactics, his organisation of the army, his correct estimate of Mughal strength, his ability to command the resources of the country and, above all, his confidence in his cause secured an easy victory for him. The Afghan historian's remark that he knew well the devices and stratagems of war and that he could adapt himself to a crisis without difficulty is not wholly without justification. But to these causes of victory we must also add his utter lack of scruple. He felt no qualms of conscience at breaking his word and sanctioning arrangements which were contrary to his declared intentions. Matched against a foe of this kind, Humāyūn, who was used to act even in critical situations with fairness and generosity, was thrown off his guard and easily overpowered.

The Emperor with great difficulty effected his escape from the field of battle. He was pursued by Farīd Khan Gūr's party, despatched by Sher Khan, while his onward march was impeded by Shāh Muhammad Afghan who confronted him in the front. But in this unfortunate plight valuable help was given by Rājā Bīr Bhān of Arail,¹ who scattered the Afghans and cleared the road. Thus

will—they had halted without precaution, when Sher Khan came and fell upon them. The army was defeated, and many kinsmen and followers remained in captivity.' Jauhar says the same thing. Humāyūn regarded the affair of Chausā as a treacherous action and clearly says that Sher Khan, after concluding peace, acted treacherously and attacked him at night. *I.O. MS.*, p. 38.

¹ Arail is in *tahsil* Karchanā in the Allahabad district. It is situated opposite

freed from danger, the imperialists proceeded further and reached Kara where they found plenty of corn and grass for their horses. The Emperor intended to proceed along the bank of the Ganges, but, when he learnt that the Afghans had posted themselves at Qanauj to impede his progress, he turned his course and crossing the Jumna, passed on to Kālpī. Disloyalty was the bane of Mughal officers and as if desertions were not enough to trouble the Emperor, the governor Qāsim Khan Qūrchi behaved in a disgraceful manner in withholding the bulk of the previous presents which he had collected for him. Visibly annoyed at this ingratitude, Humāyūn accepted only an embroidered saddle which he afterwards presented to Mirza Kāmran. Alarmed by Sher Khan's advance towards the west, the Emperor left Kālpī and proceeded posthaste to Agra where the brothers met in conclave to decide the future plan of action.

The results of the battle of Chausā were decisive. Sher Khan and the Afghans were now supreme in Bihār and Bengal. Soon afterwards, with the advice of chiefs like 'Isā Khan, Yūsuf Khalīl, A'zam Humāyūn Sarwānī, Mian Bābīn Lodi and others, Sher Khan, who had already enjoyed the title of Hazrat 'Alī, assumed the honours of royalty and in an auspicious hour, fixed by astrologers, he seated himself upon the throne under the title of Sher Shah. The coins were struck, the *Khutbah* was proclaimed in his name and he assumed the additional title of Shah 'Ālam.¹ 'Isā Khan was asked to draft

to the fort of Allahabad on the right bank of the Jumna at its confluence with the Ganges. *Allahabad District Gazetteer*, p. 221.

Gulbadan writes: 'The army was defeated and many kinsmen and followers remained in captivity. H.M.'s own blessed hand was wounded. Three days he remained in Chunār and then came to Arail'. Writing about the march to Qanauj, Jauhar says, when Humāyūn's army reached Qanauj, an express arrived from Rājā Bīr Bhān of Arail saying that the Emperor should march towards the fortress of Patnah (Pute in Stewart, p. 21) and then they should jointly exert themselves to take revenge from the enemy. The Emperor did not agree. *I.O. MS.*, p. 39.

¹ *T.S.*, pp. 148-9. This is according to 'Abbās. Dr. Qanungo's statement that 'Abbās is silent as to when and where Sher Shah was crowned is incorrect. 'Abbās is supported by Ahmad Yādgar and 'Abdulla who assert that it was after Chausā that Sher Shah crowned himself with the consent of the Afghans and adopted the insignia of royalty. Campos also writes that Sher Shah was crowned after Chausā. But numismatic evidence shows that Sher Khan assumed the title of Sher Shah and struck coins earlier than the battle of Chausā. There are coins bearing the date A.H. 945 Nos. 1040 A and 1040 B in H. N. Wright's collection issued from the Shergarh mint in A.H. 945 and in the superscription we find the title Sher Shah. Again we find the words Sher Shah Al-Sultān on coins Nos. 1257 and 1270A in Wright's collection issued in the same year (945). Edward Thomas thinks that Sher Shah assumed the title of King of Bihār when Humāyūn

the principal *firmān* of victory, while the lesser documents were entrusted to the clerks. The Afghan youths came from far and wide and after the fashion of their tribe danced with joy to celebrate the occasion. The whole of Bengal quickly came into Sher Shah's possession as Jehāngīr Qulī, the Mughal governor, and his little army were soon overpowered, and the vanquished general had to seek refuge with the zamindars of the province. The only person of distinction who survived this catastrophe was Darvesh Maqsūd Bengali, who succeeded in making his escape and rejoining the Emperor. Master of Bengal, Bihār and the whole country as far west as Qanauj, Sher Shah sent his son to attack Kālpī and Etāwah. His trusted general 'Isā Khan marched towards Māndū and Gujarāt with instructions to lay waste the country near Delhi and Agra. The Emperor's dominions had now shrunk to little more than Delhi and Agra, and there seemed no reason to suppose that the Mughals would be able to retain even this modest portion of their once vast dominions.

Such were the first and brilliant fruits of the Afghan national revival. In later chapters we shall see how the new Afghan empire, so successful at first, underwent at last the fate of its predecessor; how it proved incapable of sustained existence, and how, at last, it fell asunder, like the old empire of the Lodis, into jarring fragments.

was isolated in Bengal and Hindāl Mirza was in revolt at Agra. There is evidence in the chronicles, too, of the fact that Sher Khan assumed the title of Shah before the battle of Chausā. 'Abbās's account of the coronation after Chausā is very detailed and is a declaration of his new dignity after the clear defeat of the Mughal Emperor who was the acknowledged lord of Hindustān. The first was a preliminary ceremony gone through to proclaim his mastery of Bengal and Bihār. The second was a real consecration of his newly acquired dignity. The fêtes and festivals held for days together and the *firmāns* of victory issued soon after the battle furnish evidence of its special significance.

Tārīkh-i-Shāhī, *Bibliotheca Indica*, p. 203. *Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī*, A.U.M.S., pp. 196-7. *Islamic Culture* X, pp. 127-30. Qanungo, *Sher Shah*, p. 206. Campos, *History of the Portuguese in Bengal*, p. 41. Wright, *The Sultans of Delhi and their Metrology*, pp. 269, 270, 323. Thomas, *Chronicles of Pathan Kings*, p. 393.

CHAPTER VII

THE BATTLE OF QANAUJ AND THE FLIGHT OF HUMAYUN

WE saw in the last chapter how the national aspiration of the Afghans found satisfaction in the unity and strength which came from the leadership of the great Sher Shah. Already after the battle of Chausā, they were lifting their heads high. From their own historians it is plain that now at last they regarded their national honour as wiped clean from the slur thrown upon it by the defeat of Ibrāhīm Lodi upon the fatal field of Pānīpat. It mattered nothing that their triumph had been gained by means for which a more enlightened age can express nothing but condemnation. The fact remained that they were winning, they were ruining the hated Mughals; they would surely soon expel them from India. Sher Shah had no intention of allowing his adversaries time to recover from the effects of the crushing blow he had just dealt them. He occupied every moment of the last six months of 1539 in preparations for the final struggle which was to regain for the Afghans the position of predominance of which Bābur's exploit had deprived them, and in January 1540, he took the field once more, determined to expel from the confines of India the new dynasty and all who supported it.

Meanwhile, at Agra, all was in confusion. At first the news of the disaster sobered the recalcitrant brothers who were freely forgiven by the Emperor.¹ But soon disturbances began to break out afresh. There was much show of vigour and activity, the levying of fresh troops was hurried on, and many Amīrs and nobles came from all sides with promises of help and requests for office. Even the archrebel Muhammad Sultān Mirza came with his sons, and accepted service with the Emperor. From every direction those who owed allegiance or fortune to the Mughals were rallying round their leader, and had that leader possessed sufficient common sense to perceive his opportunity, and sufficient address to avail himself of it, he might yet have made Sher Shah miss his destiny and bitterly rue the day when he took up arms against the seed of Tīmūr. But the fatal elements of disunion were present in such strength as to ruin the great combination which was being planned. And undoubtedly, the main author of Humāyūn's present, as of his later, misfortunes was his evil genius, Kāmran.

On the Emperor's arrival in Agra, Kāmran had boastfully asked

¹ For the story of Hindāl's pardon see Gulbadan's *H.N.*, pp. 139-40.

permission to lead his 20,000 Punjābī troops against the Afghans. Humāyūn, who had seen enough of Sher Shah to realise that Kāmran would have no possible chance of success, refused his consent, asking Kāmran to save his troops and his energy until a concerted effort could be made to cope with the growing power of the Afghans.¹ Kāmran was more powerful than the other brothers; he had a large army and possessed territory from Kābul to Zamīndāwar and to Samānah in the south. But, as Abul Fazl says, he was 'contentious and wanting in his duty to so eminent a king'. He became ill and continually sought permission to retire to the Punjāb.² Naturally, Humāyūn could not spare him at such a time, but he remained deaf to all entreaties, refused to take any share in the preparations that were on foot, and remained sulkily aloof. As he could not get his own way, he determined that other people should not get theirs, and as his power was great, so was his ability to do harm considerable. No plan of action could be agreed upon and many of the ablest of the Tīmūrīds began to despair. At last came the news that Sher Shah was on the move once more, and was marching to attack the Doāb. Kāmran persuaded Mirza Haider Dughlāt to return to Lahore and Humāyūn had to make a passionate

¹ Kāmran's entreaties were not heeded by Humāyūn who is reported to have said, 'No, Sher Khan has fought against me and I must have my revenge on him; do you remain here.' Jauhar, *I.O. MS.*, p. 38.

² All authorities agree that Kāmran was ill. Abul Fazl (*A.N.* I, 346) says he had some chronic diseases and 'grew stubborn in the path of discontent'. Gulbadan also writes (*H.N.* p. 140.) that he was ill and his illness 'increased amazingly'. He became weak and so thin that his face was not in the least his own, and there was no hope of his life. He suspected that the Emperor's mother by his (the Emperor's) advice had given him poison. His Majesty at once went to him and assured him that it was not so. Nevertheless Mirza Kāmran's heart was not purged. Afterwards he got worse, day after day, and he lost power of speech. Haider Mirza writes (*T.R.*, p. 472): 'Kāmran Mirza became very ill. The climate of Hindustān had brought on some serious disorders. When he had thus suffered for two or three months, he lost the use of his hands and feet. As no medicine or treatment relieved him, he became more desirous of departing to Lahore. At length his maladies so increased that he made up his mind to return thither.' In the *Tabqāt-i-Akbarī* (p. 44) also we find that Kāmran was attacked with severe sickness and some designing persons had instilled into his mind the belief that illness was the result of poison administered to him by the Emperor's directions.

In making an appeal to Haider Mirza, Humāyūn speaks of Kāmran's 'feigned illness', but that seems to have been merely an argument to persuade the Mirza to stay. Firishtah says that Kāmran fell ill owing to his carelessness in eating and drinking and began to suspect that poison was administered to him by the mother of the Emperor at the latter's instance. *T.R.*, *Lucknow Ed.*, p. 214.

Haider Mirza says seven months were wasted in weary indecision until the opportunity was lost, and Sher Khan was on the Ganges ready for war.

appeal to the latter in terms which reveal the seriousness of the situation. The Emperor said: '... on the issue of this battle between myself and Sher Khan, depends the fate of all India and all the house of Bābur Pādshāh. If, with such a conflict about to take place, you betake yourself to Lahur on account of Kāmran Mirza's sickness, two things will ensue. Firstly, having escaped from the yawning abyss, you will save your own head, and by means of Kāmran Mirza's feigned illness, will regain safety. All the rest will die, but you will be safe! Secondly, you being the cousin of Bābur Pādshāh, your relationship (to his sons) is equal, and it is fitting that you should show your sympathy with the whole of the Emperor's race. In such a flight as you meditate, you will bear nobody's sorrow. Escaping in safety to Lahur, you will thence proceed to whatever place you consider secure. If you think this conformable with the conduct of a "friend" and a "brother", you may act accordingly; but know, for a certainty, that you will encounter the opposition of the people. Instead of their saying: "In spite of Kāmran Mirza's illness, he did not escort him to Lahur, but with sound judgment took part in the Ganges campaign with the army," they will say that you left me alone to undertake a combat on the result of which hung the fate of the house to whom your loyalty is owing. They will add that giving as an excuse the illness of Kāmran Mirza you found for yourself a place of security. Besides it is a fact that if we lose the day here, Lahur too will quickly fall.'¹

This pathetic appeal produced the desired effect and Mirza Haider agreed to stay. But Kāmran, now really ill from disappointment and rage, took this opportunity to go off home without waiting for permission. Humāyūn, seeing him inflexible, begged him at least to leave some officers and men as auxiliaries. But he refused and went off with all his troops, thus for the second time deserting his brother in the hour of need. Another authority says he left behind only Iskandar Sultān with about one thousand men as auxiliaries.² And at this particular juncture, the event was most unfortunate. As Haider Mirza rightly observes, this departure of Kāmran Mirza was the turning point in the rise of Sher Shah, and in the downfall of the Chaghatāi

¹ T.R., pp. 473-4. Haider Mirza disapproves of Kāmran's going away in such a crisis, for he says that Kāmran Mirza himself, shamefully leaving only Iskandar Sultān with about 1,000 men, left for Lahore. *Ibid.*, p. 474.

² T.R., p. 474. Abul Fazl says he left 3,000 men under the command of M. 'Abdullah Mughal and did not stay himself. (*A.N.* I, p. 348.) Nizāmuddīn says he had promised to leave a considerable force to help his brother but in spite of his promise he carried all except 2,000 only whom he left at Agra under the command of Sikandar.

power.¹ The temper of the Mughal army was bad, and the men were disinclined to fight. Desertions were common, but the deserters, instead of going over to the Afghans, simply retired to their own homes. In order to remedy a spirit of this sort, a firm hand and entire unity of action among the higher command were essential. Those being lacking, disaster became inevitable.

The first blow in the new campaign was one which should have filled the imperialists with new heart. As soon as Sher Shah heard that the Emperor designed to march upon Qanauj, he despatched one of his sons, Qutb Khan, to Māndū, with instructions to raise the local chieftains, and cause disturbances in the neighbourhood of Agra and Delhi, so as to give the imperial troops a feeling of insecurity in their rear. Mallū Khan of Māndū and Sārangpur, Bhaiya Pūran Mal of Raisin and Chanderi, Sikander Khan Mianā of Sewas and Mahesar of Bhopal had promised to offer assistance to his son. But Humāyūn had early notice of this enterprise, and hearing that Qutb Khan had gone towards Chanderi, he despatched Hindāl and 'Askarī to oppose him. In consequence, the Mālwa chiefs gave him no support and the young Afghan, overwhelmed by numbers, was defeated and slain.² Sher Shah was much grieved, and greatly wroth against those who had failed to support his son, while the imperialists were correspondingly delighted. From the Afghan point of view the defeat was balanced by the exploit of Khawās Khan, who caught and destroyed the notorious Mahāratha, for so long a thorn in the side of Sher Shah. The Emperor instantly prepared to take the field in person, and had he done so the Mughal troops, heartened by the recent success, might have fought with their old valour. But again his fatal procrastination caused him to cast aside his best opportunity. Not until the beginning of April 1540, did the Emperor pitch his tents in the Gold-scattering Garden, and formally embark upon the campaign. There was but little zeal; the effect of the recent small success had been suffered to die away, and only the memory of Humāyūn's last disastrous campaign remained with the troops. At length, the army got on the move and reached the Bhojpur ferry 31 miles north-west of Qanauj. Sher Shah appeared on the other side of the river with his host. The Mughals constructed a bridge across the river and a skirmish followed between

¹ T.R. p. 472.

² Mirza Haider writes (T.R., p. 472) that Qutb Khan was commanded to ravage the countries of Etāwah and Kālpī which were the fiefs of Hussain Sultān and Yādgar Nāsir Mirza. A part of Kālpī had been given to Kāmran Mirza and he had sent Iskandar Sultān to take charge of it. These three persons marched against Qutb Khan, who was slain in battle, and they gained a complete victory.

them and the Afghans. Though Abul Fazl says the imperialists 'routed the numerous enemy,' the pressure of the Afghans seems to have been so great that the bridge was destroyed and the Mughals were prevented from crossing the river. The army thereupon marched down the stream and encamped in the neighbourhood of Qanauj. Sher Shah took up his position on the opposite side of the river, in a carefully fortified camp, and awaited the arrival of Khawās Khan, whom he had summoned to join him immediately he had heard of the destruction of Mahāratha.¹ As soon as he received intelligence that his general was near, he sent a herald to the Emperor, announcing that he would either cross the river and fight him on the other side, or would draw back so that the Mughals could cross. Humāyūn, conscious that his men were deserting fast, and that his army was crumbling to pieces beneath his very eyes, decided to risk an engagement. Accordingly, having constructed a bridge, he crossed the Ganges, while Sher Shah, according to agreement, withdrew some *kros* away from the river bank.²

Hamīd Khan Kākar, one of his nobles, advised him to attack the Mughal army while it was crossing the river, but he refused to do so, and said that he would fight without fraud or stratagem. When he heard that the Mughals had crossed, the Afghan prince moved towards them, and after his usual habit, erected a fortified earthwork embankment close to his adversary. From this position of vantage he greatly harassed the Mughals, cutting off their supplies and capturing convoys. At length when the rains flooded the imperial camp, so that it was necessary to move to some elevated ground, Sher Shah took advantage of the confusion which reigned to draw up his forces in battle array and advance upon the foe. It was on May 17, 1540 that the armies came face to face in the decisive struggle which was to determine, for the moment at least, whether Hindustān should belong to Afghan or Mughal. Mirza Haider estimates the strength of the two armies at 200,000 men.³ At first sight, the advantage seemed to lie

¹ Mirza Haider says the two armies confronted each other for about a month, the Emperor being on one side of the river and Sher Khan on the other. The *Makhzan-i-Afghanī* alone writes four months which is incorrect. Dorn, *History of the Afghans*, p. 125.

² Only the *Makhzan* says that Sher Shah retreated twelve miles backwards; other authorities say some *kros*. (*Ibid.*, p. 125.) According to Mirza Haider one reason why they crossed the river was that desertions were taking place in the imperial army. It was thought that if they crossed, desertions would no longer be possible. *T.R.*, pp. 274-5.

³ This is Mirza Haider's estimate and very probably an exaggerated one. (*T.R.*, p. 474.) Nizāmuddīn writes that the Mughal army numbered 100,000

overwhelmingly with the Imperialists. The Emperor had at the least thirty-five or forty thousand men: he had twenty-one heavy guns, each drawn by eight pairs of bullocks, and some seven hundred swivel guns (*zarbzān*), mounted on lighter carriages, which could be drawn by four pairs of bullocks and which could discharge a ball of 500 *mishqāls* in weight.¹ As the stone balls were useless, the shot was of molten brass weighing 5,000 *mishqāls* and each costing about 200 *mishqāls* of silver.² His artillery was drawn out in line, the gun carriages were connected by chains to cover the change of camping ground, lest the Afghans should profit by the confusion. The command was entrusted to Muhammad Khan Rūmī, to the sons of Ustād 'Alī Qulī, to Ustād Ahmad Rūmī and to Husain Khalīfah. And yet, with all this preparation and outward show of strength, the Mughals were completely beaten. Their hearts were not in the struggle: they were dispirited, divided, and badly led. Besides, desertions had depleted their ranks; Muhammad Sultān Mirza and his sons Ulugh Mirza and Shah Mirza who had committed several acts of treachery, intrigued with Sher Shah and left the field, and their example was followed by many others. The feeling of the army was to get back to their homes and rest in peace. On the other hand the Afghans, despite their inferiority in numbers, were confident and resolute, trusting in their leader and themselves, and burning to inflict a final and crushing humiliation upon the hated foe.

Mirza Haider describes the Mughal plan of battle in these words: '... The proper plan would be for us to place the mortars and swivels in front, and the gunners, nearly 5,000 in number, must be stationed with the guns. If he should come out to attack us, there

horsemen while the Afghan force did not exceed 50,000. *Tabqāt*, p. 45. Firishtah, *Lucknow Ed.*, p. 218.

¹ Mirza Haider writes 'twenty-one carriages drawn by eight pairs of bullocks.' Erskine using the same passage of the *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī* writes 'sixty-one heavy guns, each drawn by sixty pairs of bullocks.' Irvine in his *Army of the Indian Moguls* writes: 'Looking to the state of things then existing, I think that the number of twenty-one is preferable to Erskine's sixty-one heavy guns; but on the other hand the larger number of bullocks (sixty and not eight pairs) is the more probably correct; the ball thrown being ten times as heavy as that of the smaller pieces, the gun itself must have weighed more, in something like the same proportion, and would have required more than twice as many bullocks to drag it.' It is quite possible the MS. of the T.R. used by Erskine may have contained sixty-one carriages drawn by sixty pairs of bullocks. The MS. consulted by Elias and Ross contained a different figure. The gun was too heavy to be borne by eight pairs and Irvine's view is likely to be correct T.R., p. 474. Erskine, *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn II*, p. 186. Irvine, *Army of the Indian Moguls*, p. 115.

² T.R., p. 474.



would be no time or place more suitable than the present for battle. If he should not come out of his entrenchments, we must remain drawn up till about midday, and then return to our position. Next day we must act in just the same way. Then the baggage must move to the new position, and we must follow and occupy this place. This scheme of mine met with general approbation.

'On the 10th Muharram, A.H. 947, we mounted to carry out the plan and made our dispositions. As had been determined, the carriages and mortars and small guns were placed in the centre. The command of the guns was given to Muhammad Khan Rūmī, to the sons of Ustād 'Alī Qulī, to Ustād Ahmad Rūmī and to Husain Khalīfah. They placed the carriages and mortars in their proper positions, and stretched chains between them. In other divisions there were Amīrs of no repute—men who were Amīrs (nobles) only in name. They had got possession of the country, but they had not a tincture of prudence or knowledge or energy or emulation, or dignity of mind or generosity—qualities from which nobility draws its name.

'The Emperor had posted the author of this work upon his left, so that his right flank should be on the Emperor's left. In the same position he had placed a force of chosen troops. On my left all of my relatives were stationed. I had 400 chosen men, inured to warfare and familiar with battle, fifty of whom were mounted on horses accoutred with armour. Between me and the river (Juibār) there was a force of twenty-seven Amīrs, all of whom carried the *tugh* (banner). In this position also were the other components of the left wing, and they must be judged of by the others. On the day of battle, when Sher Khan, having formed his divisions, marched out, of all these twenty-seven banners not one was to be seen, for the great nobles had hidden them, in the apprehension that the enemy might advance upon them. The soldiership and bravery of the Amīrs may be conceived from this exhibition of courage.'¹

Sher Shah marshalled his attack in six divisions; there was an advance guard of 3,000 men and five divisions of 1,000 men each arranged apparently in the traditional order of right, left, centre, flanking parties and reserve. The van was led by the redoubtable Khawās Khan. The right was commanded by Jalāl Khan, Tāj Khan, Sulaimān Khan Kirani, Jalāl Khan Jaloī and others, the left by 'Ādil Khan, son of Sher Shah, Qutb Khan, Rai Husain Jalwānī, Barmzīd Gūr with other officers and in the centre was Sher Shah himself with his chosen generals such as Haibat Khan Niyāzī entitled A'zam

¹ T.R., pp. 475-6.



BATTLE OF QANAUJ

his right. The Mughals were defeated and driven upon the centre. Khawās Khan advanced to attack 'Askarī and quickly overpowered him. But the greatest misfortune befell the Mughal left which was commanded by Yādgār Nāsir and Qāsim Husain Maujī who were obliged to fall back upon the centre. 'Ādil Khan and Qutb Khan Banet, wheeling round, defeated them and then penetrated to the heart of Humāyūn's troops and inflicted heavy losses upon them. Simultaneously with this favourable turn, Sher Shah's right which had been defeated, rallied again and the Mughal army was surrounded on all sides. His devoted soldiers Khawās Khan and Haibat Khan Niyāzī acquitted themselves well and performed many feats of valour. The Mughal centre moved forward but before they could firmly take their ground, they were pressed hard by the crowd of fugitives from behind. The camp followers (*ghulāms*) who attended the Mughals in enormous numbers, grew panic-stricken and rushed here and there, discouraging the troops and breaking the chains connecting the gun-carriages in a frenzied desire to escape.¹ Their panic was communicated to the soldiers who did not trust their leaders and feared to be betrayed. The wretched camp followers fled away in crowds over the four miles which separated the imperial camp from the river, broke down the bridges by the sheer weight of numbers, and perished by the thousand. The army was reduced to an undisciplined rabble and as Mirza Haider pertinently observes 'the Mīr was separated from his men and the men from the Mīr'. The Chaghataīs, numbering 40,000 excluding the camp-followers, were completely defeated.² Their plight was miserable and they fled the field disgracefully.

¹ Mirza Haider who was present on the field of battle writes: 'They (*ghulāms*) so pressed us in the rear, that they drove the centre upon chains stretched between the chariots and they and the soldiers dashed each other upon them. Those who were behind so pressed upon those who were in front that they broke through the chains. The men who were posted by the chains were driven beyond them, and the few who remained behind were broken so that all formation was destroyed.' (*T.R.*, p. 470.) Jauhar's account of this episode is different. He says: 'Mirza Haider represented that in order to let the fugitives pass, it was required to loose the chains of the carriages, which formed a barricade in front of the centre. His Majesty unfortunately complied with this advice, and the chains being unloosed, the runaways passed through the line of carriages in files.' Apparently Jauhar thinks that the disaster was due to Mirza Haider's bad advice but there seems no reason to doubt the latter's version of the affairs. (*Stewart*, p. 21.) The *I.O.MS.* is more brief. It simply says Mirza Haider suggested that the chains (*qulabah*) of carriages (*arāhahs*) should be loosened. His Majesty ordered that it should be so and the army was defeated.

² Mirza Haider says that the army was defeated without the Afghans striking a blow. The enemy had not discharged an arrow before the Mughals fled. (*T.R.*

The condition of the centre is thus graphically described by Mirza Haider himself:

'On our side I was leading the centre, to take up the position which I have selected; but when we reached the ground, we were unable to occupy it, for every Amīr and Wazīr in the Chaghataī army, whether he be rich or poor, has his camp follower (*ghulām*). An Amīr of note, with his 100 relatives and followers, has 500 servants and *ghulāms*, who on the day of battle rendered no assistance to their masters and have no control over themselves. So in whatever place there was a conflict, the *ghulāms* were entirely ungovernable. When they lost their masters, they were seized with panic and blindly rushed about in terror. In short, it was impossible to hold our ground. They so pressed us in the rear, that they drove the centre upon the chains stretched between the chariots, and they and their soldiers dashed each other upon them. Those who were behind so pressed upon those who were in front, that they broke through the chains. The men who were posted by the chains were driven beyond them, and the few who remained behind were broken, so that all formation was destroyed.'¹

So quickly did this happen and so feebly did the imperialists fight, that the Mughals were driven off the field almost bloodlessly. Mirza Haider, who was there with Humāyūn, observes disgustedly that not a man, friend or foe, was even wounded, not a gun was fired and the chariots were useless; but the statement even if true of the part of the field which Haider was watching must not be taken too literally.² It is not, however, untrue to say that the imperial army was driven off the field with little loss either to themselves or to the victors. Had the army been able to retreat to a fortified camp, as would have been the case if the position of the leaders had been reversed, the battle of Qanauj, though perhaps demoralising to the imperialists, would have been indecisive in the extreme. The shattering blows which Sher Shah directed upon the Mughal army were delivered, not during the so-called battle, but during the retreat across the four miles of plain which separated the field of combat from the river. As the Afghans had been compelled to use but little force to drive their opponents from the field, so was their vigour completely unabated, and their eagerness in pursuit intense. It was

p. 476.) The statement of the Afghan chronicler that Humāyūn stood like a mountain and displayed such valour and gallantry as is beyond all description is sheer flattery. 'Abbās, *A.U.MS.*, p. 160.

¹ *T.R.*, p. 476.

² *Ibid.*, p. 477.

in the course of the cowardly flight of the Mughal army that the immense losses which caused its destruction were inflicted upon it. Thousands fell beneath the swords and spears of the oncoming Afghans, and a terrible revenge was exacted for the humiliations which that nation had suffered since Pānipat. When at length pursuers and pursued reached the river, the carnage was terrible. The miserable Mughals were butchered on the banks or driven into the water at the point of the steel.

Let us hear of the miserable plight of the Mughal army in Mirza Haider's words:

'Many illustrious Amīrs were drowned, and each one remained or went on at his will. When we came out of the river, His Majesty, who at mid-day had a retinue of 17,000 in attendance upon his court, was mounted upon a horse which had been given to him by Tārdī Beg, and had nothing on his head or feet. "Permanence is from God and dominion is from God." Out of 1,000 retainers eight persons came out of the river; the rest had perished in the water. The total loss may be estimated from this fact.'

With the greatest difficulty did the Emperor himself find a way over, and collect round himself 'Askarī, Yādgār, and a few men. After much trouble he reached Agra, harassed by the villagers and distracted by the wrangles of his nobles.

The Emperor tried to save himself by flight; he plunged his horse into the Ganges and got separated from it when he was helped out of the water by Shamsuddīn Muhammad Ghaznavī who was afterwards given the title of Khan A'zam during Akbar's reign.¹

Where was the battle fought? It is clear that it was fought on the eastern bank of the Ganges on the tract of land which is now comprised in the Hardoi district. All authorities agree in saying that after the preliminary skirmishes Humāyūn proceeded from Bhojpur to Qanauj and having reached there he decided to cross the river on account of desertions in the army. It is stated in the *Hadīqat-ul-*

¹ This episode is variously described by historians. Abul Fazl says (*A. N. I*, p. 354) the Emperor after defeat mounted on an elephant and descended to the water's edge and looked for an exit. As the bank was high, he could not get out. One of the soldiers, Shamsuddīn Muhammad Ghaznavī, drew him up; just then Muqaddam Beg, one of Kāmran's officers, brought his horse and the Emperor left for Agra. Jauhar writes (*A.U.M.S.*, p. 40) that the Emperor was pulled to the bank by turbans tied together. Then they brought him a horse and he left for Agra. From all accounts it is clear that the unfortunate Emperor was here, as at Chausā, very nearly drowned and his escape was almost miraculous. This Shamsuddīn Muhammad is the same person whose wife under the sobriquet of Jiji Anaga became a nurse of Akbar.

Aqālīm that he crossed the Ganges at Nānāmau Ghāt, a ferry 15 or 16 miles east of Qanauj and encamped on the other side.¹ Haider Mirza says, 'When the Chaghatāis took to flight, the distance between their position and the Ganges might be nearly a *farsakh*,' which shows that the Mughal camp was about 4 miles from the river. This is corroborated by Firishtah's statement that Sher Shah pursued Humāyūn for nearly 6 miles. Crossing to the other side of the stream, Sher Shah destroyed the old city of Qanauj and built a new one called Shergarh in order to commemorate his victory.² This is mentioned on his coins as Shergarh *urf* Qanauj. It is now called Daipur and is situated at a distance of 6 or 7 miles from Qanauj. The bank of the river near Shergarh is still steep and it appears that the spot on which Humāyūn landed was somewhere near it. /

A close examination of the accounts of various writers and the topography of the place leads us to the conclusion that the battle was fought on the high ground on the other side of the river opposite to that part of the bank which is between Shergarh and Nānāmau Ghāt. Professor Qanungo fixes upon Bilgrām (in the Hardoi district) as the site of the battle. No contemporary or later writer mentions Bilgrām in this connection, nor is there any tradition current among the people today about the battle having been fought there. If the battle had been fought between Bilgrām and Qanauj, it would not have been necessary for Humāyūn to cross the river at Nānāmau Ghāt. It would not have been wise to go such a long distance and give time to the enemy who was ready for action on the other side. Besides, from Bilgrām Sher Shah could have crossed to Qanauj and built the monument of victory there. He need not have gone 6 or 7 miles eastward to build a new city by devastating the old one. There are no convincing reasons in favour of Bilgrām as the site of the battle.

The battle of the Ganges turned out a greater disaster than the rout of Chausā and shattered, for the time being at any rate, the hopes of a Mughal revival. It appears from Mirza Haider's account of the conference among the brothers which preceded the campaign that to discerning eyes the issue of the battle was a foregone conclusion.³ Abul Fazl's remarks also convey the impression that Humāyūn did not feel sure of victory in this campaign.⁴ Lack of unity

¹ The mention of the battle of Qanauj and the Nānāmau Ghāt is made in *Hadiqat* III, p. 26.

² In Daipur a mosque still exists which was built in the year 1545 by Salīm Shah Sūr.

³ *T.R.*, pp. 472-3.

⁴ The substance of what Abul Fazl writes is as follows: When he (Humāyūn)

among the brothers marred the enterprise from the very outset and Kāmīrān's intransigence must have greatly encouraged the hopes of Sher Shah. Humāyūn's choice of the river line was a blunder. He ought to have remained on the western side of the stream and ought not to have crossed it, for by doing so he did not only put his troops in peril but placed himself deliberately in a position in which a defeat was bound to prove disastrous to him. Having made the mistake of crossing the river, the camping ground was not judiciously chosen and the transfer to an elevated spot in the midst of a heavy rain drenched the baggage which became too heavy to carry and disorganised the army.¹ Nizāmuddīn Ahmad rightly observes that the heavy rain was the chief cause of the defeat of the imperial army.² The Afghans chose their minute well and began their attack while the Mughals were still removing their baggage to the new camping ground.

The contrast between the discipline and efficiency of the two armies explains the defeat of the Mughals. The Afghans had rallied under a national banner and the example and courage of their leader filled them with determination and hope. Humāyūn, who had bravely maintained himself in the thick of the fight at Pānīpat and Khānuā, had deteriorated and most of Bābur's generals had either died in the natural course or left for their homes.³ The climate of India must have told on the health of the troops, and the soft life of Bengal must have enervated them to a considerable extent. The improvised levies that had been hastily collected in the eastern country were no match for the sturdy Afghans who were well drilled and disciplined for the arduous duties of the battle field. The Mughal army was numerically larger; according to a liberal estimate, it amounted to a hundred thousand men, whereas the Afghans numbered

went on this expedition with such a small army, full of hypocrisy, empty of sincerity, it crossed his lofty mind that it was many degrees better to hasten to the city of annihilation on the steed of valour and to urge on the horse of his life to the goal of nothingness, than to be courteous to friendship-affecting enemies, to league oneself in hypocrisy with them, and to play the game of altercation with unfair gamesters. Better a mirage than a river which must be drunk in company with those wretches. *A.N.* I, p. 352.

¹ According to Badāonī 'this action of his (Humāyūn's) afforded an excuse to his men to flee and a serious defeat ensued.' Ranking, *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 465.

² *Tabqāt, Bibliotheca Indica*, p. 45. *Tārīkh-i-Khāndān-i-Tīmūriyah, Khudābakhsh MS. Firishtah, Lucknow Ed.*, p. 218.

³ At Pānīpat Humāyūn led the right assisted by a body of trusted leaders like Khwājah Kalan, Sultān Muhammad Dulḍai, Hindū Beg, Wali Khazin and others; at Khānuā he commanded the central body of the right wing assisted by soldiers equally brave and undaunted.

about fifty thousand, but in quality it was inferior to its opponents.¹ The artillery too was considerable but it could not be used effectively owing to the confusion caused by the sudden attack of the enemy. The imperialists were outgeneralled by their opponents and if Mirza Haider is to be believed the Mughal officers 'had not a tincture of prudence or knowledge or energy or emulation or dignity of mind.'² The Chaghatai Amirs were discontented, and by their jealousies and dissensions created in the camp an atmosphere which was wholly repugnant to success.³ Among them there were no leaders like Khawās Khan, Haibat Khan Niyāzī, 'Isā Khan Niyāzī and Miyan Āyūb who were loyal to their master and devoted to the interests of their race. Besides, the Mughal generals failed to make use of the *tulughma* tactics which had secured them victory at Pānīpat and Khānuā. The raw recruits who crowded the Mughal camp could ill resist the fire that was poured on them by these veteran officers and their men. The *morale* of the Afghan troops was much better than that of the Mughals. Treachery was rife in the ranks of the latter; officers meditated treason and intrigued with the enemy, and indeed it was the defection of Mughal soldiers that had obliged Humāyūn to cross the river.⁴ The Mughal tactics placed them at a disadvantage against the Afghans and the chances of their defeat were considerably increased by the conduct of the *ghulāms*.⁵ The unity of plan and purpose which prevailed among the Afghans made full concentration possible, and from the position which they had occupied they could easily withdraw in the event of disaster into a region where they had power and influence. Humāyūn on the contrary was drawn farther away from a position where he and his troops might have been safer.

Unlike his adversary Humāyūn lacked energy and quick action in moments of crisis. How little was the confidence inspired by his generalship is shown by the treacherous conduct of his troops. Mirza Haider speaks of general desertions in the army and writes, 'the cry was, "let us go and rest in our homes."' ⁶ Sher Shah was undoubtedly a more capable military leader who knew how to

¹ Jauhar writes that the king marched from Agra with 90,000 cavalry. *I.O.MS.*, p. 39. Also see *Tabqāt, Bibliotheca Indica*, p. 45. Firishtah, *Lucknow Ed.*, p. 218.

² *T.R.*, p. 475.

³ Dr. S. K. Bannerjee attaches no value to Mirza Haider's statement that Humāyūn's officers were cowards and did not unfurl their standards for fear of attack from the enemy. But the conduct of these officers before and during the battle does not justify such a view. *Humāyūn Bādshāh*, p. 248.

⁴ *A.N.*, I, p. 351.

⁵ *T.R.*, pp. 476-7.

⁶ Nizāmuddīn also writes that disaffection having become the fashion many

profit by a battle. The victory of Chausā, besides adding to his moral prestige, had placed at his disposal resources which he had utilised to the fullest advantage. He was a master of ruse and stratagem and was an adept in misleading, mystifying and surprising his enemies.¹ His whole nature was saturated with artifice and he never hesitated to break his promise. He grasped the weak points in an enemy's line and fully perceived the key to a tactical position. He knew when the decisive blow might be struck. He employed caution in his manoeuvres and developed plans considered and matured in advance. His vigilance and alertness on the field of battle kept his men in proper order and his unwillingness to allow any relaxation of discipline ever kept his troops in a state of readiness. He took good care always to remind the Afghans of the glittering prize that lay before them—the augmentation of the glory and honour of their race besides material gain.² Above all he knew the value of a hot pursuit and learnt from practical experience that the fruits of a hard-earned victory were reaped in the pursuit. From Qanauj he despatched soon after victory two parties to harass the imperialists during their retreat. Pitted against a foe of such undoubted prowess and skill, it was no wonder if the Mughals lost one of the most important battles.

The worst enemy of Humāyūn was himself. Dr. S. K. Bannerjee on the authority of 'Abbās writes that at this time Humāyūn suffered from some mental disorder, for soon after the battle he told Rajiuddīn Safvi that he saw a host of *darveshes* striking at the mouths of the Mughal horses.³ This may not be literally true. But there is no doubt that many of his troops went off and scattered over various parts of Hindustān. *Tabqāt, Bibliotheca Indica*, p. 45. *A.N.* I, p. 350.

¹ It must be said to Sher Shah's credit that he did not employ any stratagem in this battle. His reply to Hamīd Khan Kākar may be recalled: 'I have never before had any advantages, and have been compelled to use stratagems in warfare. . . . With my army arrayed in the open field, I will give battle without fraud or stratagem.' But some of our authorities say that the Afghans began to attack the Mughals when they were moving to the new camping ground. 'Abbās, *A.U. MS.*, p. 153. Firishtah, *Lucknow Ed.*, 218.

² 'Abbās, *A.U. MS.*, p. 156.

³ *Humāyūn Bādshāh*, p. 248. Rajiuddīn Safvi is Saiyyad Amīruddīn in 'Abbās (p. 162). When Humāyūn reached Sirhind, he told the same story to Muhībuddīn Sirhindī. He said the Afghans had not defeated his army, but he had seen supernatural beings fighting his soldiers, and turning back their horses. In this connection Dr. Bannerjee's amusing statement may be noted. 'As far as we are aware no such ascetics were utilised by Sher Shah in the battle and their presence must be ascribed to Humāyūn's imagination.' (*Ibid.*, p. 248). Sher Shah also openly declared that his victory was due to the presence of supernatural beings, fighting among his forces on the day of battle. These statements are not to be

doubt that the Emperor was sorely perplexed and was prevented from using effectively his men and munitions. The Afghan chronicler's statement that he stood like a mountain on the field of battle and displayed such valour and gallantry as is beyond all description, is a sheer exaggeration.¹ He was not able to appraise correctly the Afghan strength, and it was his contempt for the enemy that had landed him in disaster.² Dr. Bannerjee regrets that Humāyūn did not agree to make Kāmrān the chief commander in this battle. It is difficult to believe that a hostile traitor like Kāmrān would have been of much use in a campaign on which depended the fate of the Tīmūrid empire in India.

The Hindūs seem to have regarded this *débaclé* of Qanauj with complete indifference. There were numerous chieftains and zamindars scattered all over the country, but we do not find them ranged on one side or the other. That the Mughal was still looked upon as a foreigner is borne out by the indifference with which the vast mass of Hindūs treated the eclipse of Humāyūn's fortunes. It mattered little to them whether Sher Shah ruled at Delhi or Humāyūn. It is curious that the Rājput̃s made no bid for power even in such a crisis. Probably they were too stunned by the blow at Khānuā (1527) to venture once again on a hazardous enterprise. Their losses had been so heavy that the zeal of Rājasthān was cooled and after Sanga there was no leader of genius who could mobilise Hindū India to establish its ascendancy in north Indian politics. Delhi and Agra were too remote to be objects of desire; the chiefs did not think of the country as a whole, and their political vision did not extend beyond the small principality over which they ruled. Local interests were rated over national interests, and this prevented the Hindū states from forming a coalition to drive both the Afghan and the Mughal out of the country. They had failed in similar crises before; it was futile to expect anything better of them in 1540.³

To the reflecting historian the battle of the Ganges is not an unmixed evil. It transferred the dominion of Delhi to men more practical and better organised than those whom they had supplanted. The Emperor became a fugitive and was so deeply perplexed that he found it utterly impossible to set his affairs in order. But there

taken literally. They are only mediaeval modes of describing victories and defeats.

¹ 'Abbās, *A.U.MS.*, p. 161. Abul Fazl says His Majesty twice attacked the foe and threw them into utter confusion. This is sheer flattery. *A.N.* I, p. 352.

² 'Abbās, *A.U.MS.*, pp. 153-4.

³ Such crises there had been before in A.D. 1290, 1320, 1400 and 1526.

is one thing for which he deserves credit. In the sweat and anguish of battle he never lost his finer qualities, the serenity of his native temper and the kindness of his heart. He passed through terrible ordeals with a patience and dignity worthy of his high descent. We, who toil to pluck from contemporary writings the secrets of the past and are conscious of the labours needed to build up an empire, feel sympathy for him in his distress, but we cannot help feeling a sense of relief at the businesslike management of a large dominion by the Afghan leader who combined in himself the highest qualities of an administrator and warrior, and substituted order for chaos, discipline for inefficiency and businesslike methods for the fantastic and bizarre innovations which Khwāndamīr has described with mediaeval picturesqueness. With the greatest difficulty did the Emperor collect round himself 'Askarī, Yādgār and a few men. On their way to Agra they were plundered by the inhabitants of Bhongaon¹ and Humāyūn asked his brothers to chastise the rebels. According to Abul Fazl, the disturbance assumed such formidable dimensions that about thirty thousand men of the contiguous country districts rose up in arms to oppose the imperialists. 'Askarī's unwillingness to proceed against the insurgents led to an altercation between him and Yādgār, and blows were exchanged on both sides. At last Hindāl and Yādgār attacked the villagers and killed many of them. After much trouble the Emperor reached Agra, broken and dispirited, and to use Mirza Haider's words, 'in a state heart-rending to relate.'

Sher Shah, now at his ease with regard to the Mughals, and confident that he held them in the hollow of his hand, made leisurely preparations to expel them from Hindustān and conquer the whole country. The settlement of the Qanauj territory was ruthlessly effected. Bairak Nāzī was appointed as governor and the people were so thoroughly subdued that they willingly paid the estimated revenue. No man was allowed to keep in his house any kind of weapon or iron instrument except the implements of husbandry and cooking utensils. He despatched Shujā'at Khan, who was acting as his deputy in Bihār and Rohtās, to besiege the fortress of Gwālīor: he sent Barmazīd Gūr with a large force to press upon the Emperor's rear and hasten his retreat, never hazarding an engagement, and never approaching nearer, but effectively preventing any attempt at a rally. A third force under Nasir Khan was despatched in the direction of Sambhal, and Sher Shah, with a strong body of troops, marched

¹ Bhangaon (Bhogoan) is a village in the Mainpuri district in the State now called Uttar Pradesh.

steadily upon Agra. On his way he passed through Kachhandao and compelled the Chandelās of Motimau, Harpura and other places to embrace Islām and these villages are still in possession of their Muhammadan descendants. In Mallanwan *parganā* he made a rent-free grant of 200 bighas of land in village Mohiuddīnpur to Shaikh 'Abdul Quddas and others on the condition that they should recite the prescribed five prayers daily in the mosque.¹ Nowhere did he encounter any opposition and he openly announced that he trusted not in himself, but in Divine guidance as manifested by dreams, visions, and the presence of supernatural beings fighting among his forces on the day of battle. The *darveshes* and *jaqirs*, whose friendship he had always cultivated so carefully, gave him immense help, and the country fell into his hands without it being necessary to strike a blow.

Humāyūn had to fly for his life. When he reached Agra, he found that all was in confusion, and there was no prospect of raising a fresh army. He did not enter the city, but merely collected his family, domestics and such treasure as was portable and pushed on. The Mughal army was in a deplorable condition, and it was impossible to offer any resistance to the Afghans. Saiyyad Rafiuddīn,² the Sufi saint, whose guest the Emperor was in this plight, advised him to proceed towards Lahore, for he had no resources to enable him to defend Agra against the enemy. The Emperor accepted his advice but scarcely was the first stage reached when Mirza 'Askarī brought the news that Mīr Farīd Gūr was close upon their heels and they must push on without a moment's delay. Jauhar relates that the imperial camp was in a state of utter confusion at this time and the Emperor, downhearted and miserable at the dismay of his followers, organised his troops with a view to continuing his march in an orderly fashion. By May 25, he was in Delhi, and even there he dared make no stay. Two days later he left, and barely a fortnight afterwards, had reached Sirhind, and was still in full retreat. The wisdom of Sher Shah's tactics now became apparent. The small force which remained at Humāyūn's disposal was utterly demoralised by the presence of the Afghan pursuers, never seen within reach of attack, but ever steadily advancing for the subjection of the country round about, and for the apportionment of it into *jāgīrs*. He was particularly anxious to avoid the possibility of the imperialists rallying on Lahore, so he sent Khawās Khan with a strong force to hasten the pursuit and

¹ *Settlement Report*, pp. 165-83.

² He was a theologian and a man of great learning. He was the teacher and benefactor of Abul Fazl's father Shaikh Mubārak. *Ain* III, pp. 423-4.

to push up closer. After he had more or less settled the country round Delhi and Lucknow and had established 'Isā Khān and Hājī Khan in place of the Mughal governors of Sambhal and Mewāt respectively, he felt that he could now take upon his own shoulders the expulsion of Humāyūn from India.¹


Meanwhile, the defeated Mughals had congregated in Lahore and here again their fatal lack of unity became amply apparent. Hindāl and 'Askarī had also joined the Emperor but, as Abul Fazl indignantly observes, these 'fine fellows in spite of warnings did not bind the girdle of sincerity on the waist of resolve.' At length, one day the brothers, nobles and officers drew up a deed of concord and signed it but when the deliberations began as to the course to be followed, each forgot the solemn compact and expressed a contrary opinion.² Kāmran, selfish as ever, feeling that he was the only one of the

¹ Nasir Khan, the governor of Sambhal, had tyrannised over the people in various ways. It was in response to their request that 'Isā Khan was appointed. According to 'Abbās, Sambhal was a country full of 'many lawless and rebellious persons' and therefore a capable and efficient governor was needed. Besides the *sarkār* of Sambhal, Sher Shah gave to 'Isā Khan, the *parganās* of Kānt and Golā for the maintenance of his family and ordered him to keep a force of five thousand horse. The new governor was asked to establish peace and order in the whole country from Delhi to Lucknow. 'Abbās, *A.U.MS.*, p. 165.

Here 'Abbās relates the interesting story of Bairam Beg's escape from death at the hands of Nasir Khan. Bairam Beg had gone to Sambhal after the defeat of the Emperor and formed a close friendship with Mian 'Abdul Wahāb, son of Mian 'Aziz Ullah Dānishmand, one of the chief men of that city. Fearing the wrath of Nasir Khan, Mian 'Abdul made over the Beg to Rājā Mitra Sen of Lucknow. When Nasir Khan came to know of this, he wrote to the Rājā asking him to surrender Bairam Beg. The Rājā did so. 'Abdul informed 'Isā Khan of these developments and implored him to save Bairam's life. 'Isā Khan granted his friend's request and brought him to his own house. Later he introduced him to Sher Shah at Ujjain. His life was spared and, at the request of 'Isā Khan, a robe of honour and a horse were given to him. When Sher Shah left Ujjain, Bairam Beg fled towards Gujarāt and at last joined the Emperor. During Akbar's reign he rose to the highest position in the state and bestowed all kinds of favours and rewards upon Shaikh Gadāi, Shaikh 'Abdul Wahāb and Rājā Mitra Sen. 'Isā Khan never waited upon the Khān-i-Khānān although the latter always remembered his kindness with gratitude. *A.U.MS.* pp. 165-6.

The *Ma'āsir-i-Rahīmī* gave a biography of Bairam apparently taken from the *Tārīkh-i-Akbarī* of Arif Qandhārī who had been in the service of Bairam. It describes the Khān-i-Khānān's parentage, his birth in Qilah Zafar in Badakhshān, the death of his father Sail 'Alī at Ghaznī and his joining Humāyūn's service. See H. Beveridge's note 4 in *A.N.* I, pp. 382-3.

² *A.N.* I, p. 356. Abul Fazl apparently borrows this information from Mirza Haider who says (*T.R.*, p. 478) that a document was drawn up on the margin of which the Sultāns, Amīrs and others signed their names in order to signify their assent.



HUMAYUN'S FLIGHT

royal brothers whose resources had not suffered, was very reluctant to harbour the fugitive. By July 5, all the principal Mughal leaders in India were in consultation as to what was to be done. Hindāl and Yādgār Mirza suggested that Bhakkar (Sind) should be conquered, and used as a *point d'appui* for reconquering first Gujarāt and then Hindustān. Haider Mirza suggested that he should be allowed to go to Kashmir which he would conquer in two months and convert into a safe refuge for their families. He added that the Mirzas should settle down after securing the slopes from the hills of Sirhind to those of Sārang.¹ It would take Sher Shah at least four months to reach Kashmir and it would not be possible for him to carry into the hill country his gun carriages and cannon which were the principal mainstay of his army. Kāmran gave no help; he suggested that the Mirzas should either go to the hills or Kashmir and allow him to escort their families to Kābul but his proposal found no support. Mirza Haider reiterated his plan and the Emperor allowed him to depart. The meeting broke up; no agreement was arrived at, and all was in confusion. Kāmran feared Humāyūn much more than Sher Shah, thinking that while the Afghan leader would at least be satisfied with depriving him of the Punjāb, his brother might wish to resume all the possessions previously bestowed, including Kābul. With characteristically cold-blooded treachery to his king, Kāmran actually wrote to Sher Shah offering to accept him as overlord on condition that the Punjāb were confirmed to him and inviting him to come to Lahore.² Sher Shah, though he at first suspected,

¹ Sārang is not a place name. Sārang was the Gakkar chieftain who was friendly to the Mughals. He bravely resisted the Afghans and was flayed alive by Sher Shah.

It is consistent with Mirza Haider's narrative, as Elias and Ross point out in their note (*T.R.*, p. 480) that Haider Mirza should have advised his master to take up a position in Sārang's territory as a support. For a full discussion of the subject see Elias and Ross's elaborate note in the *T.R.*, pp. 479-80, and Beveridge's note in *A.N.* I, p. 357. What Haider Mirza meant is clear. He wanted the Mughals to occupy the lower ranges between the Indus and Kashmir, i.e., from Sirhind in the S. E. to Rawalpindi in the N. W.

² *A.N.* I, p. 358. The message was sent through his Sadr Qāzī 'Abdullah with a view to establishing friendly relations. He was asked to inform Sher Shah that, if the Punjāb were secured to him, he would soon bring affairs to a successful issue. Sher Shah was induced by the crafty Sadr to cross the river Beās. Of this Humāyūn was informed by Muzaffar Turkman who was stationed at the outpost near the Sultānpur river (Beās). Jauhar (*I.O.MS.*, p. 42) says the ambassador of Sher Shah was received by His Majesty in the garden of Kāmran. As Sher Shah had declined to treat with Kāmran, the ambassador was dismissed. After this the Emperor remained inactive for some time. His council advised him to make

was a man determined to see with his own eyes the ruin of the imperialists, and while temporising with Kāmrān's ambassadors, and sending back conciliatory messages, he pushed on fast but cautiously, forced the passage of the Beās near Sultānpur, and was soon almost within sight of Lahore. The negotiations into which he had led Kāmrān effectually prevented any resistance on the part of the only prince who had power to offer it; and Kāmrān was nearly caught in his own trap. There was nothing for the imperialists to do but to quit Lahore, bag and baggage, which they did shortly before Sher Shah occupied the town. The story goes that when the Afghan was at Sirhind, Humāyūn, hearing that he was about to advance on Lahore, sent a message to him saying, 'What justice is there in this? I have left you the whole of Hindustān. Leave Lahore alone and let Sirhind, where you are, be a boundary between you and me.' Sher Shah entered into the spirit of the message and said grimly, 'I have left you Kābul; go there.'¹

The distracted Emperor, after a great deal of hesitation, made up his mind that he would go to Sind, attempt to conquer Bhakkar and make it a base for future operations against the Afghans. Indeed it appears from Gulbadan's narrative that prolonged deliberations were held to determine the place to which the Emperor should resort, but Kāmrān's callous obstinacy and selfishness at last forced him to proceed towards Bhakkar and Multān. Evidently Kāmrān's large following led Humāyūn to abandon the idea of going to Kābul.² Sher Shah, well content, despatched a force which shepherded Humāyūn out of the boundaries of India, followed him to Multān, and thence retired.³ Another force followed Kāmrān, who was

away with Kāmrān, but he said, 'No! Never for the vanities of this perishable world, will I stain my hands with the blood of a brother, but will ever remember the dying injunction of my revered father.'

¹ Gulbadan, p. 144. The Emperor is reported to have sent Muzaffar Beg with Qāzī 'Abdullah with this message to Sher Shah. This reply, according to Gulbadan, created consternation in the imperial camp. The scene is graphically described by her: 'It was like the day of Resurrection. People left their decorated places and furniture just as they were, but took with them whatever money they had.'

² Kāmrān did not like the Emperor's going to Kābul. 'Let His Majesty talk as he would, pacifying and conciliating, the Mirza resisted more and more.' *H.N.*, p. 147.

³ The *Tārīkh-i-Sher Shāhī* mentions the names of the chief officers who formed this contingent. These were Qutb Khan Banet, Khawās Khan, Hājī Khan, Habīb Khan, Sarmast Khan, Jalāl Khan Jaloi, 'Isā Khan Niyāzī Bermazīd Gūr. They were asked not to risk an engagement with the Emperor but to drive him beyond the boundaries of the kingdom and then to come back.

retreating to Kābul, as far as the Indus. In no case was resistance made, and the Mughals were, as Sher Shah had promised long ago, expelled from India by the Afghans.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SUR EMPIRE — ORGANIZATION AND EXPANSION

WHEN ONCE the task, which had been for so many years the principal object of his life, had been successfully accomplished, Sher Shah must have heaved a sigh of relief. There was, however, no rest for him. Having expelled from India the rivals of his nation, there remained to him the hardly less difficult task of ordering the country himself. The first thing to be done was to prevent, so far as possible, the Mughals from finding their way back again. Accordingly, Sher Shah determined to make the Punjāb secure. He marched in the direction of Khushāb, and at Bhirā received the submission of the leaders of most of the Balūchī tribes, arranging that they should hand over to him all Mughal fugitives and block the way to invading forces. The Afghan chiefs and heads of families flocked to pay their respects,¹ and in the whole of the turbulent district of Roh there was only one tribe of note which did not wait upon Sher Shah—the Gakkars.² This tribe was important, not only from its warlike nature, but from its position, commanding as it did the main road to Kābul, along which the Mughals must surely come, if they ever returned to India. It was, therefore, extremely important for Sher Shah to make sure of them. Bābur had marched against Hātī Khan, the Gakkar chief, in response to the entreaties of the Janjūhas and in

¹ The author of the *Tārīkh-i-Sher Shāhī* relates at length the story of Sher Shah's generous treatment of the Afghans. His grandfather Shaikh Bāyazīd Kalkapur Sarwānī was honoured by Sher Shah. The Balūchīs were asked to restore to him the lands which they had usurped. Ismaīl Khan, the Balūchī chief, was given instead of the rent-free lands of the Sarwānīs the *parganā* of Nindunā in the Gakkar country. *A.U.M.S.*, p. 174.

² The Gakkars are to be distinguished from the Khokhars. Some writers on Indian history confound the one with the other, and it is, therefore, necessary that the distinction should be clearly borne in mind. Abul Fazl writes the two terms quite correctly. The Khokhars are still met with in the Punjāb. There are still about 20,000 families in the Multān district and districts further to the north-west, towards the Indus in the Sind Sāgar Doāb. It was the Khokhars who were defeated by Muhammad of Ghor and who afterwards murdered him. The Gakkars are still further northwards. Their territory extends over the greater part of the country that lies to the north of the Jūd hills or Salt Range, between the provinces and the mountains. It is a tableland buttressed by the Salt Range, rising eight hundred feet above the plains of the Punjāb. The present-day Gakkars claim that they are descended from Ijjab Jord, a Persian king, and were driven out on his defeat and death. They went to China from where they proceeded to Tibet and embraced Islām in the beginning of the seventh century. Later they came to India with Mahmūd of Ghaznī. Kaigohar was their leader and it is from him that the name Gakkar is derived. The present

his memoirs he gives an interesting account of his contest with him. His capital Parhāla was captured after a gallant resistance. Hātī effected his escape by flight, and it was after some time that he made his submission to Bābur.¹ He was not allowed to enjoy his power long, for he was ousted by his cousin, Sārang Khan, who assumed the chiefship in 1525 and with his brother, Adam Khan, waited on the Mughal king who, as a token of his favour, conferred upon them the country of Pothiār (Putwār). The friendly relations of the Gakkars with the house of Bābur were intolerable to Sher Shah, and he resolved, accordingly, to give them a sharp lesson. He despatched a large force against Rai Sārang, the chief of the Gakkars, and overran the whole country plundering and slaying. Rai Sārang, realising too late the calibre of the prince he had slighted, sent such poor gifts as his barren country afforded, and finding these of no avail in averting the hand of calamity, fought until he could fight no longer. He then submitted himself to Sher Shah who had him flayed alive, and his skin filled with straw. The Afghan captured the daughter of the Gakkar chief and bestowed her upon Khawās Khan. Having thus reduced the rebellious tribe to order, the Afghan prince took measures to ensure their continued good conduct. He determined to erect a fort that should at once dominate their country and safeguard the great road which led to Kābul. Selecting a favourable site near Bālināth which he named Rohtās,² after his other eyrie in the east, he induced the Gakkars themselves, by lavish bribes,

heads of the Gakkar clan are displeased at having been confused with the Khokhars. *Tabqāt-i-Nāsiri* (translated by Raverty) II, p. 455. *Punjab District Gazetteer*, Vol. XXVIII A (1907), pp. 40-41. Rose, *A Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab and the North West Frontier Province*, Vol. I, p. 58. J.A.S.B. 1880, Pt. I, pp. 100-107. *Memoirs* I, p. 387. Erskine, *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p. 425.

¹ For Bābur's dealings with the Gakkars see *Memoirs* II, pp. 387-91.

² It is a hill fort in the Jhelum district in the Punjāb, situated in 32°55' N. and 73°48' E., 10 miles north-west of Jhelum town. The object of building the fortress was to hold the turbulent Gakkars in check. The latter tried to prevent its construction and labour became so scarce that its cost exceeded 40 lakhs in modern currency. The circumference of the fort is about 2½ miles and the walls are 30 feet thick and from 30 to 50 feet high. There are 68 towers and 12 gateways of which the most imposing is the Sohal gate which is nearly 70 feet in height. An interesting account of the fort of Rohtās appeared in the *Pioneer* (an English Daily in U.P.) of 10 October 1897, extracts from which are reproduced in the *Jhelum District Gazetteer*. The hills of Bālināth are mentioned in the *Memoirs*. On reaching the Gakkar country in December 1525, Bābur writes: 'We had made five marches from the Sind-water; after the sixth, December 22 (7th Rabi I) we dismounted in a torrent in the camping ground

to bring the stone for its construction. After he had supervised the erection of the new stronghold, which apparently took the best part of a year to build, he remained for a little time longer in the Punjāb, finally appointing his general Khawās Khan governor of this important province. With rare foresight, Sher Shah seems to have contemplated destroying Lahore, always such a valuable base for the operations of an invader from the north-west, in order to render the return of the Mughals more difficult than ever. As a further safeguard, he intended to plant Afghan colonists from Roh in the tract of land from the Nīlāb to Lahore, so that their swords might serve as a barrier against the return of the enemies of their race. These are mentioned among his dying regrets by the author of the *Makhzan-i-Afghānī*. But unfortunately for his family, before he could do these things he was suddenly recalled to the east by the news of an incipient revolt which had broken out in Bengal. When he embarked upon his final campaign against the Mughals, he had left Khizr Khan Sarwānī as governor of Bengal. For some time that nobleman discharged his duties loyally and efficiently, but at last, encouraged by his master's long absence and engrossment in the affairs of Hindustān, he took in marriage a daughter of Mahmūd Shah III, the last king of Bengal,¹ and assumed all the state of a sovereign prince.

The news that Sher Shah had returned to Delhi and Agra on his way eastward seems to have sobered Khizr Khan, for when the prince arrived on the borders of Bengal, he was received in splendid state, and with every profession of devoted loyalty. Sher Shah, however, was not to be imposed upon, and took his servant sternly to task for marrying without leave, and presuming to seat himself upon the *toki*² (throne) of Bengal. 'It becomes not a noble of the state,' he is reported to have said, 'to do a single act without the king's permission.' He then ordered the defaulter into chains, broke up Bengal into different provinces, each with a different ruler, and

(Yurt) of the Bugials (a Gakkar clan) below Bālināth Jogi's hill which connects with the hill of Jūd.' The author of the *Makhzan-i-Afghānī* gives the details of the price paid for the stones. One Todar Khattri was employed in building the fort. A gold *ashrafi* was offered as the price of one stone and this made the Gakkars flock to him. Afterwards the price fell to one rupee and then gradually to five *tankas*. The total cost of building the fort is mentioned in the *Tuzak-i-Jehāngīrī* and the *Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī*, but the figures are unreliable. Dorn, *History of the Afghans*, p. 131. Hodivala, *Studies in Indo-Muslim History*, pp. 464-5. Hunter, I. G. XXI, p. 322. *Punjab District Gazetteer (Jhelum District, Vol. XXVII A)*, pp. 30-34. *Memoirs II*, p. 452.

¹ It will be recalled that this king had died at Colgong (Bihār) in A.D. 1538.

² *Toki* is a word used by 'Abbās Khan Sarwānī. It means an upper place.

appointed Qāzī Fazilat, a trusty officer, as supervisor, not as governor, of the whole.¹ After this he again turned westward, for other parts of the kingdom were claiming his attention.

We have already noticed how the local chiefs of Māndū by their desertion of Qutb Khan had caused that young man's defeat and death. Sher Shah had long been desirous of taking revenge upon them for the fate they had brought upon his son; but while urgent affairs demanded his presence in Hindustān and the Punjāb, he had been unable to do more than prepare the way for his march into Mālwa by deputing Shujā'at Khan to besiege the fortress of Gwālīor. This stronghold, which was held for Humāyūn by Abul Qāsim Beg, resisted long and gallantly all the assaults made upon it, but when Sher Shah returned to Agra from Bengal, he found letters awaiting him from the commander of the besieging force, the tenor of which was that a convention had been arranged between himself and the leader of his garrison. Abul Qāsim agreed to allow the Afghans into the fort, and to make a formal surrender of the place as soon as Sher Shah should arrive in person. Accordingly, Sher Shah, having made his preparations for the campaign in Mālwa, announced his intention of marching by way of Gwālīor to receive the surrender. When he reached Gwālīor, the Mughal commandant, according to agreement, made over the fort to the royal commissioners. Sher Shah then passed on in the direction of Mālwa.

After the expulsion of the Mughals, the kingdom of Mālwa, having been released from the supremacy of Gujarāt, had relapsed into a state of anarchy, and semi-independent rulers had sprung up everywhere. The most powerful of these was a certain Mallū Khan,² who in the time of Mahmūd II, the last Khilji ruler of Mālwa, had held high official position. By a mixture of force and address he had become possessed not merely of the fort of Māndū, otherwise known as Shādmābād, but also of Ranthambhor, Ujjain and Sārangpur.

¹ The translator of the *Riyāz-us-Salātīn* looks upon this as an instance of political insight of a high order. I am disposed to think that Sher Shah was obliged to have recourse to this policy of divide and rule because it was difficult to exercise effective control over a single governor, armed with plenary authority, from his distant capital at Delhi. Distance necessitated a policy of divided authority and command. The appointment of a theologian like Qāzī Fazilat may have been dictated by the esteem in which he held men of learning. The policy of Sher Shah succeeded, for Bengal remained in a state of tranquility until his death in 1545. *Riyāz*, (translated by 'Abdus Salām), pp. 145-6. Stewart, *History of Bengal*, p. 167.

² Mallū Khan is described by Firishtah as one of the officers of Mahmūd II, the Khilji king of Mālwa. He had caused himself to be crowned at Māndū

He had won his position largely as a result of his prowess in expelling the Mughal troops. As a leader of the local levies against the imperial generals, he had been a great success, and in less than a year from the time when Humāyūn had quitted Māndū, Mallū Khan had cleared the whole country, and had ascended the throne with the title of Qādir Shah. Unfortunately, he was not able to prevent other nobles, like-minded but somewhat less successful, from imitating his example, with the result that confusion prevailed. Though not as strong as himself, Sikandar Khan Miānā, who had seized the country of Sewas and Hindiā, was entirely independent. Further, the representatives of Salāhuddīn, Rājā Partab Shah, son of Bhūpat, and his guardian, Pūran Mal, had recovered the family holdings of Chanderi and Raisin; while a certain Bhūpāl had become possessed of the country of Bijaigarh and Tamhā. Such, in brief, was the condition of Mālwa in 1542, when Sher Shah marched into the country.

Between the Afghan prince and the self-styled Qādir Shah there had already been a certain amount of intercourse, not altogether friendly in character. While Sher Shah had been planning his last campaign against the Mughals, he had written to Qādir Shah, asking him to create a diversion by attacking Delhi in the south. He had placed his seal upon the top of the letter, in token of his superiority to the ruler of Māndū. Qādir Shah, annoyed at this, had retorted in kind, whereupon Sher Shah, in mock respect and genuine indignation, had placed the Māndū seal first in his turban and then on the point of his sword. He had declared that, if he should ever meet Qādir Shah, he would remind him of his impudence in putting his seal on a letter sent in reply to his *firmān*.¹ But circumstances had so far changed as to make Qādir Shah's former claim to equality an absurdity, and wisely realising the futility of resistance, the ruler of Māndū took an early opportunity of presenting himself at the *darbar* which Sher Shah held at Sārangpur. He came very humbly praying for the office of sweeper in his royal camp, threw himself upon his mercy and was promptly admitted to favour. He was amazed and humbled at the numbers and discipline of the Afghan army: at the way in which, at every stage, an earthen entrenchment was thrown up for the protection of the camp: at the respect with which the cavalry drew their sabres, galloped forward, dismounted at the first sight of the royal umbrella. Sher Shah after receiving

under the title of Qādir Shah of Mālwa. Bhūpat and Pūran Mal, the representatives of Salāhuddīn, also offered allegiance to him and paid him tribute.

¹ The etiquette about the fixing of seals was very strict. *Memoirs*, p. 332.

the submission of Rājā Pūran Mal¹ and other rulers advanced into the heart of the country taking Qādir Shah with him. Qādir Shah soon found to his dismay that Sher Shah intended to take over the whole country and distribute it among his own armies. He himself, as a reward for his early submission and continued humility, was assigned the government of Lucknow and Kālpi, where he would be far removed from the local influence which made him formidable. On hearing that he was under immediate orders to proceed to his new post, he disguised himself and fled straight to Gujarāt, escaping from custody by a trick.² Sher Shah was extremely annoyed, and vented his wrath upon Shujā'at Khan, who was responsible for the absconding prince. Sher Shah had first assigned to Shujā'at Khan the whole kingdom of Māndū, but in his anger he now deprived him of it, and gave instead the rich though inferior districts of Sewas and Hindiā, which had formerly been the possession of Sikandar Khan Miānā. His place was taken by Daryā Khan Gujarātī who had been *wazir* of Sultān Mahmūd of Gujarāt and had sought shelter with Sher Shah. The whole country partly submitted to Sher Shah: so great indeed was the terror of his name that the great fortresses like Ranthambhor, which could have held out for many weeks, submitted with all their treasures and resources at the first summons. He then proceeded to divide the region among his own followers. We have already noted that he assigned Sewas and the eastern district to Shujā'at Khan: to Hājī he now gave Dhar and the West: Ujjain fell to Daryā Khan Gujarātī, a noble of Bahādur Shah's court who had fled to the Afghans. Sārangpur was given to 'Ālam Khan Lodi. Chanderi also fell into the hands of the Afghans, and was restored to the nephew of the former Rājā.

¹ Rāja Rām Shah of Gwālior was asked to fetch Bhaiya Pūran Mal but the latter sent word that he would come with Shujā'at Khan. At this Shujā'at Khan went to the fort of Raisin but at the time of departure the Rājā's wife, Ratnāvalī (in some texts Ratnāvatī) told him that she would not take food until her husband's return. Sher Shah treated Pūran Mal generously and bestowed upon him 100 horses and 100 robes of honour and allowed him to return. Pūran Mal left his brother Chaturbhuj in the service of Sher Shah. *T.S., A.U.MS.*, pp. 180-1.

² The *Wāqī-i-Mushtāqī* (*B.M.MS.*) relates a curious story. According to this authority, Sher Shah himself planned Mallū's flight. He told Shujā'at Khan that if he (Mallū) paid him something he might let him go. Mallū gave him seven lakhs of *tankas* and was allowed to escape in the night. This strange story is hardly consistent with the other circumstances. The other authorities give a different account. 'Abbās says when Mallū intended flight and Sher Shah came to know of it, he asked Shujā'at Khan to arrest him. The trick by which Mallū escaped is described in the *Tārīkh-i-Sher Shāhī*.

Having thus completed the preliminary settlement of the country, Sher Shah marched back to Agra, leaving his representatives to complete the subjugation of their particular district. In the warfare which was waged by the former ruler against Sher Shah's officers, Shujā'at Khan won great distinction. He utterly defeated, with a far inferior force, Nasir Khan, the brother of Sikandar Khan Miānā, and drove him to the hills. He also defeated Qādir Shah who had now returned with a small force from Gujarāt, and drove him headlong out of Mālwa. So pleased was Sher Shah with the work of his general, that for once his caution deserted him. He gave Shujā'at Khan Ujjain, Sārangpur, Māndū and Mandsur in *jāgīr* and bestowed his former holding of Sewas upon Shams Khan, Bihār Khan, and Mīr Khan Niāzī, who were all of his kindred. The natural result was to make Shujā'at Khan sole ruler of all the territory of Māndū. Meanwhile, Sher Shah remained nearly a year in Agra ordering and directing the affairs of his dominions. Everywhere he was successful. Haibat Khan, now viceroy, was asked to expel the Balūchīs from the country of Multān of which they had acquired possession. They had caused much disorder and sacked the city. Haibat Khan marched against them and won a signal triumph by defeating and capturing such chiefs as Fath Khan, Hindū Balūch, and Bakshi Langah. He collected together the inhabitants, restored the town to its former prosperity and erected in addition a new quarter which he named Shergarh in honour of his master. Sher Shah was highly delighted and bestowed upon his representative titles of Masnad 'Alī and A'zam Humāyūn. In settling the revenue of the country he was instructed not to follow the *jarīb* but to take a share of the produce.

It is to this period of Sher Shah's reign over Hindustān that the administrative measures which made him famous must be ascribed. The objects of his activities, we are told, were five in number: the first was the relief of his subjects from tyranny: the second, the repression of crime and villainy: the third, the maintenance of the prosperity of the realm: the fourth, the safety of the highways: the fifth, the comfort of traders and soldiers.

Under the first and third of these heads, may be considered the revenue system and the military regulations upon which depended to a large degree his interests. The unit of revenue collection was the *parganā*, of which there were said to be 116,000.¹ In each *parganā* there was an 'Amil or administrative officer, a *Shiqdār* or bailiff, a

¹ In Elliot's translation (IV, p. 424) figure is 113,000 villages. In 'Abbās's text (*A.U.M.S.*, p. 230) it is 116,000 *parganās* or *dehas* (villages). The number given by the *Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī* and the *Wāqī'āt-i-Mushtāqī* (*B.M.M.S.*) is the same.

Khazānādār or treasurer, a Hindi writer and a Persian writer. Every harvest the land was measured afresh, and a share felt to the *Muqaddam* (headman). The assessments were carefully fixed according to the kind of grain, so that the interests of the cultivators might be safeguarded. The passage in Elliot's translation is as follows:

'Land was measured every harvest and the revenue was collected according to measurement and in proportion to the produce giving one share to the cultivator and half a share to the *Muqaddam*, and fixing the assessment with regard to the kind of grain in order that the *Muqaddams*, *Chaudhris* and *Amīns* should not oppress the cultivators who are the support of the prosperity of the kingdom.'¹

The text goes on to add that before it was not the custom to measure the land but there was a *Qānūngo* in every *parganā* from whom was ascertained the present, past and probable future state of the *parganā*.²

It is clear that every harvest the land was measured afresh and this system was extended to the whole of the empire. The only exception was the distant country of Multān where the governor was specially ordered to take only a fourth share of the produce as revenue. According to this passage one share was to be given to the cultivator and half a share to the *Muqaddam* who was responsible for the collection of revenue on behalf of the State which means a claim to one third of the produce. This view is supported by a schedule of Sher Shah's assessment rates given in the *Aīn*.³ It appears cash payment was introduced by Sher Shah now for the convenience of the cultivators. Above the *parganā* came the *sarkārs*, forty seven in number, which were primarily districts, but which also formed the sphere of officers who supervised the administration of the *parganās*. In every *sarkār* there was a *Shiqdār-i-Shiqdārān* and *Munsif-i-Munsifān* who were to keep themselves constantly informed of the doings of the 'Amils and the peasants. The 'Amils were changed once or twice a year and their work was carefully supervised. Sher Shah was particularly anxious about the collections and he ordered that if the peasants by their contumacious conduct put obstacles in the way of realization, they must be severally punished and ruthlessly exterminated to serve as a warning to like-minded miscreants.

¹ Elliot, IV, p. 413. The *A.U.MS.* is more brief. It simply says the land was measured every year (*jarīb kunand*) and the state demand was fixed according to measurement. (p. 216)

² T.S., p. 216.

³ Moreland, *The Agrarian Systems of the Moslems in India*, p. 76. J.R.A.S. 1926, pp. 453, 455.

The civil and military authorities worked hand in hand, so that the cultivator was adequately protected from riot and disorder, while the state had no resistance to fear when its demands were made. The local officers, like the *'Amils*, were free and it was the king's desire that a number of deserving persons should have the opportunity of enjoying a post of ease and profit. Underlying the whole of Sher Shah's civil administration was the strong military organization which he introduced. He had a large army which consisted of 150,000 horse and 25,000 footmen who were reinforced in time of need by the auxiliaries of provincial governors and *zilahdars*. To guard the kingdom against foreign invasion and internal disorder, Sher Shah created a large number of forts and posted garrisons in them under capable commanders.¹ These forts served their purpose well. The zamindars, inhabiting the country adjoining the rivers Junna and Chambal were sternly put down, and Bairak Niāzī, the *Shiqdār* of Qanauj, succeeded in effectively suppressing highway robbery which was rampant in that country. So complete was the subjugation in this area that no man kept in his house a sword, an arrow, a bow or a gun, nay, any iron article whatever except the implements of husbandry and cooking utensils. The military regulations were carefully devised and enforced. Assignments were granted to nobles and the system of paying monthly salaries in cash was also in vogue. He insisted that the nobles should furnish the exact contingents which their obligations required, and he demanded in these troops a high condition of efficiency. The interests of the soldiers themselves were carefully considered, and the *Mansabdārs* were forced to pay their men regularly and adequately. The horses of the troops were branded to prevent a grant being drawn twice for the same animal, and unless the brand were present the monthly salary was not paid. Branding was carried to such an extent that he would not give anything to the women servants in the palace and sweepers who did not have their descriptive rolls. The salary was paid after examining this roll. A number of regulations of this kind all strictly enforced, brought the army system to a high condition of efficiency. The military regulations which he issued for the protection of the peasantry, were enforced with great strictness. Soldiers were asked to keep watch on the crops and if a man trampled upon

¹ Sher Shah was very fond of forts. He said on one occasion: 'If my life lasts long enough, I will build a fort in every *sarkār* on a suitable spot, which may in times of trouble become a refuge for the oppressed and a check to the contumacious; and I am making all the earthen work *serāis* of brick, that they may also serve for the protection and safety of the highway.'

them, his ears were chopped off by the King himself, and with the corn hanging round his neck he was paraded in the camp. Whenever the army encamped near the fields, the soldiers, to avoid blame, guarded the crops themselves.¹ Even in the enemy's country the crops were never destroyed and so great was the esteem in which the King was held by people that he never suffered from want of supplies.

Under the second head, that of repression of crime and villainy may be considered Sher Shah's police system and his very important attitude towards religion. He was a firm believer in the theory of local responsibility for the misdeed unless they could produce the offender. The *Muqaddams* of villages had to produce thieves and robbers or to make good the loss when such crime occurred within their jurisdiction. *Muqaddams* harbouring offenders were severely punished. Murder was treated more severely. When the culprit could not be traced, the *Muqaddams* were asked to produce him and if they failed to do so, they were put to death, for it was held by the administration that 'thefts and highway robberies could take place only by the connivance of headmen.' It was the duty of the '*Amils* of *parganās*, and over them of the authorities who controlled the *sarkār* concerned, to exact reparation for every offence. Any dereliction of duty in an official of any grade, from the highest to the lowest, was most severely punished. The King knew all that was going on, through an elaborate secret service system, which he had established to keep a watch upon the local administration of the great nobles. Any failure of local justice, any hushed-up crime, found its way at length to the ears of the King, who took prompt and exemplary action. That his discipline was so successful was certainly in a large degree due to the pains which he took to conciliate the learned and religious classes of the community, whose great influence was uniformly exerted in his favour. Encouraged by his regard for them, they had encroached on the Khālsā lands. He purified their ranks, put down fraudulent dealings in the matter of land grants, by showing greater care in the issue of *firmāns*, and practised such devotion himself that he was held up as the model of a pious Muslim. The Afghans were treated with special favour and the pious amongst them were asked not merely to receive his

¹ Several anecdotes are related by the Afghan historians to illustrate the jealous care with which Sher Shah protected the crops. Drastic punishments were inflicted upon those who damaged the crops and transgressed his rules. Once in Mālwa a man's leg was tied to the back of the camel on which he was riding and he was dragged along the route for picking some grains from the field of a cultivator.

bounty but also to share in the sovereignty of Hindustān. Thus while he strengthened himself upon the material side by his regulations and good management, he contrived to buttress up his rule by the help of those spiritual forces which always exert so vast an influence upon political affairs.

Under the fourth and fifth heads may be said to fall his elaborate system of road building, his patronage of merchants, and his care for the well-being of his tribesmen. He caused every main road to be furnished with *serāis* at a distance of two *kros* from each other.¹ The *serāis* were elaborately regulated for the comfort both of Hindū and of Muslim travellers and were furnished with two horses apiece so that news from outlying parts of the kingdom might travel fast to the capital. The *serāis* were built of burnt brick in the midst of a group of villages and every one of them had a well, a *masjid* and a temple; watchmen were employed to guard the goods of travellers. For the comfort of the Hindūs, Brahmans were employed to supply hot and cold water, beds and food and grain for their horses. In addition to repairing and maintaining the old roads, he built several new ones of considerable strategic importance. One was built stretching from Sunārgāon in Bengal to the Punjāb, so that troops could be moved rapidly and easily from one end of his domain to the other. Another road was made from Agra south to Burhānpur to be used as the main artery along which armies might move for operations against the Deccan: a third was constructed from Agra to Jodhpur and Chittor, to lead into the heart of Rājputānā: and a fourth was constructed from Lahore to Multān to safeguard the frontier. This improvement of means of communication naturally had a great effect upon trade. Intercourse between various parts of the kingdom was much encouraged, and the protection of travelling merchants was a duty carefully enforced upon the village authorities. When a traveller died on the road, his goods were restored to his heirs. Customs were taken in two places only by royal officials, i.e., on the borders of the kingdom and at the place of sale, and all other dues were strictly forbidden. The officials were not allowed to buy anything except at the market rates. The result of it was that trade flourished, and Hindustān became more prosperous than had been the case for years. Nor did Sher Shah neglect to follow the example of Sultān Bahlol Lodi in encouraging the settlement of his brother Afghan soldiers from the mountains, and in insisting upon their good treatment at the hands of their employers.

¹ There were 1700 *serāis* in the kingdom.

In all these elaborate but commonsense regulations there was little that was entirely new, except in certain features of the arrangement of revenue collection. What was new was the minute care with which the King supervised every detail working early and late that all should go well. No matter was too minute, no question too weighty, to receive its proper share of the King's attention. Himself devoted heart and soul to the business of the state, he used to say: 'It always behoves the great to be active.' The consequence was that the local administration, being adequately supervised by the central authority, became energetic instead of supine, and the whole machinery of state, local and central, moved easily and efficiently.

While Sher Shah was planning and supervising these arrangements, his lieutenants were strengthening their hold upon the portions of the kingdom committed to their charge. When at length the system was in working order, he determined to visit in person various parts of his dominions and as a preliminary he determined to undertake the reduction of Raisin and Chanderi¹ which, as we have seen, were held by a Rājput family. He declared a *jehād* and marched against Raisin which resisted boldly under its gallant commandant, Pūran Mal the deputy of Rājā Pratāp Singh. For six months the siege was pushed, with many gallant feats of arms on either side: every day skirmishes were held between the Rājputs and the Afghans and these trials of strength were witnessed by Pūran Mal himself, but, at length, the continuous fire of the besieger's artillery began to produce an effect upon the wall, and Pūran Mal asked for terms. The excuse for the attack was that Pūran Mal and his master had enslaved Musalman families, and taken the daughters of Musalmans into their harems, and Pūran Mal was offered pardon and the fief of Banaras if he released the captives. He replied that he had none but that he would surrender the fort on promise of safe conduct, and

¹ Ahmad Yādgār gives an account of the campaign against Chanderi. The Rājā sent his nephew (brother's son) at the head of his troops to fight against the Afghans, but another nephew of his went over to the enemy and suggested a device by which the fort could be captured. Ready to take advantage of the traitor's services, Sher Shah promised to make him ruler of the country if the plan succeeded. At the head of 5000 horsemen his general, Walīdād Khan's brother, advanced towards Chanderi; Walīdād himself was to march with a force of 4000. A surprise attack was made upon the Rājputs and in a hotly contested action, according to Ahmad Yādgār, the Afghans were slain. At last the Rājputs were overpowered and the fort came into Afghan hands. Among the booty seized was a beautiful daughter of the Rājā who was presented to Sher Shah. The traitor, who had disgraced himself by inviting a foreign invasion, was placed upon the throne of Chanderi as a reward for his treason. *Tārīkh-i-Shāhī*, pp. 210-12.

would go to put the matter before his master. He added that the Afghan army should march two *kros* from the fort to allay his apprehensions and that he would come out of the fort with his family if 'Ādil Khan and Qutb Khan Banet¹ promised by solemn oaths that no injury would be done to him. Pūran Mal must have been aware of Sher Shah's antecedents and unscrupulous ways, and it was for this reason that he put little faith in his promises. On an assurance being given by the prince and the Afghan noblemen, Pūran Mal came out of the fort and encamped with his garrison on a spot assigned to him by Sher Shah. It is about this time that Sher Shah was detained on the road by the widows of the chief men (*Mūkhdamān*) of Chanderi, who recounted before him their tale of woe and begged him to avenge the insults offered to Muslim women by Pūran Mal and his chief. Their piteous appeal moved his orthodox heart and with tears in his eyes he hesitated at first and remarked that he had made a solemn promise to Pūran Mal to protect his life and honour. Thereupon these women, who must have been either excited over the fate of their own kith and kin or instigated by their more orthodox co-religionists, entreated him to consult the theologians (*Ulamā*) if an oath of that kind was binding upon him. Sher

¹ Elliot's *MSS.* perhaps mentioned only one name—that of Qutb Khan Banet. (Elliot, IV, 401). The *A.U.MS.* of the *Tārīkh-i-Sher Shāhī* has Qutb Khan Munī. Other texts have Nāib. There are several persons bearing this name. He seems to have been a man of great integrity and honour. We hear of him again in the reign of Islām Shah. 'Ādil Khan before coming to court wanted a guarantee from certain nobles among whom Qutb Khan Nāib is also mentioned. Qutb Khān was accused of intriguing with 'Ādil Khan against the Sultān.

Ahmad Yādgār gives a detailed account of the campaign. Having obtained the *fatwa*, Sher Shah marched towards Raisin. After going two or three stages, he got fever on account of fatigue and though a physician Mahānand by name advised rest, he pushed on. The desire for revenge completely possessed his heart. When he reached Raisin, Pūran Mal's brother waited upon him and presented him with Rs. 7000 and three elephants. He was asked to advise his brother to release the Muslim women whom he had admitted in his harem. The brother's protest that the reports that had reached him were untrue was unheeded and Sher Shah ordered the siege of the fort. Pūran Mal offered 40 lakhs and agreed to wait upon him provided a solemn promise was made that his life would be spared. This was done and he decided to leave the fort with his family notwithstanding the advice of his kinsmen to the contrary. As Rājput̃s they begged him not to put faith in Sher Shah's words and urged him to fight to the last for the honour of his house. But their counsels were unheeded and Pūran Mal came out of the fort and landed at the place allotted to him in the midst of the royal camp. Though outwardly friendly, Sher Shah secretly hinted to Haibat Khan that the infidel should be exterminated with his wives and children. *Tārīkh-i-Shāhī*, pp. 215-17.

Shah consulted Shaikh Rafiuddin Safvi, Saiyyad 'Aliuddin and other learned men who advised him that he was at liberty to break his word and that the misdeeds of Pūran Mal must be visited with death.¹ Abul Fazl rightly condemns Sher Shah and writes that he 'got the Rājā out of the fort by a dishonest treaty and promises and by the efforts of sundry misguided lawyers and wretched ignoramuses he destroyed the men to whom he had given quarter.'² The tactics which Sher Shah employed against the Rājput̃s are described by the Afghan historians. He ordered 'Isā Khan Hājib to collect his troops and secretly commanded Haibat Khan to keep a watch on Pūran Mal and see that he was taken by surprise. At the appointed place the elephants and troops gathered at sunrise and the Afghans under Khawās Khan, Qutb Khan, Jalāl Khan Jallū, Dūdā Miyānah and others suddenly attacked the Rājput̃ camp. Finding himself in danger, the Rājput̃ warrior, after the manner of his tribe, first cut off the head of his queen Ratnāvati (Ratnāvalī in some MSS.), who was highly skilled in music, and called upon his officers and men to slay their families. The last scene is described by 'Abbās: 'Pūran Mal and his companions, like hogs at bay, failed not to exhibit valour and gallantry, but in the twinkling of an eye all were slain. Such of their wives and families as were not slain were captured.'³

A daughter of Pūran Mal and three sons of his elder brother were captured alive and the rest were all put to the sword. The daughter of the valiant Rājput̃ was given to itinerant minstrels (*bāzīgārān*) that they might make her dance in the bazaars and the boys ordered to be castrated so that the race of the 'oppressor' might be extinct.⁴

¹ Elliot's MS. perhaps mentioned only one name—that of Rafiuddin Safvi. The A.U.MS. mentions the name of another theologian, 'Aliuddin. Rafiuddin Safvi of Ij was one of the most powerful Saiyyads of Balkh and exponent of the traditions, who came to India in the time of Sikandar Lodi and was given the title of *Hazrat-i-Muqaddas*. He died at Agra in A.H. 954 or 957. Abul Fazl speaks of him as a learned man of saintly habits. His mother was the daughter or near descendant of Rafiuddin. Despite the Shaikh's learning and his relationship with him, Abul Fazl is candid enough to say that he was 'misguided' in this respect. (Blochmann, *Ain* I, p. 523. Jarrett, *Ain* III, p. 423) Ahmad Yādgār mentions three theologians—Rafiuddin, Shaikh Khalil and Miyān Majduddin Sirhindi.

² A.N. I, p. 399.

³ T.S., p. 197. The *jauhar* was performed. The flames continued to blaze till noon and the entire garrison perished. *Makhzan*, I.O.MS., 102a.

⁴ T.S., A.U.MS., p. 198. The I.O.MS. of the *Makhzan* (102a) gives a slightly different version. Of the garrison only two survived. One of these was a daughter of Pūran Mal who was made over to the minstrels so that they might make her sing and dance from door to door. The other was a boy who was given to the *bāzīgār*s or jugglers. Ahmad Yādgār mentions two daughters and three boys. The latter, he says, were castrated. *Tārīkh-i-Shāhī*, p. 220.

Such was the inhuman barbarity of Sher Shah towards an enemy who had relied upon his plighted faith and it will ever remain a blot on his honour even if we admit Rājā Pratāp's misbehaviour towards Muslim women. The fort was entrusted to Shahbāz Khan, son of Yūsuf Khan Acchākhail Sarwānī and Sher Shah returned to Agra to prepare for another expedition against the Hindūs.¹

The next victim he selected for attack was Māldeo, prince of Jodhpur, who after Rānā Sāngā's death, had attained a position of pre-eminence in Rājasthān. Abul Fazl describes him as the lord of Ajmer, Nagor² and many other countries, and Nizāmuddīn and Firishtah speak of him as 'the most powerful ruler' in Hindustān. He had organized a large army and with its help had conquered Jalor, Siwānā, Bikāner and, if the bardic chronicles are to be trusted, his influence was felt in Jesalmīr, Mārwar, Sirohi and several other states of Rājputānā.³ Having ascended the *gaddi* in June 1531, he

¹ He was advised by the 'Ulamā, who had always a great influence with him, that he should march against the Rāfizī sect in the Deccan where it had made much progress. But Sher Shah preferred to direct his operations against the powerful provinces in the countries of Delhi and Mālwa. *T.S.*, pp. 199-200.

The Hindūs referred to are probably the Rājputs of Etāwah. The Shaikhs complained that one Bāsdeo Rājput had burnt and plundered the country and seized their women and children. This seems to have been a common pretext for obtaining Sher Shah's help. Dūdā Miyānā was appointed to deal with the rebellious Rājput who was crushed and the victims of his aggression were released. *Tārīkh-i-Shāhī*, p. 220.

² *A.N.* I, p. 400. Abul Fazl attributes his father's flight from Nagor to Ahmedābād to the Māldeo disturbance (*Hādīsāh-i-Māldeo*). Beveridge in a note in the *Akbarnāmāh* says that the catastrophe referred to is Sher Shah's invasion of Māldeo's territory. Jarrett thinks that the incident referred to is Humāyūn's flight from Nagor. Beveridge is undoubtedly correct, for Sher Shah's invasion was a much more serious matter than Humāyūn's flight. The *Hādīsāh* occurred at the time of the death of Mubārak's mother but the date of this incident is not given. Abul Fazl must have heard of these things from his father. Blochmann, *Introduction to the Aīn-i-Akbarī* I, p. ii. *A.N.* I, p. 400, note 5. Jarrett, III, p. 421.

³ According to Nizāmuddīn and Firishtah, Māldeo's army was 50,000 strong and according to the *Khyātas*, 80,000. Māldeo seems to have exercised sway over an extensive dominion. According to the chronicles, which are not always reliable, he conquered Siwānā from Jetmal Rāthor; Chohtan, Rārkar, Rādhanpur and Khawar from the Pawārs; Raipur and Bhadrarjun from Sindhal Rāthors; Jalor from Behāri Pathāns; Malani Rao from the descendants of Malināth; Merta from Bīramdeo; Nagor, Sambhar, Didwānā and Ajmer from Muslims; Gohwar, Badnor, Madariya and Kosithal from the Rānā of Mewār; Bikaner from the Bika Rāthors; Sanchor from the Chauhāns; and Sirohi from Dewras. His kingdom had reached the confines of Agra and Delhi. Most of these conquests meant nothing more than a temporary subjugation. Still Mārwar was at this time at the zenith of her power and independence. (*Rajputana Gazetteer*, Vol. I-III, (1909), p. 56. Jagdish Singh Gahlot, *History of Mārwar*, p. 130.)

had done much to increase his power. He had built forts and strengthened the city of Jodhpur by enclosing it on all sides by a wall and by improving its fortifications. He had resumed many *jāgīrs* and by his unscrupulous disregard of old and recognized rights he had incurred the displeasure of the nobility. The cause of the invasion must have been Sher Shah's desire to subdue a powerful chieftain who had attained a position of such pre-eminence among the Rājpuṭs at this time. But according to a Sanskrit work called *Karma Chandra Vansotkīrtankam Kāvyaṃ*, composed in 1593, it was Jet Singh, Rao of Bikāner, who being attacked by Māldeo, sent his minister Nāg Rāj to Sher Shah to seek his help against the Rāthor prince.¹ The chief of Mairta, Bīram, also sought his aid against his oppressor. Be that as it may, Sher Shah took the field against Māldeo with an immense army fortyfying and entrenching each camp as he advanced.² As it was difficult in the sandy desert to complete the entrenchments, bags full of sand were employed to construct them at the suggestion of Mahmūd Khan, his grandson. On the borders of Ajmer, Māldeo came out to meet him, at the head of a large body of Rājpuṭ horse. Sharp skirmishes were a daily occurrence, in which the Afghans had by no means an advantage; and the Rājpuṭ cavalry soon reduced Sher Shah to considerable straits by cutting off his provision trains and interfering with his food supply. He was greatly unnerved by the dangerous situation in which he found himself. His confidence in Afghan courage and military skill was lessened by what he saw of the reckless valour of the Rājpuṭs. He had recourse to a stratagem to gain his end. He caused letters to be forged in the name of Māldeo's officers to the effect that he (Sher Shah) should have no anxiety, and putting them in a silken *kharītah*, he arranged that they should be dropped near the tent of Māldeo's *vakīl*.³ When the letters were

According to Mr. Reu's account, Māldeo fought 52 battles and his kingdom included at one time 58 *parganās* which are detailed by him. Some of these have been mentioned above. Reu, *Jodhpur kā Itihās*, p. 142.

¹ R. B. Gauri Shanker Ojha's article in the *Mādhuri*, Vol. V, Pt I, pp. 43-49. The long verses quoted show that the account is not a mere poetic fancy. According to the *Mārwar Khyātas* also, the cause of this invasion was the hostility of the ruler of Bikaner and Bīram, the chief of Ajmer and Mairta whose countries Māldeo had seized. Pandit V. Reu writes to me that the cause of difference between Māldeo and Humāyūn was the slaughter of cows in the Mārwar area which, I think, is a mistake.

² Tod, *Annals* (Ed. by Crooke) II, p. 934. Tod writes that Māldeo had an army of 50,000 brave Rāthors and Sher Shah marched against him at the head of 80,000 men. Tod, *Annals* II, p. 956.

³ According to the *Khyātas* this was done at the instance of Bīram who had caused these forged *firmāns* to be put inside the shields which were sold to

picked up by Māldeo's men, their contents led him to think that the Rājput chiefs, who supported him, were in league with the Afghans. In vain did the gallant nobles protest their loyalty but they failed to dispel his suspicions. A contingent of officers headed by Jetā and Kūpā¹ bravely courted death for bare suspicion of tainted honour, and with eight or ten thousand devoted followers charged the whole Afghan army and caused immense damage before they were cut down to a man. Sher Shah was at his prayers when an Afghan came running and asked him to leave the field forthwith. He quickly mounted his horse but just at that time the news came that Khawās Khan had routed the Rājputs. Sher Shah, devoutly thankful to have avoided a general engagement with warriors so desperate, made the famous remark, 'How nearly had I thrown away the empire of Delhi for a handful of *bājārī*' referring to the coarse millet that was almost the staple food of the country. 'Isā Khan Niāzī and Khawās Khan with other officers were left in the country of Nagor, Ajmer and Mārwar to bring about its complete subjugation. The proud Rānā fled to Siwānā on the confines of Gujarāt.

Sher Shah then turned off south for the professed purpose of attacking Chittor; but as the Rānā submitted, he continued his journey through the country of Dhandhira² (Jaipur) to Kalinjar in Bundelkhand. The Rājā of Kalinjar, Kīrat Singh, warned by Pūran Mal's

Māldeo's chiefs. Having done this he informed the Rai that most of his men had gone over to Sher Shah and that an examination of their shields would convince him of the correctness of his information. This was done and the forged *firmāns* were discovered. Māldeo was, as history records, seriously perturbed by this revelation of treachery. Mr. Ojha does not accept this story. Reu, *Jodhpur kā Itihās* I, p. 129. Ojha, *Jodhpur Rājya kā Itihās*, Pt. I, pp. 302-4.

Ahmad Yādgar's account of the Mārwar expedition is quite different from that of other writers. But it is confused and not free from inaccuracies. *Tārīkh-i-Shāhī*, pp. 221-6.

¹ These names are variously written by historians. In the *Phalodi Khyāta*, to which reference is made by Dr. Tessitori in his *Bardic Survey of Rājputānā*, the names are given as Jeto and Kupo. Mr. Reu writes Jaita and Kūnpā. (*J.A.S.B.*, 1916, p. 89.) The Muslim chroniclers speak of the desperate valour with which the Rājputs charged the Muslims and drove them back. There is some confusion about the chronology of these events but the following dates seem to be approximately correct. Raisin was attacked during the first half of A.H. 950 which began on April 6, 1543 and the Mārwar campaign came later, some time during November and March 1544. The attack on Chittor followed a few months later and Kalinjar was invaded in or about November 1544. Sher Shah died on 23 or 24 May 1545.

² This is Dhūndar, the district of which Dyosa, the oldest seat of the Kachwaha Rājputs, was the centre. *I. G.*, XIII, p. 385. Cunningham, *Archaeological Survey Reports* XX p. 3.

fate, did not come out to meet him and prepared to offer resistance. The fort was besieged and mounds were erected which rose higher than the fort itself. The Afghans discharged arrows and fired at the garrison from the top of the mounds. According to 'Abbās and the author of the *Makhzan* the storming of the fortress was delayed by Sher Shah, for he feared lest the Rājapūts should kill a beautiful slave girl in the Rājā's possession, whose beauty had attracted him. Here as on other occasions the 'Ulamās declared that it was a *jehād* and urged the king to press on the siege with great vigour. He did so; and mines were laid under the fort and at last under a heavy fire the walls were battered in. Sher Shah himself directed the operations and ordered loaded rockets (*huqqahs*) to be discharged. It was at this time that one of these rockets rebounded from the wall and falling on the ground blew up the whole magazine. Sher Shah was dreadfully burnt along with certain divines who happened to be with him. 'Abbās writes: When Daryā Khan brought the *huqqahs*, Sher Khan descended from the bastion (*sabāt*) and ordered that fire should be set to them and they should be thrown into the fort. When they were engaged in throwing the *huqqahs*, one of them struck against the wall of the fort and rebounded. It fell on the spot where the other *huqqahs* were placed and a conflagration ensued. Shaikh Khalīl, Shaikh Nizām and other wise men were burnt, Sher Khan came out half-burnt. Babu, a young man, who was standing near was burnt to death.¹ When Sher Shah regained his consciousness, he beckoned to his officers to do their utmost to capture the fort and according to 'Abbās 'the chiefs attacked on every side like ants and locusts', and by the time of afternoon prayer they succeeded in their attempt. With his face lit up with joy Sher Shah expired after hearing the news that the fort had surrendered.²

¹ At this time Shaikh Khalīl, Mullā Nizām and Daryā Khan Sarwānī were with the King. 'Abbās, p. 207.

² The date of Sher Shah's death is variously given by various writers. According to 'Abbās it is 10th Rabi I, A.H. 952 (May 22, 1545), and according to Abul Fazl, 11th Rabi I, 952. He says Sher Shah died after having ruled 5 years 2 months and 13 days. Firishtah's date is 12th Rabi I, A.H. 952 (May 24, 1545) which is accepted by Erskine. Among Afghan historians the *Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī* does not give the exact date but says that Salīm came (to Kalinjar) on the fifth day and sat on the throne on the 15th Rabi I, A.H. 952 which means the 11th Rabi I. Ahmad Yādgār's date Thursday, the 24th Zu'l Qa'da A.H. 952 is incorrect. The *Wāqī'āt-i-Mushitāqī* does not give the precise date. It only mentions the year. The *Mukhzan* writes that on Friday, the 9th of the 1st Rabi in A.H. 952 some time after one watch of the night had passed, Sher Shah took something to eat and asked the 'Ulamā what merit consisted in fighting the infidels. On Tuesday (May 25) at midnight he performed his devotions for the last time

Rājā Kīrat Singh was closely guarded in Qutb Khan's house and next day at sunrise was put to death. Sher Shah had done much during his lifetime. From a petty *jāgīrdār's* son in Bihār he had risen to the position of Emperor and had brought large and extensive territories under his sway. He had driven the Mughals out of India and humbled the pride of the noblest Rājapūts. He had built up an immense army which was the terror of his contemporaries. The institutions which he devised for the better governance of the country and the unremitting industry with which he looked after the business of the state had won him the admiration and esteem of friends and foes alike. By sheer force of genius, he had organized the Afghans into a nation and curbed their separatist tendencies. But he did not seem to be satisfied with his achievements and the Afghan historians mention four dying regrets: (1) to depopulate the country of Roh and to transfer the inhabitants to the tract between the Nilāb and Lahore so as to avert the danger from the Mughals; (2) to destroy Lahore which was on the road of the invader where he could easily collect supplies and organize his resources; (3) to build two fleets of fifty large vessels each as commodious as *serāis* for the convenience of pilgrims going to and coming from Mecca; and (4) to raise a tomb to Ibrāhīm Lodi at Pānīpat on the condition that there should be a sepulchre of the Chaghatāis whom he may have 'dispatched to martyrdom'.¹

and departed from this world. All writers agree in saying that four *gharīs* of night had passed when he died, but they do not agree about the exact date. From the data available it is difficult to ascertain the precise date. Mr. Erskine, for reasons not given, accepts May 24. It seems probable that he died either on the 23rd or the 24th. *A.N.* I, p. 615. *Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī*, *A.U.M.S.*, p. 228. Dorn, *History of the Afghans*, p. 141. *Tārīkh-i-Shāhī*, p. 233. Erskine, *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p. 441.

¹ Ahmad Yādgār writes that at the time of his death Sher Shah heaved a sigh and said that he had two unfulfilled desires—one was the destruction of Lahore so as to deprive the Mughals of their route and the other was the construction of a fleet of 20 ships for the convenience of the pilgrims to Mecca. This is supported by the *Makhzan-i-Afghānī* but it mentions four regrets. *Tārīkh-i-Shāhī*, p. 233. *Makhzan*, *A.S.B.M.S.*, p. 93.

CHAPTER IX

SHER SHAH'S SUCCESSORS

THE DEATH of this remarkable man plunged all into confusion. Being still young in years, he had nominated no successor, and neither 'Ādil, his elder, nor Jalāl, his younger, son was with him at the time. Jalāl Khan, who was by far the stronger personality, was closer at hand, and managed to reach the camp in three days. He commanded the following of most of the great nobles, less perhaps from his own merits, than from the hopelessly depraved character of his elder brother. The nobles debated among themselves as to the choice of their sovereign. 'Isā Khan, probably with a view to adding to the weight of his advice, said that Sher Shah occasionally remarked that both of his sons were unfit for the throne—one was a luxurious profligate, fond of ease and pleasure, and the other had a headstrong and vindictive temper. The reasons which ultimately weighed with them were that 'Ādil was far away at Ranthambhor, and the choice of a ruler could not be long delayed in the peculiar circumstances of the country, and Jalāl, besides being brave and warlike, was available near at hand. To Jalāl's feigned protest that he would not sit on the throne while his elder brother was still alive, the reply of the nobles was that sovereignty was nothing but a gift bestowed by the grandees of the empire on any individual whom they considered worthy of it, and that the only alternative to anarchy and disorder was the speedy enthronement of a capable prince of the royal blood. Accordingly, he was proclaimed king under the title of Islām Shah,¹ and set out for Agra, where he received the submission of the governor, Khawās Khan.

Soon after his assumption of royal dignity, the new monarch distributed two months' pay² in cash to the army and resumed all the *jāgīrs* in the various provinces and granted to their holders a stipend in money. The Rājā of Kalinjar, who had been seized with

¹ He was popularly known as Salīm Shah. According to the *Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī* Jalāl was at this time at Rewah in the province of Patna. The date of his accession to the throne is given by him as 15th Rabi I, A.H. 952 (May 27, 1545). Islām Shah's election throws some light on the Afghan theory of kingship. Primogeniture was disregarded and what 'Isā Khan said on this occasion was confirmed by the Niāzīs when they met in Khawās Khan's tent after the battle of Ambala. They distrusted Islām Shah and when Khawās Khan suggested 'Ādil's name they said: 'No one obtains a kingdom by inheritance; it belongs to whoever can govern it by the sword.' 'Ādil's son Muhammad was present in the camp at Kalinjar but the nobles hoodwinked him by giving him a letter for his father. When the young man went away, they proclaimed Jalāl as king.

² One month's pay was given in advance and one month's as gift.

70 men after the capture of the fort, was put to death. The *Madad-i-Ma'āsh* (maintenance) and *aimā* grants,¹ which his predecessor had allowed, were not interfered with. He built a *serāi* at every half *kros* between the *serāis* of Sher Shah and stationed at each of them two horses and some footmen to bring news every day from Bengal. Alms were given at each *serāi*, and the poor travellers were supplied with every kind of convenience. No distinction was made between the Hindū and the Muslim in this respect. Regulations were issued for guiding civil, military and ecclesiastical affairs which were settled in accordance with them. The decision which was made according to the regulations was strictly enforced whether it was in conformity with the religious law or not. He maintained under the severest discipline an army which made him immensely superior to his nobles and sought by legislation to hamper the dangerous growth of power in every possible way. He retained the *dagh* system, seized the war elephants of the nobles, and kept the revenues wholly in his hands. He organized the army by dividing it into separate corps of 50, 200, 250 and 500 each. To every corps of 50 was attached a Persian writer (Türkī writer in some chronicles) and a Hindi writer. Besides these, there were armies of five thousand, ten thousand, twenty thousand and thirty thousand men, to each of which he assigned a *Sardar*, an Afghan *Munsif*, a Hindū *Munsif* and two *Khoja Sarahs* (eunuchs of the palace), and he granted lands for the maintenance of these troops.² He promoted to higher ranks his old six hundred horsemen who had served him as prince 'according to desert'. He abolished the system of supplying money in exchange for a certain quota of mounted men, and this deprived the nobility of any chance to increase their power without his knowledge. His espionage system was even more

¹ Here also the *Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī* says that he abolished the '*Alūfādārs* and *Jāgīrdārs* and paid them in cash from the treasury. *A.U.MS.*, p. 229.

² The passage in the *Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī* to which Sir Henry Elliot refers in a footnote is not very clear. He takes 50, 200, 250, 500 and 1,000 to be the stipend of soldiers which does not seem to be correct. The word used in the text is '*alūfā* (crops) which literally means *fodder* and is best translated by the word *maintenance*. But the author later on makes it quite clear what he means. He says to each '*alūfā* (which I have translated by *crops*) he assigned a Persian writer and a Hindi writer. Then again he says that those to whom '*alūfās* were given in the time of Sher Shah were granted *vilāyats* and *parganās*, that is to say lands. The *Wāqī'āt-i-Mushtāqī* (*British Museum MS.*) uses the word *garoh* for '*alūfā* and clearly says that he remodelled his army and organized *garohs* of 50, 200, 250 and so on and to each assigned the officers mentioned in the *Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī*. It goes on to add that Sher Shah had paid monthly salaries but he assigned *parganās* for their maintenance. Elliot, IV, p. 480. *Wāqī'āt-i-Mushtāqī*, *B.M.MS.* *Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī*, *A.U.MS.*, pp. 229-30.

elaborate than that of his father; reports were regularly forwarded to him of events that were happening in the remotest corners of his kingdom. In reply to these reports, he personally superintended the despatch of mandates direct to the parties concerned, which had to be executed in the minutest particulars without regard to Qāzī or Mufti. 'Abdul Qādir Badāonī who saw some of Islām Shah's regulations in force in 1548 in the country of Bājwārā, refers to a strange practice of this monarch.¹ The Amīrs of five, ten and twenty thousand on every Friday pitched a lofty tent, supported by eight poles, and brought the shoes of Islām Shah together with a quiver in front of the throne. Then the commanders of troops, Munsifs and Amīrs came with bowed heads and took their seats in their proper places after making obeisance. In this *darbar* was read out, by a secretary, Islām Shah's order which covered eighty sheets of paper and every Amīr was asked to comply with it. This is probably the code of eighty sections which was interpreted by a Munsif and not by a Qāzī. The adequate execution of the royal justice, as well as the far-reaching extension of the royal power, was ensured by the policy of stationing large bodies of troops, five thousand and upwards, in permanent camps in various places throughout his dominions. These camps formed, as it were, the centres from which royal influence radiated, and every Friday the royal justice was administered to suppliants in accordance with the provisions of the code.

The new sovereign was not lacking in ability, but was gloomy and suspicious by nature, quite incapable of commanding the affection, even if he did not forfeit the respect, of the Afghans who had adored his father. From the first he continually attempted to kidnap his elder brother, regardless of the fact that several trusty nobles like 'Isā Khan Niāzī, Jalāl Khan Jālū and Khawās Khan had made themselves surety for him.

'Ādil Khan paid a visit to the court but Islām Shah was prevented from carrying out his sinister designs by the nobles who reminded him of his pledge. His life was spared; he was given the *jāgīr* of Biyānā whither he was escorted by 'Isā Khan and Khawās Khan. But he had hardly been in possession of the *jāgīr* for two months when Islām Shah sent Ghāzī Malhī with golden chains to arrest him. 'Ādil fled to Khawās Khan and complained to him of Islām's atrocious conduct. Ghāzī Malhī also reached there at the same time and, knowing his mission, the distinguished general ordered him to be put in chains. Khawās Khan greatly regretted the death of his old

¹ Ranking, *Al-Badāonī* I, pp. 496 -7.

master, and saw with deep disgust that the new sovereign was attempting to gain cheap notoriety by reversing some of his father's wise ordinances. He began to meditate rebellion. He wrote to some of the principal Amīrs, such as Qutb Khan and 'Isā Khan who were offended at Islām Shah's arrogance and independence, and asked them if they would join in the proposed movement. The answer received was that, if 'Ādil Khan and Khawās Khan arrived at Agra before sunrise on a certain day, a party would certainly join them.

By one of those strange accidents which so often change the course of history, the conspirators on their way to Agra visited the great Shaikh Salīm Chisti to pay their respects. The Shaikh was celebrating *Shab-i-Barāt* at this time. In their piety they stayed so long that they failed to arrive until the forenoon, and were consequently not joined by the promised reinforcements. Even so, they were formidable, and their advance was sufficiently unexpected, to take Islām Shah quite by surprise. He summoned to him certain nobles whom he suspected of complicity with the rebels, admitted his mistake, and asked them to arrange reconciliation with Khawās Khan. His private intention was to escape to Chunār, and with the treasures stored there to raise an army which would restore to him his rights and enable him to take vengeance on those who had impugned them. But 'Isā Khan, the Mīr Hājib, pointed out that there were in the capital two or three thousand¹ devoted followers, as well as other troops, and advised him to march out and try his fortune. As the old minister had foreseen, the spectacle of their sovereign marching out to fight for his throne won over the wavering nobles. A battle took place at Midakur,² a village near Agra, in which Islām Shah was completely victorious. 'Ādil Khan fled from the country, and vanished for ever: Khawās Khan retreated to Mewāt, where he maintained himself for some time.

It is extraordinary to reflect that Sher Shah had not been dead three months when the empire which he had built up began to fall to pieces. Everywhere the Afghan national tendency to separatism began to exert its fatal influence, and in each province the officials, who had served the father so loyally, withheld their allegiance from the son and declared their independence. In the light of this rude test, the weak point of Sher Shah's policy becomes amply apparent; the people with whose help he had constructed his empire were

¹ In some histories the number is 5,000.

² Midakur is a village on the metalled road from Agra to Fatehpur Sikri at a distance of about 10 miles from the district headquarters. *District Gazetteers of the United Provinces VIII*, p. 316.

not yet ready to play their part in such a grandiose political conception. Their own ideas were still too primitive; they were too reluctant to make the sacrifice of independence and freedom which every highly organized polity exacts from its members. In consequence, too much depended upon the personality of the one man at the head of things; the machinery of state needed continual watching; it would not run with its own momentum. Sher Shah himself, with his immense powers of administration, could manage to make his great conception in to a reality for the moment; but when once he was removed, and his sceptre fell into hands less competent, it was found that the structure of the Afghan empire rested, not upon solid foundation of its own, but upon the shoulders of a single man of genius.

The discovery of the conspiracy which had so nearly proved fatal to his throne, did much to confirm the naturally harsh and suspicious temper of Islām Shah. Having first made his position secure by the seizure of Chunār and the treasure contained therein, he proceeded deliberately to procure the destruction of all who had taken part, openly or covertly, in the recent movement in favour of his brother. 'Setting himself', as Badāonī says, 'to slay and eradicate a party who were favourable to 'Ādil Shah, he girded up his loins in enmity against them, and swept them one by one from the board of the world, like so many pieces in the game of draughts or chess.'¹ Qutb Khan Sūr, Jalāl Khan Sūr, Zain Khan Niāzī, and many other great Amīrs, who had served his father long and faithfully, were seized and thrown into prison, where they shortly after met death in one form or another.

The Sultān, deciding that the nobles to whom his father had assigned dominions were dangerous, determined to crush them one by one. Entirely lacking his father's genius for inspiring them with an enthusiasm for faithful service, and dreading every powerful and capable servant as a possible rival, he determined to make himself the sole power in the land. In this conception, there was present as grave an error as that which had misled Sher Shah in his calculation of the political capabilities of the Afghans. The area ruled by the house of Sūr was now too vast, and the machinery of administration, for all the recent reforms, too cumbrous to render it possible for one man to exercise effective sway over the whole. And just as in the first Afghan empire, the work of the statesmanlike and conciliatory Bahlol Lodi had been undone by the cruel and arrogant Ibrāhīm, so

¹ Ranking, *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 490.

now in the second Afghan empire the structure completely planned and partially excuted by Sher Shah was to be ruined by the imperiousness and violence of Islām Shah. There was, however, this difference between the two cases: Ibrāhīm was foolish and reckless, and the folly he committed recoiled on him and his mistakes came home to roost not with himself, but with his successors. There is something not far from pathetic in the way in which Islām Shah hounded to death the Amīrs who had helped his father to build up the empire of which the whole Afghan race was so proud. After dealing with Khawās Khan and the nobles who were concerned in the recent disturbances, the next victim the Sultān selected for attack was Shujā'at Khan, the royal representative in Mālwa, who had been given extensive powers and possessions as reward for distinguished services rendered to Sher Shah. Like a political maniac, devoid of sense and sagacity, he laid his hands upon the trusted servants of the empire. The sole ground which Islām Shah had for suspecting him was that he was rich and powerful and had been extremely successful in maintaining order, reducing local chiefs to subjection and suppressing local troops with a firm hand. For the moment the Sultān could find no cause of complaint against the governor, who, hearing that he was regarded with an evil eye, made humble representations so that action against him had to be postponed until some pretext could be found. But the governor of the Punjāb, Haibat Khan Niāzī 'Azīm Humāyūn, who was similarly hated and distrusted by Islām Shah, was less adroit. He took no pains to dispel his master's wrath, and when served with the fatal summons to attend court, he sent instead, like Daulat Khan, his predecessor of Ibrāhīm's day, a blood relation. Like Ibrāhīm Lodi, Islām Shah received the substitute, whose death would profit no one, with grim courtesy, similarly displaying to him some ghastly tragedies of royal justice, trophies bearing the features of men well known and respected in the court circle of Sher Shah. As with Daulat Khan, so with 'Azīm Humāyūn, fear ripened into disloyalty. But unfortunately for the governor, and luckily for the king, 'Azīm Humāyūn found no Bābur to bring down upon his master. All he could do was to extend a welcome to the unfortunate Khawās Khan, who arrived in the Punjāb with such force as he had been able to collect after the Sultān's men had driven him from his own place.

Thus less than a year after Sher Shah's death, there broke out the second revolt in his distracted empire. But Islām Shah for all his coldness and cruelty was shrewd and hard-hitting, a bold and formidable antagonist. He was not dismayed by the prospect of meeting the entire resources of the Punjāb with his small force of personal adherents,

but made his preparation with courage and skill. He first fortified the new suburb of Delhi which Humāyūn had called *Dīnapanāh*, and which he now named Salīngarh. Secure in the feeling that he had a strong base of operations in his rear, he marched into the Punjāb to attack the rebels. The army of 'Azīm Humāyūn and of Khawās Khan, said to be more than double the size of his own, advanced to meet him.

The Niāzī revolt had by this time assumed formidable dimensions. On the eve of the battle 'Azīm Humāyūn and his brothers met in Khawās Khan's tent and debated as to who should be made king. Khawās Khan suggested 'Ādil's name which was opposed by the Niāzīs who wanted to usurp power for themselves. Loyalty and jealousy alike prompted the veteran general to betray his confederates and he secretly sent a message to Islām Shah assuring him of his support and allegiance. He concealed his plans from the Niāzīs who were taken unawares on the field of battle when Khawās Khan acted contrary to the instructions he had given them. He drew off his forces and rode away on the back of an elephant into the open country without attacking the enemy. An Indian army is apt to be confounded by the defection of a leader, but the Niāzīs encountered the imperialists with great valour near Ambala, and the action was desperately contested. At last the imperialists won the day and 'Azīm Humāyūn was beaten. Khawās Khan suspected 'Azīm Humāyūn of having designs on the throne and could not bear that the son of his old master should be deposed. But so great was the hatred that Islām Shah inspired that even after he had won the day he was all but assassinated by a handful of desperate men, who pushed towards him in disguise and, recognized just in time, fought their way out of the very centre of his army and escaped. 'Azīm Humāyūn and Khawās Khan fled for their lives, and the Sultān occupied the Punjāb.

Having arranged matters to his satisfaction, and done his best to ruin every one who might ever conceivably be inspired to resist him, Islām Shah retired from the Punjāb. Leaving Khwājah Wais Sarwānī to complete the military operations in the Afghan country, he went to reside at Gwālīor, a fort, the strength of which seems to have given him a feeling of security which he lacked in the ordinary residence of the king of Hindustān. Soon afterwards he was greatly pleased to hear that the veteran Khawās Khan,¹ who had taken refuge in the Sewalik mountains, had been enticed therefrom by a former protégé, Tāj Khan Kīrrānī Sambhal and treacherously executed. Thus was one more

¹ The Afghan historians mention several persons bearing the name of Khawās Khan. The person alluded to here is Khawās Khan styled Masnad 'Alī by Sher Shah. He is the same brave general who had successfully fought against

of Sher Shah's old servants done to death. The next to meet the royal displeasure was Shujā'at Khan. The governor of Mālwa had deservedly punished an Afghan named 'Usmān for a piece of insolence, and the injured man had applied to Salīm for revenge.¹ The Sultān contemptuously remarked, 'What! Are you not too an Afghan?' and this encouraged 'Usmān to think of personal reprisals. He made a determined attempt to assassinate Shujā'at Khan at Gwālīor, while the governor was on his way to a *darbar*. Shujā'at Khan was slightly wounded and when Islām Shah went to pay him a visit, his son Fath Khan intended to murder him, but was diverted from this resolve by his brother. The king was requested by Shujā'at Khan not to trouble again, for the Afghans were a rude and intemperate people. After his recovery Shujā'at waited on the king, and the latter treated him with overwhelming kindness and offered him a present of 101 horses and 101 costly fabrics from Bengal. Surprised at these unexpected marks of royal favour, the governor suspected treachery and fled to Māndū without taking leave.

Islām Shah followed him with a force, whereupon the gallant veteran fled almost alone, declaring that he would never draw sword against the son of his old master. This seems at last to have touched the stony heart of Salīm, and to have convinced him that there might

Mahāratha, the refractory chief of Bihār. After his desertion on the eve of the battle of Ambala, he had gone to the Kamayun hills and had received generous treatment at the hands of the Rājā. Islām Shah deputed Tāj Khan Kīrrānī, governor of Sambhal, to employ every means in his power to entice him out of his retreat. The Rājā was asked to surrender him but he refused to perpetrate an act of such baseness. Then Islām Shah wrote to Khawās Khan granting him pardon and asked him to come and assist him in suppressing the Rānā of Udaipur who had raided the royal dominions and 'carried off the wives and children of Musalmans'—a good excuse to put the valiant soldier on his mettle. This request was reinforced by every kind of solemn oath and a guarantee of safety duly recorded on a piece of saffron-coloured cloth. Despite the entreaties of his followers, Khawās Khan came within 20 miles of Sambhal. Tāj Khan sought the advice of Islām Shah as to the course he should pursue. As the chronicler says, 'Salīm's heart could not be healed but by the salve of this murder,' and he wrote to the governor to slay him immediately. The command was carried out with execrable fidelity. For a detailed account see Elliot, IV, pp. 528-32.

¹ One day 'Usmān Khan came drunk into Shujā'at Khan's *Dewān Khāna* and spat repeatedly on the carpet. When asked not to do so by the menials, he gave them blows with his fist. A great outcry followed, and Shujā'at Khan ordered the hands of the Afghan to be cut off. 'Usmān complained to Islām Shah at Gwālīor but he kept quiet, for he did not want to give offence to Daulat Khan Ujiyalah, son of Shujā'at, for whom he had a great infatuation. Again, the Afghan reminded the king of his injury whereupon he angrily replied, 'You are an Afghan, go and revenge yourself upon him.'

perhaps be faith and loyalty even in the ranks of the higher nobility, for next year, in 1547, when Salīm had to go to the Punjāb to suppress the disorders that were once more breaking out there, he restored Shujā'at Khan to his former dignities mainly through the good offices of his son, Daulat Khan Ujiyalah.¹

Meanwhile the active 'Azīm Humāyūn, who still retained considerable forces, had been able to set another army in the field, and had inflicted a defeat upon the Sultān's general Khwājah Wais Sarwānī at Dīnkot. Reinforcements were despatched to the royalists, with the result that a second action was fought near Sirhind, and the rebels were utterly routed. 'Azīm Humāyūn and the leaders fled for protection to the strongholds of the Gakkars, leaving their wives and children in the hands of the victorious army. Many helpless women were forwarded to Gwālīor, and by the Sultān's command were given to the camp rabble to be dishonoured.² Despite his pleasure at success, Salīm could not rest satisfied until he had gone to the Punjāb in person to see how matters stood. The Gakkars, with whom the rebel leaders had taken refuge, altogether refused to give them up when the Sultān demanded them. Salīm, therefore, determined to teach the recalcitrant tribesmen a lesson they should not forget. Sārang Gakkar was flayed alive, and his son Kamāl Khan was imprisoned in the fort of Gwālīor but Adam Gakkar eluded his grasp. He proposed to enlarge and strengthen the fortress of Rohtās and to use it as a base for conducting operations against the districts round about. The difficulties of the work were extreme, for no local labour was forthcoming, and the Sultān was compelled to keep part of his army toiling with bricks and mortar, while the remainder stood to arms and warded off Gakkar raids. For nearly two years the army was stationed in this desperate country, busied with work which was hard and uncongenial. Nothing but the Sultān's personal force of character, and the dread his name inspired could have held the troops down to their work for so long. There was, however, a good deal of formidable discontent. Pay was in arrears, and troops had no heart in their work. At length Shah Muhammad Farmūlī found courage to remonstrate with Salīm, who promised that full satisfaction should be given to the army as soon

¹ He was styled Ujiyalah because at night torches always blazed on both sides of the road between his residence and the royal palace.

² According to the *Makhzan* the families of the three disaffected chiefs were lodged in a tent in the market place which was closely guarded by volunteers. Every Tuesday during three years these women were ignominiously shown in the *darbar* when the officers with high voice proclaimed aloud that 'Azīm Humāyūn, 'Isā Khan and Sa'īd Khan were ungrateful rebels.

as a return was made to Gwālīor.¹ The work, in truth, was nearly done. The Gakkars had become weary of the two-year contest seeing that as long as they continued to shelter the rebels they could expect no peace. So Sultān Adam, the Gakkar chief, sued for terms, and agreed to expel 'Azīm Humāyūn.

The veteran commander, therefore, sought refuge in Kashmir with his followers, but the tribes inhabiting the defiles obstructed his progress at the instance of Mirza Haider. 'Azīm Humāyūn, then, proceeded to Rajouri and was pursued by Islām Khan as far as Nausherā. Negotiations for a peace were entered into with 'Azīm through Sa'id Khan and 'Abdul Malik who carried a letter for the rebellious chief from Islām Shah. 'Azīm's mother and son were handed over to the king whereupon he returned to Bān near Siālkot. The Kashmiris, among whom Muhammad Nazr and Sabr 'Alī, artillery officers of Kashmir in Rajouri, are prominently mentioned, hatched a plot to deprive Mirza Haider of his power and place the Niāzī leader on the throne of Kashmir. The latter consulted the Afghans who advised him to go but he clearly saw the dangers of such a hazardous enterprise. He sent a Brahman envoy to Mirza Haider and begged help from him in his miserable plight. When the Kashmiris, who were tired of Haider, saw their plans thus frustrated, they turned against 'Azīm Humāyūn and informed Haider that he was coming to invade Kashmir with a body of Afghans. Anxious to save himself, the Mirza despatched a force under Idi Ratnā, Husain Mākārī, Bahrām Chak and Yūsuf Chak to deal with the Niāzīs. A fierce battle followed in which Bibī Rab'ia, the wife of 'Azīm Humāyūn, fought with great courage

¹ *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 499. Islām Shah promised that after his return from Gwālīor he would order accounts of the soldier's pay to be drawn up and pay them in gold. This order was never carried out. Gwālīor was a hill state in the Punjāb.

The Rājās of the Siwālik country and Parastrām, the Rājā of Gwālīor, became the king's faithful vassals and were honoured by him. Islām Shah was not pleased with the Gwālīor people, for they were not good looking. He is reported to have composed these lines in jest:

Bah Parastrām nadānam chunān salām kunam

Chu binamash rū az khush Ram Ram kunam

Chigūnah wasf-i-miyān-i-Gualiyar kunam

Bashūrah rāst niāyad aqar hazār kunam.

[I do not know how to salute Parastrām.

When I behold his face, I say Rām, Rām.

How can I sing the praises of Gwālīor?

I cannot do so, even if I tried in a thousand ways.]

Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī, A. U. MS.

and finished Lāl Chak Kashmiri with her sword. But in spite of desperate fighting the Afghans were overpowered. 'Azīm and his noble and gallant wife with many Afghans were killed, and their heads were sent by Mirza Haider to Islām Shah.

Friendly relations seem to have been established between Islām Shah and Mirza Haider, for the latter sent his envoys to the court of Delhi with presents of shawls and saffron as tokens of good will.¹

As can be seen from what has been said, the rule of Salīm was as personal, though not as popular, as that of his father. Sher Shah had by his great administrative abilities succeeded in re-uniting the Afghans under a powerful kingdom. He had the knack of getting the best out of his subordinates and to their loyal service he owed much of his triumph. He maintained his popularity by his accessibility and justice. Salīm, on the other hand, attempted to make himself absolute, to crush the great nobles, and to rise superior to them on the ruins of their fortune. He was unpopular but ruled by sheer force of character, inspiring great terror by his ruthlessness and energy. His reign went far to break up that feeling of national unity which his father had done so much to foster among the Afghans, by making the name of king stand for grievous hardships, sternness and 'over-government'. The result was that on his death the empire which he had held together in iron bonds broke to pieces almost at once, to the great relief of most of its constituents.

Two years had Islām Shah been beyond the Sutlej, and he was now preparing to return to Delhi when Kāmṛān, now a fugitive from Humāyūn, joined him. There is a consensus of opinion among historians that Mirza Kāmṛān was badly treated by Islām Shah. The only authority that speaks of generous treatment is Ahmad Yādgār who positively states that Islām Shah gave the prince a poetical test which he stood well and although he did not mean to do him any favour, he continued to treat him well in accordance with the advice of some of his nobles. All others, Afghans as well as Mughals, definitely assert that he was very coldly received and, suspecting foul play, he fled in the disguise of a woman into the Gakkar country where he was detected and surrendered to Humāyūn.² Salīm was about to resume

¹ T.R., Appendix A, pp. 489-91.

² Leaving aside discrepancies of detail the accounts of all writers except Ahmad Yādgār are in substantial agreement. There is no reason to doubt Abul Fazl's narrative. He says that Salīm (Islām Shah) wanted to imprison him in one of the Indian forts. When the Mirza saw this, he wanted to escape. He sent his trusted servant Jogī Khan to Rājā Bakhū and asked for help which was immediately offered. The Mirza escaped disguised as a woman and was well received by the Rājā

his journey when he suddenly heard that Humāyūn was advancing into the Gakkar country in an endeavour to regain his kingdom. Sick as he was at the time, he determined to advance against the Mughals. His army obeyed him reluctantly: but such was the ascendancy he exercised over the soldiers that when it was found that the gun-bullocks had been left behind, the men dragged the heavy guns themselves. Humāyūn did not venture to meet his formidable antagonist, but retired to Kābul. Salīm, wasted with disease, left the Punjāb for Gwālīor. Before he left he is said to have meditated carrying out his father's scheme of destroying Lahore so that the town could be of no service to invaders. Islām Shah apparently designed to transfer the capital of the Punjāb to a strong new fort which he had constructed at Mankot, on the extremity of the Sewālik mountains. The only other act of Islām Shah which deserves a passing mention is his treatment of Shaikh 'Alāī who professed the religion of the Mehdī at Biyānā and acquired a great influence. This was reported to the king and he called an assembly of divines to discuss his doctrines. Mullā 'Abdullah Sultānpurī, who enjoyed the title of Makhdūm-ul-Mulk, complained to the king that the soldiers had accepted his faith and gave a *fatwa* that the Shaikh deserved to die. Shaikh Budh, a holy man of Bihār, whom Sher Shah had held in great esteem, was also consulted, and he endorsed the view of Makhdūm-ul-Mulk. The Sunnī theologians who condemned 'Alāī as a heretic urged his death. A man of firm convictions, he refused to recant under the threat of terrible punishments. He was scourged by royal command and in deep distress 'rendered up his soul to the angel of death at the third blow in A.H. 956.' His delicate body, emaciated by an ulcer in his throat, was tied after death to the feet of an elephant and trampled to pieces. The attitude of the 'Ulamā towards Shaikh 'Alāī gives some idea of the religious currents that swayed men's minds at the time, and shows how orthodoxy and superstition ranged themselves with uncompromising bitterness to stifle all forms of dissent. Such was the social environment which produced a man like Islām Shah who exterminated friends and foes alike and hastened the ruin of the empire over which he presided.

Even when the end of his reign was drawing nigh, he was consumed with the desire of destroying the nobles. But suddenly in the

of Kāhlur. From there he proceeded to Jammu, but he was not allowed to enter the country. Dismayed and confused, he went to Mankot and from there to the Gakkar country, the chief of which made him over to Humāyūn. *Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī*, pp. 250-2.

midst of his plans he fell ill at Gwālīor and died on the 22nd Zu'l Qa'da, A.H. 960 (30th October, 1553).¹

No sooner was he dead, than the disastrous effects of his policy of hewing down the great nobles, who should have been pillars of the Afghan empire, became fully apparent. When once his commanding personality was removed, there was no healthy feeling for the empire, such as had moved the great Amīrs to choose Islām Shah on the death of his father; all was confusion, selfishness, and mutual distrust. The late Sultān left a son Fīrūz, twelve years old, and the boy was acknowledged as king by the chiefs who were with Salīm when he died. But unfortunately, there was another aspirant to the throne, Mubārīz Khan, the son of Sher Shah's brother, Nizām and the brother of Fīrūz's mother Bībī Bāi. Islām Shah had, during his lifetime, more than once, spoken to his wife about the danger to her son's life from him, but she always thought her brother, immersed as he was in the pursuit of pleasure, would never care for the honours of royalty. Even when the king was on his death-bed he told Bībī Bāi that it was absolutely essential for the safety of her son to make away with Mubārīz Khan, but the gentle lady, out of fraternal love, adhered to her opinion previously expressed. Although Mubārīz Khan was ignorant and dissolute, possessing none of the qualifications which ought to be possessed by a ruler, he aspired to fill the place of Islām Shah. After brutally murdering his nephew Fīrūz with his own hand,² he ascended the throne with the title of Muhammad 'Ādil, although he was commonly called by his old nickname of Andhalī.³ Hopelessly debauched, and entirely indifferent to public affairs, he was the last man in the world to save the Afghan empire from falling into the ruin that threatened it. Much addicted to the distribution of largesse, and childishy extravagant, he did not lack popularity with the vulgar. But the habit of lavishing honour upon favourites of low birth brought him into disrepute with the more substantial classes. The climax was reached when

¹ The majority of historians write 961 but this is incorrect. Abul Fazl writes 960. *A.N. I*, p. 615. Hodivala, *Studies in Indo-Muslim History*, pp. 477-8.

² Ahmad Yādgār alone calls him Mamrez Khan. He rushed into the palace with his retainers and snatching away Fīrūz from his mother killed him immediately despite the entreaties of his sister. The lady told him that her son would never think of royalty and be content to live in a remote corner of the country but the heartless brother paid no heed to her entreaties.

³ In the text of the *Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī* it is Andhalī meaning 'blind'. Perhaps the common people gave him this nickname because of his dissolute and senseless ways. Abul Fazl writes 'Adalī which Beveridge translates by 'tyrant'. Dorn writes 'Adalī and says it means 'foolish.' *A.U. MS.*, p. 243. *A.N. I*, p. 617.

he made the able Hindū financier, Hemū, chief minister over the heads of the representatives of the Afghan nobility. Hemū belonged to the Dhusar caste of Rewārī and had risen to high position by sheer dint of merit. Abul Fazl pours scorn and ridicule upon him for he had the 'audacity' to encounter the armies of Akbar at a later stage in his career. He had secured his master's goodwill and confidence by 'master-pieces of feline trickery' and assumed the title of Bikramājīt. But even Abul Fazl praises him for his business capacity and writes that he became famous for courage and capability and by his valour did great deeds. The fact that the Hindū was possessed in a remarkable degree of military and administrative genius mattered not a particle; and discontent soon showed itself in open sedition. The first symptom of trouble was almost an extraordinary incident. As the king sat in council, distributing and rearranging grants, he passed an order that the *jāgīr* of Muhammad Farmūlī be transferred to Sarmast Khan Sarwānī. At this Sikandar Farmūlī, son of Muhammad, ran amuck in open *darbar* and slew Sarmast on the spot and would have killed 'Adalī also had he not hastily rushed into the private apartments. There was a tremendous uproar in the royal assembly and the father and son were attacked and killed by Daulat Khan Lohānī and Ibrāhīm Khan Sūr respectively. After this bloody scene the nobles dispersed and 'Adalī's authority rapidly declined.

That very evening Tāj Khan Karrānī who was at Gwālīor took the road to Bengal with the object of raising that kingdom against 'Adalī. He joined hands with Sulaimān, Imad and Khwājah Ilyas who held *parganās* on the bank of the Ganges. The king pursued the rebel, and after an indecisive engagement brought him to action at Chunār. The two forces confronted each other across a river until Hemū, by a sudden dash, gained the other bank with a few elephants and routed the rebels after a desperate struggle.

From this time onwards the talented Hemū, by his flattery as well as by his extraordinary parts, gained such an ascendancy over his master that he became virtually supreme, replacing and transferring officers, and resuming *jāgīrs*, at his pleasure. He had gained his position solely by his own abilities. In Islām Shah's time he had been successively a shop-keeper, a royal purveyor, and finally a superintendent of the bazars. He was now chief minister, absolutely dominant wherever his master was acknowledged. Though too feeble to sit on horseback and never wearing a sword, this extraordinary man won two and twenty battles for his unworthy master. His commanding talents were equally prominent in warfare and in council; and if ever one man

could have kept 'Adalī master of a united Afghan empire, Hemū was the man to do it. That he failed so utterly to preserve even the semblance of supreme authority for his king, is the clearest possible testimony to the strength of the centrifugal forces which were tearing the empire asunder.

Fresh rebellions were constantly breaking out, and the task of subduing them became almost impossible. The Sultān's cousin Ibrāhīm Khan Sūr,¹ seized Delhi and Agra, enticing to himself so many of the court circle that 'Adalī was unable to take the field. Rapidly, piece by piece, the empire which Sher Shah had built up so carefully crumbled in the grasp of his successors. Mālwa first, then the Punjāb and Bengal set themselves up as independent kingdoms, and the only districts which acknowledged 'Adalī were the provinces east of the Ganges where his grip was still firm.

There were now five Afghan kings disputing the empire: Shah 'Adalī, the nominal Emperor, had Bihār, Jaunpur and the neighbouring districts: Ibrāhīm Sūr, who now styled himself Sultān Ibrāhīm, held Delhi and all the Doāb: Ahmad Khan Sūr with the title of Sikandar Shah declared himself absolute in the Punjāb: Muhammad Khan Sūr of Bengal was now Sultān Muhammad: Daulat Khan, the son of Shujā'at Khan, had proclaimed his sovereignty in Mākwa. The ruler of the Punjāb was the first to move. He marched on Delhi with ten or twelve thousand men whereas Ibrāhīm had eighteen thousand and was supported by a number of powerful nobles. The two armies encountered each other at Farah, a village ten *kros* from Agra, but seeing the strength of his rival, Sikandar began to make overtures. A treaty was drawn up by which the whole country from Delhi to the eastern extremity of Hindustān was to belong to Ibrāhīm, and Sikandar was to hold the provinces of the Punjāb and Multān. Another clause was added to the treaty that if Ibrāhīm obtained possession of the treasures of 'Adalī and the kingdom of Bhatta,² he would share the gains with his rival. Ibrāhīm gave his consent to these terms but his Afghan supporters interpreted them as a sign of weakness. Action was postponed for some time but it could not be long delayed. A battle was fought in which Ibrāhīm was utterly defeated. He fled towards Kālpī and then towards Biyānā where he was pursued by Hemū at the head of a large force and defeated in a battle near Khānuā. The peace of the country was seriously disturbed; the Doāb was

¹ Ibrāhīm Khan Sūr was a brother-in-law (sister's husband) of 'Adalī and so was Ahmad Khan Sūr.

² Bhatta in Central India.

passing through a famine and the rival aspirants for the Afghan throne were determined to destroy each other. The ruler of the Punjāb marched on Delhi with ten or twelve thousand well-armed men, and utterly defeated his cousin Ibrāhīm. Sikandar then occupied Delhi and Agra, and found himself for the moment master of the whole country between the Indus and the Ganges. Ibrāhīm was planning to regain his dominions from Sikandar, 'Adalī was preparing to expel Ibrāhīm, and Muḥammad Shah was on the point of crossing his border and attacking 'Adalī in Bihār. Such was the state of affairs in 1555.

The Afghan empire had fallen into utter chaos: the life work of Sher Shah was undone, and the way prepared for the re-entry of the Mughals into the kingdom from which they had been expelled for fifteen years.

It will not be out of place here to sum up the causes of the fall of the Sūr empire. The efficiency and vigour with which the administration had worked under Sher Shah was seriously impaired by the arbitrary and capricious policy of his successors. Salīm had shown energy and strength in suppressing disorder, but the dissensions of the nobles had begun in his reign and some of them had utilised their resources to the detriment of the empire. The measures of reform devised by him maintained for some time the prestige of the monarchy, but the Afghan nobility tended to revert to the norm of its politics namely, the reduction of the king to the position of the *primus inter pares*. This theory of kingship was a serious obstacle to the stability of the government. Placed amidst warring tribes, the king found it difficult to enforce discipline or exact obedience from his vassals. The chiefs, like the feudal barons of mediæval Europe, held large *jāgīrs*, commanded armed retainers, and occupied a privileged position in the state. With ample resources at their disposal, they could often defy the sovereign with impunity. They still adhered to notions of rank and precedence, the practice of which led to disorder and anarchy in the state. Their narrowness of vision, their unwillingness to co-operate for the common good and their inability to see the dangers of disunion sapped their national strength and created factions which hampered the cause of good government. They subordinated the interests of the state to the interests of the clan and tried to act as independent despots. They failed to recognise peace as the fundamental basis of a lasting political system. Even in Salīm's lifetime the turbulence of nobles had at times assumed formidable proportions. The fall in the prestige of the crown under 'Adalī is illustrated by the quarrel which occurred in open *darbar* in the presence of the sovereign between

Shah Muhammad Farmūlī and Sarmast Khan on the occasion of an administrative act like the transfer of a *jāgīr* from one man to another. The Sultān had to betake himself to the harem to save his own life. Tāj Khan Karrānī's rebellion is another instance of the growing disorder in the empire. The rebel could go from Agra to Chunār and Khawāspur-Tāndā, and excite the Afghans in the neighbourhood and seize the treasure and elephants of the provincial governors. Matters continued to grow from bad to worse and the Sultān's conduct gave great offence to the leading tribes.¹ The idea of clan chiefship received an impetus during his reign. Ahmed Khan Sūr with the help of Tātār Khan Kāsī, Haibat Khan, and Nasīb Khan Tughūjī declared open war against the Sultān and assumed the title of Sultān Sikandar. Even the prospect of a common danger did not awaken the Afghans to a sense of their responsibility. Provincial governors flouted the authority of the central power and some, like Mian Yahya Tūran who defeated in Badāon (1553-54) twenty of 'Adalī's Amīrs and overpowered Rājā Mitrasen, the ruler of Sambhal, were able to organise a considerable force and set up a kind of *imperium in imperio*.² Every rebellion that occurred and every seditious conspiracy that was formed emphasised the importance of the personal factor in mediaeval politics and proclaimed the incompatibility of patriarchal organisation with individualistic ideas. The absence of an astute ruler and statesman like Sher Shah led to baronial strife and tribal feuds, which distracted the country and dislocated the administration.

The serious famine which occurred near Agra during 1555-56 must have added considerably to the difficulties of the government. The historian Badāonī writes: 'In the eastern portion of Hindustān, especially in the country near Agra, Biyānā, Delhi, the distress was so acute that *jawār* was sold at one *sir* for two and a half *tankas*. Even men of wealth and position died by scores without getting either grave or shroud.'³ Man ate his fellow man and for two years the country remained desolate and the administration in a state of chaos.⁴ The same authority adds that the peasantry and tenants disappeared and lawless crowds attacked the cities of the Muslims. This was

¹ Badāonī says: 'Adalī was fond of a life of ease and luxury and otiose in his habits and by no means fitted for the conduct of military affairs or the duties of civil administration.' He goes on to add: 'Sedition awoke from heavy slumber, the bonds of kinship with Sher Shah and of orders passed by Islām Shah snapped asunder, and disorder reigned supreme.' Ranking, *Al-Badāonī I*, p. 538.

² Ranking, *Al-Badāonī I*, p. 545. *Al-Badāonī*, Persian, p. 425.

³ Ranking, *Al-Badāonī I*, p. 549. *Al-Badāonī*, Persian, p. 428.

⁴ *Al-Badāonī*, Persian, p. 429.

followed by a fire in the fort of Agra (A.H. 962) which resulted in heavy loss.¹ So deadly was this conflagration that the people out of sheer fright, roused from their sleep, began to repeat the formula of *Tauhīd* (Unity of God), *Tauba* (Contrition) and *Istighfār* (Pardon).

But the country seems to have recovered quickly from the effects of these calamities as is shown by the considerable military resources which the Afghans could gather for a contest with Humāyūn. The fact that Sikandar could bring to the field of battle 80,000 horsemen shows how strong the Afghans were and this figure by no means represents the fighting strength of the entire nation. The chiefs had their own armies and possessed abundant war material. But they lacked unity of purpose and knew little of the art of building up a permanent political organisation. Even the Afghan character had deteriorated ; the sense of self-respect was lowered, so much so indeed, that when Hemū charged them with cowardice they 'swallowed his insults like sweetmeats.'² They took no offence at the indignities which he chose to inflict on them. They did not honour their word; their assurance was of no avail and they understood little of the sanctity of plighted faith. From the time of Sher Shah onwards their history is replete with instances of treachery which ultimately recoiled upon themselves and made them a despised lot. After his death they did nothing to improve the condition of the peasantry. Their chiefs and rulers became tyrants ; not even holy men were immune from the ferocity of their temper.³ They constantly disregarded the supreme

¹ Ranking, *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 550. The date of the fire is A.H. 962 (A.D. 1554-55). *Al-Badāonī*, Persian, p. 429.

² *Al-Badāonī*, Persian, p. 430. Dorn, *History of the Afghans*, p. 176. According to Badāonī when Hemū laid siege to Biyānā, God's people were crying for bread and taking each other's lives; a hundred thousand sacred lives were as naught for a single grain of barley, whereas the elephants of Hemū's army, which numbered five hundred, were fed solely upon rice, oil and sugar. Ranking, *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 551.

At a banquet when Hemū saw an Afghan eating slowly, he would address him in terms of the foulest abuse saying, 'How can such a non-descript nonentity as you who are sluggish in eating your victuals hope to contend against your sons-in-law the Mughals in battle?' The historian adds, 'As the fall of the Afghan power was near at hand, they had not the courage to say a word to that foul infidel, and laying aside all that disregard of superior force for which they were renowned, swallowed his insults like sweetmeats.' Either from fear or hope, this had become a regular practice with them. The author of the *Makhzan* writes that Hemū invited the Afghans to dinners and sitting himself upon a raised seat he jested with the Afghans and bade them eat and salute him as Hemū Shah. Ranking, *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 552. *Al-Badāonī*, Persian, p. 430. Dorn, *History of the Afghans*, p. 176.

³ The punishments inflicted by Salīm upon Shaikh 'Alāi and Darvesh Khwājah Husain were exceedingly severe.

moral law to which all human plans and policies must submit in the end, and which, with the swiftness of Nemesis, brought about their speedy ruin.

Besides these causes of weakness there were others which contributed in no small measure to the fall of the Afghan empire. The example of Sher Shah was forgotten ; his institutions had fallen into abeyance and the numerous forts, garrisoned with trusted soldiers which he had built throughout the country to serve as effective safeguards of his empire, had become centres of mischief and sedition. The financial stability of the government had been seriously undermined by internecine strife and the royal exchequer was no longer a centralised unit. Large sums of money that might have been spent in making the Afghan rule strong and beneficent to the people, were wasted on punitive expeditions and bootless skirmishes. The revenue was not properly collected nor could audit and inspection of accounts be rigidly enforced. The vast majority of the subject population watched with indifference the declining fortunes of a race which had been both selfish and unscrupulous. They had no desire to rally to its support in the impending crisis. The only Hindū who could save them from ruin was acting on a narrow principle. He was the leader of a faction; he frittered away in mutual quarrels the energy that he might have utilised in organising the national forces in such a manner as to present a united front to the common enemy. Loyalty to the salt, overconfidence in his own superior powers, a lack of foresight and the malicious designs of rivals prevented him from realising the necessity of a united Afghan state. Abul Fazl's generous tribute that he 'did great deeds such as men could not conceive' is the measure of the importance of his failure in achieving such a task.¹

Lastly, it must be observed that the Afghans failed because they lacked justice. Their rulers and chiefs who followed Sher Shah were not just in their actions nor was their conduct inspired by lofty ideals. This canker had begun to gnaw at the vitals of the body politic soon after Salīm's accession and hastened their doom. The empire became a school of unrepentant license and unbridled tyranny. It failed to rear up a bureaucracy devoted to the business of the state or a military class proud to die for its defence. It could not rest permanently on the force of arms ; it needed valour as well as virtue for its continuance. The first was needed to keep the martial tribes in check and the latter to school the nobles and officers into obedience to the state. The empire lacked that discipline which in a large political organisation must come partly from above and partly from below, but in actual practice is

¹ *AN.* I, p. 619.

foreign to communities that suddenly rise to power and find themselves in possession of extensive territories through the genius of a single leader or warrior.

CHAPTER X

HUMAYUN IN EXILE

HAVING THUS traced the growth and decay of the Afghan empire, which had been raised upon the ruins of Mughal power by the genius and considered policy of Sher Shah, we must now turn back to take up the history of Humāyūn at the time when he had been forced to leave Hindustān.

We have already seen something of the confusion which attended the councils of the Chaghataīs when they were compelled to abandon Lahore before the advance of the Afghans. The retreat was conducted in great haste, and had it not been for the fortunate accident that the river Ravi happened to be fordable, Humāyūn and his brothers would certainly have been prisoners of Sher Shah. The dissensions, which had prevented any unity of action among the brothers, broke out with redoubled fury in the course of the retreat, and the Emperor's counselors, in desperation, urged him to make away with the principal centre of opposition, Kāmrān Mirza. But the Emperor, mindful of the oath he had sworn to his dying father, refused absolutely to entertain any such project. Well for him would it have been if he had consented.

The plans which found most favour among the Mughal counsellors and of which mention has been made before were three in number. First, there was that of Haider Mirza, who was anxious that the Emperor should conquer Kashmir and make the mountain kingdom a base for operations against Sher Shah. Second, there was the design of Yādgār and Hindāl, who wished to undertake the conquest of Bhakkar in Sind as a stepping stone to the occupation of Gujarāt and to the subsequent attack on Delhi from the south. Thirdly, there was the Emperor's own plan, which he proposed but did not actively advocate, of going to Badakhshān and raising forces there for the expulsion of the Afghans.

The first plan was that which seemed to hold out the best prospects of success, and which appealed most thoroughly to the Emperor. Kāmrān, however, disturbed Humāyūn by repeated requests to be allowed to retire to Kābul; while Hindāl and Yādgār without consulting anyone set off for Gujarāt, accompanied by a large body of troops. The Emperor, thus left in the lurch, had no choice but to fall in with the plan of Haider, who had long meditated an incursion into Kashmir, being egged on thereto by a powerful body of Kashmirī nobles who were dissatisfied with the ruler who then swayed the fortunes of their country. It was agreed that forces were to be collected at Nausherā, that Khwājah Kalān was to bring another contingent, and that

Humāyūn was then to join in. But the ubiquitous Kāmrān, who feared lest his brother should become too powerful by the success of the project, intercepted the Khwājah at Bhīrā, seized his house and person, and the Emperor, who arrived just afterwards, was discouraged and turned back to Khushāb.¹ From there he proceeded to Multān and stood on the bank of the Indus, distracted and confused, without any boats to enable him to cross into Sind. His counsellors had for some time been urging upon him the danger lest Sher Shah, by holding the Punjāb, should shut the Mughals up in Kashmir and the result was that Humāyūn abandoned the whole design, and determined to join Hindāl and Yādgār in their attempt on Sind.² As history knows, Haider pushed into Kashmir, and made a brilliant conquest of the country. Had the Emperor possessed sufficient perseverance to follow up the project, he would undoubtedly have been spared much suffering, and would probably have regained his kingdom at least as soon as actually was the case.

Humāyūn, having made up his mind at last, took the road to Sind. As chance would have it, he arrived at a narrow place in the road at the same time as Kāmrān who was pursuing the same route up to the point where the Kābul road branched away north. Neither brother would yield precedence, and blows were almost struck over this absurdly trivial affair before the influence of a famous saintly man named Mirza Abu Baqā induced Kāmrān to submit to the superior claims of his elder brother. Kāmrān then passed on to his own comfortable domain of Kābul, whither he absolutely refused to allow the Emperor to proceed, accompanied by 'Askarī. He was afterwards joined by Muhammad Sultān Mirza and his treacherous sons.

The unfortunate Emperor, abandoned by all but a remnant of his forces, pushed on. As he was entering the Sind desert, he received the discouraging news that Hindāl and Yādgār, who, as we have seen, had preceded him, had suffered so much from the attacks of hostile Balūchī clansmen that they were actually thinking of retracing their steps.³ As soon as they heard of the approach of the Emperor,

¹ This action of Kāmrān greatly annoyed the servants of the Emperor and one of them actually begged permission to kill the prince. But the Emperor replied, 'I refused this request at Lahore and certainly will not agree to it. I will proceed to Khushāb and visit Sultān Husain.' This is another instance of Humāyūn's kindness.

² Abul Fazl says the Emperor had decided to go to Kashmir but in the beginning of Rajab A.H. 947, Hindāl, Yādgār Nāsir Mirza and Qasim Husain Sultān succeeded by importunity in persuading him to go to Sind. *A.N.* I, p., 360.

³ Jauhar, *I.O.MS.*, p. 44.

however, they regained their courage and, the two bodies of troops having joined up, pursued their march southward together. Their movements were considerably hastened by the report that Khawās Khan, with the troops of Sher Shah, was hard at their heels, although in actual fact, as we already know, the pursuit had been abandoned as far north as Multan.¹

At the end of 1540, Humāyūn's force passed through the territory of Bakshū Langah,² a local chieftain who inhabited the borders of Sind. The Emperor conferred the title of Khānjahān upon him and sent him a banner, kettle drums, a horse, and garments and asked him to send boats and corn.³ He did not wait upon the Emperor, probably because he doubted the wisdom of offending a person whose arm reached as far as that of Sher Shah; but he supplied grain for the necessities of the army, and a hundred boats for its transport; both of which were, as appears from Gulbadan's narrative, as welcome as they were necessary. At the beginning of January 1541, Humāyūn crossed the Gārā,⁴ and moved down the left bank of the river Indus. There was great scarcity in the army, and even wealthy men had the greatest difficulty in procuring sufficient grain for the needs of themselves and of their men. The price of grain rose so high that sometimes one seer of the coarsest millet could not be had for an *ashrafī*, an enhancement of price with approaches six thousand times the normal figure. Naturally, there was the greatest distress in the imperial camp.

Humāyūn seems to have hoped that he would find Shah Husain Mirza,⁵ the ruler of Sind, friendly, although he ought to have known that that astute prince was far too shrewd to do anything which might offend Sher Shah. He had, indeed, made all possible

¹ All authorities make mention of Khawās Khan as coming in the rear but this is hardly correct. Abul Fazl is so prejudiced against the Afghans that he writes that although Khawās Khan had a large army he did not dare give battle to the imperialists. *A.N.* I, p. 361.

² Gulbadan calls him Bakhshū, a Balūchī who had many men and forts. *H.N.*, p. 147; Text, p. 50.

³ Abul Fazl writes that a costly *Khilat* was sent by Beg Muhammad Bakāwal and Kacak Beg and hopes were held out that he would be given the title of Khān-i-Jahān. Jauhar says the title of Khān-i-Jahān was conferred upon him and writes four elephants for the one horse of Gulbadan. Gulbadan's account seems to be correct. *A.N.* I, pp. 362-3. *H.N.*, p. 148; Text, p. 50. Jauhar, *I.O.MS.*, p. 44.

⁴ A stream near Uccha.

⁵ Shah Husain Mirza was the son of Shah Beg Arghūn who after the conquest of Qandhār by Bābur had come to Thatta and Bhakkar and brought the country under his subjection. The *Tarkhānnāmah* describes at length the story of the conquest of Sind by Shah Beg. Elliot, I, pp. 308-11.

preparations for resistance to any pressure which the fugitives might be able to bring to bear upon him. He had committed the charge of Upper Sind and the great fortress of Bhakkar to a trusty officer, Sultān Mahmūd Bhakarī, with orders to lay bare the country in the path of the intruders, to burn the crops and to drive off the cattle. The result was that, as Humāyūn entered the territory of Shah Husain,¹ he found the whole country laid waste so thoroughly that it was almost impossible for his army to find any sustenance. However, he encamped at Luhri (Rohri), in the delightful garden of Babarlūka opposite the island fort of Bhakkar,² and allowed his army to recover from the fatigues of the long march. Meanwhile he still hoped for friendly support on the part of the Sind Government and summoned the governor of the fort to admit him. Sultān Mahmūd who knew Shah Husain well enough to consider that he might change his attitude at any moment refused, indeed, to comply with the request in the absence of direct orders from his master, but sent 500 boatloads of grain and other victuals to the Emperor.

Even so, provisions soon ran short, and as the country round had been devastated, no further supplies, at least in any adequate quantities, seemed available. Gulbadan writes that grain became scarce and the soldiers killed their camels and horses to eat. It was therefore determined that Hindāl and Yādgār should march further down the river, cross it and then proceed to Pātar (Sehwan) and Dārbila,³ respectively 50 and 20 *kros* away from the imperial camp. Humāyūn, in sore distress, sent Tāhir Sadr and Mīr Samandar as ambassadors to Shah Husain, telling him frankly of the design upon Gujarāt, and asking for his help and support. He was also informed that they were

¹ The royal army reached the neighbourhood of Bhakkar on January 26, 1541.

² J. Abbot's essay on Bhakkar in his *Sind, a Re-interpretation of the Unhappy Valley*, pp. 59-64 may be read with interest.

Rohri is situated on the left bank of the Indus opposite to the fort of Bhakkar.

³ Pātar is mentioned in the *Aīn-i-Akbarī* in *Sarkār Sivistan* (Sēhwan). (Jarrett, II, p. 340.) Nizāmuddīn says it is 50 *kros* from Luhri. Jauhar says it is 20 miles west of the Indus. This is the place where Humāyūn married Hamīdah and some time later Kāmrān married the daughter of Shah Husain—the beautiful and noble Māh Chūchak who insisted upon accompanying the blinded Kāmrān to Mecca. Pāt is now in ruins and lies a little to the east of the village of that name in the Kākar *parganā* and is called Pātkuhna (Old Pāt). An interesting account of Pāt is to be found in Major General Haig's *Indus Delta* (1894), p. 91, note. See Beveridge's note in the *A.N.* I, pp. 363-64 and Mrs. Beveridge's note in the *H.N.*, p. 149.

Dārbila is mentioned in the *Aīn* in *Sarkār Bhakkar*. See also Jarrett, II, p. 334 and Tieffenthaler, I, p. 117.

not going to interfere with his possessions. The ruler of Sind temporised; he received the envoys with every courtesy, and offered the Emperor the revenues of the country between Kālikandā¹ and Betura for his support. But he declined to come himself and return a definite answer to the questions asked him, well knowing that for every month Humāyūn lay idle he would be deprived of a considerable portion of his power of offensive action.² At length, pressed for a decision, he returned an artful reply, suggesting that the Emperor should march to the district of Hajkān,³ which was rich and fertile, and an excellent *pied-a-terre* to Gujarāt. Humāyūn was pleased with the tone of the message, and was inclined to agree to the suggestion, when his counsellors pointed out that the district in question was inhabited by fierce and warlike tribes which Shah Husain himself had for long been striving unsuccessfully to subdue. Accordingly, professing himself dissatisfied with the replies given to his ambassadors, he announced his intention of laying siege to Bhakkar. Shah Husain, who had previously put the place in the strongest possible posture of defence, looked on with equanimity, saying that the Emperor had lived too long in the beautiful Rohri garden even to quit it willingly and that his Amīrs alone would never take the city.

Meanwhile large numbers of fugitives from all quarters had flocked to the imperial camp, and a greater scarcity than ever set in. Humāyūn had wasted much time in fruitless negotiations, and had given Shah Husain ample opportunity to devastate Schwan, which fertile district Hindāl had long been wishful to attack. The younger prince was

¹ This country is mentioned in the *Tarkhānnāmah* as extending from Hāla Kandī to Bitūra on the other side of the river. Erskine thinks it is probably the tract of land to the north west of the Ran. Elliot, I, p. 316. *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p. 216.

² Shah Husain was asked by Humāyūn to come to meet him. Gulbadan clearly says that he made excuses and sent word that after arranging his daughter's marriage he would send and himself enter service. It appears from the text that Humāyūn was led to think that Shah Husain was going to marry his daughter to him. The Emperor waited for three months and then sent word to Shah Husain again. The latter sent a reply: 'My daughter has been betrothed to Kāmran. I cannot meet you. I cannot enter your service.' Abul Fazl says that he informed His Majesty that he would pay respects when his fears and apprehensions were set at rest. According to the author of the *Tarkhānnāmah*, Shah Husain had a mind to see the Emperor but the Arghūn nobles dissuaded him from doing so. Gulbadan's version is correct. As she says, by tricks and wiles he kept the Emperor waiting at Samandar for five months and then sent word that he was too busy with the arrangements for his daughter's wedding. *H.N.*, p. 148; Text, p. 51. *A.N.* I, p. 363. Elliot, I, pp. 316-17.

³ Hajkān is mentioned as a *sarkār* in the *Aīn-i-Akbarī* containing 11 *mahals*. Jarrett, II, p. 340.

thoroughly dissatisfied with his brother's management of the campaign, and soon reports reached the ears of Humāyūn that Hindāl at the instigation of Yādgār Nāsir Mirza intended to go to Qandhār. This roused the Emperor from his lethargy and he left his garden to pay belated visits to the distant camps of Yādgār and Hindāl with the object of keeping them in proper respect. It was while he was visiting Hindāl, that he saw and admired Hamīdah, the daughter of Shaikh 'Alī Akbar Jāmī, Hindāl's preceptor.¹ So attracted was he by her beauty that he wished to marry her forthwith, despite the fact that she was only fourteen years old. Hindāl also greatly disliked the idea of the marriage,² and a quarrel was on the point of breaking out, but the objectors saw that Humāyūn's mind, for once in his life, was thoroughly made up, and they gave way at length at Dildār's suggestion. The young lady resisted, says Gulbadan, for forty days and the matter was discussed again and again. At last Hindāl's mother advised her to agree and in September 1541 the Emperor took the astrolabe in his own hands, chose the auspicious hour and sent for Mīr Abul Baqā to solemnise the marriage.³ Immediately after his marriage, the Emperor returned to Bhakkar. But the army was in great distress through the shortness of supplies, and siege

¹ Gulbadan calls her the daughter of Mīr Bābā Dost. Jauhar calls her the daughter of Hindāl's *Akhund*. Mīr Ma'sūmī states that she was the daughter of Shaikh 'Alī Akbar Jāmī. Abul Fazl does not give the name of the father of Hamīdah but calls Muazzam, who was with her at Pāt, her brother. It seems probable that Mīr Bābā Dost may be a mere sobriquet of Shaikh 'Alī Akbar. Mrs. Beveridge does not feel sure and says that there is difficulty in making a precise statement about Hamīdah's family relations. Gulbadan, *H.N.*, pp. 149, 237-9. Jauhar, (Stewart), pp. 30-31. *Tārīkh-i-Ma'sūmī* (A.U. MS.), ff. 120-21. *A.N.* I, p. 364.

² Hindāl objected to the marriage. Stewart's surmise that probably he wanted to marry her himself is incorrect, for Gulbadan puts these words into the mouth of Hindāl: 'I look on this girl as a sister and child of my own. Your Majesty is a King, heaven forbid there should not be a proper alimony, and that so a cause of annoyance should arise.' At this Humāyūn took offence and left the place. The brothers were appeased by Dildār Begam. *H.N.*, pp. 150-51; Text, p. 53.

³ How Hamīdah agreed to marry Humāyūn is well described by Gulbadan. When the young lady hesitated, Dildār advised her saying, 'After all you will marry someone. Better than a king, who is there?' The woman's wit flew to her rescue and the lady replied: 'Oh yes, I shall marry someone; but he shall be a man whose collar my hand can touch, and not one whose skirt it does not reach.' Dildār persisted in her endeavours and at last made her agree. (*H.N.*, Text, p. 54) Hamīdah was married in A.H. 948 (1541) which shows that she must have been born sometime in 1527. She accompanied her husband in his wanderings in the Afghan country and Persia. At Amarkot on November 23, 1542, her son Akbar was born who was destined to make her motherhood refulgent and glorious. During Humāyūn's flight she had to leave her

operations did not progress. Shortly afterwards in September 1541, Humāyūn received certain intelligence that both Hindāl and Yādgār contemplated leaving him and marching upon Qandhār in response to the invitations of Qarāchah Khan, the governor who promised them the sovereignty of that region. Hindāl, whose relations with Humāyūn had been badly embittered after the latter's marriage, left for Qandhār with his forces and sent instructions to Yādgār Nāsir to join him on the road.¹ Humāyūn was greatly perturbed to hear of this defection. He immediately deputed Mīr Abul Baqā, a holy man, to plead with Yādgār to remain where he was and with the utmost difficulty the Mīr succeeded in persuading the Mirza to abandon his project in return for lavish promises which were to be claimed when it should be in the Emperor's power to fulfil them.²

Humāyūn, despairing at the condition of affairs, agreed to abide by any terms which Shah Husain might suggest, if only he would come and pay his respects. But this the lord of Sind consistently refused to do on one pretext after another, until at last the Emperor, now thoroughly angry, left Yādgār to carry on the siege of Bhakkar, and marched on in the direction of Thatta (September 1541). Unfortunately for the scheme of revenge upon Shah Husain, he allowed himself to be persuaded into attacking the fortress of Sehwan, which was strong and well garrisoned. The Sind troops cut off all provisions and ravaged the country around. Munitions failed, disease raged and to cover all the misery the river rose and flooded out the royal camp. Desertions from the army became frequent. Stragglers were cut off and murdered every day. According to Jauhar, the chiefs were bribed by Shah Husain and such men as Mīr Tāhir Sadr, Khwājah Ghiyāsuddīn of Jām, and Maulānā Abul Baqā went over to the other side. Abul Fazl also writes that the base and the dishonest began to desert and even the great departed from the path of rectitude.

infant son at Kābul where she met him again in November 1545. She was a great friend of Gulbadan's and the two lived in close association with each other. Akbar treated her with respect and conferred upon her the title of Mariyam Makānī. She lived up to a ripe old age and died in the autumn of 1604 when she must have been about 77 years of age.

¹ Gulbadan says His Majesty gave Mirza Hindāl leave to go to Qandhār which is undoubtedly, as Mrs. Beveridge writes, a sisterly gloss upon his defection. *H.N.*, p. 151.

² The terms of the treaty entered into with the Mirza by Abul Baqā reveal Humāyūn's helplessness. Yādgār was to receive in lieu of active service Ghaznī Carkh and the district of Lohgarh, and when the Emperor had regained his kingdom of Hindustān, he was to give one third of it to Hindāl. The holy man on his return journey was killed by the men of Bhakkar. *A.N.* I, p. 365.

Several men of note went over to Yādgār Mirza. In desperation, Humāyūn was compelled to ask for aid from Yādgār.¹

Since Humāyūn had left him, that prince had pushed on the siege of Bhakkar with vigour. Unlike the Emperor, he was thoroughly trusted by his soldiers, with the result that his force steadily grew stronger through desertion from Humāyūn's contingent. He had inflicted heavy losses upon the garrison when they sallied out in the open in an endeavour to break the coils which were now closing round them. So formidable did he appear, indeed, that Shah Husain became alarmed, and attempted, all too successfully, to seduce him from his allegiance to Humāyūn. He offered to acknowledge him as Emperor; to read the *Khutbah* in his name, to bestow upon him his daughter and his treasure, as well as the reversion of the succession to Sind.² Yādgār, completely deceived as to the good faith of the wily prince, fell into the trap, declined to push the siege with any vigour or to take offensive measures against the Sind authorities, and to Humāyūn's urgent appeals for assistance, responded by sending a bare 150 men. When the Emperor whose position was becoming daily more critical sent to hasten Yādgār's march, that prince not only did not come, but seized and handed over to Shah Husain a boat laden with supplies for the imperial camp.

The ruler of Sind, freed from all anxieties on the score of Yādgār, was able to devote his whole attention to the ruin of Humāyūn. In April 1542 he proceeded up the river with a fleet of boats, and succeeded in seizing all the Emperor's flotilla, on which were embarked the women and the stores. The unfortunate army had to fall back upon Bhakkar in the greatest haste, deprived of all its baggage. When Humāyūn got to Rohri, he found no boats, for Yādgār had privately invited the Sind authorities to come and seize all the craft in the night. The delay hung up the army for some days, and just as it was beginning to cross the river upon extemporised rafts of hide, Shah Husain's fleet came up and captured many men. After a good deal of quarrelling and confusion, Humāyūn gained the left bank in safety, and Yādgār, not yet quite ripe for open revolt, made a display of zeal by attacking a body of Sind troops who had crossed to the same bank. But he

¹ H.N., pp. 152-3.

² Gulbadan writes: 'If the Emperor, when he is retreating, should come near Bhakkar, do not let him in. Bhakkar may remain your holding. I am with you; I will give you my own daughter.' H.N., pp. 157-8; Text, p. 54.

Abul Fazl says that Husain Shah sent his seal-bearer Bābur Qulī making these offers and suggested that the two should proceed to the conquest of Gujarāt. Yādgār easily fell into his trap. This story is corroborated by Mir Ma'sūm also. A. N. I, p. 368. *Tārīkh-i-Ma'sūmī*, A.U.MS., f.122(b).

secretly continued his discreditable relations with Shah Husain, and did that ruler a great service too by kidnapping and handing over to him a couple of chivalrous local zamindārs,¹ who had taken pity on the Emperor's plight when there were no boats, and had helped him to cross.

Humāyūn's army now began to feel the pinch more than ever. Many soldiers deserted to Yādgār who was supplied with provisions by Shah Husain, and had become openly hostile. All kinds of rumours about the Emperor's misfortunes were circulated by mischief-mongers to make the situation worse. He sent Tārdī Beg and other officers to Sultān Mahmūd, the governor of Bhakkar, to afford relief in this hour of distress. That Humāyūn should have been compelled to petition for aid the man whom he was besieging shows to what desperate straits he had been reduced at this time. Mahmūd took pity on the famished besiegers and sent them 300 loads of grain. But this was soon exhausted and famine and treachery began to thin the ranks of the imperialists. These brave men might have held out otherwise, but hunger drove them into the country in search of food where many of them died or were killed by the inhabitants. Qāsim Husain Sultān Uzbek went over to Yādgār and tried to seduce other officers to join him. Mun'im Khan and Tārdī Beg also meditated treason and the Emperor, as soon as he was apprised of their intentions, ordered the first to be confined with the result that the second gave up his seditious intent. Mirza Yādgār now turned to take up arms against the Emperor himself and was about to attack the imperial camp when he was reproached by Hāshim Beg, one of his trusted friends, who successfully persuaded him to retrace his steps to Rohri.

Matters dragged on in this miserable condition for some time, and Humāyūn began to despair. He talked openly of retiring altogether from the turmoil of the world, and spending his declining years in the holy city of Mecca.² But, as fortune would have it, another opening for his activities suddenly presented itself. For some little time, the Emperor had received messages from Māldeo, the Rāi of Mārwar entreating him to come thither.³ There can be no doubt

¹The story is related at length in the *Tahqāt-i-Akbarī*, p. 51. It was on the pretext of settling some revenue affairs that Yādgār obtained them from Humāyūn. He snatched them away from the men who were ordered to accompany them and handed them over to Shah Husain. Abul Fazl also mentions the incident and gives the names of the zamindārs as Gandaur and Hāla. *A. N. I*, p. 369.

²*A. N. I*, pp. 370-71.

³All authorities agree in saying that these offers of help were received while Humāyūn was in Sind. Mīr Ma'sūm writes that when he was in Sind he

that the Rājput prince, in making this request, was not actuated by either pity or respect. Powerful and ambitious, determined to elevate Mārwar to the same position of supremacy which Mewār had occupied in the days of Sangrām Singh, it had struck him that if he could get the exiled Mughal prince into his power, he might make use of him as a pawn in the game for supremacy which he hoped to play with Sher Shah. As may be imagined, his scheme was doomed to failure, not merely because he was content to reckon Sher Shah as an Afghan freebooter of the ordinary type, but because he altogether failed to estimate the very extensive resources of the revived Afghan empire—resources, which for any continuous military enterprise, as distinct from a short campaign, so far outweighed his own that no rivalry was possible between them.

Humāyūn, ignorant of the motives which underlay Māldeo's profuse offers of hospitality, was easily persuaded by his servants to leave Sind for Mārwar. On May 7, 1542 he left Rohri, and marched up the left bank to Arū (a village in the district of Bhakkar) where he struck the Jesalmir caravan route. After the custom of the time, the army plundered such caravans as it met in order to secure a stock of the necessities of life, and then, much cheered, pushed on to Uchha by way of show. The journey across the desert was very trying, and when they re-entered the country of Bakhshi Langā, they found that he would not allow any dealers to supply the Mughal army. At the end of June, however, they found ample supplies in the fort of Derāwal; and the Emperor was much pleased by a message from Māldeo, forwarding armour, and a camel's load of *ashrafis*, with the greeting: 'You are welcome; I give you Bikāner.'¹ To Bikāner, therefore, the weary travellers bent their steps pressing across the desert and encamped at Wāsilpur until, by July 31, they were within 12 *kros* of the lonely city itself. The royal camp advanced to Phaludi, where ample supplies were found. But Humāyūn was suspicious because the Rāi had not come to meet him, and despatched several messengers, some openly, others secretly, to ascertain Māldeo's intentions before venturing farther into the regions he controlled.

received a petition (*'arz dāsh*) from Māldeo saying that he would render service with 20,000 Rājputs. After this on the 21st Muharram, A.H. 949 (March 7, 1542) the Emperor started for Uchha and on the 14th Rabi II (July 28, 1542) reached Dilāwar (Derāwal). *Tārīkh-i-Sind*, A.U. MS., f. 24a.

¹Gulbadan, p. 154. Derāwal is mentioned as a fort on the boundaries of Jodhpur. Here Humāyūn's retinue obtained abundant supplies. Shaikh 'Alī proposed to the King that the fort should be captured by surprise but he replied, 'If you could make me king of the whole world, I would not attempt so foul an action, or be guilty of such ingratitude.'

In each case, the reports given were such as confirmed the Emperor's doubts, and one of the Rājput's librarians, Mullā Surkh, who had formerly been in the imperial service, sent a solemn warning that if Humāyūn were wise he would depart forthwith, because Māldeo intended to make him prisoner.¹ Amarkot, the Rājā of which place had sent friendly messages, seemed now to be the only hope.

There is one question that deserves to be examined. What was the attitude of Māldeo towards Humāyūn? Did he really, as Abul Fazl says, turn hostile and intend to capture the Emperor and make him over to Sher Shah? All authorities are unanimous in saying that the Emperor, while in Sind, had received repeated offers of help from Māldeo accompanied by protestations of goodwill and sincere loyalty. It may be conceded at once that in the beginning Māldeo's intentions were good; he meant well by the Emperor and wanted to help him. Gulbadan says that when the Emperor saw the helplessness of his position in Sind, he said, 'Very well; I shall go to Rājā Māldeo.'² He would not have done so, had he known of the Rājā's hostile intentions. Abul Fazl's statement that the Rājā intended foul play from the beginning is untenable. Jauhar, who is a knowledgeable contemporary, writes that when the Emperor reached Phaludi, he sent a *firmān* to the Rājā asking him to wait upon him but he made idle excuses, and sent a present of fruit. No act of hospitality was performed and no comfort was given to the distressed monarch.³ Gulbadan supports Jauhar by saying that when the Emperor was at Phaludi, Māldeo sent armour and a camel's load of *ashrafīs* and greatly comforted him by sending the following message: 'You are welcome, I give you Bikāner.' The Emperor halted with an easy mind, despatched Atkah Khan (Shamsuddīn Ghaznavī) to Māldeo with a view to obtaining his reply.⁴ It was at Kūl-i-Jogī at a little distance from Phaludi that the Emperor got evidence of Māldeo's hostile intentions. Jauhar clearly says that the Emperor had obtained a hint of the intentions of Māldeo at Kūl-i-Jogī and resolved to set out for Amarkot.⁵

¹Mīr Samandar was sent to Māldeo and when he returned, he informed the Emperor that he was insincere. Defections in Humāyūn's own camp increased his difficulties. His servants Rājū, Ishāq and several others deserted to Māldeo and told him that the Emperor possessed precious diamonds. The Rājā sent his confidential agent Sangāi of Nagar on the pretext of purchasing a diamond. This made Humāyūn more cautious and when Rāi Mal Soni, who had been sent to observe Māldeo's capital, brought the news that he had evil intentions, the Emperor was confirmed in his misgivings.

²H. N., p. 153; Text, p. 54.

³Jauhar, I.O. MS., p. 52.

⁴H. N., p. 154.

⁵Jauhar, I. O. MS., p. 53.

He is corroborated by Gulbadan who goes so far as to say that Mullā Surkh, a former librarian of Humāyūn, who had entered the service of Māldeo, had sent a warning that the Rājput chief intended to capture the Emperor and asked him not to trust him.¹ He further sent a message that an envoy had come to Māldeo from Sher Shah and brought a letter to the following effect: 'By whatever means you know and can use, capture that King. If you will do this, I will give you Nagor and Alwar and whatever place you ask for.'² Atkah Khan (Shamsuddīn Ghaznavī) who had been sent to Māldeo's court to ascertain his intentions quietly escaped from there and on his return told the Emperor: 'This is no time for standing.'³ The Emperor marched off instantly; from which it may be concluded that he was convinced of Māldeo's intended treachery. Abul Fazl definitely says that Māldeo was hostile and meant treachery. He writes: '... yet many people are of opinion that Māldeo was in the first instance well-intentioned and desirous of doing service, and that afterwards he was diverted from the right path either by learning the distressed condition of the troops and their small numbers, or by the false promises of Sher Khan by perceiving his ascendancy or he was withheld from help and service by his (Sher Khan's) threats.'⁴

The same authority writes that Mīr Samandar and Rāimal Sonī who had been sent to Māldeo had brought the news that whatever his professions, he was hostile. Abul Fazl is, however, wrong when he says, 'The general opinion, however, is that from beginning to end his protestations of service and his sending petitions of obedience were all based upon hypocrisy and hostility.'⁵

Nizāmuddīn Ahmad writes: 'When Māldeo became aware of His Majesty's arrival, and learnt that the Emperor had very few adherents, he felt anxious because he did not see any power of resistance to Sher Shah. The latter had sent an envoy to Māldeo and made promises asking him to capture Humāyūn and make him over to him.'⁶ He speaks also of Mullā Surkh's warning and adds that since Nagor and its dependent country had come into the possession of Sher Shah, Māldeo feared him and this led to his changed intentions. The *Tārīkh-i-'Alfī* writes in the same strain and says that Māldeo, seeing his inability to resist Sher Shah, decided to capture Humāyūn and make him over to the Afghan.⁷ Badāonī and Mīr Ma'sūm repeat the story without any material difference. Badāonī says that

¹H.N., p. 154; Text, p. 55.

²A.N. I, p. 373; Text, p. 180.

³*Tabqāt, Bibliotheca Indica*, p. 53.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 154.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 373.

⁶I. O. MS., f. 416a.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 154.

Māldeo sent a large force under the pretence of welcoming him with the intention of treacherously attacking him and taking him prisoner.¹ Mīr Ma'sūm, who was a native of Sind, writes of Māldeo's insincerity and says that it was on account of Sher Shah's crafty promises and strength that Māldeo sent an army to obstruct the Emperor's path.²

It is established beyond dispute that Māldeo gave no help to Humāyūn nor did he afford any encouragement either directly or through his officers. At first definitely friendly to the Emperor, he decided later to keep himself aloof for several reasons. The Emperor had a slender retinue and Māldeo must have clearly seen that he would not be able to give him any help if an encounter with the Afghans took place.

Sher Shah's power had considerably increased by this time and Māldeo may have received overtures from him. There is no improbability in the Afghan envoy having waited upon Māldeo with a view to preventing him from affording succour to the Emperor.³

Māldeo did not mean treachery for he did not capture the Emperor, although it was quite easy for a man of his resources to do so. The Emperor had a small number of adherents and they, too, were in a highly distressed condition. As a Rājput who had sent offers of help, he must have considered it highly unchivalrous to seize the Emperor and to surrender him to his mortal enemy. There are instances in history when Rājput princes have refused to play such a part. There is the case of the hill chieftain of Kamāyūn who had given shelter to Khawās Khan the veteran general of Sher Shah. The Rājput pride and honour alike would have scorned to commit such foul treachery. All that Māldeo was anxious to secure was that Humāyūn should go away from his territory and this done he was satisfied. He judged it highly impolitic to help him in these circumstances.

It has been suggested that there is some connection between Māldeo's attitude towards Humāyūn and Sher Shah's invasion of Mārwar

¹Ranking, *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 563.

²*Tārīkh-i-Ma'sūmī*, A.U.M.S., f. 24b. The *Turkhānnāmah* also charges Māldeo with sinister designs and writes that he had invited him only because Sher Khan had placed a force in ambush for the purpose of attacking and plundering the army. Elliot, I, p. 317.

³Dr. Qanungo in his article on Humāyūn's relations with the Rājput princes in the *Journal of Indian History* I, pp. 582-5 writes that it would have been the height of folly on the part of Māldeo to quarrel with Sher Shah, leaning on such a broken reed and so suspicious a stranger, and thereby bring ruin upon his own people. The subsequent pursuit of Humāyūn by Māldeo was a sham meant to remove suspicion from the mind of Sher Shah about Māldeo's intrigues with Humāyūn and to satisfy the Afghan envoy who had been sent to see the Emperor off the limits of Mārwar.

in 1544. Māldeo's failure to capture Humāyūn is not mentioned as the *casus belli* by any of our authorities. Erskine suggests that the cause of the quarrel may have been the dispute between the two for the possession of towns and districts which had been recently conquered.¹ The idea of punishing Māldeo is not even mentioned, for after the desperate fight, Sher Shah is reported to have said : 'How nearly had I lost the empire of Hindustān for a handful of bājri.'² This shows the intention of conquest and not of punishment. No writer makes the slightest mention of Māldeo's failure to capture the Emperor in this connection. Even Abul Fazl whose father was obliged to leave Nagor owing to the Afghan invasion is unable to throw light on this point.

It may be asked why Humāyūn did not go to Māldeo as soon as he received his letters. The reason is clear. He judged it better to conquer Gujarāt by making Sind the *point d'appui* of his operations. He hoped that his brother would not misbehave in such a desperate situation. He had never thought that Shah Husain Arghūn would be so unfriendly and that matters would take such an unfortunate turn.

The Emperor now determined to march to Amarkot³ by way of Jesalmīr, and a start was made across the desert which so nearly proved fatal, in after years, to Sher Shah himself and his great host. Humāyūn's little force, besides being absolutely destitute of proper equipment for a journey so toilsome, was in addition distressed by the pursuit of troopers, consisting of 500 horse each sent by the Rājā of Jesalmīr. The Mughals safely reached Satalmīr, on the border of Jesalmīr territory, and beat off a party of pursuers. The country was

¹ *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p. 436.

² Bājri is a kind of coarse grain mostly consumed by the poor people.

³ The Emperor's march from Bhakkar to Amarkot is described as follows by different authorities with slight variations :

Gulbadan : (1) Marched by way of Jesalmīr towards Māldeo; (2) reached Derāwal; (3) Satalmīr; (4) Phaludi; (5) Amarkot ('Umarkot).

Jauhar: (1) From Bhakkar to Anu, (2) Uccha; (3) Mhow; (4) Derāwal; (5) Pilpur; (6) Phaludi; (7) Kūl-i-Jogī; (8) Jesalmīr country, encounter with the Rājā's son; (9) Amarkot.

Abul Fazl: (1) Uccha; (2) Derāwal; (3) Wāsīlpur; (4) encamped at a distance of 12 *kros* from Bikāner; (5) Phaludi; (6) moved 2 or 3 stages from Phaludi which is 30 *kros* from Jodhpur and stopped at the Kūl-i-Jogī; (7) Phaludi; (8) Satalmīr; (9) Jesalmīr; (10) Amarkot.

Mīr Ma'sūm: (1) Uccha; (2) Derawāl; (3) Phaludi; (4) Kūl-i-Jogī; (5) returned to Phaludi; (6) Satalmīr; (7) Jesalmīr; (8) Amarkot.

'Umarkot (or Amarkot) was founded by 'Umar, a chief of the Sumra tribe on the high-road from Sind to Rājputānā through the desert track. *Journal of the Sind Historical Society* II, p. 17.

scoured for supplies, and a number of cows were killed for food, regardless of Hindū prejudice. Rājā Lūnakaran sent two messengers to protest that the Emperor had entered his country without invitation and that his men had killed cows—a practice forbidden in a Hindū country. The Emperor took counsel with his friends and forthwith ordered their confinement.¹ The consequence of this rash action was to make an enemy of the Rājā, who placed a guard upon all the tanks and attempted to harass the Emperor in every possible way. But the little band was now desperate, and careless of consequences, marched up to Jesalmīr, dispersed the men who guarded the tank,² and filled their waterskins. They pressed on quickly and for four days found no water. All the desert wells had been choked up with sand by the Rājā's son and such as had somehow escaped being ruined by this fate were so deep that extemporised tackle was wholly inadequate to the task of drawing up water in sufficient quantities.

Terrible scenes occurred at the well-mouths, and many unfortunates either perished of thirst within the very sight of water or, in their frenzy, cast themselves down the wells and were seen no more.³ At this time the son of the Rājā of Jesalmīr waited upon the Emperor

¹Stewart's translation is incorrect. According to him the messengers arrived from Māldeo, the Rājā of Jodhpur, who protested against the King's entry into his territory without invitation and the killing of cows. The *India Office MS.* of Jauhar is clear: 'At this stage two messengers came from Rājā Lūnakaran of Jesalmīr. They informed the Emperor that his men had killed cows in the country in spite of the fact that such a thing was forbidden in the latter's dominions, and had ravaged the country and done an improper thing.' Other MSS. also agree with the India Office copy. The slaughter of cows was prohibited in Māldeo's territory and the Mughals had given offence by committing it.

²According to Jauhar a skirmish ensued in which several Mughals were severely wounded. Abul Fazl is guilty of exaggeration when he says that the Mughals defeated the vile crew and proceeded to 'Umarkot. The two men were brought before the Emperor. This Māldeo was the son of the Rājā of Jesalmīr. The translator of Jauhar's *Tazkirāt* and Abul Fazl have made the mistake of regarding him as the Prince of Jodhpur. It is clear, however, from Jauhar's narrative that he was the son of the Rāi of Jesalmīr who was coming to molest the royal party on hearing of the confinement of the two messengers referred to above. Jauhar, *I.O.MS.*, p. 55. Gulbadan, *H.N.*, p. 154. *A. N. I.*, p. 374.

According to the *Mārwār Khyātas* the departure of Humāyūn was due to the slaughter of cows by the Mughals. When the latter reached Satalmīr, there was a scuffle between the Rājput̄s and the imperialists in which the former were overpowered. Reu, *Jodhpur kā Itihās*, Pt. I, p. 127.

³Jauhar relates at length the scramble of Humāyūn's *entourage* for water. Tārdī Beg seems to have behaved at this time in an aggressively selfish manner. It was Humāyūn's intervention that secured water for his domestics. *I.O.MS.*, p. 56. Nadim Beg in Gulbadan and Khalid Beg in Jauhar.

with a view to remonstrating with him and asked for the release of the messengers. This was done immediately, and the royal party, greatly thinned in numbers, moved onwards in three parties—the royal family escorted by Tārdī Beg and the other two headed by Mun'im Khan and Shaikh 'Alī respectively.

Both Jauhar and Gulbadan describe the sufferings of the royal party in this inhospitable region. The conduct of the Mughal officers is presented in a highly odious light by the two authorities who write that one of them demanded his horse which the queen was riding and the other (no less a man than Tārdī Beg) refused to lend a horse when asked to do so. No words can too strongly condemn the unchivalrous acts of these officers especially when we remember that the queen was in an advanced state of pregnancy.¹ At last the Emperor decided to part with his horse when another officer, on hearing of this, made his mother ride on a camel and gave her horse to the queen. Misery and thirst had considerably thinned the ranks of the imperialists.² With their hearts sunk and spirits low, they wended their weary way towards Amarkot.

The journey to Amarkot was terrible. Gulbadan writes : 'It was extremely hot; horses and (other) quadrupeds kept sinking to the knees in the sand, and Māldeo was behind. On they went, hungry and thirsty. Many, women and men, were on foot.'

For three days they found no water. On the fourth they reached some very deep wells, the water of which was extraordinarily red. The scramble for water is described by the royal authoress:

'As each bucket came out of the wells within reach, people flung themselves on it; the ropes broke and five or six persons fell into the wells with the buckets. Many perished from thirst. When the Emperor saw men flinging themselves into the wells from thirst, he let anyone drink from his own water-bottle. When everyone had drunk his fill, they marched on again at afternoon prayer time.'

¹Jauhar (Stewart), p. 42. Roshan Beg demanded his horse which he had lent to the queen. The MSS. of Jauhar do not agree. The *I. O. MS.* does not mention this fact. (Gulbadan, pp. 154-55.) Jauhar writes that, when Humāyūn was in Uccā, Hamīdah was seven months with child. So it must have been more than seven months at this time.

²According to Jauhar, Humāyūn's party consisted only of 16. The royal stud was reduced to two horses and one mule. When the two camel-drivers were captured in the neighbourhood of Kūl-i-Jogī, Abul Fazl writes that the royal *entourage* consisted of Sheikh 'Alī Beg Jalair, Tarsūn Beg, Fazil Beg and others, the total being about 20. There were some domestic slaves and some faithful menials. Of learned men there were Mullā Tājuddīn and Maulānā Cand, the astrologer. It seems the party was further thinned, for Jauhar says that the Emperor entered Amarkot attended by only seven horsemen.

'After a day and a night they reached a large tank, the horses and camels went into the water and drank so much that many died. There had not been many horses, but there were mules and camels. Beyond this place water was found at every stage on the way to 'Umarkot, which is a beautiful place with many tanks.'

The distresses to which the army had been subjected had entirely destroyed its unity and discipline, and it was extremely fortunate for Humāyūn that Rānā Prasād¹ of Amarkot, a gallant Rājput gentleman, was faithful to the hospitable traditions of his race. Then on August 22, 1542 Humāyūn rode at length into his host's capital; he was accompanied by only seven horsemen. His men struggled along in twos and threes for many hours afterwards.

The Rānā received the Emperor with distinguished courtesy, furnished him with all supplies, and as the grateful Gulbadan Begam says, 'paid such fitting services as tongue could not set forth.' He apologised for the fact that his resources were so meagre that he could put only 2,500 horsemen at the disposal of his guest, but these were very much at his service. Humāyūn, for his part, was in such distress that in order to find the presents which etiquette demanded in response to the courtesy of the Rānā, he had to ransack the tents of his nobles in a burglarious manner that would have been laughable had it not been so pathetic. For seven weeks the Emperor remained at Amarkot resting and refreshing himself. After discussing plans with his host, he determined to attack the district of Jūn,² which would be a useful stepping stone for the conquest of Lower Sind. Accordingly, on October 11, 1542, he set out, after first placing his girl wife Hamidah, now far advanced in pregnancy, in the Rānā's own castle, which that model host had courteously vacated. Four days afterwards, on Sunday, October 15, was born the infant afterwards known to the

¹Abul Fazl writes Parsād; Gulbadan does not give the name. The *India Office MS.* of Jauhar has Persiā. The correct name was perhaps Prasād.

²The district of Jūn lies to the north-west of the Ran, on the western limit of Chachkān, near the eastern branch of the Indus, which after traversing the desert forms the western boundary of Kutch. The territory of Jūn is intersected by many small branches of the river. It is a fertile land full of fruits and vegetables. (Erskine, *Histroy of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p. 255) Gulbadan writes Jājkā (Hāj-kān) for Jūn. (*H. N.*, p. 159) Abul Fazl puts it in Hājkan *Sarkār* in the *Ain-i-Akbari*. The *Mahal* of Jaun (Jūn) yielded a revenue of 3,165,418 dāms. Of the eleven *Mahals* mentioned in the *Sarkār* of Hājkan this is the most important. (Jarrett, II, p. 340.) According to General Haig, Jūn, the chief town of a fertile and populous district, was situated on the left bank of the Ran. It was 75 miles south-west of Amarkot and 50 miles north-east of Thatta. (*A. N. I.*, p. 380) Abul Fazl speaks of Jūn as the most eminent among the cities of Sind for its many gardens, streams, pleasant fruits and amenities.

world as the Emperor Akbar.¹ Humāyūn heard the news from Tārdī Beg, while he was halting at the first stage, about 12 *krōs* from Amarkot. Having no valuable presents to distribute, in the customary manner among his Amīrs, he broke up a musk bag upon a plate and gave it to those who accompanied him. The same evening he continued his march to Jūn, accompanied by some of the Rānā's men.

Near Jūn, he was opposed by a formidable force, but the gallant Shaikh 'Alī Beg, who commanded the imperial advance, boldly attacked and routed the enemy before the Emperor with the main body of his troops had even made his appearance. He then marched on to Jūn, and placed his camp in a strong position, well protected by a deep trench. Here Humāyūn remained for nearly nine months, receiving the submission of a large number of local chieftains, and controlling most of the country. At the beginning of December arrived Hamīdah and the infant Akbar from Amarkot, with a small escort, and Humāyūn's family circle was again completed.

While the Emperor had been undergoing these changes of fortune, Shah Husain in Sind had had everything his own way. No sooner was Humāyūn out of the country than Yādgār found himself duped. Two months later, he was glad to lead his men away from Sind and its astute prince in the direction of Qandhār, where Hindāl, who had seized the city from Kāmran's officers, was now being besieged by his indignant brother, the lord of Kābul. Shah Husain, having thus cleared the country of the Mughals, saw to the repair of the fortifications which had been damaged by their activities, and ordered all things to his liking. From this state of contentment he was suddenly aroused by the news of Humāyūn's successful attack upon Jūn, which seemed to threaten a renewal of the trouble to which he had been subjected by the imperial army. Jānī Beg's troops were defeated by the Mughals and Jats, and among the prisoners captured was a Mughal

¹ The official date is Sunday, the 5th Rajab, A.H. 949 (October 15, 1542). Jauhar's date is Saturday, the 14th Sha'ban, 949 (Thursday, November 23, 1542). The *India Office MS.* of Jauhar has: 'The world-sheltering King with all his dignity and prosperity had treasure of rubies, jewels and pearls, yet he stood in need of a pearl of a lovely son. It was on Saturday in the month of Sha'ban that all of a sudden the world-decorating moon shed its lustre from the horizon of divine acceptance (of prayer) during the night of the 14th.' Another *MS.* of Jauhar gives the same date but says that since the moon of the 14th Sha'ban is called Badr, Akbar was given the name of Badruddīn and that Jalāluddīn and Badruddīn mean the same thing. Relying on this statement Smith put forward the theory that Abul Fazl's date was false and was deliberately invented by him. He accepted Jauhar's date as correct. There seems no adequate reason to doubt the official date. Smith's article in the *Indian Antiquary* (Vol. XLIV 1914, pp. 233-44) is full of interesting discussion.

deserter who was generously forgiven by the Emperor. Jānī Beg hurried up to the neighbourhood of Jūn, and made desperate attempts to detach the Rānā of Amarkot from his loyalty to the Emperor.¹ The Rānā resisted his overtures stoutly, and there is no doubt that Shah Husain would have failed to disturb the alliance but for the folly and tactlessness of the Mughals themselves. The Rānā was personally insulted by a certain Khwājah Ghāzī, and the Emperor was so foolish as to refuse all redress. The natural result was that the ruler of Amarkot withdrew all his men and departed, saying openly that an attempt to please the Mughals was simply labour lost. His defection was naturally imitated by other local chiefs, with the result that Humāyūn was once more thrown upon his own resources. Many even of his personal adherents deserted² and joined Shah Husain who was so encouraged thereby that, contrary to his usual practice, he was led to attempt an open attack on Humāyūn's fortified position. This, however, proved too strong to be taken, and the assailants were beaten off with some loss. At this juncture the imperialists were greatly encouraged by the arrival of Bairam Khan, who had managed to make his escape after hair-breadth adventures and had now come to join his master.³ Being a man of much good sense, he was a most valuable adjunct to Humāyūn's council board. The Emperor, indeed, needed all the good advice he could get, for after his recent attitude towards the Rānā of Amarkot, the desert tribes had turned unfriendly, and famine began to threaten the army. This led to a minor tragedy. The gallant Shaikh 'Alī Beg was sent to seize a store of corn which lay at Thari, but on the way he was surprised and slain by Sultān Mahmūd Bhakari, to whom Shah Husain had entrusted the duty of cutting off supplies from the imperial camp. It was darkly whispered that there had been treachery at work, and that Shaikh 'Alī had not been properly supported by the other chiefs, notably by Tārdī Beg.⁴

¹ Shah Husain sent for the Rānā a robe of honour, a rich dagger and several other presents. The Rānā showed them to the Emperor who ordered them to be put on a dog and then sent back to Shah Husain. Jauhar, *I.O.MS.*, p. 61.

² Jauhar makes mention of three principal deserters—Tarsh Beg, the Rānā of Amarkot, and Mun'im Beg. Gulbadan says desertion took place day by day until very few Amīrs remained with the Emperor. Among them were Tārdī Muhammad Khan, Mirza Yādgar, Mirza Payanda Muhammad, Muhammad Wai and Nadīm Kūkah, Rushan Kūkah and Khadang, the *Hājib* (Chamberlain).

³ According to Abul Fazl Bairam Khan reached Jūn on 7th Muharram, A.H. 950 (April 12, 1543) and was well received by the King.

⁴ This seems to have been a well-contested fight. Gulbadan calls it a 'famous fight'. Abul Fazl says that Tārdī Beg was remiss in fighting, but Sher 'Alī Beg stood firm and in that battlefield of the brave 'quaffed with unaltered mien the *sherbet* of martyrdom.' (*A.N.* I, p. 380.) Jauhar's narrative creates the

The loss of this dashing lieutenant affected the Emperor's spirits very much; and as Shah Husain was willing to offer reasonable terms in order to get the Mughals out of Sind, an agreement was soon arrived at. Shah Husain was determined to give battle, but he was informed by one Muhammad Binauz, who had gone over to him, that the Emperor had become desperate and that he should open negotiations for peace. Bābar Qulī was sent with a few presents and an assurance that shame alone prevented the Mirza from waiting upon the Emperor. It was settled that in return for Humāyūn's undertaking to leave his dominions Shah Husain was to furnish thirty boats for the transport of the troops, a hundred thousand *mishqāls* in cash, two thousand loads of grain, and three hundred camels.¹ These were duly delivered, although the camels were such wretched beasts that they gave far more trouble than they were worth.² At length all difficulties were overcome, and on July 10, 1543, Humāyūn started on his march out of Sind. His prospects were now most dismal. He had no longer a single friend in India, and his brothers were too much occupied with their own squabbles to give him any assistance. Kāmrān, who had for some time been giving himself the airs of an independent sovereign, had just concluded a successful campaign against Hindāl, who had seized Qandhār from him, at the instance of Qarāchah Khan, the governor, and had carried his brother a prisoner to Kābul. He had defeated Mirza Sulaimān, the ruler of Badakhshān in a combat and compelled him to acknowledge his supremacy. Humāyūn had in vain attempted to stop fraternal discord by sending his aunt Khānzādah Begam to reconcile the two; but the lady had been unsuccessful in her mission.³ Kāmrān, who naturally took his friends from the

suspicion that Shaikh 'Alī was a victim of foul play. Tahir Sultān, the officer who was sent to reinforce Shaikh 'Alī, had a quarrel with the latter and it was he who at night brought the news that the convoy had been attacked and Shaikh 'Alī killed.

¹ The *'Arghūnnāmah* writes 300 horse and an equal number of camels. A bridge was also built to enable the Emperor to cross the Indus. The presents were made over to the Emperor at the village of Rumāi and Shah Husain faithfully observed the terms of the treaty. The remainder of Shah Husain's life was unhappy. He lost his old habits and chose for his companions 'men of loose character and mean extraction.'

² Gulbadan finely describes the inconvenience caused by the camels. She says about 200 ran away into the jungle after throwing down their riders. *H.N.*, p. 163.

³ Gulbadan makes mention of this mission. She says His Majesty went to his aunt Khānzādah Begam and said with great urgency: 'Pray do me the honour of going to Qandhār and advising Mirza Hindāl and Mirza Kāmrān. Tell them that the Uzbeks and the Turkmāns are near them, and that the best plan is to be friends amongst themselves. If Mirza Kāmrān will agree to carry

ranks of the Emperor's enemies, actually sent to ask for the hand of Shah Husain's daughter at the very moment when Humāyūn was being forced to leave the country.¹ It became plain to the Emperor that his worst enemies were those of his own kin, and that it behoved him, if he desired to keep his life, to say nothing of retaining his dominion and to remove himself as far as possible from the sphere of influence of Kāmrān and 'Askarī.

So the remnants of the imperial army marched from the banks of the Indus westwards towards the Bolān Pass by way of Fathpur-Gandava.² They suffered severely from the deficiency of water, as well as from the attacks of the Balūchīs. After a toilsome and dangerous journey they at length arrived at Shah Mastān near the place where Quetta in Pakistan now stands. But the Emperor found that his movements were being carefully watched by 'Askarī who was now Kāmrān's deputy in Qandhār. The younger brother had received orders from Kābul that Humāyūn should be seized and arrested; and although he doubted his ability to do this, and feared lest he should drive the Emperor into Persia, he decided to carry out his instructions. His men warned him against taking such a dangerous step, but, foolhardy as he was, he turned a deaf ear to their advice. Humāyūn was in a serious plight; he was obliged to ask Tārdī Beg once again for a horse for Hamīdah Bānū Begam, but that unchivalrous officer gave a curt refusal and the Emperor had to mount the Begam on his own horse. 'Askarī very nearly succeeded in surprising Humāyūn's camp, but the Emperor had received warning through an Uzbek youth, just in time, and rode off at a gallop into

out what I have written to him, I will do what his heart desires.' The Begam told Kāmrān that Bābur had given his throne to Humāyūn and the *Khutbah* had been read in his name till then. She asked him to regard Humāyūn as his superior and be obedient to him but he insisted on having the *Khutbah* read in his name. The only compromise he suggested was that the *Khutbah* should be read in his name at least as long as the Emperor was away. Evidently the mission of Khānzādah Begam failed. *H.N.*, pp. 161-2; Text, p. 62.

¹ Kāmrān had sent Amīr Allah Dost, who had acted as his agent (*vakīl*) on several occasions, and Shaikh 'Abdul Wahāb, a descendant of Shaikh Pūran, to conduct the negotiations. Humāyūn sent for Allah Dost but he made excuses on the ground that the garrison would not allow him to go. (*A.N.* I, p. 389.) Gulbadan writes Bābā Jūjūk for 'Abdul Wahāb. *Jūjūk* is a Turkish word which means sweet and tender to the palate. Probably, as Mrs. Beveridge thinks, the saint was a sweet-tongued man with considerable powers of persuasion. Redhouse, *A Turkish and English Lexicon*, p. 687.

² Gandava is a town in Balūchistān. It is situated on the Baddra, a small stream which flows down from the Hāla Mountains and is lost in the desert further east. It is the capital of the province of Cutch Gandava. Thornton, *Gazetteer of the Countries Adjacent to India*, p. 213.

the desert, accompanied by only forty men and two women.¹ All the rest of the party, with the tents and baggage, had to be abandoned. When 'Askarī came up, he was plainly annoyed to find that his bird had flown, but loudly proclaimed that his only desire was to wait upon the Emperor and pay such homage as the case demanded. He treated the men who fell into his hands with apparent kindness, although next day many were put to the torture for the purpose of ascertaining if they had concealed any money in the neighbourhood of the camp. A chest belonging to the Emperor was broken open but to his great chagrin nothing was found in it. The little Akbar, with his personal attendants who included Māham Anaga, Jijī Anaga and Atka Khan, was removed to the citadel of Qandhār, and placed in charge of 'Askarī's wife, Sultān Begam, from whom he received the most affectionate kindness.²

Meanwhile Humāyūn, having ridden off without tarrying for provisions or equipment, was overtaken by nightfall in the most wretched plight. Deep snow was on the ground, and there was neither fuel nor food. At last a fire was somehow lighted, and some horse flesh boiled in a helmet. Everyone, the Emperor himself included, roasted the sodden flesh over the flames for himself. Humāyūn never forgot the experience, and in telling the story used to say, 'My very head was frozen with the intense cold.' When morning came, the little party pushed on in the direction of Seistān. So wretched was their plight that the very Balūchī chief, Malik Khattī, who had been ordered by Kāmran to arrest them, declined to carry out

¹ The two women mentioned here were Hamīdah Bānū Begam and Ayshek Akā, the wife of Husain 'Alī, who was the daughter of a Balūchī chief. It was the latter who, by reason of her knowledge of the Balūchī tongue, told the Mughals what the Balūchīs intended to do. *H.N.*, p. 167.

The name of the young Uzbek who brought this information to Humāyūn is given as Jui Bahādur by Jauhar.

² As 'Askarī was fast approaching and there was not a moment to be lost, Akbar was left behind. 'Askarī treated the child well, for Jauhar says that when the latter was presented to him he took him in his arms and embraced him. He is supported by Abul Fazl who relates the story of 'Askarī's observance of the Tūrkī custom of striking the child with the turban of his father or grandfather or their representative when he begins to walk. When Māham Anaga asked 'Askarī to perform this ceremony, the readily agreed. Abul Fazl says he heard the story from the Emperor himself. (Jauhar, *I.O.MS.*, p. 67. *A.N.* I, pp. 396-7; Text, p. 194.) Abul Fazl calls the lady Sultān Begam and highly praises her; but Gulbadan writes her name as Sultānam Begam and says she showed much kindness and affection towards the child (*A.N.* I, p. 396. *H.N.*, p. 166)

According to Abul Fazl, Akbar reached Qandhār on December 16, 1543 and was assigned a residence near his uncle. *A.N.* I, p. 395.

his orders, and supplied the fugitives with all necessities before honourably conducting them to the borders of his territory. With this assistance, Humāyūn managed to reach the country of Garmsir¹ the governor of which, 'Abdul Hai by name, grudgingly gave some supplies in spite of Kāmrān's prohibition to the contrary. But another local official, 'Askarī's revenue collector, generously presented tents, baggage animals, and a considerable sum of money.

The Emperor, though for the moment encouraged by this, began to despair of his fortunes.² For some time he seriously entertained the proposal of abandoning the world and living a religious life at Mecca or some other secluded place far from the madding crowd's strife, but the thought of his ancestral dominion and the devotion and service of his followers deterred him from following such a course. At last he resolved to try what was now plainly the last card left—an appeal to the Shah of Persia, with whose father his own father had had intimate, though not always friendly, relations. He, therefore, sent off Chupi Bahādur (Jai Bahādur in some texts) a trusty servant, with a letter³ to Shah Tahmāsp, praying for his help and hospitality. But before the answer could be received, he had sudden news that Kāmrān, dreading the power which the patronage of Persia would confer upon the brother he had so deeply injured, had despatched a large force with stringent orders to arrest him. His one chance of escape was to cross the Persian border immediately, trusting in the generosity of the Shah. Accordingly, he passed the river Halmand,⁴ and entered Seistān.⁵ This unhappy choice was forced upon Humāyūn by circumstances. He saw the risks of a journey abroad, particularly in a Shiah country, which called to

¹ A fertile district of Afghānistān, situated on both banks of the river Halmand. It is called by this name because of its warm climate.

² *A. N. I*, p. 413. Gulbadan also says the Emperor was in a helpless condition because of the disunion of his brothers and the desertion of his Amīrs, and the best course now was to go to Khorāsān. Humāyūn's letter in the '*Ināyatnāmah* (*I.O. MS.*) shows how deeply distressed the Emperor was at this time. *H.N.*, p. 168.

³ According to Abul Fazl, this letter was despatched on December 28, 1543. *A. N. I*, p. 414.

⁴ The Halmand is a river in western Afghānistān. It has its remote source on the eastern declivity of the ridge of Hageguk, which connects transversely the the Hindū Kūsh with Koh-i-Bābā.

⁵ Seistān is a province in the east of Persia: it is 300 miles in length and 160 in breadth. It appears there was also a city of the name of Seistān, for Bāyazīd speaks of the town of Seistān. For more information about Seistān the reader is referred to Tate's *Seistān—a Memoir on the History, Topography, Ruins and People of the Country* in four parts.

his mind unpleasant memories of the past, but in the wide dominion of his father there was not an inch of ground which he could call his own. Kāmrān was master of Kābul, Ghaznī, Qandhār, Khutlān Badakhshān, and was bent upon his ruin. 'Askarī had joined hands with Kāmrān and Hindāl was a prisoner in Kābul. Hindustān had passed completely into the hands of the Afghans and Sher Shah was busy in consolidating his power at Delhi. Sind and Multān, where he had hoped to find support, were in the hands of Shah Husain 'Arghūn who had given ample proof of his hostility. The numerous Hindū chiefs of the country were indifferent to the fallen fortunes of their erstwhile liege-lord and did not want to imperil their thrones for his sake. Where was he to go in this hour of distress? In sheer despair he was driven to throw himself, as Erskine rightly observes, on the dubious and untried generosity of a stranger.

Ahmad Sultān Shāmlū, governor of Seistān, having probably received an inkling of his master's intention to show courtesy to a distressed brother-prince, received Humāyūn with every mark of respect. The exiled Emperor, his cares for the moment over, passed the time very pleasantly in hunting, sight-seeing and other recreations, until the Shah should answer his letter. Many notable men of Irān came to wait upon him, and Humāyūn greatly enjoyed the cultured atmosphere which once again, after so much hardship, surrounded him. Nor was this all. Hearing that their master had safely reached a refuge, many followers, who had previously been afraid to join him on account of their fear of Kāmrān, slipped across the border and entered his service once more. Altogether these last weeks of 1543, when Humāyūn was waiting in Seistān, must have been the pleasantest he had spent for many months. Unfortunately, this period of rest soon came to an end. Certain of Kāmrān's followers, among whom were his foster-brothers Hājī Muhammad bin Bābā Qashaq and Hasan Kokā, who had grown tired of the selfish cruelty of their own master, tried to persuade the Emperor to return to Qandhār, saying that there would be an instant rising in his favour. The suggestion that the Emperor should depart without the Shah's orders so alarmed the governor of Seistān, who would probably have forfeited his head had he allowed any such enterprise, that in order to quiet him Humāyūn agreed to set out for Herāt and Mashed, where he would be further removed from such tempting proposals.

Shah Tahmāsp of Persia, being only the second member of his house to sit upon the throne of Persia, was much excited by the news of the Emperor's arrival, being well aware of the prestige that would accrue to him, should he stand forth in the eyes of the world as the

protector of Timūr's descendant, the Pādshāh of Hindustān.¹ After the delay demanded by court etiquette, which under the circumstances might well have proved fatal alike to Tahmāsp's ambition and Humāyūn's existence, he returned a most gracious answer to the letter and despatched *firmāns* to the governors of all the provinces through which his guest would pass on the way to the capital giving minute directions for the Emperor's reception and entertainment in the most magnificent manner possible.²

Humāyūn's advance to Herāt was a triumphant procession. The whole route was lined with people and the principal officers of each city came out to meet him and escort him within the walls. He was hospitably received by Muhammad Khan Shārafuddīn Ughlī Taklū, governor and Mīr Diwān of Herāt and tutor to Muhammad Mirza, eldest son of the Shah, who made the most magnificent arrangements for the Emperor's reception. He stayed in the Jahānārā Bāgh for forty days, saw all the sights and met all the notabilities.³ The governor

¹ Shah Tahmāsp was the eldest son of Shāh Ismail and succeeded to the throne in 1524 at the age of ten. He reigned till 1576. His early victories and the Shiah influences that surrounded him increased his pride and sharpened his religious zeal. Sir John Malcolm also writes that he was a bigoted Shiah and in support of this he cites his treatment towards the English merchant who brought to him a letter from Queen Elizabeth for certain commercial concessions. It was Anthony Jenkinson whom the Shah is supposed to have slighted in many ways. (Malcolm, *History of Persia* II, pp. 511-12.) Tahmāsp is described as a bigoted Shiah by the author of the *Ahsān-ut-tawārikh*. He liked riding on Egyptian asses and this became a fashion in Persia. Alluding to this a poet wrote: 'The scribe, the painter, the Qazwini and the ass obtained every promotion without trouble.' (Browne, *Literary History of Persia* IV, pp. 95-7.) According to the *Humāyūnāmāh*, (O.B.M. Or 1797) the Shah was delighted to hear of Humāyūn's approach and said: 'The *humā* of goodness has come into my net.'

² This *firmān* to the governor of Herāt is in the *India Office MS.* (224) which contains extracts dealing with Humāyūn's flight. It is a laudatory document full of details of the presents and gifts and the manner of reception. (ff. 1-6.) The details given in this *MS.* are too wearisome to be reproduced here. The governor of Herāt at this time was Muhammad Khān Shārafuddīn Ughlī. Bāyazīd also makes mention of this *firmān* in his *Memoirs* and writes: 'A copy of this *firmān* was received by Mīr Juvaini, the Imperial Record Keeper, and it has been included verbatim in this *Mukhtasar*.' The *firmān* is reproduced in the *Akbarnāmāh* (pp. 418-31) in extenso.

³ There is some difficulty about Abul Fazl's dates. He says (*I.O.*, 418) that the '*arzdāsh*t of the governor of Herāt reached the Shah on the 12th Zu'l Hijja (March 8, 1544) and Humāyūn alighted in the Bāgh Jahānārā on the 1st Zu'l Qa'da, 950 (January 26, 1544). This means that Humāyūn reached Herāt 1½ months before Muhammad Khan's letter was received by Shah Tahmāsp. Beveridge says (*I*, p. 418) that the correct date of Humāyūn's arrival is given in *B.M.MS. Or*, 4678 as Tuesday, the 5th Shawwāl 950 (January 1, 1544). In this copy Shah Tahmāsp describes himself as answering the letter the same day. What Beveridge

held a grand feast at which was present also Sābir Qāq, a distinguished man among the literati of the time, who recited a quatrain for the occasion in praise of Humāyūn, in which he hinted at the ups and downs of life. From Herāt, the Emperor proceeded to Mashed by way of Jām¹ where he visited the tomb of Ahmad Jām,² a holy saint and one of the ancestors of Hamīdah Bānū Begam. At Mashed Sultān Qulī Khan Istājilū came to receive him with his Amīrs and officers. Humāyūn stayed here for forty days and paid homage to the shrine of Imam Raza³ on the 15th Muharram A.H., 951, (Tuesday, April 8, 1544). It was here that he received an invitation from Shah Tahmāsp to join him at Qazwīn, and he went

says about the *Ma'āsir-i-Rahīmī* does not seem to be correct. I have looked into the *Bibliotheca* edition and I do not find his statement corroborated. The printed text (p. 578) has *duwāzdaham Shahar Zu'l Hijja*. This does not bear Firishtahs' reading. According to Bāyazīd, the Shah's *firmān* was issued on the 20th Rajab.

¹ Abul Fazl says the Emperor reached Jām on the 5th Zu'l Hijja (February 29, 1544). This is also incorrect. Beveridge suggests 5th Muharram (March 29, 1544). We are told that Humāyūn reached Mashed on the 15th Muharram, A.H. 951 (Tuesday, April 8, 1544). He rightly thinks that Humāyūn would have hardly taken six weeks to get to Mashed from Jām. Jām is situated in longitude 94.5' and latitude 34.50'. It is a small town.

² Ahmad bin Abu Hasan surnamed Zindah Pīl, Shaikh-ul-Islam was born in a village in Khorāsān in A.D. 1049 and died in 1142. Early in life he took to religion and is said to have converted 60,000 persons to Islām. Both the mother of Humāyūn, Māham Begam and his wife Hamīdah Bānū traced descent from him. Ahmad Jām was buried at *Turbat-i-Jām* which stands halfway between Mashed and Herāt. There is an inscription on a stone slab in the *Turbat-i-Jām*, to which reference is made in an article in the *J.R.A.S.*, 1897, p. 47 by Ney Elias, which shows that Humāyūn paid a visit to the shrine in December 1544. The inscription is as follows :

Ai rahmat-i-tū 'uzr pizīr-i-hamā kas
Zāhir ba-janāb-i-tū zamīr-i-hamā kas
Dargāh-i-dar-i-tū qiblahgāh-i-hamā kas
Lutf-ba-karishma dastgīr-i-hamā kas.

O Thou whose mercy accepts the apology of all
 The mind of everyone is exposed to thy Majesty
 The threshold of thy gate is the Qibla of all people,
 Thy bounty with a glance supports every one.

A wanderer in the desert of Destruction,
 Muhammad Humāyūn,

14th Shawwāl, A.H. 951—December 29, 1544.

This must have been Humāyūn's second visit to Jām.

³ 'Alī-al-Riza bin Mūsā Ibn Jāfar was the eighth Imām of the Shīahs. He was born at Medīna in A.H. 148 (A.D. 765) or 153 (A. D. 770) and died in 818. His followers believe that he was poisoned though others affirm that he died from a surfeit of grapes. He was a man of great piety and was credited with supernatural powers. *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. I, pp. 296-97.

Mashed is the capital of the Persian province of Khorāsān and is a place of pilgrimage of the Shīahs.

along by Nishāpur, Sabzwār, Dāmghān, Bostām, Sāmnām and Safiābād, receiving presents and gifts on the stages of his journey and enjoying the hospitality of governors and officers. At length he got to Fort Daras near Rēi, and here he was allowed to send Bairam forward as an ambassador. There was a good deal of discussion as to the way in which the two monarchs were to meet, and Tahmāsp, who had no intention of losing a jot of the advantage of his position in order to spare his guest's feelings, was at first prepared to insist that Humāyūn should cut his hair off and wear the Tāj, in token of his adherence to the Shiah tenets favoured by the Shah. Bairam was asked to shave his head and to wear the Tāj (Persian cap), but he expressed his inability to do so on the ground that he was in the service of another king. At this the Shah was offended and said, 'You are a servant of yourself,' and for political reasons, to make an impression upon Bairam's mind, he ordered a few men of the *Chirāgh Kūsh* sect,¹ to be brought out and executed. The Shah then went to his summer quarters between Sultānia² and Sūrlīq and Humāyūn received permission to advance to Qazwīn. This was in Jamād I, A.H. 951, (July-August, 1544). He was well entertained at one of the royal palaces, and received a deputation from the Shah consisting of his brothers Bahrām Mirza and Sām Mirza and at length moved along to join him.³ On the way there were inflicted upon him a number of petty slights, which are carefully described by blunt old Jauhar. At one place, while the Emperor was asleep, the coolies who were repairing the road, sang so loudly as to disturb his sleep and he was told by Jauhar that they could not be prevented. Again a number of small chiefs, meanly equipped, came and made their salute, the object being to prove that all Persians, whether of high or low rank among themselves, were of sufficient dignity to be on a footing of some sort with the Emperor.

¹ *Chirāgh Kūsh* literally means 'extinguisher of lamp'. It was a sect of the Mulāhidah heretics who held the world to be eternal and did not believe in resurrection or a future life. They said that the law was binding in the Prophet's time but the duty incumbent upon them at the present time was to follow reason. The sect allowed much moral laxity and encouraged undesirable practices. Erskine's note in the *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* I, p. 287. *A.U.M.S.*, p. 81.

² Sultānia is a famous city. It was founded by Arghūn Khan grandson of Halāgū Khan, the Mughal, and was completed by his son Uljaitu.

³ The *India Office Fragment* (MS., 224) describes both as brothers of the Shah. Jauhar (Stewart, p. 63) calls Sām Mirza son of the Shah which is a mistake. Abul Fazl also calls them brothers. According to Gulbadan (p. 169) all the brothers of the Shah came to meet His Majesty. They were Bahrām Mirza, Alqās Mirza, and Sām Mirza.

When the two sovereigns met face to face, the Shah received the Emperor with all honour, seating him upon his right hand, and insisted upon his assuming the Shiah Tāj, which, he said, was the Tāj of greatness.¹ Humāyūn consented with a graceful play upon the double meaning of the word that robbed the act of its religious significance. The Shah placed the cap with his own hand upon Humāyūn's head, whereupon all the nobles shouted Allah! Allah! evidently satisfied at the success which God had vouchsafed to their bigoted sovereign. Then Humāyūn requested the Shah to allow the Mirzas to sit down, but he was told that the etiquette of the Persian court did not permit of such a practice. The next day the Persian king repaired to Sultāniā and at the time of departing Humāyūn went to pay him a visit but was received very coldly.² He came away in disgust, deeply mortified, and reproached himself for seeking shelter with the Shah, in the quiet seclusion of the mausoleum of Sultān Muhammad Khudābandah³ to which he paid a visit. At this time the Shah's bigotry again manifested itself and he bluntly demanded that Humāyūn should embrace the Shiah beliefs, otherwise he would have him burnt to ashes with the firewood which had been collected for his entertainment. This at first the Prince stoutly refused to do and reminded the Shah of the story of Namrod and Khalīl Abraham and declared that he had in him the soul of Khalīl and that he was not afraid of death. He protested that he had

¹ The I.O. MS. (p. 73) has : *bād azān Shah ba badshah guftand ki tāj khwāhand poshīd poshidanī ast ki in tāj izzat ast*. Some MSS. put these words into the mouth of Humāyūn. Stewart's MS. seems to have contained a different version, for according to him it was Humāyūn who uttered these words. The *Khudābaksh* MS. has : *bād azān farmūdand ki tāj khwāhī poshīd hazrat bādshah 'arz kardand ki tāj izzat ast*. A.U. transcript, p. 93.

According to the H.N. (B.M. Or, 1797) the Shah praised Shiahism at which Humāyūn was annoyed.

Zabānash bakhūnrol Shahjahān

Zabānah sifāt gasht ātish fishān.

[The tongue of the lord of the world became the shedder of blood : it emitted fire like flames.]

² According to the *Khudābaksh* MS. of Jauhar's *Tazkirāt*, Humāyūn was informed by Ibn-ul-Oalah, Qazi-ul Quzāt Qāzi Jāhān that the cause of the Shah's displeasure was the behaviour of his (Humāyūn's) servants. They talked about the Khārijis and this gave offence to the Shah. A.U. Transcript, p. 84.

³ He was a brother of Ghāzān Khan, the Ilkhān ruler of Persia. His original name was Uljaitu. His mother was a Christian and he was himself brought up in that creed. When his mother died, he married a Muslim woman who converted him to Islām. At first a Sunnī, he became a Shiah afterwards. The Shahs called him *Khudābandah* for his Shiah leanings and the Sunnīs expressed their dislike for him by calling him *Kharbandah*. Abbās Iqbāl, *Tārīkh-i-Muffasil*, Irān, p. 308.

beliefs of his own and that kingship did not weigh with him as much as the supreme dictates of religion and conscience. He desired that he might be permitted to proceed to Mecca, but the Shah replied that he must either accept the Shiah tenets or suffer the consequences of refusal.¹ Seeing that he was at the mercy of a man who would not scruple to push his advantage to the uttermost to gain his ends, Humāyūn agreed to comply. Qāzī Jahān's advice decided his attitude. When the Qāzī told him that continued refusal would imperil not merely Humāyūn himself but his seven hundred followers, who accompanied him, the Emperor signed a paper embodying a statement of Shiah theology.²

The first difficulty to free intercourse between the sovereigns having been thus surmounted, Shah Tahmāsp relaxed his attitude to some degree. Splendid hunts were arranged, and day followed day in pleasure. Humāyūn presented his host with some of his best jewels, including the great diamond³ which he had received at Agra,

¹ The Shah is reported to have sent the following message to Humāyūn : 'For a long time I have been thinking that I should march the armies against the Sunnīs and luckily you have come of your own accord. I do not wish that you should continue in your religion. My heart has got what it wanted from God.' Jauhar, *I.O.MS.*

² The *MS.* of Jauhar's *Tazkirāt*, which was consulted by Stewart, differs from the *I.O.MS.*, but agrees with another *MS.* in the library of the Allahabad University. The Qāzī pressed Humāyūn and said : 'You are powerless at this time; you know it well. If God and the Prophet send Kufr, there is no option but to submit.' At this Humāyūn asked the Qāzī to bring in writing what his master wanted. He brought three papers, two of which Humāyūn passed over, but when he came to the third he carefully looked at it and signed it. The signing of this paper is not mentioned in the *I.O.MS.* That Humāyūn was obliged to sign a statement of the Shiah creed is corroborated by circumstantial evidence. According to the *I.O.MS.*, Humāyūn reminded the Shah of the *sura* in the Qurān about compulsion in religion whereupon the Shah kept quiet and went away. It is clear that Humāyūn signed the paper. One *MS.* of Jauhar states that Humāyūn accepted the Shiah faith.

Humāyūn was evidently dissatisfied with the 'manners' of the Persian monarch as is shown by what he said to Jauhar when the latter restored to him his lost purse containing valuable diamonds. *Khudābaksh MS.*, *A.U. Transcript*, p. 85.

Among official historians the only one who makes mention of this is Badāonī who says : 'Humāyūn copied the Shiah beliefs which they wrote upon a sheet of paper and he gave precedence in the *Khutbah* after the custom of Irāq to the recital of the twelve Imāms.' *Al-Badāonī I*, p. 572.

³ The *India Office MS.* (p. 224) says that the diamond which Sultān Alāuddīn Khilji had brought from Warangal and which, from the time of Sultān Bahlol, had been in the possession of the kings of Hindustān down to the time of Ibrāhīm was presented by Humāyūn along with 250 Badakhshānī rubies. According to Jauhar, it was the largest diamond presented to the Shah. The jewellers were called to value the diamonds offered to the Shah but they declared that they

and the Shah in return conferred complimentary titles upon Bairam Beg and Hājī Muhammad Kokā.

But, before long fresh troubles began to arise, which for nearly two months caused a distinct coolness between the two sovereigns. A number of reasons, all trivial in themselves, made Tahmāsp think poorly of Humāyūn and regret having given him shelter. In the first place, Kāmran's officers Roshan Beg, Khwājah Ghāzī and Sultān Muhammad passed through the Shah's dominions when returning from Mecca, and took the opportunity to slander Humāyūn's character and abilities, actually having the impudence to assert that his misfortunes were due to the ungrateful way in which he had treated his brothers. Tahmāsp did not believe the story, but he was sorely tempted, when these officers said that their master would surrender Qandhār to Persia in exchange for the person of the Emperor. More serious, however, was the attitude assumed by were priceless. A reference to this diamond is made in the *Memoirs* also. Bābur writes in the *Memoirs* (Erskine's translation, p. 308) as follows: 'In the battle in which Ibrāhīm was defeated Bikramājīt met his doom. Bikramājīt's family and the heads of his clan were at this time in Agra. When Humāyūn arrived, Bikramājīt's people attempted to escape, but were taken by the parties that Humāyūn had placed on watch and put into custody. Humāyūn did not permit them to be plundered. Of their own free will they presented to Humāyūn a *pesh kash*, consisting of a quantity of jewels and precious stones. Among them was one famous diamond, which had been acquired by Sultān Alāuddīn. It is so valuable that a judge of diamonds valued it at half the daily expenditure of the whole world. It is about eight *mishqāls*. On my arrival, Humāyūn presented it to me as a *pesh kash*, and I gave it back to him as a present.' Eight *mishqāls* are equal to 320 *ratīs*. Abul Fazl says that Humāyūn presented to Tahmāsp a precious diamond worth the revenue of climes and countries, and 250 Badakhshānī rubies and adds that this would have been enough to recompense Shah Tahmāsp for all the expenditure incurred in showing hospitality to the great King. As Beveridge rightly observes this remark is ungracious. In another MS. in the British Museum *Or*, 53 *Rieu's Catalogue* written by Khur Shah, the ambassador of Ibrāhīm Qutb Shah of Golkundā at the Persian court, it is said that Humāyūn presented to the Shah the diamond which his father Bābur had got from Sultān Ibrāhīm's treasury, and which weighed $6\frac{1}{2}$ *mishqāls*, and was reckoned to be worth the expenditure of the whole universe for two days and a half. Shah Tahmāsp did not think much of the *Ahsan*, Humāyūn's diamond which weighed four *mishqāls* and four *dangas*. An interesting history of this diamond will be found in Beveridge's article, 'Bābur's diamond! was it the Koh-i-Noor?' in the *Asiatic Quarterly Review*, 1898, pp. 370-89. Beveridge's view is that it was the same diamond which was presented in the next century to Shah Jahān and which Tavernier sold at the court of Aurangzeb.

The Shah instructed his sister to show the best hospitality to Hamīdah Bānū Begam. Gulbadan describes at length how the Indian Empress was treated. Evidently Begam Sultānam observed no *purdah*, for she was seen riding behind the Shah at the hunt. Hamīdah used to enjoy the sight from a distance either on a camel or in a horse-litter. *H.N.*, pp. 169-71.

certain officers of the Persian army, who were probably bribed by Kāmran; they said that, when Tahmāsp's father had been in alliance with Humāyūn's father, the disastrous defeat of Mīr Najm Sani and the Persian army at Ghazdwān had been due to the treachery of Bābur. They feared, they said, that if they served the son, they might meet with the fate of their predecessors who had served the father. Further, Tahmāsp's royal vanity was wounded when malicious persons informed him that long years before, when Humāyūn had been employing divining arrows to measure his future greatness against the destiny of the Persian kingdom, he had used twelve arrows of the first class for himself, and had inscribed Tahmāsp's name upon eleven inferior ones. Humāyūn tried to explain the last by saying that he did so because Hindustān was a country far larger in extent than Khorāsān whereupon the Shah turned his face and ironically remarked: 'What sort of control did you exercise over it that everybody has turned against you?' All these small causes of disagreement were carefully fomented by interested persons who meant to do injury to the Indian Emperor and were delighted at the prospect of his conversion to Shiahism. Most fortunately for himself, however, the distressed Emperor had three steady and eminent friends, the Shah's sister Sultānam Begam, the venerable Qāzī Jahān and the physician Nūruddīn, who constantly tried to establish friendly relations between the two monarchs. But their efforts were hampered by the Shah's evil designs. After some time he took counsel with his brother with a view to making away with the Mughal Emperor. Some of our authorities say that Bahrām Mirza cherished a grudge against Humāyūn and carefully fomented discord between the Shah and the Emperor, but this statement is not supported by Jauhar.¹ According to him, Bahrām Mirza was sorely afflicted to hear of his brother's nefarious design and divulged the whole thing to his sister Sultānam Begam, and added that it was highly improper to treat in such a manner a prince who had sought refuge in their country. The gentle lady was moved to pity and when she was alone with her brother, she read to him a *rub'āī*² composed by

¹*Al-Badāonī* I, pp. 569-70. *Tabqāt, Bibliotheca Indica*, p. 60. Nizāmuddīn says Bahrām Mirza instigated the Shah to encompass the murder of Humāyūn. But according to Jauhar, Bahrām was grieved to hear of the Shah's atrocious design and communicated the whole thing to his sister. (*I.O. MS.*, p. 77. Stewart, p. 70.) There is evidence in Jauhar's *Tazkirāt* to show that, whatever Bahrām's feelings in the beginning, he had become friendly towards the Emperor afterwards.

²This *rub'āī* is differently given in different texts. One MS. of Jauhar's *Tazkirāt* gives the following :

Humāyūn, which indicated his inclination towards the Shiah faith, and advised him to send the Emperor to his country with a force befitting the rank and dignity of the Lord of Irān. Al-Qāsh Mirza, another younger brother of the Shah, who was in charge of the frontier of Rūm, wrote to him that the King should be sent back to his country. Firishtah says the Shah was delighted at Humāyūn's acknowledgment of Shiahism and offered to send him back with a large force, if he agreed to repeat in the *Khutbah* the names of the Imāms. Humāyūn's reply was what the awkward situation demanded. He declared that the discord of the Chaghatāi Amīrs and the hostility of Kāmrān was due to his devotion to the family of the Prophet. Shah Tahmāsp was satisfied; he called Bairam Khan in private and made some enquiries. His ill-humour gradually passed away, and he made up his mind, beyond the possibility of change, to support Humāyūn. The two sovereigns entered into a regular league; the Shah on his part was to help Humāyūn to recover Qandhār, Kābul and Badakhshān, and to receive back Qandhār for his pains; on the other hand, Humāyūn and his suite were to listen

Hastīm zi-jān bandah-i-aulād-i-'Alī .
Hastīm hameshah shād ba-yād-i-'Alī.
Chun sirr-i-wilāyat az 'Alī zāhir shud,
Kardīm wird-i-khud hameshah nād-i-'Alī.

[We are the slaves of the descendants of 'Alī with our life and soul, we are always glad of his remembrance. As the secret of *wilāyat* (attachment to God) became manifest through 'Alī, I always recite Nād-i-'Alī.]

According to the Shiah the following is the Nād-i-'Alī. It is in Arabic.

Nādi 'Aliyyan mazhara-l-'ajā'ib.
Tajiduhu 'aunan laka fī-'n-nawā'ib.
Kullu hammin wa ghammin sayanjali
Bi-wilāyātika yā 'Alī, yā 'Alī, yā 'Alī.

[Call 'Alī the manifestation of wonders, you will find him helpful for yourself in calamities. All sorrows and griefs will soon disappear through your *wilāyat* (attachment), O 'Alī, O 'Alī, O 'Alī.]

This was taken by the Shah to be an indication of Shiahism. The *India Office MS.* says the following *rub'āī* was presented to the Shah on behalf of Humāyūn:

Al Shāh-i-jahān ki asmān pāyah-i-tust;
Ahsān wa karam hameshah sar-māyah-i-tust.
Shāhā, ba-jahān jumlah Humā mī-talaband;
Bi-nigar ki chisān Humā'ī dar sāyah-i-tust.

[O King of the world: you are equal to the Heaven in rank. Kindness and favour are always your Capital. O King! in the world all seek Humā (a birp), see how Huma is under your shadow.]

Firishtah alone gives (*Lucknow Ed.*, p. 237) the former *rub'āī* which indicates Humāyūn's Shiah leanings. It appears, as Erskine says (II, p. 290), that Humāyūn had taken care to assure the Shah's sister that he had always been well-disposed towards the Shiah faith, one of the causes of his fortunes.

attentively to the theological instruction of Qāzī Jahān. It was officially agreed that Humāyūn was to favour the Shiah creed, and that Tahmāsp was to believe that he was in earnest in so doing.

By way of cementing the reconciliation, a grand feast was held, and the officers who had slandered Humāyūn were put in oubliettes. There they would have deservedly rotted, had it not been for the kindness of the man they had attempted to injure. Humāyūn begged them off as a personal favour, and released them without further question. Even the Shah was impressed by Humāyūn's magnanimity and forbearance. For three days the festivities lasted, and on the fourth day the sovereigns took formal leave of each other.¹ Shah Tahmāsp, having made up his mind to support Humāyūn, did not do the thing by halves. He supplied 12,000 of his finest cavalry under the nominal command of his third son, Mirza Murād, an infant.² In addition he promised to lend 300 (600 in some MSS.) veterans of the Imperial Bodyguard.

Taking leave of the Shah, Humāyūn went to Tabrez, accompanied by Bahrām Mirza. When the latter was about to depart, the Emperor presented him with a diamond ring and professed great friendship for him in these words: 'Such is my friendship for you that I would willingly remain with you all my life, but my reputation is at stake, and obliges me to leave you.' This rebuts the statement of some authorities that the Mirza bore a grudge towards the Emperor.³

The Emperor halted at Tabrez for five days and then proceeded towards Ardabīl and remained there for a week, visiting the tombs of Shaikh Safī⁴ and Shah Ismāil. Passing through Khardbī, Tarun

¹ Gulbadan says (p. 173) that owing to the secret communication of Khwājah Ghāzī and Roshan Kūkah the Shah's heart was troubled and his attitude was not what it had been before. Humāyūn presented some jewels to him and then he felt satisfied.

² The *I.O. MS.* of Jauhar has 12,000 and this is supported by Abul Fazl. Bāyazīd, the *Tārīkh-i-'Alfī*, the *Tārīkh-i-Badāonī* and *Tārīkh-i-Khāndān-i-Tīmūriyah* all have ten thousand. Gulbadan does not give the number. *A.N. I*, p. 441. *Al-Badāonī I*, p. 572. *Tārīkh-i-'Alfī*, *I.O. MS.*, 419 (b). Bāyazīd, *I.O. MS.*

Prince Murād was a mere infant. He is described as *Shūr-Khwār*, as a mere suckling.

³ Bahrām Mirza, brother of the Shah, became displeased and from that day sowed seeds of enmity against Humāyūn in his heart and set himself to overthrow his enterprise and reminded Shah Tahmāsp of Bābur's treachery towards Shah Ismāil. (*Al-Badāonī I*, pp. 569-70.) The *Tabqāt-i-Akbarī* speaks of the Mirza's hospitality to the Emperor and his desire to have him slain. He instigated the Shah to bring about Humāyūn's death. *Bibliotheca Indica*, p. 60.

⁴ An ancestor of the Safavī kings of Persia. He was born at Ardabīl in A.H. 650 (1252-3). He was the son of Khwājah Kamāluddīn 'Arab Shah and Daulatī, said to be in the 25th line of descent from 'Alī and in the 20th from Mūsā Al-Qāzim, the seventh Imām. He was the founder of the Darvesh order of the

and Sarkhāb, he reached Qazwīn where his *entourage* was encountered by the Persian monarch who sent a warning to Humāyūn by a certain Mehtar Ziyā that he was rather slack and that he should march at least 12 *farsakhs* a day. The Emperor forthwith resumed his march towards Sabzwār and went to Mashed again to visit the shrine of Imām 'Alī and stayed for a week holding converse with divines like Maulānā Jamshed and Mullā Harāti.

At Sabzwār a daughter was born to Hamidah Bānū Begam.¹ The Emperor was detained by a snowfall and when the weather cleared, he started and, proceeding by way of Rewat Tarq, Langur and Tubbas, reached Seistān while Hamidah and the heavy baggage came by another route.²

Here Humāyūn found himself at the head of at least 14,000 horse of the finest possible quality. After reviewing them and spending about a fortnight in Seistān in supervising the details of the equipment and arranging the plan of the approaching campaign, he crossed the river at the end of 1544 and invaded his brother's dominions in force.

A few general remarks on the unpleasant Persian episode in Humāyūn's life will hardly be out of place in a history dealing with the career of that unfortunate monarch. There is nothing in Persian histories about the ungenerous treatment meted out to him by the Shah.³ The modern historian of Persia, Sir John Malcolm, has written in terms of exaggerated praise of the liberality of the Shah and the noble qualities of the Persians.⁴ His panegyric needs to be

Safavis which later attained political power in Persia. *Encyclopaedia of Islām*, p. 57.

¹ A.N. I, p. 445. At Sabzwār, Khwājah 'Abdus Samad *Shīrīn qalām* entered the Emperor's service but could not accompany him to Kābul and Qandhār.

² Humāyūn's sojourn in Persia was now complete. We may summarise the stages of his journey according to different authorities:

1. *Abul Fazl*: Farah (164 miles S. of Herāt), Herāt, Jām, Mashed, Nishāpur, Sabzwār, Damghān, Bostām, Samnām, Safiabad, Rei, Qazwīn, Sultaniya, Tabrez, Shammāsī, Ardabīl, Khal Khāl, Kharzbil, Sabzwār, Mashed, Tarq, Seistān.

2. *Jauhar*: Seistān, Herāt, Mashed, Nishāpur, Sabzwār, Damghān, Bostām, Samnām, Qila Aizwar, fountain of Alhaq, Qila Mesmeh, fountain of Savuk Betak, Fort Daras, Qazwīn, Takht Sulaimān, Tabrez, Ardabīl, Khardbīl, Tarun, Sarkhāb, Qazwīn, Sabzwār, Mashed, Rewat, Tarq, Langur, fort of Kāh, Tubbus, Seistān.

3. *Bāyazīd*: Herāt, Mashed, Sabzwār via Nishāpur, Damghān, Samnām, Qazwīn, Zanjān, Tabrez, moved towards Kābul and Qandhār.

³ The *Tazkirāt Safviah*, an autobiographical memoir of Tahmāsp makes only a brief allusion to Humāyūn. It speaks of the generous treatment meted out to him by the Shah. A.S.B. MS.

⁴ Sir John Malcolm writes: 'The Persians have in all ages boasted of their hospitality; and the vanity of every individual is concerned in supporting the

corrected in the light of facts supplied by Jauhar. The official historians, for obvious reasons, dwell on the lavish hospitality of the Shah and say nothing about the persecution to which the Indian Emperor was subjected by him. Abul Fazl only makes a veiled allusion to this when he says: 'In the intervals between these glorious reasons of fortunate conjunctions a cloudiness of heart was created on both sides through the instigation of sundry strife-mongers, but the turbidity did not last long and was washed away by the waters of cleansing.'¹

Gulbadan Begam speaks effusively of the friendship which existed between the two monarchs: 'The friendship and concord of these two high-placed pāshās was as close as two nut-kernels in one shell. Great unanimity and good feeling ensued, so that during His Majesty's stay in that country, the Shah often went to his quarters, and on days when he did not, the Emperor went to his.'² Again she says: 'His Majesty's time in Irāq was spent happily. In various ways the Shah showed good feeling and every day sent presents of rare and strange things.'³ Later she refers to the mischievous action of Khwājah Ghāzī and Roshan Kūkah who carried their talk so far that his (the Shah's) heart was troubled and it was with difficulty that confidence was restored through a liberal present of jewels and rubies.⁴ Bāyazīd's narrative is confined mainly to a minute account of Humāyūn's campaigns in the Afghan region and says nothing about what happened in Persia. Nizāmuddīn Ahmad vaguely writes of Humāyūn's difficulties and mentions the good offices of his three helpers—the Shah's sister, Qāzī Jahān Diwān, and the physician Nūruddīn.⁵ The only exception is Badāonī who says that the Emperor was compelled to recite in the *Khutbah* the names of the twelve Imāms.⁶ Firishtah, who wrote later than Badāonī, is more explicit and clearly says that had it not been for the Shah's sister, Humāyūn would have suffered still harsher treatment at his hands. But for Jauhar's straightforward narrative we would have never known of Humāyūn's miseries in Persia. Jauhar's account is too detailed to be a mere invention, and his constant association with the Emperor during his exile strengthens the weight of his evidence. He had no polish of

pretensions of his country to a superiority over others in the exercise of this national virtue. The arrival of the fugitive Hūmāyūn presented an opportunity of a very singular nature for the display of this noble quality; and we know no example of a distressed monarch being so royally welcomed, so generously treated, and so effectually relieved.' *History of Persia* II, p. 509.

¹ A.N. I, p. 439; Text, p. 218. ² H. N., p. 169. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

⁵ *Tabqāt, Bibliotheca Indica*, p. 60.

⁶ *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 572.

language or Abul Fazl's literary skill to gloss over what was manifestly a humiliation of the Emperor. He says, in more than one place, how bigoted and merciless the Shah was at times and how he forced the Shiah doctrine upon him, though not without a firm and dignified protest. The *Humāyūnāmāh* in verse, a copy of which is preserved in the British Museum, supports Jauhar and speaks of the Emperor's indignant protest against the Shah's ill-timed praise of Shiahism.¹ The two monarchs stood in strange contrast to each other; on the one hand was Humāyūn, gentle and forbearing, tolerant in his religious beliefs, but unprepared to sacrifice these for a mundane advantage; on the other, was the Shah of Irān, egotistical and bigoted, careless of the rules which govern the conduct of men in civilized society, alternating, in a most fantastic manner, his hospitality with unchivalrous attempts to torment his exiled guest. Humāyūn acted as any other man would have done in similar circumstances. He adopted the Shiah creed under duress and protested to the Shah that compulsion in religious matters was forbidden by the Prophet of Islām. No blame attaches to Humāyūn for acting in this wise. He expressed a desire to go to Mecca and declared that he did not care for earthly pomp and power. But when he saw staring in his face the death not only of himself but of his seven hundred followers, he yielded and put up with the indignities which the Shah chose to inflict on him. His brothers afterwards taunted him with Shiah heresy, but this is what hostile persons always do when they see the slightest aberration in the conduct of their opponents. The fact that Humāyūn employed Bairam in his service does not establish that he had become a Shiah. His liberal outlook did not exclude talent from office on grounds of belief, and if he treated him with special favour, we must remember that he had stood by him through thick and thin and to dismiss him would have been an act of the deepest ingratitude. Though himself a Shiah, he had proved true to the salt of his master and had sternly refused to wear the Shiah *Tāj* in the presence of the Shah.

Erskine's surmise that in after times Humāyūn's pride perhaps prevented him from making an explicit avowal of his religious sentiments so as to please the bigoted Sunnīs who criticised him for what he had done in Persia is unfounded.² No such declaration was

¹ *A.U. Rotograph*, pp. 39-40.

² Badāonī relates an interesting story which throws light upon Humāyūn's religious beliefs. During the Indian campaign of 1555 Shaikh Hamīd told him that the whole of his army consisted of Rāfizīs and that his officers bore such names as Yār 'Alī, Kafsh 'Alī, Haider 'Alī and so on. Humāyūn was indignant

needed. Humāyūn judged it quite unnecessary and we find no opposition to his authority when he recovered his throne after defeating the Afghans. If he gave his outward assent to Shiah beliefs in circumstances of unusual difficulty, he did so in order to get out of the clutches of a man who would have otherwise completely ruined him.¹ In a far-away land in the midst of men swayed by religious fanaticism this was the only alternative that could be accepted by a man who still thought of his lost empire and the safety of his adherents. That he incurred no moral or religious obligation is clear beyond the possibility of doubt.

at this and throwing his pencil on the ground in anger said: 'The name of my grandfather is 'Umar Shaikh and I know no more than this.' Then he rose and went into the harem and returning with great gentleness informed the Shaikh of the purity of his faith. *Al-Badāonī*, *Bibliotheca Indica*, p. 468. Ranking, *Al-Badāonī* I, pp. 604-5.

¹Jauhar writes that, when in exile he was compelled to sign the Shiah faith, he uttered the following:

*Mā ba-dīn-i-khud qā'im hastīm;
Mārā chandān arzū-yi-pādshāhī ham nīst
Wa harchi hast, ba-rizā-'i-khudāy, 'azza wa
Jalla, ast; dil-i-khudrā ba-ū bastah im.*

[We are firm in our religion ; and we do not even entertain much desire for kingship. And whatever there is, it is with the will of God, the Great and the High. We have bound our hearts to him.]

CHAPTER XI

THE CONQUEST OF QANDHAR

KAMRAN was now at the very height of his power and prosperity. He had one brother, 'Askarī, as a loyal servant and deputy in Qandhār; the other, Hindāl, with his cousin Yādgār Nāsir¹, was under close surveillance at Kābul. Hindāl, though nominally governor of Juī Shāhī², was living in custody in the palace of his mother Dildār Agāchah at Kābul. Not only was he master of Kābul and Qandhār; he had in addition waged a successful war with his cousin Sulaimān of Badakhshān. Kāmran had invaded that kingdom and, after a sharp struggle near Anderāb³, had defeated and captured both Sulaimān and his heir, Mirza Ibrāhīm, had thrown them both into prison and had occupied Badakhshān, Qunduz, Kishm and the adjoining country. These were not the only princes in his custody. There were also Sultān Mirza, grandson of the great Sultān Husain of Herāt, and his sons Ulugh Mirza and Shah Mirza who were wasting their time at Kābul in a state of enforced inaction. He entrusted Badakhshān to Qāsim Barlās and himself returned to Kābul where he celebrated his victory by holding fêtes and festivities for one month. Abul Fazl indignantly writes: 'He remembered not his God; nor did he deal justice to the oppressed.' It seems to be true, for Kāmran was very unpopular as is shown by the defections in his ranks. His officers loathed him, and were only waiting for an opportunity to throw off their allegiance. What had hindered them so far, had been the absence of any candidate who could fairly claim to be a rival to Kāmran in birth and influence. With the coming of Humāyūn, the spell of his brother's prosperity was broken, and Kāmran in his turn was to experience some of the hardships in which his selfishness had involved the brother from whom he had received nothing but kindness as long as he lived. Directly the Emperor crossed the border of Seistān and entered Garmsir, the enemies of Kāmran began to show hostility, and his friends, disaffection.

'Abdul Hai, the governor of the country, was now only too eager to support an Emperor who had some prospect of being able to

¹Yādgār Nāsir Mirza had stayed in Rohri (Sind) when Humāyūn left it. When he found that the promises of the ruler of Thatta were false, he proceeded towards Qandhār despite the advice of Hāshim Beg to the contrary. He paid homage to Kāmran and accompanied him to Kābul.

²Juī Shāhī is now called Jalālābād.

³Anderāb is north of Hindūkūsh, south-west of Badakhshān. The date of this battle was the 17th Jamād II A.H., 949 (September 28, 1542).

protect his friends. He met Humāyūn, no longer poor and destitute, but in command of a fine army, near the border of Garmsir, and promptly put himself and the entire resources of his province at the Emperor's disposal. As the Emperor pressed on, the strong fortress of Bist, strategic centre of the district of Zamīndāwar, fell and most of the garrison joined him.¹ Shāhīm 'Alī and Mīr Khalj, Kāmran's officers, paid homage and were pardoned.

Humāyūn pushed forward fast to Qandhār, hoping that along with that town he would succeed in recovering his infant son, Akbar. In this hope he was disappointed, for Kāmran's first act on hearing of his brother's advance was to send for the child to Kābul. It was in bitter rain and sleet, amid all the cold of an Afghan winter, that Akbar journeyed from Qandhār to Kābul, where he was lodged with his great aunt Khānzādah Begam. Along with the Prince went his half-sister Bakhshī Bānū Begam² Shāmsuddīn Ghaznavi, Māham Anagah, Jījī Anagah, mother of 'Azīz Kokaltāsh, and several other attendants. He was well-cared for in Kābul but seems to have lacked the almost maternal love of 'Askarī's wife, whose tender affection for the boy-prince is frequently commented upon by historians of the period.³

As soon as the Emperor set foot on Kāmran's territories, the air became thick with rumours, some favourable, others unfavourable, but nearly all baseless. The extent to which Kāmran's popularity had declined was greatly exaggerated, as also the growing coolness of his relations with 'Askarī, his governor in Qandhār. It was said, indeed, that 'Askarī was about to abandon his charge, and flee rather than face the just indignation of the Emperor. Encouraged by this intelligence, which was quite untrue, Humāyūn boldly pushed right

¹ The fort of Bist lies near the confluence of the Arghandāb with the Halmand and is the chief city of Zamīndāwar. Abul Fazl says it belongs to Garmsir and appertains to Qandhār. *A.N.* I, p. 457.

² Bakhshī Bānū Begam was afterwards married to Sharafuddīn Hasan, a nobleman of Akbar's court.

³ The royal attendants tried to conceal the identity of the Prince and during the journey they called the Prince Mīrak and his sister Bījo or Baca or Bacheh, signifying child. When they arrived at Qilāt, they were detected, but they started forthwith and hastily proceeded towards Ghaznī. Gulbadan's statement that the Prince was at the time two and a half years old is incorrect. He was more than three years old. Bāyazīd (*I.O. MS.*) says that Bairam enquired about the age of the Prince whereupon Māham Begam replied that he was three years and six months old. Khānzādah kept the Prince and Gulbadan writes: 'She (Khānzādah) was very fond of him, and used to kiss his hands and feet and say, "They are the very hands and feet of my brother, the Emperor Bābur, and he is like him altogether."' *H.N.*, p. 174. *A.N.* I, p. 454.

up to the walls of the town on March 16, 1545. Unfortunately, the garrison was fully on the alert, and Humāyūn's troops were mowed down by gunfire and thrown into confusion.¹ Mīr Jamīl, one of the commandants of the garrison and brother of Bābūs tried to follow up this victory and sent word to 'Askarī that if he sent reinforcements, the enemy would be completely routed. With this force he might easily have inflicted irreparable damage upon Humāyūn's troops, with results which could not fail to have been of the utmost consequence to the history of India. As it was, the Emperor was able to withdraw in good order to a safer position, and six days afterwards, he formally laid siege to the town; the resistance of the garrison was most obstinate, and the besiegers suffered considerably. They were able, however, to score a point through the boldness of Bairam Khan and others, who surprised and destroyed a body of auxiliaries, stationed behind a hill on the bank of the Arghandāb and consisting of Hazāras and Nakodars, under the command of Rafī Kokah, Kāmran's foster-brother who was attempting a diversion. Haider Sultān was killed and Khwājah Muazzam was wounded. This success brought a large store of provisions, cattle and grain into the hands of the imperialists and ensured plenty for some time.

Humāyūn was anxious for many reasons to get the business in hand settled as soon as possible. Like his father before him, he found the Persians uncomfortable allies, bigoted, cruel and ruthless in circumstances when Humāyūn's gentler disposition would have admitted the claims of mercy. Also he hoped that Kāmran, if a suitable opportunity were given him before too much damage had made him bitter, would remember his fraternal duty and offer reasonable terms. Accordingly, Bairam Khan was sent to Kābul to sound Kāmran's intentions, armed with a letter from the Shah of Persia and a remonstrance from the Emperor. He was well received by the Prince who was beginning to be alarmed about the fate of Qandhār, and contrived to convince Hindāl, Yādgār, Sulaimān and Ulugh Beg Mirza, all in various degrees of captivity, that Humāyūn was only too eager to overlook all past offences.² Bairam went to see Akbar also and

¹ According to Jauhar, there was a severe contest and several officers were killed. Finding that he could not take the fortress by assault, Humāyūn ordered its siege. Abul Fazl is not correct in saying that Khwājah Muazzam, Haider Sultān, Hājī Muhammad, 'Alī Qulī, Shah Qulī Nāranjī and a number of Chaghatāis and Persians fought well and drove the enemy back to the fort. Jauhar, *I.O. MS.*, p. 85. *A.N.* I, p. 458; Text, p. 228.

² Abul Fazl gives a lengthy account of Bairam Khan's mission. Kāmran received him in a *darbar* in Chār Bāgh. Fearing lest the Mirza should receive him with discourtesy, he carried with him a copy of the Qurān, on seeing

offered obeisance. Kāmrān watched his movements with great suspicion and kept him under surveillance. Bābūs was appointed by him to be present at all the interviews. At length after six weeks, Kāmrān, who found it difficult to decide what to do, dismissed Bairam, sending along with him Khānzādah Begam, professedly to induce 'Askarī to surrender Qandhār, but actually, to encourage him to hold the place until Kāmrān could come there in person with an overwhelming force. In the event of failure, he hoped to gain the Emperor's pardon through the good offices of his aunt.

The siege at first went on slowly¹ and the Persian troops, accustomed to fiercely contested but brief engagements in the open field, grew so dispirited that they talked of retiring to their own country. They were surprised to find that the son of the illustrious Bābur had not been able to rally round him the Chaghatāi nobles and tribesmen of the Afghan region. They despaired of success and looked upon the whole enterprise as a wild goose chase. But Humāyūn displayed a rare courage, and his resolution stimulated the soldiers not to desert their leader. With a steady and courageous advance under heavy fire, a siege battery was planted within a stone's throw of the walls. The deed at once restored the *morale* of the besiegers, and caused great dismay to the garrison. So much damage was done by its fire that 'Askarī, alarmed, sent a petition through Mīr Tāhīr, brother of Khwājah Dost Khāwind and asked for a cessation of hostilities. The arrival of Khānzādah Begam, with her secret instructions to hold out, completed 'Askarī's dismay. The besiegers pressed their advantage, and it became apparent that nothing could prevent the speedy fall of the place. Kāmrān received information which led him to regard the place as lost, and he abandoned all pretence of relieving it. Many of the notables of his court, among them Ulugh Beg Mirza, fled from Kābul and joined Humāyūn.² The chiefs of

which the Mirza stood up and accepted the gifts tendered by Bairam. The trick succeeded and the ambassador secured the respect he wanted. *A. N. I.*, 461; Text, p. 230.

Prince Hindāl was kept under surveillance in the house of his mother Dildār Begam.

¹ The fort was made of mud and it was difficult to breach, the breadth of the walls being sixty yards. 'Askarī had taken steps to strengthen the fort and placed guns and muskets over it. *A. N. I.*, p. 463.

² These notables were Sher Afghan Beg, son of Qūch Beg, Fazī Beg, brother of Mun'im Khan, Mīr Barkāh and Mirza Hasan Khan, sons of Mīr 'Abdullah and many others. Abul Fazl relates how they escaped. Kāmrān changed Ulugh Mirza's jailor every week. When Sher Afghan's turn came, he released him and along with other chiefs proceeded himself to join Humāyūn. He received them well and granted Zamīndāwar to Ulugh Beg Mirza. Qāsim Husain Sultān

the tribes dwelling round Qandhār quickly saw how things stood and the Hazāra chief, Dāwa came with his tribesmen and offered homage. The contagion of disloyalty quickly spread in Kāmrañ's camp, and letters came from the leading men in Kābul, indicating willingness to support the Emperor. Desertions began from the ranks of the garrison itself. The first to secede was Khwājah Khizr, Gulbadan's husband, who threw himself down from the fort and he was followed by Mu'ayyid Beg, who let himself down by means of ropes. Among others who came to join the imperialists were Ismāil Beg, one of Bābur's officers, Abul Husain Beg, nephew of Qarāchah Khan, Mun'im Beg, and Munawwar Beg, son of Nūr Beg who had all escaped from the fortress. 'Askarī now despaired alike of rescue and of resistance; he sent Khānzādah to negotiate a peace, and on September 3, 1545 appeared before Humāyūn as a suppliant, with a sword hung round his neck as symbol that his life was forfeit, accompanied by his principal nobles.¹ Relying upon the easy good nature of his brother, he hoped to get off scot-free for all his long sustained course of treachery to his sovereign; but adversity had convinced Humāyūn of the truth of Sa'ādī's remark that 'clemency to the wicked is tyranny to the good.' 'Askarī was courteously received in the *Dewān Khānah* through the intercession of the Begam, and was drowning his cares in the wine-cup, when an officer quietly laid before him the letters he had written to Balūchī chiefs, ordering them to arrest the Emperor in his piteous flight towards the Persian border. 'Askarī, struck dumb with shame and amazement, was placed in custody and kept under careful guard. He was ordered to attend the court from time to time and his treasures were distributed by the Emperor among his officers and troops. About thirty officers paid homage, of whom all except Muquim Khan and Shah Qulī Sistānī were pardoned. The latter were bound in fetters and thrown into prison.

Humāyūn had thus scored a great point in the early days of his enterprise, but the capture of Qandhār exposed him to many difficulties. By treaty, it should belong to the Shah, and the Persians, somewhat

was late in coming, for he had lost his way in the hills. This Qāsim Husain is the same person who had deserted Humāyūn in Sind and gone over to Yādgar Nāsir Mirza. *A.N.* I, p. 465; Text, p. 234.

¹ According to Gulbadan, Humāyūn took possession of the fort on September 4, 1545 and bestowed it upon the Shah's young son, who in a few days fell ill and died. Abul Fazl's date is Thursday, 25th Jamād II, 952 (September 3, 1545). Erskine accepts Abul Fazl's date. 'Askarī had first offered to surrender the fort and begged permission to go to Kābul, but Humāyūn rejected the offer. *H.N.*, p. 175. *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p. 311.

unreasonably, expected that it would be handed over to them at once, before the Emperor had regained any other important place. Humāyūn pointed out that he could not give up Qandhār until he had obtained some other fortress suitable to be used as a base of operations for his further campaigns against Kābul and Hindustān, and secondly that Qandhār was to be the price paid for Persian assistance in the reconquest of his kingdom. Until that enterprise was concluded, the price could not be paid. While the dispute was going on, jealousies arose between the Persian auxiliaries and Humāyūn's own soldiery, who had now joined him in considerable numbers. The Persians claimed the town, the treasure found therein and 'Askarī Mirza, whom they desired to send to their master as a trophy, well knowing that a real live captive prince of Tīmūr's blood would be much appreciated by him. Humāyūn, however, was firmness itself. He gave up the town as agreed and added the treasure as a voluntary gift¹ but entirely declined to surrender his brother. He assumed an air of great determination, refused to yield an inch and ostentatiously held reviews of his own body of troops, now of such a size as to enable him to bring pressure to bear upon his late allies without much fear of any consequences that might arise. Humāyūn's review of the troops alarmed the Persians who suspected that he might do to them what his father had done to Najam Beg. Their zeal was cooled; they felt no desire to assist him in his Kābul campaign and longed to return to their country without fulfilling the compact which their master had entered into with the Emperor of Hindustān. They escorted their treasure to a distance of twelve *kros* from where it was carried to the Shah. The latter was much gratified to receive it and sent in return some nice presents which included a swift-footed mule for Humāyūn himself. The Emperor signified his appreciation of the gift by riding a few paces upon the back of the animal. He remained in the fort of Qandhār for three days and on the fourth day handed it over to the Persians and himself encamped in the Chār Bāgh, a garden laid out by Bābur in a charming spot on the bank of the Arghandāb. Here 'Askarī's property, collected from all parts of the country, was laid before him, but he generously ordered it to be distributed among his soldiers.

¹ According to Jauhar, the Persians claimed the treasure for their master, but Humāyūn rejected the claim and offered it as a gift of friendship. He ordered the chests to be locked in the presence of Shah Qulī Khan, governor of Kirmān, Bidāgh Khan, the Persian prince, Husain (Hasan in the MS.) Sultān, governor of the Punjāb, Ahmad Sultān and governor of Siestān and sealed with the Imperial Seal and the seals of these officers. Jauhar saw all this with his own eyes. *Khudābaksh MS., A.U. Transcript*, p. 100.

Kāmrān, although he had begun to look upon Qandhār as lost, had expected the siege to last much longer, and he was greatly dismayed by the sudden fall of the town. As a precautionary measure he brought Akbar from Khānzādah's house and entrusted him to the care of his chief wife Muhatārima Khānam and threw into prison the young Prince's foster-father Shamsuddīn Muhammad Ghaznavī called 'Atka Khan. While Kāmrān dismally consulted his counsellors as to the most profitable attitude to assume towards his injured brother, who was now becoming a person most unpleasantly powerful, he had a further piece of bad news. The Badakhshānīs, ever faithful to their own dynasty, had grown disgusted with the foreign officials sent from Kābul to rule over them and had risen as one man. They had surprised the great prison-fortress of Qilah Zafar, the key to the country, had seized all Kāmrān's officers, including Qāsim Barlās and were now demanding that their sovereign Sulaimān should be released, under threats of reprisals against the prisoners now in their hands. Kāmrān, agitated by this intelligence and thrown off his guard by news of the disaster at Qandhār, gave way at once and released Sulaimān Mirza.¹ By and by, however, his pride again reasserted itself, and he attempted to intercept his late captive before he could cross the border. He was too late; Sulaimān, riding hard, came safely back to his own country before orders could be given to stop him, and was enthusiastically received by his own people, and shortly acquired undiminished power. The misfortunes which overtook Kāmrān encouraged Hindāl and Yādgār to attempt an escape to Humāyūn, who had already contrived to assure them that all previous misdeeds would be overlooked and that they would find a warm welcome. It was arranged that, in order to secure as long a start as possible, Yādgār should escape first, and that, when his absence was noticed, Hindāl should offer to ride after him, and use his powers of persuasion to induce him to return to Kābul. Both

¹ Bāyazīd gives a different account. He says Sulaimān was released before the surrender of Qandhār. Sulaimān's wife Haram Begam or Khānam Begam had bribed the officers of Kāmrān to support her husband's release. He says the Begam and her son Ibrāhīm were kept as hostages at court. Kāmrān soon regretted the step he had taken and sent a man to bring Sulaimān back. He refused to return but promised obedience and loyalty. The Begam and her son were also released shortly afterwards. Abul Fazl's account is different. He places Sulaimān's release after the capture of the fortress and says he was accompanied by his wife and son. Kāmrān was advised by his tutor, 'Abdul Khāliq Beg and his political adviser, Bābūs to release Sulaimān, but what really led him to do so was the threat of the Badakhshānī officers to hand over the province to the Uzbeks if their demand was not complied with. *A.N.* I, p. 460; *Text*, p. 237.

together would then make the best of their way to Qandhār. Abul Fazl writes that he promised to give Hindāl one third of all that he possessed or should acquire in future on condition that he would never swerve from his loyalty to him.¹ The ingenious plan was completely successful. Kāmrān gladly fell into the trap and accepted Hindāl's offer. Feeling confident that, if Hindāl did not succeed in persuading Yādgār by peaceable means, he would arrest him and bring him back by force, he never gave pursuer or pursued another thought until the news came that both had escaped from his power. This last misfortune completely upset Kāmrān's equanimity, and for some time he was utterly at a loss which way to turn. Everything seemed to be against him and in favour of his brother. He was ready to give way to despair.

A strange nemesis dogged Kāmrān's steps. One by one his leading followers had gone over to the Emperor and he himself felt that there was none in his camp on whose counsel he could confidently rely. His temper was not in accord with his ambitious designs and his unpopularity had increased to such an extent that even his devoted officers had begun to doubt the wisdom of his actions. His egotistical habit forbade a free and frank discussion of the political situation with the result that he could never have the benefit of the advice of those whose perspective was clearer and judgment sounder. No one felt sure that he would stick to the right course even in such depressing circumstances. Isolated and forlorn, he passed, as Abul Fazl rightly observes, 'from blunder to blunder for want of warning wisdom and the absence of sound counsellors.'

But as a matter of fact, owing to the dispute with the Persians above mentioned, all was not going very well with Humāyūn either. Not only were all further operations rendered quite impossible for the moment, but it even seemed that he would be compelled to fight his late allies.² The jealousies which had sprung up between the Persians and the Chaghatāis had now assumed serious proportions. The former considered that their duty was now done; they refused to obey the commands of the Emperor, and their commandant Bidāgh Khan peremptorily ordered the Mughal troops beyond the

¹ *A.N.* I, p. 469. Gulbadan does not speak of this offer to Hindāl. She writes that Hindāl and Yādgār formed a compact between themselves to run away. *H.N.*, p. 176.

² Humāyūn, on his part, was true to his promise. As Jauhar says, soon after the capture of Qandhār the Persians began to doubt whether the Emperor would allow them to send the treasure to the Shah. As has been said before, the Emperor ordered the money to be put in boxes and sealed and handed over to the officers of the Shah. *I.O. MS.*, p. 86.

range of the guns of the fort. In revenge for this insult, Humāyūn who was not minded to put up with such things, seized and retained 1700 horses belonging to some merchants, who had brought them for the Persians. The merchants waited upon the Emperor for the redress of their grievance, but all that he did was to give them a bond for the full price to be redeemed when his affairs assumed a normal shape. The final breach between the late allies was apparently due to four principal reasons. In the first place, the Chaghatāi Amīrs, especially those who had accompanied Humāyūn into exile, bitterly disliked the Persians, who served to remind them only of the hardships they had undergone. They were also annoyed by the boastfulness of the warriors of Iran, who went about proclaiming that, but for their valour and their master's charity, the Emperor would still be a beggar, homeless and destitute. The Persians refused to let the Chaghatāis winter near the town, with the result that Humāyūn suddenly found his men beginning to desert back to Kāmran. He was thus led to consider the possibilities of seizing Qandhār and ejecting the Persians. His own men loudly urged him to take this step, and seem to have hinted that, if he did not do so, his army would not hold together. But in the second place, Shah Tahmāsp's men had been guilty of gross oppression towards the helpless townsfolk of Qandhār, who complained to the Chaghatāis of their ill treatment and asked for help. Thus, in addition to the other motives of ill-will, must be reckoned the efforts of the townsfolk to foment a breach between the two parties in the hope that their deliverance would result therefrom. Nor should the religious question be forgotten, although it is much to be doubted whether this factor played such a large part in the rupture of relations as Badāonī would have us believe.¹ The Persians were, like their master, rigid and fanatical Shīahs while the Qandhāris and the Chaghatāis alike were stout Sunnīs. Here were the elements of explosion, and when Yādgār Nāsir Mirza, in a fit of zeal, struck dead a Persian who was abusing the companions of the Prophet, the two parties were ready to fly at each other's throats. The winter came on and the imperialists had no place of shelter where they could leave their families in safety. The Emperor sent a message to Bidāgh Khan to inform him of his dire necessity and asked him to set apart a few houses for himself and his men in Qandhār. But the proud general refused to comply with this request. Some of the imperial officers fled to Kābul; 'Askarī

¹ Badāonī says the Persians uttered foul and improper abuse against the first three companions of the Prophet in the presence of Yādgār Nāsir Mirza who could not bear it. *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 578.

also made an attempt to escape, but he was caught and brought back and placed in confinement.¹ Despair seized the royal army, and once again Humāyūn's men began to doubt the possibility of his prospects ever getting brighter and more hopeful. The future line of action was keenly debated, and some of the Chaghatāi nobles suggested that Qandhār should be taken at once and afterwards restored to the Shah, but this was opposed on the ground that, if the attempt failed, the results would be disastrous. The Shah will be offended and the Emperor would have no place of shelter in the world. Another plan was that the Emperor should betake himself to Badakhshān, make a compact with Mirza Sulaimān and then advance upon Qandhār. But the rigour of winter and the fall of snow rendered this impossible. While Humāyūn was in the midst of these conflicting counsels, an event happened which completely altered the situation.

Unfortunately for the Persians their child leader Murād, the emblem of Shah Tahmāsp's authority, suddenly died, and this is usually accounted the fourth reason for the outbreak of open hostilities between the allies. The boy, though his command was entirely nominal, had evidently kept Humāyūn in mind of the very real benefits conferred by the Shah; but his death seemed to remove the overpowering sense of obligation which had previously held Humāyūn back from complying with the requests of his followers that he should seize the town.

For long, as we have seen, the Emperor hesitated, but he was at length brought to a decision by Mirza Murād's death. The task presented no difficulties, owing to the friendliness of the townsfolk, the over-confidence of the Persians, and the spirit which animated his own men. But Humāyūn was not inclined to undergo the rigours of a siege which he said would lead to heavy loss of life. He asked Hājī Muhammad to devise some plan whereby the fortress might be taken 'without war or tumult'. A message was sent to Bidāgh Khan that, as the Emperor was going towards Kābul, he judged it prudent to leave 'Askarī in the fort in proper custody. To this the Persian general agreed. It was decided to send parties under trusted commanders to lie in ambush near the fort and enter it when a favourable opportunity presented itself. Bairam Khan, Hājī Muhammad, Ulugh Mirza, Mu'ayyid Beg and several others were appointed to carry out the plan. Hājī Muhammad Khan Kūkī with two well-armed servants entered the gate along with a train of camels, who were bringing supplies to the garrison. On being questioned, he

¹ He was found hiding in the house of an Afghan, was brought back by Ambar Nāzir and was entrusted to the custody of Nādim Kokultāsh.

answered that he was entering the fort by Bidāgh Khan's orders to secure 'Askarī there. The guards at the gate resisted, but they were cut down and the entrance was held. Meanwhile Bairam and others joined and the fort fell into the hands of the Mughals. More and more men poured into the town and after some desperate street fighting, in which isolated bodies of Persians were hunted to death like mad dogs by the townsfolk they had oppressed, the remnant of the garrison under Bidāgh Khan was driven to take refuge in the citadel. Thence many men, including the commandant, made their escape in the night, although large numbers of Persians refused to take any part in the fighting, and eagerly ranged themselves on the side of Humāyūn when he entered the town. The Emperor was rapturously received by the townsfolk, and so terrible were the stories told of the cruelties practised by certain Persian regiments, that Shah Tahmāsp, when the matter came to his ears, found it best to believe the account officially put forward, namely, that Bidāgh Khan had presumed to act contrary to the instructions of his master, and that thereupon Humāyūn had taken the liberty of superseding further orders from Herāt.

With Qandhār in his hands, the Emperor now proceeded to parcel out the territory dependent on it among his most deserving followers. Ismaīl Beg was given Zamīndāwar, Sher Afghan Beg received Qilāt; Haider Sultān got Shāl; most of the Tīrī district on the Halmand was given to Ulugh Mirza while the *parganā* of Lahū was given to Hājī Muhammad Kūkī, the daring officer who had opened the town gate for his comrades. Secure in the knowledge that Qandhār was behind him, Humāyūn now determined to bring to a settlement his long-standing account with Kāmran at Kābul.

CHAPTER XII

THE STRUGGLE FOR KABUL

THE possession of Qandhār made all the difference to the Emperor's strength. He had now a secure territorial base for his future endeavours. In addition to gaining a walled city, with a fort of the first importance, he was now in possession of a considerable tract of territory. The revenue he derived therefrom was not, it is true, great, as most of the land was of poor quality, inhabited for the most part by wild Balūchī tribes who lived a semi-nomadic life and paid little tribute. But the moral gain to Humāyūn was immense, and out of all proportion to the purely material advantages. He was no longer that most pitiable object, a landless prince; he had a kingdom, even if it were small in size and meagre in resources.

Accordingly, he determined to lose little time before attacking Kāmran. While he was preparing for the expedition against Kābul, 'Askarī, the rigours of whose captivity appear at this time to have been somewhat relaxed, took the opportunity to attempt an escape. He succeeded in getting away from his guards but was at length captured by Shah Mirza and Khwājah Ambar Nāzir, two officers who were deputed for the purpose by the Emperor. Once more Humāyūn in obedience to his father's dying charge spared his life, although he consigned him to prison in the custody of Nadīm Kokultāsh.¹ All being ready, the Emperor started out on his march to Kābul leaving Qandhār in charge of Bairam Khan. Hamīdah Bānū Begam was also left in the fortress. Luckily at this time the Emperor secured a large number of horses from certain merchants who expressed willingness to accept payment when Hindustān had been reconquered. Bonds were executed to this effect and the chiefs and officers felt much relieved.²

The Emperor moved forward and was led to the fort of Tīrī by Dawa Beg Hazāra who willingly offered help and service. It was here that Khānzādah Begam died after three days' illness and was buried at Ghilchak from where her dead body was afterwards removed to her father's grave in Kābul.³ As Ghaznī was not yet in

¹ Nadīm Kokultāsh is the husband of Maham Anagah, foster-mother of Akbar. She was the mother of Bāqī and Adham Khan.

² The Emperor was near Hasan Abdāl at this time and Abul Fazl says that one thousand horses were purchased from the privy purse and distributed among the officers. *A.N. I*, p. 476.

³ Gulbadan says that when Humāyūn started, Khānzādah Begam went with him and at Qabal-Chak (a place in the mountain district of Tīrī, probably

his hands, Humāyūn was unable to use the military road through the mountains which connected Kābul with Qandhār, but was obliged instead to follow the course of the river Halmand. The difficulties of the route were considerable, and the season was so far advanced that the army suffered severely from the weather. It was not merely the rigour of winter from which the army suffered; unfortunately, an epidemic broke out in the camp and many died with the result that the imperial army was greatly reduced in strength.¹ It was on this occasion that Hindāl, who was accompanying the expedition, put forward the suggestion that the army ought to return to Qandhār to winter there. As the Mirza's opinion had not been asked, Humāyūn was much annoyed at his brother's presumption, and sent word to him through Saiyyad Barqah to mind his own business and spend the winter at Zamīndāwar which had been assigned to him. Hindāl, who now began to realise that he had no longer to deal with the genial, easy-going Humāyūn of former days, took the rebuke meekly and apologised. The Emperor had at this time with him a force which, according to Bāyazīd, amounted to two thousand including officers.²

As the army slowly advanced nearer and nearer to Kābul, it was joined by many local chiefs of more or less importance, who were eager to see the last of Kāmrān's hated rule. It was during this march that Jamīl Beg, brother of Bābūs, who was appointed guardian of Āq Sultān, Kāmrān's son-in-law, paid homage to the Emperor.³ The Mirza for his part had not been idle; he had repaired the forti-

Ghilchak as suggested by Beveridge), she had three days' fever. All kinds of medicines were tried but they proved of no avail and on the fourth day of her illness she passed to the mercy of God. According to Abul Fazl also, the event occurred in the Tīrī district. *H.N.*, p. 175. *A.N.* I, pp. 476-7.

¹ Obviously this epidemic broke out after Khānzādah's death when the Emperor resumed his march towards Kābul. Neither Gulbadan nor Abul Fazl says that she died of it. Abul Fazl specifically points out Haider Sultān as the victim of the fell disease that attacked the imperial camp.

² Besides soldiers there were 72 officers in the Emperor's army. All told, the imperial force numbered 2000. Bāyazīd gives the names of the officers. *I.O. M.S.*

³ Bābūs is differently spelt in different MSS. In some it is written as Bābūs. Erskine has adopted the form Bāpūs and Beveridge Bābūs. It is Bābūs in Bāyazīd and Bāpūs in Gulbadan and Abul Fazl. The *Ma'āsir-i-Rahīmī* also has Bābūs. Āq Sultān whose name was Yāsīn (Hasan or Ais) Dawlat was the younger brother of Khizr Khwājah Kalan, husband of Gulbadan Begam. He was married to Habībah, one of Kāmrān's daughters, in Khizr Khan Hazāra's country after Kāmrān's flight from Kābul in 1545. Later he offended his father-in-law by asking the later to make obeisance to the Emperor. Āq Sultān left the Mirza and went to Bhakkar with his wife. But Kāmrān wrote to Shah Husain

fications of his capital, had collected a large army, and had sent a picked advanced guard under Qāsim Barlās to seize and hold the Khimār pass,¹ a defile through which the imperialists must come. He had asked Qāsim Mukhlis Turbatī, Master of Ordnance (Mīr Ātish) to take the artillery to Jalqa Dūrī near the house of Bābūs and post himself there. At first sight, despite the confidence with which Humāyūn advanced the odds might well seem heavy against him. His only resources were derived from the poor and barren kingdom of Qandhār: his army was certainly not more than four or five thousand men.² On the other hand, Kāmran as master of Kābul, Ghaznī, and all the districts round about, could command the allegiance of many tribes and had been so long established in his kingdom that his wealth was considerable. He was able to put into the field a force at least four times as great as that which his brother was bringing against him. His administration, at least until the return of Humāyūn from Persia, had been uniformly successful. He had scarcely ever lost a battle, and his grip over his provinces was firm.

On the other hand, his subjects were without exception thoroughly tired of his hard, selfish rule; his officers hated him personally and were no longer loyal; and all classes were eager for a change. Humāyūn's men on the other hand, were inspired with an excellent spirit, and were flushed with their recent exploit of expelling the Persians from Qandhār. A small advance guard under Hājī Muhammad Khan and Sharaf Khan attacked Qāsim Barlās and his men with the greatest resolution, inflicted severe loss upon them, and drove them out of their position. Mirza Hindāl was at his own request entrusted with the command of the vanguard. The Khimār pass was seized by the imperialists, and the way cleared for the advance upon Kābul.³

to snatch away Habībah from him and tell him to go where he liked. Shah Husain carried out this order and Āq Sultān departed for Mecca. Gulbadan, *H.N.*, pp. 31, 45, 177, 178, 196.

¹ Khimār in Gulbadan and Abul Fazl but Himār in Jauhar which means an ass. It is Khimār in the *Memoirs*. But Himār is a variant. *Memoirs* I, p. 260.

² Bāyazīd, *I.O. MS.*

³ Gulbadan makes no mention of Hājī Muhammad's dashing raid. She says His Majesty halted in the Khimār on the 9th Ramzan, 951 (November 24, 1544). Kāmran was greatly disturbed. He brought out his tents and encamped in front of the Guzargāh. According to the royal authoress, on the 11th of the same month, when the Emperor halted in the valley of Tīpa, Kāmran also came and drew up opposite to fight. It was at this time that desertions in the Mirza's army took place. Jauhar speaks of Hājī Muhammad's attack. Bāyazīd is silent, Abul Fazl supports Jauhar. It was after Hājī Muhammad's raid that Kāmran gave way to despair and many of his men went over to the Emperor. Gulbadan, *H.N.*, p. 177. Jauhar, *I.O. MS.*, p. 89. *A.N. I*, p. 478. Bāyazīd, *I.O. MS.*

Kāmrān who seems to have anticipated his lieutenant's failure to hold the pass, had drawn up a powerful army to oppose his brother. But Humāyūn, who had many friends in Kābul, estimated this imposing armament at its proper value. His army was considerably strengthened by desertions from Kāmrān's ranks, when the imperial army rested near Arqandī. Bābūs came with Shah Bardī Bayyāt¹ who held the country of Ghurdez, Naz and Bangash and paid homage. Gulbadan describes Bābūs as a well-known officer. He was followed by Musāhib Beg, son of Khwājah Kalan, who joined the Emperor with a large number of retainers. Besides Bābūs Bāyazīd mentions two other officers, 'Alī Qulī Safarchī and Bahādur Parwānchī, sons of Haider Sultān, who were the recipients of imperial favour at this time. Bābūs urged the Emperor to push on and his advice was accepted. The Emperor boldly moved forward with his absurdly inferior army until he had come to within half a *kros* of Kāmrān's headquarters. But he had foreseen what actually took place. Every night large bodies of Kāmrān's men slipped across and swelled the Emperor's ranks, until the Mirza's force was so far depleted that resistance became out of the question. Qarāchah Khan also joined the imperialists after some time. At last Kāmrān became extremely alarmed, and sent a party of Shaikhs into his brother's camp to find out what terms they could procure for him.² The Emperor agreed to pardon his brother, but stated firmly that Kāmrān must come in person, make suitable submission, and receive forgiveness. Kāmrān, who was probably conscious of the vengeance which he would have exacted from Humāyūn had the positions been reversed, took fright, abandoned his army to its fate, and fled to the citadel of Kābul. Gulbadan thus describes Kāmrān's perplexity: 'The Mirza was left solitary and alone. "No one remains near me," he thought, so he threw down and destroyed the door and the wall of the house of Bābūs which was near, and went softly, past the New Year's Garden

¹ According to Bāyazīd this is the same man who afterwards became a water-carrier and assumed the name of Bahram Saqqā. He wrote poetry and his *Diwān* is very popular in which he has followed the Persian *Diwān* of Shah Qāsim Anwar and the Turkish *Diwān* of Shah Nasmi. *I.O. MS.*

² These Shaikhs were Khwājah Mahmūd and Khwājah 'Abdul Khāliq according to Abul Fazl. Bāyazīd writes, 'Khan Mahmūd, Khwājah 'Abdul Haq, Khwājah Dost Khāwind and others went to the Emperor to intercede for Kāmrān.' Erskine, following Abul Fazl, says the Mirza sent forward two men to make offers of submission. Jauhar says two holy men, Khwājah 'Abdul Haq and Khan Mahmūd, came to make peace between the King and his brother. *A.N. I*, p. 479. Bāyazīd, *I.O. MS.* Erskine, *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn II*, p. 324. Jauhar, *I.O. MS.*, p. 89.

and the tomb of Gulrukh Begam, dismissed his 12,000 troopers and went off.¹

This he did, while the negotiations were actually going on, before he could have heard Humāyūn's final propositions. Nor did he venture to stay in Kābul, although the citadel, which was of great strength, could have offered successful resistance to a force more formidable than that of his brother. That same night, when darkness fell, he slipped out of the town and taking with him his son Mirza Ibrāhīm and his family rode hard to Ghaznī by the Panni-Hissār road.² But his own officers refused to admit him to the town, and he was compelled to hasten on to Sind, to throw himself upon the mercy of Shah Husain, his father-in-law.

Humāyūn, as his camp was close to Kāmrān's, had early notice of the Mirza's flight, and was able to take instant action. He made no effort to arrest his brother, but devoted all his attention to winning the favour of the people of Kābul. He sent on a body of men under a trusty officer named Bābūs to save the town from pillage and to restore confidence among the citizens. Qarāchah Khan, the governor, offered homage and requested the Emperor to enter the fort. On the 12th Ramzan, 952 (September 19, 1545) he made his state entry, amidst scenes of great rejoicing.³

¹ H.N., p. 177; Text, p. 76. Many officers of Kāmrān went over to the Emperor at this time. Erskine writes that it was at this time that the Emperor met Musāhib Beg, the son of Khwājah Kalān at the head of the Amīrs of Kāmrān, who came to make their submission. Abul Fazl mentions Musāhib's coming much earlier. It was before the intercession of the Shaikhs. Erskine, *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p. 324. A.N. I, p. 479.

² According to Gulbadan (H.N., p. 177) Kāmrān's party consisted of the following : Dosti Kukah and Jūki Khan who were sent to bring his eldest daughter Habībah; his son Ibrāhīm Mirza; Hazārā Begam who was the child of Khizr Khan's brother; Māh Begam who was the sister of Haram (Khurram) Begam; Mahar Afroz, mother of Hājī Begam; and Bāqi Kukah Mahar. Bāyazīd also writes that Kāmrān's followers bolted. Of the 5000 horsemen none re-mained with him except Bulbul *Aftābchī*.

³ There is a conflict among historians about the date of the capture of Kābul. Gulbadan writes that the Emperor halted in the Khimār pass on the 9th Ramzan, 951 (November 24, 1544) and on the 11th he halted in the valley of Tīpā and Kāmrān also came and drew up to fight. She goes on to add that the Emperor dismounted in the Bālā-i-Hissār when five hours of the night of 12th Ramzan had passed. But she does not give the year in this place. The year 951 is incorrect, for in Shawwāl 951 Humāyūn was in Persia as is testified by the inscription in the Turbat-i-Jām. Jauhar does not give the date and Bāyazīd gives the 10th Ramzan, 952 (9 o'clock in the night) as the date of Humāyūn's entry into the Kābul fort. Abul Fazl's date is Wednesday, the 12th Ramzan, 952 (November 18, 1545). Two hours of the night had passed when Humāyūn entered Kābul. Nizāmuddīn gives the 10th Ramzan, 953 and says that Akbar was at the

Here he met his son Akbar, now a little more than three years old, whom he had not set eyes on for more than two years. Jauhar relates an anecdote which indicates the magnanimity of Humāyūn's temper and his respect for religious prejudices. The Emperor had not eaten anything throughout the whole day and felt very hungry. He sent Wāsil, the Chamberlain (Hājib) and Jauhar *Aftābchī* to Begā Begam, Bābur's widow, who was living in the fort, to enquire if she could give anything to eat. The Begam immediately supplied some beef broth and curry of the same meat mixed with vegetables. When the plate was laid before the Emperor, he at once discovered that it was a preparation of beef. In disgust he drew back his hand and exclaimed: 'O Kāmrān! How will you behave towards the Hindūs? Matters have come to such a pass that you have made this Asylum of Chastity subsist on beef broth and curry of the same. You could not afford to fix a goat for her kitchen. She is the lady who brought

time four years two months and five days old. Badāonī gives only the year 952. The *Tārīkh-i-'Alfī*'s date of victory is the 10th Ramzan, 952, but the author miscalculates the age of Akbar at the time as four years two months and five days.

According to Jauhar and Gulbadan the circumcision of Akbar was celebrated soon after the conquest of Kābul. Gulbadan writes: 'A few days later, he sent persons to bring Hamīdah Bānū Begam from Qandhār. When she arrived, they celebrated the feast of the circumcision of the Emperor Jalāluddīn Muhammad Akbar. . . . The Emperor Muhammad Akbar was five years old when they made the circumcision feast in Kābul.' We may expect Gulbadan to be correct about a date of this kind. As a royal lady and a close relation of the Emperor, she ought to have known the exact age of the Prince at the time of circumcision. But this is not so. If we accept 952, the Prince would be only three years and about two months old which is much less than five. If we accept 953, the Prince would be four years and about two months old. The Prince would be five years of age in Rajab, 954 and surely if the victory of Kābul happened in Ramzan, 953, Humāyūn would not have sent for Hamīdah after nearly ten months. It seems Gulbadan's five is a mistake. Against her we have Bāyazīd's statement that Akbar was at the time of circumcision four years old and not five. Again, from Shawwāl, 951 to Ramzan, 953 would be a period of more than twenty months. Humāyūn did not take so much time in conquering Qandhār and coming to Kābul. The year 953 would be too late. As Beveridge says, he might have arrived at Qandhār in the beginning of 952 and conquered Kābul in Ramzan of the same year. Abul Fazl's date seems to be correct and he is supported by Bāyazīd with this difference only that the latter makes Humāyūn enter the fort of Kābul on the 10th Ramzan (November 15, 1545). As regards the actual date both Gulbadan and Abul Fazl are in agreement. The numismatic evidence supports 952. Gulbadan, *H.N.*, pp. 117, 179; Text, pp. 77-8. *A.N.* I, p. 480, n. 2. Bāyazīd, *I. O. MS.* Jauhar, *I.O. MS.*, p. 92. Whitehead, *Punjab Museum Catalogue of Mughal Coins II*, nos. 53, 54. *Tārīkh-i-'Alfī*, *I.O. MS.*, f. 422 (A). *Tabqāt*, *Bibliotheca Indica*, p. 65. *Al-Badāonī I*, p. 579. Erskine, *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn II*, p. 325.

the bones of our father to be deposited in the graveyard of our ancestors and did what we four of his sons could not do.'¹ The Emperor contented himself with a cup of sherbet and fasted until the next day.

The whole of Kābul welcomed the Emperor with the utmost enthusiasm. Everyone had long been weary alike of Kāmrān's policy and of his person and was eager to experience a change. Following the example of the capital, the whole country round about gave in its submission. A general amnesty was proclaimed, and Humāyūn proceeded to the task of ordering his new dominions. The Government of Ghaznī was conferred upon Hindāl, as sign and seal that his past misdeeds were forgotten, and Zamīndāwar and Tirmī were given to Ulugh Mirza. The Emperor's triumph was crowned by a splendid feast which he held to celebrate the circumcision of Akbar.² A ceaseless round of festivities brought high and low together to take part in these rejoicings. Wrestling tournaments were organised and the Emperor himself entered the lists with Imām 'Alī Qūrchi. All servants of the Crown were richly rewarded and the festivities were carried on for seventeen days. Gulbadan describes the scene thus:

'... They decorated all the bazars: Mirza Hindāl and Mirza Yādgār Nāsir, and the Sultāns and Amīrs, decorated their quarters beautifully, and in Begā Begam's garden the Begams and ladies made theirs' quite wonderful in a new fashion.

All the Sultāns and Amīrs brought gifts to the Audience Hall Garden. There were many elegant festivities and grand entertainments, and costly *Khilats* and head-to-foot dresses were bestowed.

¹ Ruqayya Begam (Rayke Begam) in Stewart is clearly a mistake. The A. U. MS. of Jauhar's *Tazkirāt* has Begā Begam who is described by Mrs. A. S. Beveridge in her *H. N.* on pages 216-7. Mrs. Beveridge is, however, inclined to think that the story of Jauhar applies more appropriately to Bībī Mubārikah, another wife of Bābur. Gulbadan speaks of Begā Begam in connection with Akbar's circumcision (p. 179). Stewart's translation clearly follows the MS. in the Allahabad University Library but curiously enough he has omitted the first sentence in which Humāyūn refers to the Hindūs. This sentence is not to be found in the I.O. MS. also. On tasting the beef dish Humāyūn is reported to have wept and levelled this sharp reproach at Kāmrān. The remark is wholly worthy of a gentle and kind-hearted kinsman and a tolerant ruler. I.O. MS., p. 91. Stewart, p. 83.

² A little before the circumcision, says Abul Fazl, Humāyūn arranged a festival to which Hamidah was brought, accompanied by a number of other ladies. Though Akbar had not seen her for a long time, he recognised her at once and went into her arms. Abul Fazl like a court historian and hero-worshipper says that this was due not to bodily senses but spiritual intuition. A. N. I, pp. 484-5.

Peasants and preachers, the pious, the poor and the needy, noble and plebeian, low and high,—everybody lived in peace and comfort, passing the “days in merriment and the nights in talk”.¹

Congratulatory embassies came pouring in, from Shah Tahmāsp himself, in reality to secure possession of Qandhār from Sulaimān Mirza of Badakhshān who despite the Emperor's repeated *firmāns* had not come to pay homage in person. He was induced to keep away from court by Qāzim Taghāyati and Muzaffar Kokāh who told him that a visit to Kābul would surely lead to his incarceration. Sulaimān acted on this advice with fatal results. The important Afghan and Balūchī chiefs, among whom Mīr Sayyid ‘Alī and Lavang Balūch deserve to be specially mentioned, came and offered obeisance. The former was confirmed in his fief of Dūkī while the latter was granted the districts of Shāl and Mastang. By generous gifts and rewards did the Emperor win the hearts of those intractable tribesmen and succeed in attaching them to himself. Altogether a new era seemed to have begun in the Emperor's life; he was master of Kābul and Qandhār; his worst enemy was a fugitive, and he had recovered his son. However, this state of affairs, pleasant as it might be, was not to last for long.

The first unpleasant reminder of the existence of his enemies came with the discovery that Yādgār Nāsir Mirza, though a captive, had contrived to get in touch with Humāyūn's ill-wishers, and was doing his best to foster intrigues. The Mirza's cup of iniquity was now full: he had long been the ally of Kāmrān, he had bitterly persecuted the Emperor in the days of destitution. Nonetheless, he had had granted his life when he was helpless. Now that distinct proofs of his complicity in further intrigues were forthcoming, Humāyūn lost patience with him. Determined from henceforth not to allow his relatives too much power, he decided to make an example of the culprit. At his instance, thirty separate articles of accusation were brought against Yādgār some of which are mentioned by Bāyazīd and Abul Fazl.

The Mirza had listened to the counsels of Muzaffar, the foster-brother of ‘Askarī who was hostile to the Emperor. Of these recent intrigues the latter was apprised by ‘Abdul Jabbār Shaikh who had deftly wormed himself into the confidence of the conspirators. But more serious were the offences that related to an earlier period of Yādgār's life. He had treated the Emperor with disrespect during the siege of Champānīr² and later had fallen in with the plans of Shah

¹ H.N., pp. 179-80.

² Yādgār had walked into the treasury without permission at Champānīr. The Emperor had sent him all kinds of dishes of which the Mirza accepted

Husain Arghūn to molest and harass him when he was in Sind. There were other charges but the most damaging was the treachery that had forced the Emperor to seek refuge in Persia. Judges were constituted, witnesses were examined and the articles of accusation were proved to the hilt. Yādgār was found guilty, and placed in rigorous imprisonment until the spring of 1546, in the fort of Kābul. When Humāyūn left for Badakhshān on a punitive expedition, he judged it unsafe to leave the Mirza behind and decided in Abul Fazl's veiled words 'to relieve him of the pangs of existence and thereby give peace and security to the state.'¹

Muhammad 'Alī Taghāyati (Taghāi in the *A. N.*) was commissioned to do the deed but he expressed his utter inability to carry out the royal command. Then at the suggestion of Mun'im Beg, the atrocious duty was assigned to Muhanīmad Qāsim Mauji who strangled the Mirza with a bow-string and buried him in a mound near the gate of the fort. It was afterwards that his remains were removed to Ghaznī and interred in his father's tomb.

Humāyūn who could thus take vengeance upon one of his own blood, for Yādgār was the son of his father's youngest brother, was a very different person from the Humāyūn who had lost India, as he had frankly confessed to Shah Tahmāsp, largely because he had not kept his relations in due subjection. And indeed there is no question that the misfortunes through which the Emperor had passed, did much to strengthen his character and increase his determination. Not that he ever became hard and ruthless, as was his brother Kām-rān; on the contrary, he remained to the day of his death considerate, kindly and generous. But the two characteristics which had particularly distinguished him in India, genial indolence and quixotic generosity, had largely disappeared from his personality as a result

only one and gave the rest to the Kakāwal. This, according to Humāyūn, was a breach of royal etiquette. (*Bāyazīd*, *I.O. MS.*) Nizāmuddīn and Badāonī say that the Mirza meditated flight and this made Humāyūn anxious.

¹ According to Abul Fazl this happened after Humāyūn had left Kābul, but it appears from *Bāyazīd*'s narrative that Yādgār was made away with before the expedition started.

Bāyazīd refers also to a party in the Arta Bāgh where Humāyūn drugged himself with a heavy dose of opium in the company of Mullā 'Abdul Bāqī Sadr, Qarāchah Khān, Musāhib Beg, Muwāriz Beg, Husain Qulī Sultān Muhardār, Khwājah Ayūb and others. When the Emperor rose after midnight, he began to stumble whereupon Khwājah Jalāluddīn Mahmūd Mīr Sāmān rebuked the Emperor that it was a pity that the legs of one like him should tremble like those of a child. The Emperor promised that he would never eat anything of that kind again. Erskine in his note (II, p. 329) speaks of a drinking party but in the text of *Bāyazīd* that I have used there is no mention of wine.

of the hardships he had undergone. The Humāyūn of Kābul, though perhaps a less remarkable figure than the Humāyūn of the fantastic court in Delhi, was a stronger, more dignified, and altogether more impressive person. And it was this essential change in his character rather than any change in the external circumstances that enabled him to struggle on through all difficulties towards the recapture of the kingdom which his father had won.

The Emperor had no intention of resting in Kābul in idle enjoyment, but from the very beginning took his renewed responsibilities perfectly seriously. The first question he had to consider was connected with the kingdom of Badakhshān. When the able and energetic Sulaimān Mirza had eluded Kāmran and regained his ancestral kingdom, he decided to take advantage of the enthusiasm which animated his people to declare war upon his cousin. Kāmran had his hands full with other troubles, mainly connected with the growing power of Humāyūn. He could thus spare very little time for the proper settlement of accounts with Sulaimān Mirza, with the result that that prince had captured certain provinces 'beyond the mountains' dependent upon Kābul, the most important of which were Khost, Qunduz and Anderāb. When, however, Humāyūn came into the place of Kāmran, he was not minded to put up with the aggression of Badakhshān, though he was willing to allow Sulaimān to retain those possessions which had been given to his father by Bābur.¹ Besides, Sulaimān had issued the *Khutbah* in his own name and acted as an independent prince. He summoned him to surrender the captured provinces. The Mirza refused; Humāyūn, therefore, determined to lead a punitive expedition against him.

Now the Emperor was on his mettle for several reasons. In the first place, he was anxious to show the Kābulīs that he knew how to safeguard the prestige of their ruler. But next, and perhaps most important, he was just at that moment entertaining an embassy from Shah Tahmāsp.² It would be, he thought, an excellent thing to show the Persians that he was not to be trifled with, and that he was capable of striking a quick and effective blow in assertion of his rights.

Accordingly, having made all secure in Kābul by carrying 'Askarī with him, and giving orders for Yādgār, long under sentence of death, to be strangled, he marched out in the spring of 1546 to recover his provinces. Along with him went a certain number of Persian

¹ Abul Fazl says by theory and practice the whole of Badakhshān did not belong to Sulaimān. *A.N.* I, p. 490.

² The Persian embassy under Valad Beg has already been referred to. It had come really to secure possession of Qandhār.

soldiers and diplomats, including a few members of Shah Tahmāsp's own bodyguard who had accompanied the embassy.¹ When he crossed the mountains into the province of Anderāb, he found that Sulaimān had made all preparations for an obstinate resistance. The ruler of Badakhshān had collected a considerable army of excellent quality, including a formidable contingent of the famous Badakhshānī archers, whose skill was remarkable. He had taken up a strong position near Tīrgirān exactly in the path of the invader, and had fortified his camp with much care. There he awaited attack with confidence. Humāyūn, who saw clearly that it would be dangerous to leave Kābul for long with Kāmrān at large, realised the necessity of bringing the campaign to a conclusion as quickly as possible. Accordingly, he sent in advance a strong party commanded by Hindāl, Hājī Muhammad Khan, Qarāchah Khan, and other leaders, to attempt an assault upon the Badakhshānī stronghold. The attacking party delivered its assault with the utmost courage and resolution in the face of heavy odds. Khwājah Muazzam and Bahādur were wounded and had to dismount from their horses. The garrison stood stoutly to their entrenchments, and the celebrated Badakhshānī archers caused terrible execution. Even Abul Fazl admits the gallantry displayed in this battle by Sulaimān's warriors. But the spirit which animated the Mughal troops was not to be denied. Among the storming party were a certain number of Shah Tahmāsp's bodyguard who greatly distinguished themselves by their splendid courage and discipline. Determined not to be outshone by strangers, Humāyūn's men pressed on in emulation, with the result that after heroic fighting on both sides, the defences were broken and the position was stormed. Heavy losses were inflicted upon the attackers, but the moral effect of their victory was immense. The army of Badakhshān was dumbfounded. They had seen a body of troops assault and take a strongly fortified entrenchment defended by an army far superior in numbers, possessing every advantage of position and local knowledge. The spectacle was too much for their courage. Despite the efforts of Sulaimān Mirza to rally them, they broke and fled. Sulaimān himself took refuge in Khost, and the whole country of Badakhshān submitted to Humāyūn. Many horses fell into the hands of the imperialists, and the nobles and soldiers of Badakhshān came in large numbers to offer homage. Alarmed by these developments and the news that a party was pursuing the fugitives, Sulaimān

¹ Abul Fazl mentions Valad Qāsim Beg, Jāfar Beg and the bodyguard, and Ahmad Beg and Dūghān Beg who belonged to the Shah's special bodyguard. *A. N. I.*, p. 491.

left Khost with a small remnant of his followers and pushed further beyond across the Amu to Kūlāb. Humāyūn, passing through the valley of Khost, arrived at Qism where he spent three or four months. It was here that a Persian named Khusrau was killed by some men of the Shah's bodyguard whom the Emperor ordered to be thrown into prison but later granted forgiveness through the good offices of Husain Qulī Sultān Muḥardār.

The Emperor, following his usual plan, distributed the conquered country among those nobles who had taken the most conspicuous part in the conquest. To Hindāl, as reward for good service, came the chief district belonging to Sulaimān Mirza, namely Badakhshān itself. He was also put in charge of the provinces of Kābul beyond the mountains of which the most important were Qunduz and Anderāb concerning which the whole dispute had arisen. The outlying provinces were distributed to lesser men; Khost, Sulaimān's present refuge, which was still unsubdued, was given to Mun'im Beg; Taliqān to Bābūs. Meanwhile the Emperor himself, with an energy that must have amazed those who were strange to the later development of his character, worked extremely hard in reducing recalcitrant districts to order and in striving to win the confidence of the people. He planned to spend the whole winter in the great fortress of Qilah Zafar whence he could control the destinies of the new kingdom and see with his own eyes that the administration was working properly. But by an unfortunate accident, at the very moment when he was actually on his way thither, he suddenly fell desperately sick at the village of Shāhdān¹ between Qism and Qilah Zafar. This illness, which prostrated the Emperor for four days and incapacitated him for many weeks, was attended by the most disastrous consequences. Reports of his death were widely circulated by persons interested in securing an acceptance of the rumours; his friends lost confidence and knew not which way to turn; his enemies plucked up courage and embarked on new ventures. The Amīrs of Badakhshān became once more bold and eager to fight. Hindāl in Qunduz girded up his loins for the struggle for the throne, and all Humāyūn's affairs and enterprises seemed likely to be involved in the utmost confusion. Fortunately at this moment the Prime Minister, Qarāchah Khan, was a strong man. During the crisis of the illness, for the four days when the Emperor lay unconscious, to all appearances dying, in the village of Shāhdān, Qarāchah Khan behaved with exemplary firmness. He caused the state prisoner 'Askarī to be brought to his own tent, lest a rescue should be attempted and himself

¹ Shākhdān in the *Akbarnāmah*.

watched over the Emperor night and day. Among those who served the Emperor with fidelity during his illness Bāyazīd makes special mention of two persons—Mullā Bāyazīd Hakīm, tutor to Akbar and Bibī Fātimah, the Urdū Begī of the palace.¹ One day when Hamīdah was pouring the juice of some pomegranates into the mouth of the Emperor, he opened his eyes and regained consciousness. His head was clear, although he was very weak. He enquired of the Begam how affairs stood and was informed that everything was in a state of utter confusion. Qarāchah Khan was immediately summoned to the presence and ordered to broadcast the happy tidings that he was convalescent. He issued orders to his officers; Fāzil Beg was sent to Kābul with the message that the Emperor was improving and he reached there before much mischief was done. His Amīrs, reassured, went back to their duty; Hindāl returned to Qunduz and earnestly protested his loyalty, and at first it seemed as though all would go on as before. A tragic event which cast its gloom on the imperial camp was the murder of Khwājah Sultān Muhammad Rashīdī, the Mughal *wazīr*, on November 16, 1546 by Muazzam Sultān Taghati who had conspired with some Persians to do the foul deed. The culprits were brought to book by Muhammad 'Alī Taghati and Fāzil Beg, and Muazzam was condemned and thrown into prison.² The Emperor was moved to Qilah Zafar, where he slowly recovered his health. But as a matter of fact, much of the work which he had done since

¹ Fātimah Bibī is the mother of Roshan Kūkah and Zuhra, wife of Khwājah Muazzam. The term Urdū Begī is translated by Blochmann as 'armed woman'. This lady is mentioned by Gulbadan among the ladies present at Hindāl's marriage. Her name is given as Fātimah Sultān Anagah, the mother of Roshan Kūkah. (*H.N.*, p. 122) Abul Fazl writes that during the Emperor's illness Qarāchah Khan acted as a personal attendant, and no one was allowed to go into the sickroom except Khwājah Khāwand Mahmūd and Khwājah Muin. Mīr Barkah saw the Emperor when he became convalescent. Jauhar says the Queen personally attended the King though she was greatly distressed. (*A. N. I.*, p. 494. Jauhar, *I.O. MS.*) What the Emperor's illness exactly was we are not told. It seems he had high fever accompanied by loss of consciousness, for Gulbadan says '... an illness attacked his blessed frame and he slept day and night.' *H.N.*, p. 180.

² Khwājah Muazzam was the brother of Hamīdah Begam. For an account of him see Gulbadan's *H.N.*, pp. 65-6. He had been very mischievous since his boyhood. He had stolen rubies in Persia and had generally misbehaved in the belief that his sister would always secure for him royal forgiveness. It was in the time of Akbar that he was punished for murder and ultimately died in prison at Gwālīor.

The motive for the murder of Rashīdī seems to have been greed and not Shiahism, for the culprit had acted in collaboration with 'vagabonds who took faithless bigotry to be faith.'

the capture of Qandhār had been entirely nullified by the rumour of his death.

After complete recovery Humāyūn built here a hut of straw in which he sat to administer justice. It was here that he conferred upon Sher Afgan, the son of Kuch Beg, Kahmard, Zuhāq and Bāmiān and promised to add Ghorband to his fief on reaching Kābul. He progressed in health so rapidly that he began to take part in hunting expeditions which were always a delightful pastime to him. Abul Fazl's statement that his presence in Badakhshān 'wrought dismay in all Tūran' is doubtless an exaggeration.¹ The Emperor had neither the time nor the resources to engage in a struggle with the Uzbeqs while Kāmrān was still at large endeavouring to recapture Kābul.

As we have already seen, Kāmrān, after Humāyūn's march towards Kābul, had fled to Ghaznī, and thence to Sind. His father-in-law Shah Husain, who naturally feared lest he himself should be the next victim of Humāyūn's activities, at once saw the wisdom of assisting the fugitive Prince with men and money. So long as Kāmrān could be maintained in opposition to Humāyūn, so long would the Emperor be crippled and hampered in all his projected operations. Kāmrān, for his part, had no intention of abiding by the result of the trick which fortune had played him of late; he was determined to seek his revenge. Accordingly, well supplied with troops and with money, he took the opportunity, when Humāyūn was away in Badakhshān, to make his appearance before the walls of Kābul. The suggestion that Qandhār should be attacked first was not approved of because the fortress was well guarded by Bairam Khan. At this juncture the report of Humāyūn's death was still abroad. The natural consequence was that the imperial officers, having no definite information, did not dare to offend the man who, if the news were true, was almost certainly the next holder of the imperial dignity. They offered no resistance to Kāmrān who was able to seize the whole town.

It was not long before the news that the Emperor still lived arrived, but the harm had been done. Humāyūn's partisans in Kābul wrote to him urging an immediate return, before Kāmrān, with his well-known ruthless cruelty, should have taken a terrible vengeance on all who had assisted his brother. The Emperor was not long in making up his mind. As soon as he was well enough to move, he concluded a treaty with Sulaimān Mirza, by the terms of which he retained his own provinces of Qunduz and Anderāb and other Kābul

¹ A. N. I, p. 497.

dependencies, but gave up the rest of his conquests to their rightful owners.¹ Then, leaving Hindāl as governor of the recaptured districts, he set out on the march to Kābul well satisfied with the results of his campaign—he had given Sulaimān a lesson, and he had regained his own property.

The season was winter and the travelling extremely difficult. Humāyūn's troops were terribly anxious about the fate of their families who were in Kābul at the mercy of Kāmran. It was only by the utmost personal exertions that he succeeded in keeping his men from slipping off individually to see how matters stood with their relations. From Taliqān he proceeded to Qunduz, where he was hospitably received by Hindāl. He stopped there for a little time, resting and recruiting his army. He did not delay long, for on February 1, 1547 he set out on the march across the mountains to Kābul.² The weather was now extremely difficult, and it required all Humāyūn's resolution to induce his men, anxious as they were to regain Kābul, to face the deep snow. So heavily did it lie, that men and horses had to be sent ahead to ram it down, lest the baggage animals should be hopelessly entangled. Marching under these conditions was necessarily terribly slow, but Humāyūn had great hopes that any advance in such weather would take his brother entirely by surprise.

As Humāyūn approached nearer Kābul, he began to learn particulars of Kāmran's recent movements. It appeared that the Mirza had only been about three months in the district of Pātar, assigned him as a refuge by Shah Husain, when he had heard of the Badakhshān expedition and had determined to surprise Kābul in his brother's absence.³ From Shah Husain he had managed to borrow a body of some thousand chosen horsemen, accompanied by whom he had ridden fast northwards. On the way he had met and plundered some Balūchī horse-dealers, with the result that he had been able to give most of his men a led horse, and vastly increase the mobility of his

¹ He assigned to Hindāl Qunduz, Anderāb, Khost, Kahmard and Ghorī and the adjoining country. *A. N. I.*, p. 504.

² Abul Fazl says the Emperor marched after the Id-i-Qurbān by the pass of Shibartū to the pass of Regak and halted at Khwājah Seh Yārān. This festival, also called Id-uz-Zuhā, falls on the tenth day of Zu'l Hijja which is regarded as a day of sacrifice. It is founded on an injunction in the *Qurān*, sura XXII, 33-8. Hughes, *Dictionary of Islām*, pp. 192-4.

³ Kāmran had fled through the Balūch country to Bhakkar and was well received by Shah Husain Arghūn. He was asked to reside at Pātar and soon afterwards married the Shah's daughter Chūchak Begam, who faithfully remained with him through all his trials and sufferings.

little army. Advancing with the utmost rapidity, he had surprised Ghaznī, had seized the town and had cut off all communication with Kābul. The governor Zāhid Beg was found in a state of drunkenness and the fort was taken without a show of resistance. He was brought before Kāmrān and slain and Ghaznī was entrusted to the Mirza's son-in-law, Daulat Sultān who was assisted by the Sind force under Mulk Muhammad. Then, gathering his forces together for the final effort, he had advanced upon the capital. As we have read, and as Humāyūn now learned, his appearance had taken the officers on guard by surprise. Not venturing to resist him they had suffered him to penetrate into the city. The imperial governor, Muhammad 'Alī Taghāi was arrested as he was taking his ease in a hot bath, brought before Kāmrān in a state of inebriation, and instantly sabred. Paralysed by the uncertainty about the Emperor's life, and overwhelmed by the rapidity of the Mirza's actions, Humāyūn's friends and officers could make no resistance. Abul Fazl writes that it was through the treachery of Pahlwān, the guard at the gate, that Kāmrān was allowed to enter the city.¹ Jauhar and Gulbadan relate a different story and it appears from their accounts that the imperialists were taken by surprise.² Gulbadan describes the scene thus: '... It was morning; the Kābulīs were off their guard; the gates had been opened in the old way, and water carriers and grass cutters were going in and out, and the Mirza passed into the fort with all these common people. He at once killed his uncle Muhammad 'Alī Taghāi who was in the hot bath. He alighted at the college of Mullā 'Abdul Khāliq.'³

Kāmrān advanced towards the fort. Naukar whom the Emperor had posted at the door of the harem was so unnerved that he escaped in the disguise of a woman.⁴ The gate-keeper was seized by the Mirza's men and thrown into prison. When he entered the fort and took up his abode there, Shamsuddīn Muhammad Khan Atkah presented to him the young Prince Akbar who was treated with kindness but ordered to be entrusted to his own men.

Among Humāyūn's officers who had joined Kāmrān were Sher

¹ A. N. I, p. 501.

² Kāmrān proceeded to Kābul. Mīr Fāzil Beg, brother of Mun'im Khan, Mehtār Wāsil and Mehtār Vakīl, who were preparing for the expedition to Hindustān in accordance with the King's order, were seized and blinded. Mīr Muhammad Qafāi, who was governor of Kābul, was killed and Kāmrān took possession of Akbar. Jauhar, *I.O. MS. H.N.*, pp. 180-81; Text, p. 78.

³ Muhammad 'Alī was the brother of Māham Begam. According to Bāyazīd 'Alī Qulī Lālī was the man who killed the governor.

⁴ Gulbadan, *H.N.*, p. 181.

Afghan, who had turned traitor despite the favours he had received at the Emperor's hands, Hasan Beg Kūkā and Sultān Muhammad who were won over by means of false representations.

As the soldiers of the Badakhshān expeditionary force had foreseen, Kāmran celebrated his triumph by a hateful orgy of vengeance, unworthy of a scion of Bābur's stock, against Humāyūn's followers. He slew, he blinded, he mutilated, he imprisoned, until he had satisfied himself that his brother's supporters were now effectually cowed. Gulbadan writes:

'The Mirza's people went into the Bālā-i-Hissār, and plundered and destroyed innumerable things belonging to the harem, and they made settlement for them in Mirza Kāmran's court (*Sarkār*). He put the great Begams into Mirza 'Askari's house and there he encircled a room with bricks and plaster (?) and dung cakes, and used to give the ladies food and water from over the walls.

He behaved very ill indeed to the wives and families of the officers, who had left him for the Emperor, ransacking and plundering all their houses and putting each family in somebody's custody.'¹

Abul Fazl's account of Kāmran's atrocities is more detailed. Mehtār Wāsil and Mehtār Vakīl were blinded and Hisāmuddīn 'Alī, son of Mīr Khalīfah who had offered stubborn resistance at Zamīndawār, was castrated and put to death in a terrible manner. Qulī Bahādur was also killed, and some servants of the Emperor, like Khwājah Muazzam, Bahādur Khan, Atkah Khan, Nadīm Kokah and others, were put to the sword. The discomfiture of the imperialists was mainly brought about by their dissensions and neglect. Taghāi and Fāzil Beg had worked for their selfish ends and had done nothing to consolidate the position in Kābul. Kāmran now received the homage of officers and soldiers, and began to collect forces for a fresh trial of strength. It was at this time that a Persian suggested to Valad Beg that the Mirza should be slain and the young Akbar should be installed in his place, but the head of the embassy, whom Abul Fazl charges with cowardice, demurred and said that it was not for them to meddle in such affairs.² Kāmran felt secure but he was not long allowed to comfort himself thus without molestation.

As Humāyūn advanced, he found that Kāmran had been very busy making preparations for the destruction of the army returning

¹ H.N., p. 181.

² A.N. I, p. 503. Abul Fazl says one day Kāmran was seated on top of the citadel when Valad Beg, Abul Qāsim and many others went to pay their respects to him. Akbar was also present. It was at this time that the suggestion was whispered into Valad Beg's ear by Abul Qāsim.

from Badakhshān. The Ābdāra defile, through which the Emperor must pass, was strongly held by a trusted officer of Kāmṛān, named Sher 'Alī. Humāyūn pushed on into the great defile and Sher 'Alī was checked by Hindāl and Qarāchah Khan; but his baggage train was badly cut up in a sudden surprise attack directed by the opposing general. Worst of all, the nearer the Emperor approached to Kābul, the more did anxiety for their families paralyse the activity of his men. When at length he reached Chārī Karān and the tales of some of Kāmṛān's cruelties were spread abroad, many of Humāyūn's adherents deserted him, in the hope that by offering a prompt submission to Kāmṛān they could save their dependents from persecution. Among these were Iskandar Sultān and Sanjar Barlās, who was a nephew (sister's son) of Bābur. So serious did this become, that at last it was a very doubtful question whether there were enough men left to him to make active operations against Kābul a possibility. The Emperor summoned a council to consider the matter. His Begs were strongly of the opinion that the best course would be to march past Kābul to Bori and Khwājah Pashta,¹ and there remain until he had collected recruits to fill the gaps in his depleted ranks. But Humāyūn was no longer a man to defer readily to bad advice. He saw at once the immense moral advantage which Kāmṛān would derive from his brother's failure to attack him at once. Despite the odds against him, he determined to adopt the sound policy of striking hard and quickly without further delay.

Already, realising the seriousness of the enterprise, he had recalled Hindāl, and the garrison left behind in Qunduz. The younger Mirza was now a dashing general, who appeared anxious to atone for past misdeeds by present exploits. On this occasion he was detailed to lead the advance guard, for whom there was the prospect of hard fighting. Now Kāmṛān, either because he did not feel sure of the population of Kābul, or because he mistrusted the effect which the appearance of Humāyūn before the walls of the town would have on the courage of the garrison, had determined to direct all his efforts to keeping his brother at a distance. A large body of his best troops, under the command of Sher Afghan, were despatched to hold the narrow passage near Dih Afghānān, and resist the advance of the

¹ The route called the Bori pass leads from Dera Ghāzī Khan to Qandhār and Ghaznī. Bābur led his army through it in 1505 and it is still used by caravans. This is, as Beveridge remarks, probably the Khawak pass which forms the communication between the head of the Punjshīr valley and the valley of the Anderāb. Timur marched through this pass in his march on Hindustān towards the close of the fourteenth century. Thornton, *Gazetteer of the Countries Adjoining India*, pp. 115, 381.

Emperor to the last. Humāyūn, who was intimately acquainted with the country, realised the difficulties of the position, and laid his plans with considerable skill. It was arranged that Hindāl should make a frontal attack, supported by the Emperor and Qarāchah Khan, while Hājī Muhammad Beg and a few picked men were to work round by the Minār pass, a troublesome and unfrequented route, to take the Kābulīs on the flank. This arrangement was successfully carried out. Hindāl, as he was advancing towards Dih Afghānān was attacked by the enemy in immensely superior numbers, but held his ground with the utmost gallantry. The fighting was very hot, and some of his men began to flee, despite all his efforts. Humāyūn, who was advancing quickly to the aid of his brother, was about to charge at the head of the reserve, when Qarāchah Khan begged leave to lead on his own troops instead. The Khan's charge was gallantly led and well pushed home. It proved the turning point of the battle, for Sher Afghan, the opposing general, was sought out, unhorsed and captured by the bold leader.¹ Almost at the same time Hājī Muhammad Khan and the flanking party, which had at last worked into position, charged down upon the Kābulīs, so that they broke and fled. Humāyūn now once again put into practice the two lessons he had learned in his misfortunes, namely, never to pardon a traitor, and never to lose the fruits of victory by indolence. Sher Afghan for all his bold bearing was executed on the spot as a warning to others, and the Emperor pressed on to Kābul, by the Khiyāban route, with the utmost speed. He seized the outer fortifications without difficulty, and was warmly welcomed by the townsfolk. Mirza

¹ Jauhar and Bāyazīd are both eye-witnesses of these events but their accounts are different. Jauhar who is followed by Abul Fazl writes that Sher Afghan was attacked by a detachment under Hindāl and a hotly contested engagement took place. The King wanted to rush forward to the rescue of the Prince but Qarāchah Khan insisted on his keeping in the rear and himself attacked the rebels. Sher Afghan fell from his horse; Qarāchah Khan rode upon him, took him prisoner and begged the Emperor to put such a traitor to death without delay. This was done and the rest of his party fled. Bāyazīd says that when Sher Afghan heard of the approach of Humāyūn he was drunk in the bath. He set out to engage the enemy (without Kāmran's permission) whom he met at Bābā Shir. Here he was attacked and seized by Saiyyad 'Alī, a Qūrchī, who captured him and took him to the Emperor. The Emperor was mercifully inclined—and this statement is supported by Jauhar also—but Qarāchah Khan insisted on his death. A quarrel arose between Shah Mirza, Ulugh Mirza's brother, and Jamīl Beg, brother of Bālūs as to which of them had captured Sher Afghan but on the testimony of the soldiers the honour was awarded to Jamīl Beg. Saiyyad 'Alī, the real captor, was altogether forgotten in this scramble of commanders, who probably had a well-recognised right to the booty seized by their followers. *A. N. I*, p. 506. Bāyazīd, *I.O.MS.*

Khizr Khan and the Arghūn troops fled and sought refuge among the Hazārās and Sher 'Alī, baffled and discomfited, retired into the town. In the citadel, Kāmrān still held out stoutly with a strong garrison, and a number of helpless hostages, the wives and children of some of Humāyūn's principal Begs.

The Emperor prepared to push the siege with vigour. He established his headquarters on the Eagles' Hill, Koh Uqābain, overlooking the fortifications, and commenced a bombardment. He still had too few troops to make a really effective blockade, and Kāmrān's men made frequent sallies which were only repulsed as a result of desperate fighting. It was during one of these that Hājī Muhammad Khan was attacked by Sher 'Alī and received a serious wound in his right arm. The rumour got abroad that he was dead whereupon the Emperor asked him to ride to the trenches to dispel the suspicions of the enemy.¹ On one occasion Kāmrān sent his best captain, Sher 'Alī to intercept and plunder a rich caravan consisting of 500 horses that was coming from Chārīkarān. Skilfully evading the attention of the besiegers, Sher 'Alī slipped out of the town, and actually succeeded in plundering the caravan, bringing away much booty. But Humāyūn, who had notice of the enterprise, managed with great ingenuity to bar all the roads, passes, and fords, so that Sher 'Alī was quite unable to re-enter the town. At length the garrison arranged a diversion, hoping that while the Emperor's men were repelling the sally, the troops outside might be able to force their way through the besiegers' lines into the town. Accordingly, the troops of Humāyūn suddenly found themselves attacked on both sides. After some desperate fighting, the garrison were forced to retire in disorder within their walls; they owed their discomfiture largely to the extraordinary steadiness of a body of Humāyūn's matchlock-men, who poured volley after volley into their ranks, inflicting fearful loss, and finally causing a regular panic by the accuracy of their fire. Sher 'Alī, quite unable to rejoin his friends, withdrew in despair to Ghaznī. Humāyūn, however, had no intention of allowing him to escape so lightly. Like his father before him, the Emperor viewed with peculiar disfavour any attempt to rob merchants and private individuals who had given no cause for offence. He determined to visit his wrath upon Kāmrān's lieutenant. A strong body of troops under Khizr Khwājah Khan, Musāhib Beg and Ismāil Beg Dūldāi was despatched in pursuit of Sher 'Alī who

¹ It was at this time that Sanjar, son of Sultān Junaid, was made prisoner and Muhammad Qāsim and Muhammad Husain (the sister's sons of Pahlwān Dost Mīr Barr) came and paid homage. *A.N.* I, pp. 507-8.

was overtaken and utterly routed at the Sajāwand pass. All the goods which could be found were freely restored to the injured merchants, and all the prisoners promptly hanged as robbers and traitors. These two acts, strongly in contrast with each other, clearly show that war and misfortune had not blunted his sense of justice but had compelled him to alter his methods in dealing with rebels and enemies.

When Kāmrān received news of this, he behaved as might have been expected from one of his cruel and selfish nature. He retaliated savagely upon the unfortunate hostages who were at his mercy. The wife of the Emperor's trusted officer Bābūs Khan was handed over to the bazar rabble to be dishonoured, and his three sons aged seven, five and three respectively were hung from the walls, exposed to the fire of the besiegers.¹ The wife of Muhammad Qāsim was suspended by the breasts over the Iron Gate and the wives and children of other officers were treated with similar cruelty. Sardār Beg,² son of Qarāchah Khan, and Khuda Dost, son of Musāhib Beg, were hung from the walls and the Mirza threatened to kill them if the siege was not abandoned. But these undaunted warriors refused to be cowed by these inhuman threats and remained firm in their loyalty to their master. Even the child Akbar, Kāmrān's own nephew, was placed upon the ramparts. Concerning this incident, many legends have arisen, but the sober truth seems to be as follows. The fire of the besiegers had been steadily growing hotter and hotter, and at last Mirza Kāmrān himself, as he was going up to the roof of the citadel to inspect the dispositions of the enemy, had a very narrow escape from being hit by a shot aimed directly at him. In a fit of passion he gave the order about Akbar : 'Bring him and put him in front.' Humāyūn got immediate notice of the order, and diverted the artillery fire away from the spot where Akbar and Kāmrān were standing. It does not appear that the child was ever actually under fire.³

¹ Abul Fazl mentions three sons of Bābūs while Bāyazīd writes that his two sons who were aged ten and twelve were killed. *A.N.* I, p. 510; Bāyazīd, *I.O.M.S.*

² It is Sardār Beg in the *Akbar-nāmah*. Bāyazīd writes *pisar-i-Darbeg walad-i-Qarāchah Khan* which means, son of Darbeg, son of Qarāchah Khan.

³ It is difficult to accept Abul Fazl's statement that the infant Akbar was actually placed in front of the guns and kept in a place where it was difficult, on account of the marksmen of the victorious army, for an ant or grasshopper to pass. It is interesting to read the courtly historiographer's picturesque narrative describing the miraculous escape of the Prince. Nizāmuddīn also writes that Kāmrān ordered Akbar to be exposed upon the ramparts in the place where shot and shell fell thickest, and Māham Angah took the child in her lap and turned herself towards the enemy. This has been repeated by writers like Badāonī, Firishtah and others. But the real truth has to be gleaned from the

Every day the blockade became closer. The news of the Emperor's continued success soon brought in all his followers from outlying districts and he was thus enabled to press the siege with such vigour that he soon reduced Kāmrān to great straits. Abandoning the policy of terrorism which he had so long practised, the Mirza made the humblest promises of present submission and future good conduct. Humāyūn, mindful as ever of Bābur's dying injunction, was disposed to forgive him, but Kāmrān feared the vengeance of the men whose families he had injured, and losing his nerve, resolved to leave the fort. According to Abul Fazl the Mughal officers like Prince Hindāl, Qarāchah Khan, Musāhib Beg and others who 'had not freely quaffed the sweet waters of loyalty' did not approve of Kāmrān's new move and secretly sent word to him that surrender would lead to sure ruin. They were primarily moved by self-interest in taking such a step. It would be too much to suggest that they apprehended more and more intrigue and strife at the imperial court with Kāmrān's advent. The more probable reason seems to be that they felt that with the Mirza's submission their importance would be lessened and Humāyūn, rid of his dangerous rival, would be a formidable autocrat, caring nothing for their advice or support. Again, their loyalty too was not sufficiently strong as is borne out by Qarāchah Khan's subsequent conduct. The Mirza was informed that the imperial forces had considerably increased and as submission would be fraught with the direst consequences to himself, they would assist him in effecting his escape quietly from the fort. Accordingly he

writings of Jauhar and Gulbadan. Bāyazīd, who was present at the siege, does not take any notice of this incident, although he describes the events of the time in great detail. Jauhar only says Kāmrān ordered the young Prince Akbar to be exposed to the fire of the cannon whereupon His Majesty forbade their being used. From Gulbadan's narrative also it does not appear that Akbar was placed under fire. She writes '... Then he gave this order about the Emperor Akbar : "Bring him and put him in front." Someone let his august Majesty (Humāyūn) know that Mirza Muhammad Akbar was being kept in the front, so he forbade the guns to be fired and after that none were aimed at the Bālā-i-Hissār.' Gulbadan does not say the child was actually put under fire. Muhammad 'Arif Qandhāri writes that Kāmrān made Akbar his shield for his protection. It appears, it was a mere threat to compel the Emperor to stop the siege. It is impossible to accept Abul Fazl's remarks about Sumbul Khan, the artillery officer's bewilderment and the divine intervention which made the evil design manifest. *A.N.* I, pp. 511-12. *Tabqāt, Bibliotheca Indica*, p. 68. Gulbadan, *H.N.*, pp. 183-4. Jauhar, *I.O.MS.*, p. 96. 'Arif, *A.U.MS.*, p. 33.

It was during this siege that Jahan Sultān Begam died. She was two years old. It appears from Gulbadan's narrative that Humāyūn apprehended serious harm to Akbar. He wrote : 'Some time or other, if we had used force against the citadel, Mirza Muhammad Akbar would have disappeared.' *H.N.*, p. 184.

came out by the Delhi gate on the night of April 27, 1547, and reached the place which had been pointed out to him by the Mughal officers.¹

Hindāl was despatched to recapture the fugitive, but, so wretched was Kāmrān's plight, alone and badly mounted, that the younger brother forgot his duty to the Emperor, and remembered only his blood-kinship with Kāmrān.² He gave him a horse, and suffered him to escape. The Mirza, evidently fearing the effect of the recent failure upon his father-in-law's cordiality, decided to avoid Shah Husain of Sind, and to go to Badakhshān. He started at night attended only by a single man 'Alī Qulī and proceeded by the valley of Sanjad. He was plundered by the Hazārās, but on being recognised by their leader he was sent to Zohak and Bāmiān³ where his follower Sher 'Alī still held the ground. As he went, he managed to collect a small body of followers, and was lucky enough to defeat Mirza Beg Barlās, the imperial governor of the hill fortress of Ghur, and seized the place.⁴ Leaving Sher 'Alī in charge of the fortress he pushed on to Badakhshān, to implore the help of Sulaimān Mirza and his son Ibrāhīm, who had some experience of Kāmrān in prosperity, and who very naturally refused to have anything to do with him in distress, and adhered loyally to the treaty concluded with Humāyūn. Thus

¹ Jauhar says nothing about this incident. Bāyazīd who is an eye-witness of the siege writes that Kāmrān fled on this night. He was recognised and caught by the watchmen but he obtained his release by giving them a purse. He reached Sanjad and from there proceeded towards Balkh. Gulbadan says: "The night Mirza Kāmrān went away, prayer-time passed and indeed bedtime came, and there was no noise at all." (*H. N.*, p. 184). According to the *Tabqāt-i-Akbarī* a hole was made in the wall on Khwājah Khizr's side and Kāmrān made his way barefoot to the place indicated by the nobles. *Bibliotheca Indica*, p. 69.

² This is Jauhar's version. Bāyazīd writes that Hindāl allowed Kāmrān to pass through his lines, when he was recognised and seized but was able to obtain his release by payment of money. According to Abul Fazl, Hājī Muhammad Khan was sent in pursuit of Kāmrān but he let him go. 'Aq Sultān and other adherents were captured and duly punished. Nizāmuddīn says Hājī Muhammad deliberately withdrew when Kāmrān called out to him in Tūrkī: 'I have not killed your father Bābā Qashaqah.' In Elliot's translation (*Vol. V*, p. 227) *not* is omitted. *A. N. I.*, pp. 514-15. *Tabqāt*, p. 69.

³ Bāmiān is a famous valley on the route from Kābul to Turkestān. The valley is about a mile broad and very fertile. It is situated just within the frontier of Afghānistān where it joins Qunduz. The castle of Zohak is in the vicinity of Bāmiān. Zohak Bāmiān is mentioned in the *Aīn-i-Akbarī* also as a dependency of Kābul yielding a revenue of 861,750 *dāms*. Thornton, *Gazetteer of the Countries Adjoining India*, p. 68. Jarrett, II, p. 412.

⁴ Kāmrān wanted to pass by the fortress but he was led by the taunts of one of his servants to direct an attack against it. *A. N. I.*, pp. 515-16.

the Mirza was compelled to throw in his lot with the Uzbeks, the hereditary enemies of his dynasty.

On entering Kābul Humāyūn ordered the troops to plunder the city for one whole night as a punishment to the citizens for allowing Kāmran and his crew to come in.¹ Certain divines were also put to death for countenancing Kāmran's treasonable designs. Qarāchah Khan was appointed to go in pursuit of the Mirza and to deal with him in collaboration with Sulaimān and Hindāl. He advanced against the fort of Ghur which he captured after defeating Sher 'Alī who put up a gallant resistance. Unable to hold the ground, Sher 'Alī fled and took the garrison along with him. It was during his stay at Kābul that the Emperor put the Prince to school on November 20, 1547, his earliest tutor being Mullā Zādah Mullā 'Asāmuddīn Ibrāhīm, son of Hisāmuddīn, who is described by Bāyazīd as 'a man of great learning unequalled in Samarqand.' The Prince was at this time five years, one month, and five days old.

¹ Jauhar, p. 87; The *I.O.MS.* does not contain the words 'one whole night'. (p. 97). Abul Fazl's account is different. He says (I, p. 514), the Emperor entered Kābul and 'made it, by his advent, a pleasant home of friendliness.' Gulbadan says the same thing.

CHAPTER XIII

THE BATTLE OF TALIQAN AND THE RECOVERY OF KABUL

KAMRAN pressed on towards Balkh, and found that the governor of that province, Pīr Muhammad Khan, was only too ready to interfere in the quarrels of the house of Tīmūr. The Uzbegs had been much disturbed by Humāyūn's late operations in Badakhshān, and the visit he had paid to the provinces off the Amū. They feared that this, in conjunction with his new alliance with Sulaimān, implied that extensive military activities against their kingdom were contemplated. Accordingly, Pīr Muhammad treated Kāmran with great courtesy and readily supplied him with a force so powerful that he was able in his turn to take offensive action. Not only did he recover Ghur, expelling the imperial garrison which had reoccupied it, but, in addition, he was able to drive Humāyūn's officers from the field. On the news of the alliance with the Uzbegs, the Emperor had despatched Hindāl and Qarāchah Khan to operate along with Mirza Sulaimān and the forces of Badakhshān. But Kāmran's force of Uzbegs was so overwhelming that the imperialists under Hindāl were driven to take refuge in Qunduz. Qarāchah Khan was able to escape back to Kābul in quest of reinforcements, while Sulaimān Mirza, less fortunate, hastily retreated to guard the mountain passes of his country. Determined to attack the principality of Badakhshān, Kāmran advanced to Kishem and Taliqān and despatched a body of Chaghatāi and Uzbek troops under Rafīq Kokah and Khāliq Bardī to Rūstāq, a town on the Kokachā river, north-east of Taliqān, in the territory of Badakhshān. Sulaimān and Ibrāhīm collected a force at Kūlāb and marching into Rūstāq they encountered the enemy near Qilah Zafar Khamalinkān, but were badly defeated and compelled to take refuge in the mountains.¹

The news of Kāmran's renewed strength exercised a considerable effect on the politics of Kābul. Nearly three thousand of his old adherents fled from the Emperor to join him and many waverers, remembering Kāmran's brutal vengeance, began to look askance at the Emperor, and to speculate upon the probabilities of his losing the game after all. As soon as Humāyūn heard of this danger, he moved all his available troops forward into the threatened zone. When he reached Ghorband, he met Qarāchah Khan who, however, was obliged to go to Kābul for fresh equipment as he had been robbed of

¹ Abul Fazl, who does not like the defeat of the imperialists, is naturally very brief. *A.N.* I, p. 521.

his baggage by the Aimāks. The Emperor was divided in purpose between the desirability of striking quickly, and the danger of facing the Uzbeks without having collected every available man. Finally, he decided to wait for Qarāchah Khan at Gulbahār with the unfortunate result that it grew so late in the year 1547, before Qarāchah Khan joined him, that the season for crossing the mountains had gone by; men and cattle perished in the deep snow and there was nothing to be done but postpone his operations until the beginning of the next year.

At last spring came, the passes were declared practicable, and Humāyūn prepared to cross the mountains and meet his foes. But suddenly, to his great dismay, he found that there was sedition in his camp and his leading officers were thinking of going over to the enemy. Kāmran had brought the Badakhshān territory under his control and his increased power made the officers think poorly of Humāyūn's fortunes. He was held up in snow and there was no immediate prospect of opening a vigorous campaign. Then they recalled the vengeance which Kāmran had exacted on a former occasion at Kābul and feared a similar catastrophe again. Besides, they overestimated their importance and regarded their help as indispensable to any aspirant to the Mughal throne. Around them was an atmosphere of intrigue, suspicion and treachery which favoured all kinds of treasonable acts and attempts at seduction. Although they fought for the Emperor and braved great risks in his cause, yet no one could be sure of their permanent loyalty and devotion. Often they transferred their allegiance without any qualms of conscience, and Abul Fazl rightly observes that they were wanting in loyalty and their overweening conceit led them to magnify petty matters into serious grievances. The trouble arose from the overwhelming pride of Qarāchah Khan who had been promoted for his services to the post of *Wazir*. His power was great, he had his master's ear, and the fortunes of all were at his mercy. Qarāchah Khan's conduct was reprehensible to a degree. The Emperor had addressed him as his father and shown him every mark of consideration, yet he deemed it fit to indulge in improper language against his master and harboured evil designs.¹ Fancying himself indispensable, he assumed airs that gave great offence and gathered round him a number of Begs who were pledged to his support. Among the members of this clique were many chiefs who had lately rendered conspicuous services, such as

¹ Bāyazīd condemns Qarāchah's conduct and comments on his folly. He says he was a tall man with a long beard, and such men have no sense. He was impatient.

Bābūs, Qurbā, Qarāwal, Musāhib, Haider Dost, 'Alī Qulī, Shaikhān Khwājah Khizri, Ismāil Beg Dūldāi and others.¹ Between them, the members could command some three thousand veteran soldiers. As long as the Emperor was content to leave matters in their hands all went well; but when he began to show signs of desiring to take a line for himself trouble arose. The immediate cause of the final rupture was trivial. Qarāchah Khan had drawn an informal draft for 10 *tūmāns*² upon the treasury, and the officer in charge, Khwājah Ghāzī, the *Dewān*, refused to cash it as it was not in order. The *Wazīr* was furious that anyone should dare think of regulations when his orders had been passed and chose to take up the matter personally. He demanded the instant dismissal of Khwājah Ghāzī and the appointment of Khwājah Qāsim Tūla in his place, being determined to give friends and foes an object lesson of his practical power in the state. Humāyūn refused to take action and this caused estrangement between him and the minister. Qarāchah Khan was annoyed that the Emperor treated the affair so lightly, and determined to desert to Kāmran. The Emperor was apprised of Qarāchah's intentions and he ordered Prince Akbar to go to the offended minister in order to conciliate him, but one of the eunuchs, Amber, who was present, urged that it would be undignified on the part of the Prince to wait upon a servant of the state, and gave the ominous hint that he might be detained as a hostage. Another emissary was deputed to reassure Qarāchah of the Emperor's goodwill and to bring him back, but this time the demand was preposterous. He wanted Khwājah Ghāzī to be handed over to him so that he might satisfy his grudge. The Emperor who recognised Qarāchah's services, sent another messenger, pointing

¹ The leading officers mentioned by Abul Fazl and Bāyazīd are the same. The latter mentions one Jaghal Kanchī among the malcontents.

² Stewart calculates this sum as equal to £10 and Erskine to £80 or £100. Both estimates seem to be wrong. The *Ain* says eighteen *dīnārs* make a *tūmān* and each *tūmān* is equal to 800 *dāms*. The *tūmān* of Khorasān is equal in value to 30 rupees, and the *tūmān* of Irāq to 40 rupees. In Akbar's day conversion of the rupee was 8 or 9 to the pound sterling. *Tūmān* was a coin used by the Mongols, Persians and Tūrks. The coin is mentioned in Bābur's *Memoirs*. The cost of feeding the province of Hissār, according to Bābur, was estimated at 1,000 *tūmāns* of copper coins (*fulūs*). According to the *Waqf-nāmah*, 6 copper coins were equal to one *dīnār*. In Persia the *tūmān* in the 17th century meant a much smaller sum than in the earlier period. About 1660 Raphael du Mans gives the value of the *tūmāns* as 40 French francs. Sir Thomas Herbert (1630) and Fryer (1677) give the value as £3. 6s. 8d in English money. The *tūmān* as a gold coin was first struck by Fath 'Alī Shah in 1797. The precise value of the *tūmāns* referred to by Jauhar cannot be ascertained, but it appears from the context that it was not considerable. Jarrett, II, pp. 393-94. *Encyclopaedia of Islām* IV, p. 836.

out that the matter was a departmental one and the minister as the official superior of the treasurer (*Dewān*) could reprimand or dismiss him at will.¹ But Qarāchah was not satisfied and immediately deserted carrying away with him all his adherents, to the number of about 3,000. Humāyūn promptly ordered a pursuit, but the fugitives saved themselves by breaking down the bridge of Ghorband after they had crossed the river. The defection of these troops so weakened the army that there was nothing for it but to retire to Kābul to collect more men. Preparations were pushed on with the greatest vigour, and letters were sent all over the country summoning Humāyūn's vassals and adherents from far and near. Soon the force gathered at Kābul began to assume formidable dimensions, and by the beginning of June 1548 all was in readiness for the campaign. On Monday, June 12, the Emperor left Kābul. While he halted at the Qarābāgh, he received three welcome visitors. One was Hājī Muhammad Khan whose exploits had been distinguished, but whose loyalty was of late suspect; the other was Qāsim Hussain Sultān Uzbek who had come from Bangash; the third was Ibrāhīm Mirza, son of Sulaimān Mirza, who had come to assure the Emperor of his father's loyal adherence to the alliance between them and to arrange schemes of co-operation. In order to reach the Emperor quickly Ibrāhīm had to march through a hostile country. When he arrived at Panjshīr, he was encountered by Tamār Shigālī who guarded the passes for Kāmran. With the help of Malik 'Alī of Panjshīr, who had joined Ibrāhīm with his clan, the Mirza defeated Tamār who was killed in an engagement. The hill chieftain, though well-disposed towards Humāyūn, refused to accompany Ibrāhīm to the court, either because, as Abul Fazl says, he had anxieties about his lands, or because his pride did not allow him to go with another man who was a mere prince. Still when the Emperor was informed of his services, he expressed his gratefulness to him and assured him of his favour when he visited Badakhshān. Ibrāhīm too was praised for his gallantry and sent back to ask his father to keep ready at the head of his forces in the neighbourhood of his country, and to form a junction with the imperialists at Taliqān.

From Qarābāgh Humāyūn moved to Gulbahar,² from where he sent Hamīdah and Akbar to Kābul which was entrusted to Muhammad Qāsim Maujī who was to look after the government of the country. Then he marched through the beautiful valley of Panjshīr

¹ Bāyazīd writes that the disaffected officers, whose names have been mentioned before, decided to attack the Emperor, but Bābūs dissuaded them from doing so. *I.O.MS.*

² *Memoirs I*, pp. 154, 219.

which abounded in all kinds of fruits and luxuries, and the inhabitants of which were connected with the infidel tribe called the *Siyahposh* (black-attired). He stopped at Barārak,¹ a village in the valley and from there sent Hājī Muhammad, Qāsim Husain Sultān, Tārdī Beg, Muhammad Qulī Barlās and other officers as an advance guard to find out the position of the enemy. As soon as these men crossed the Hindūkūsh, Mehdi Sultān,² Tārdī Muhammad Jang and others who were in charge of the fort of Anderāb left it and fled in fear. The imperialists rushed to Khost to capture the families of the runaway officers but were forestalled by Qarāchah Khan who had deputed Musāhib Beg to remove them to Taliqān. Kāmrān, who was in Qilah Zafar was asked to block the Kābul road so as to make the passage of the imperial army difficult and Mullā Khirad Zargar strained every nerve to persuade Kāmrān to do so but in vain. As the Emperor came within striking distance of Anderāb, Kāmrān's men fell back and Humāyūn entered the province without opposition. It was here that Hindāl came from Qunduz to meet his brother and he was so lucky as to bring with him a distinguished prisoner, Sher 'Alī, one of Kāmrān's generals, who had been captured while leading an attack upon Qunduz.³ As he had always been an honest adversary who had never played the traitor, and as he was in addition a gallant soldier and a capable administrator, the Emperor received him with favour, granted him a robe of honour and made him governor of Ghur. Defection seems to have been a common practice among the Mughal warriors, and its frequent recurrence is accounted for by its easy condonation. The officers quickly changed sides, and it is surprising to find them easily forgiven and entrusted with important commands.

The Emperor reached the Qāzī's Alang towards the middle of 1548 in the territory of Anderāb and was joined by the Qāzī and the members of the Tūbāqī and Sālqānchī tribes, the Balūchīs and the Aimāqa of Badakhshān. He was joined also by some followers of Musāhib Beg who were received with favour. Kāmrān, meanwhile, had not been idle. His forces were in a highly efficient condition; the army had been considerably strengthened by deserters from the imperial camp and he had good hopes of resisting his brother's

¹ Jarrett, II, pp. 399-400.

² Probably a brother of Gulbadan's husband Khizr Khwājah. An account of the places mentioned above is given in the description of the *sarkār* of Kābul in the *Ain-i-Akbarī*. Jarrett, II, pp. 398-411.

³ Abul Fazl says he was attacked in his house by Hindāl's men. He threw himself into a river, fractured his arm and was captured. (*A. N. I*, p. 528). Abul Fazl is hostile to him but appreciates his great qualities.

advance. The fort of Taliqān was garrisoned by Qarāchah Khan and other troops under 'Abdullah who had prepared themselves for a long siege, while Kāmrān had posted himself near Kishem and Qilah Zafar at the head of a considerable force. Kāmrān's retirement was an act of deliberate policy by which he intended to fill the invaders with confidence and create within them the impression that he was unable to meet them in the field. His plan would have certainly succeeded but for the steadiness and good discipline of Humāyūn's men. Mirza Hindāl was ordered by the Emperor to cross the Bangī river¹ which flows south of Taliqān and take up a position on the other side. Hindāl advanced somewhat cavalierly, it would seem, in the neighbourhood of Taliqān when he was suddenly attacked. The main army had not yet crossed the river, and it was away from the advance guard. The officers of Kāmrān hastily informed him of the danger and suggested that it was an excellent opportunity for making a surprise attack on Hindāl who could be easily overpowered. Hindāl had no idea at all that there were any hostile troops in the neighbourhood. But Kāmrān made a forced march of fifty miles to fall upon him, arrived near Taliqān, and encamped on elevated ground. The moment of attack was exceedingly well chosen, for Hindāl was on one side of the river while Humāyūn and the main body were on the other. As soon as Hindāl crossed the river, Kāmrān attacked him and the vanguard, without getting any help from the main army, was badly repulsed and thrown into confusion by the suddenness of the attack and its baggage was plundered.²

Humāyūn reached the river at the time when this attack was being made, but he was compelled to march a mile further up the river in order to find a safe crossing so that the greater part of his men were not engaged at all. Had Kāmrān pressed his advantage, he might well have inflicted a severe defeat on the Emperor; but Hindāl stood his ground stoutly, and the enemy was afraid of being taken on the flank by Humāyūn's men who were hastening up. Kāmrān immediately left the position which he was occupying, and hurriedly retired to the fort of Taliqān, where he was besieged by the imperialists. His baggage was plundered and the surrounding country was laid waste by Humāyūn's men who were pressing on with great vigour. Several prisoners who were captured by them were put to death, and

¹ Nizāmuddīn calls it the Taliqān river. It is shown in the maps south of Taliqān. Stewart's Helcan is Taliqān as the context clearly shows.

² This battle was a clear defeat for the imperialists. Jauhar gives an instance of Kāmrān's cruelty. He clove with his own hands the skull of one of his followers from the top of his head to his temples. *I.O.MS.*, p. 99.

the fortress was closely invested.¹ To avoid bloodshed and misery the compassionate Humāyūn wrote to Kāmran to put an end to hostilities, but the latter turned a deaf ear to all overtures of peace.²

Failing in his efforts to persuade Kāmran to make peace, Humāyūn ordered the siege of the fort of Taliqān to be pushed on with great vigour. He was strengthened at this time by the arrival of certain chiefs who brought forces with them. Mirzas Sulaimān and Ibrāhīm arrived with reinforcements, and Chakar Khan, son of Sultān Wais Qipchāq, came from Kūlāb with a contingent under his command. Reduced to sore straits and despairing of getting any help from the Uzbegs, Kāmran whose perfidy suggested to him new subterfuges and stratagems offered submission through Mīr Arab Makkī, a man who was well known for his integrity and for whom Humāyūn had a great regard.³ The Mīr, probably not acquainted with Kāmran's nature, dwelt upon the latter's acts of treachery and intrigue, and accepted the Mirza's feigned admission of his guilt and contrition therefor.⁴ But soon afterwards he suspected foul play and asked

¹ Jauhar, *I.O.MS.*, p. 100. Jauhar says that, after several were killed, he took pity on the rest and let them go. Abul Fazl flatteringly says that the prisoners were treated with justice and kindness. *A.N. I*, p. 350.

Abul Fazl's account is different. He says that the king proceeded to the height where Kāmran was. The vanguard, under the command of Fathulla, son of Roshan Kokah, marched forward, and a fierce engagement took place in which the imperial commander was unhorsed. Just then Kāmran lost heart and felt unable to offer any resistance. No one was injured except 'Alī Qulī Khan Ishāq. Tārdī Beg, the son of Beg Mirak, Bābī Jūjak, and several others were captured. (*A.N. I*, pp. 529-30). When Hājī Muhammad Khan was routed and the royal camp was plundered, Humāyūn enquired if the library was safe. He was informed that it was, and he felt much relieved. He is reported to have said: 'Blessed be God that the treasure which cannot be replaced is safe! As for other things, they are easy to obtain.' *I.O. MS.*, p. 100.

² It was Humāyūn who first wrote a letter to Kāmran and sent it by Nasīb, an astrologer. He wrote: 'O brother of wicked habits! O dear warrior! Desist from this act which is the cause of war and the slaughter of human beings and, as far as possible, show mercy to the men of the city and the army. The blood of men who are slain to-day shall be on your head on the day of judgment and their hands shall be on your skirt.' On reading the letter Kāmran kept quiet for some time and then read the following verse:

*'Arūs-i-mulk kase dar kīnār gīrad tang;
Ki bosah bar lab-i-shamsir-i-ābdār zanad.*

[He can press tightly in his embrace the bride of the kingdom who can kiss the lips of the sharp-edged sword.] *I.O. MS.*, p. 100. *A.N. I*, p. 531.

³ Kāmran shot arrows into the Mughal camp to which he attached letters addressed to the Emperor. In these letters he confessed his guilt and promised to be of good behaviour. In this way he tried to appease the Emperor and suggested Mīr Makkī as his plenipotentiary.

⁴ The Mīr was at first misled by Kāmran's feigned offers of submission.

Kāmrān to send away to court his fugitive rebellious officers with halters round their necks, to issue the *Khutbah* in Humāyūn's name, and to depart himself to Mecca in secrecy.¹ Kāmrān agreed to these terms and begged to be allowed to take only Bābūs with him, probably, as Bāyazīd says, to atone for the cruel and disgraceful manner in which he had behaved towards his wife and children. Humāyūn readily consented and on Friday, the 12th Rajab A.H. 955 (August 17, 1548) his Sadr 'Abdul Bāqī entered the town and recited the *Khutbah* in his name.² The siege was raised and Kāmrān, strongly escorted by Hājī Muhammad with a body of troops, was conducted to the borders of the imperial territory. Precautions were taken to guard the gates of the fort and this task was entrusted to 'Alī Dost Bārbegi, 'Abdul Wahāb, Saiyyad Muhammad Paknah and others. When incivility was shown to one of Kāmrān's servants by a retainer of Ibrāhīm, Humayun chided him and the rebuke seems to have been so strong that Ibrāhīm left the imperial camp without permission.

In his triumph the Emperor could afford to be generous. The rebellious Amīrs made their submission and were pardoned, although they were not restored to their old authority. When night had advanced Qarāchah Khan was presented and granted forgiveness.³

Later, when he reached near the gate of the fort, he became aware of his real intentions. *A. N. I.*, p. 533.

¹ The *I.O. MS.* of the *Tārīkh-i-'Alfī* (f. 424b) says that Humāyūn had agreed to Kāmrān's offers of peace on condition that the rebellious Amīrs should be surrendered. It appears from the *Akbarnāmah* also that this must have been one of the conditions of the peace.

² Abul Fazl's date is Friday, the 12th Rajab A. H. 955. Beveridge renders it August 12 and Erskine August 17, 1548. August 12 is a mistake.

³ When Humāyūn saw Qarāchah Khān, he said: 'He is a grey-bearded man, and I called him father; take off the sword from his neck!' On seeing his son Sardār Beg, he said: 'It was their elders' fault. What fault have the children committed?' Last of all came Qurbān Qarāwāl, a personal attendant of the Emperor, who had gone over to the other side. He said in Tūrki: 'What ailed you and what made you go away?' He replied there was no use enquiring about the complexion of those who had been made black by the hand of God's power. According to Bāyazīd, an order was given that his *jāgīr*, if resumed, should be restored. Hasan Qulī Muḥardār, who seems to have been a witty fellow, on this occasion quoted the following verse:

*Chirāgh-rā ki aizad bar faro zad;
Har ān ki puf kunad reshah baso zad.
[When a lamp has been lighted by God
Who puffs at it burns his own beard.]*

The officers present saw in the quotation a grim jest about Qarāchah Khan who had a long beard. *A.N. I.*, pp. 534-5; Text, p. 280. Bāyazīd, *I.O. MS.*

A general amnesty to all who had taken part in the late troubles was proclaimed. This clemency, unluckily, had one very undesirable consequence. While Humāyūn was still encamped on the bank of the Bangī river, he heard that Kāmrān was coming to pay homage in person.¹ Hearing of the generous treatment meted out to his followers, he gave up his intention to go to Mecca and, at the instance of Mirza 'Abdullah, started to meet his brother and sent Bābūs in advance to report his advent.² The Emperor could hardly have been condemned, even by modern standards, if he had inflicted upon Kāmrān almost any conceivable punishment, for if there was one man more than another who was responsible for the troubles through which Humāyūn had passed, Kāmrān was that man. And yet Humāyūn, as was his wont, with extraordinary generosity, convinced himself that his brother's submission, this time at all events, was sincerely felt. He despatched Hindāl and 'Askarī, whose chains were removed at this time, along with other distinguished Amīrs, to accord a befitting reception to Kāmrān. Never was kindness more misplaced.

¹ This was about August 22. It was five days after Humāyūn had congratulated himself that he had seen the last of him that Kāmrān suddenly appeared and threw himself upon his brother's mercy.

The *Tabqāt* says Kāmrān came out of the fort and went two *farsakhs*, (*Bibliotheca Indica*, p. 72). Sir Henry Elliot's translation has 'went to the distance of a *parsang*' (V, p. 229). Erskine writes 10 *farsakhs*. Probably his copy contained 10 *farsakhs* or it may have been a mistake of the scribe. He may have written *dah* for *do*. *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p. 358.

² Jauhar's account is different and it seems he is confused. The order of events in his narrative is as follows: (a) For nearly two months the fortress was besieged and Kāmrān offered to submit to the Emperor. (b) In consequence of this Mullā 'Abdul Bākī, the *Sadr*, was sent into the fort and the *Khutbah* was read in His Majesty's name. (c) At night Qarāchah Khan and others presented themselves and begged for mercy and forgiveness. (d) After the arrival of these officers, Kāmrān made his escape from the fort and halted on the bank of the river Bangī. Here he was attacked by Mirza Ibrāhīm Husain, son of Sulaimān, and was taken prisoner. On receiving news of this His Majesty sent an agent to Husain to demand the prisoner and sent *khilats* to him. He accepted the dress and agreed to wait upon the King. (Jauhar, p. 91. *I.O. MS.*, pp. 100-101.) This is not to be found in Abul Fazl, nor in Bāyazīd who says that Kāmrān surrendered and applied for permission to go to Mecca. Humāyūn was kindly disposed and recalled him after he had gone a little way on his journey and had an interview with him at Taliqān. Bāyazīd was present on this occasion and is an eye-witness of these events. *J.A.S.B.*, 1898, p. 301. Beveridge's article on Bāyazīd's *Memoirs*.

The *Tabqāt* also says Kāmrān went out of the fort and, when he saw no danger from Humāyūn, he felt ashamed and turned back to offer allegiance to him. As soon as His Majesty came to know of this, he rejoiced and sent out 'Askarī and Hindāl to receive him. It appears, Kāmrān offered to wait upon the Emperor himself and Jauhar has made some confusion. *Bibliotheca Indica*, p. 72.

Soon after the termination of the siege Humāyūn held a *darbar* where Kāmrān presented himself. Taking a handkerchief from one of the attendants, he tied it round his neck to signify his guilt, and appeared before the Emperor.¹ On seeing him the latter observed that there was no need to do such a thing. After the customary salutations Kāmrān was commanded to sit down on his right and Sulaimān and other princes occupied positions on the right and left according to their rank.² Kāmrān tried to explain his past conduct when the Emperor said: 'Let bygones be bygones. The formal meeting is over. Let us now meet as brothers.' They embraced each other and shed profuse tears which moved the hearts of those present. A cup of *sherbet* was brought, half of which was drunk by the Emperor and the rest was passed to Kāmrān as a mark of brotherly affection. A grand festival was held in which the four brothers took part, and the hearts of the officers were delighted at the prospect of the termination of hostilities.³ Sumptuous dishes and delicious fruits were provided and a band of musicians played delightful airs. The festivities lasted for two days after which the princes discussed the feasibility of a campaign against Balkh but no definite conclusion

¹ Gulbadan gives an account of the meeting. She says it was held at Kishem, while, according to Abul Fazl, it was held near Ishkāmish.

² Even in these circumstances the royal etiquette seems to have been fully observed by Humāyūn and his brothers. Bāyazīd says that the Emperor asked Kāmrān to sit on the left. He gave the order in which the chiefs and nobles were seated. According to Jauhar, Kāmrān was seated on the left and the right was pointed out to Sulaimān. Erskine wrongly thinks the left to be the place of honour. Gulbadan mentions two instances which go to show how formal the princes were: (a) The Emperor ordered an ewer and a basin to be brought and he and Kāmrān washed their hands. As Sulaimān was older than 'Askarī and Hindāl, the two brothers placed the ewer and basin first before him. (b) After washing his hands Sulaimān did something improper with his nose. 'Askarī and Hindāl were much displeased and said, 'What rusticity is this? First of all, what right have we to wash our hands in His Majesty's presence? But when he bestows the favour and gives the order, we cannot change it. What sense is there in these nose-wagging performances?' Then the two Mirzas went and washed their hands outside and came back and sat down. Mirza Sulaimān was very much ashamed. They all ate at one table. Jauhar, *I.O.MS.*, p. 102. *A.N.* I, pp. 536-7. Gulbadan, p. 187; Text, p. 84.

³ Gulbadan says the officers and their followers met their relatives again. They had thirsted for one another's blood before (p. 188). At this meeting of the brothers the Emperor is reported to have said: 'If it be the will of the most high God, may our assembly be kept in His own place? He knows without shadow that it lies not in my heart's depths to seek any Musalmān's ill; how, then, should I seek the heart of my brothers? May God grant to you all the same divine and beneficent guidance so that our agreement and concord may endure.' Gulbadan, pp. 187-88; Text, p. 84.

was reached.¹ The Emperor with his *entourage* proceeded to Nārīn, a village, where the road branches in two directions, one leading to Balkh and the other to Kābul. From there they went to the spring of Bandgashā or Bandkushā in the vicinity of Iskāmish² and spent their time in merriment and pleasure. Here, according to Bāyazīd, the Emperor ordered to be inscribed on a rock the date of his coming there and the fact of Kāmran's submission, after the fashion of his father on reconciliation being brought about between him, Khan Mirza and Jahāngīr Mirza.

The union of brothers having been accomplished, the magnanimous Emperor proceeded to divide the territory of Badakhshān among the princes. Kāmran still desired to go to Mecca—he was thoroughly insincere in what he said—but Humāyūn in his generosity granted him the district of Khutlān or Kūlāb which was held by Chakar Khan, a general of Kāmran; and 'Askarī, who was asked to go with him, was given the fief of Qurātīgīn. Kāmran was not satisfied with this gift, though, according to Bāyazīd, the district abounded in horses, goats and men, and when the seal-bearer, whose tongue was rather sharp, went to him with the imperial *firmān*, the Mirza

¹ Bāyazīd gives the details of the discussion. Sulaimān was of the opinion that the expedition was practicable and he was supported by Hindāl on the ground that the brothers had been united. Husain Qulī Sultān held a different view and pointed out the difficulties of the campaign. He dwelt upon the courage and fighting capacity of the Uzbegs and the inadequacy of the imperial forces. He suggested that they should go to Kābul, strengthen the army, and undertake the campaign next year. The Emperor agreed with him. Kāmran did not take any part in these discussions, obviously, for two reasons: he had been helped by the Uzbegs and had married an Uzbek lady. It appears that he was not consulted at all.

² Iskāmish and Isksham are two different places. The former is in Badakhshān E.S.E. of Qunduz and the latter is away to the east. Both are given in maps.

Jauhar and Bāyazīd both speak of this visit to the fountain but Jauhar calls it Ashak mashak. In the I.O. MS. it is Rashak mashak. The Emperor, according to Jauhar, stayed here for eight days. Bāyazīd writes: 'Next day His Majesty left that place, and at midnight reached the spring of Bandkushā which is very deep. He summoned skilled blacksmiths to prepare steel pens and said, "While returning from Samarqand, His Majesty Firdaus Makānī inscribed the date of his arrival and the names of those who accompanied him. It is fitting, if we do also in the same way inscribe the date and the names of the brothers and Amīrs with us." ' The Emperor inscribed the date and other details with his own auspicious hands. Abul Fazl has probably misread Bāyazīd and made the mistake of thinking that the two inscriptions were at one and the same place. There is no mention of Bābur's inscription in the *Memoirs*. Abul Fazl's source is clearly Bāyazīd. But Bāyazīd does not say that Bābur's inscription was included at Bandkushā. A. N. I, p. 538, n. 1. Erskine, *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p. 359. J.A.S.B., 1898, pp. 302-3.

burst out: 'I have been master of Kābul and Badakhshān; Kūlāb¹ is only a *parganā* of Badakhshān. How can I accept service with this *jāgīr*.' Husain Qulī promptly retorted by adding that it was wonderful that, in spite of his crimes, he was given a *jāgīr* which he was reluctant to accept. Kāmrān understood the meaning of this remark and next day waited upon Humāyūn who presented him with a charger and robe of honour to signify his pleasure. It is surprising that Humāyūn should have been so completely deceived by the feigned humility and submission of his treacherous brother. Qunduz, Ghorī, Kahmard, Baqlān, Iskāmish and Nārī (Nārīn) were given to Hindāl, and Sher 'Alī was sent along with him as minister. Sulaimān and Ibrāhīm were entrusted with the Qilah Zafar, Taliqān and a number of other *parganās*. Everyone departed to assume his respective charge and the Emperor proceeded to Kābul. Again the brothers exchanged greetings and drank *sherbet* out of the same cup to ratify the unity and concord that had been established by solemn agreements. During his march Humāyūn ordered the fort of Parian² to be repaired and renamed it Islāmābād. An attempt was made to work the silver mines in the locality but the enterprise was found unprofitable. The Emperor resumed his journey and, passing along the Panjshīr river (Panchhār in Bāyazīd), he alighted near the Ushtar-karām pass.³ When he reached Kābul, winter had already commenced and the ground was covered with snow. He entered Kābul on October 5, 1548 and was delighted to see his son, Akbar.⁴

¹ Kūlāb and Qarātīgīn are mountain tracts north of the Oxus, and that is why they were given to Kāmrān. Kūlāb lies beyond the Amū between Darwaz and Shughnān. It is the old Khutlān. It appears from Bāyazīd's account that this was merely a nominal assignment, for he says that the *jāgīr*, which was given to Kāmrān, was held by Chakar Khan, son of Sultān Wais Qipchāg, who owed allegiance neither to Humāyūn nor to Sulaimān. The alacrity with which the seal-bearer offered to create a *jāgīr* for Kāmrān is also significant.

² The fort of Parian was built by Tīmūr after punishing the infidels of Katūr. Humāyūn found it in ruins, and so active were his exertions that the reconstructions were finished in ten days. It is eight miles north of Chārikār.

³ Bāyazīd relates an interesting story about the Emperor when he lost his way near the Ushtar-karām pass. He met a pedestrian whom he asked his name. 'A servant of God,' he replied. 'We are all servants of God,' replied Humāyūn, 'tell us your real name'. 'My name is Khāk (earth)' replied the man. Humāyūn on this said, 'What is your proper name? What sense is there in the word *Khāk*?' He then replied, 'Call me what you like.' Humāyūn, who became very angry, said, 'Shall I call you a kite or a muck-rake (*Gūr-i-dalāl*)?' Bāyazīd says, 'During the five or six years I was with the Emperor I had never seen him so angry before.'

⁴ This is Abul Fazl's date (*A. N. I*, p. 541). Friday, the 2nd Ramzan, A.H. 955

In token of his latest triumph, embassies came in from neighbouring princes, congratulating him upon the defeat of his adversaries. One of these was from Haider Mirza, now safely established in Kashmir, where he had ruled for seven or eight years.¹ He was extremely anxious that Humāyūn should come and take over his mountain kingdom, pointing out that it was secure from the attacks of enemies, and afforded an excellent base for future operations against Hindustān. The Emperor was greatly attracted by the idea, but did not dare venture so far away from Kābul for fear of giving Kāmran the opportunity of working further mischief. His position was still far from being secure, for the Amīrs were extremely unreliable, and would think nothing of betraying him if they considered that their interests would be served thereby. Accordingly, a favourable answer was sent to Mirza Haider to the effect that as soon as the Emperor could spare time, he would come and visit him. Unfortunately, before he did so, Mirza Haider, that gallant warrior and very capable historian, was killed (1551) in a struggle with some rebellious nobles.

Another embassy came from ‘Abdur Rashīd Khan of Kāshgar with valuable presents and was received with marked honour by the Emperor. Khwājah Jalāluddīn Mahmūd was sent to Persia as an envoy with a view to cementing the relationship with the Shah. Besides, the Emperor did two other things to strengthen his position further—one of these was the dismissal from service of certain officers whom he suspected of treacherous leanings and the other was the marriage of his half-sister Gulchirā Begam to ‘Abbās Sultān, an Uzbek prince, who had offered homage.² The tendency towards disloyalty was rife in the Mughal camp. The officers transferred their allegiance from one master to another without any qualms of conscience and Humāyūn was considerably perturbed by the fear of defections in his ranks. Neither loyalty to their salt nor favours

(September 5, 1548). Bāyazīd says in the month of Tir, A. H. 955 Humāyūn entered Kābul.

¹ Abul Fazl says Samandar came from Kashmir with valuable gifts and a letter from Haider Mirza praising the climate of the beautiful valley and asking him to attempt the conquest of Hindustān. This Samandar is probably the same person whom we come across in the Māldeo episode. He was a trusted servant of Humāyūn. His name is mentioned by Gulbadan as Mīr Shah Husain Samandar. Mīr Samandar was sent to ascertain Māldeo's true intentions and came back with the news that the Rājā was insincere. *H. N.*, p. 152. *A.N. I*, p. 372. Beveridge's note I, p. 541.

² Abul Fazl says the prince absconded when the time came to join the Balkh expedition. *A. N. I*, p. 544.

could secure the permanent attachment of generals who habitually sought in treachery the satisfaction of their personal ends. Qarāchah Khan and Musāhib Beg who were acting as traitors were ordered off to Mecca, but they stayed in the Hazāra country and were afterwards restored to royal favour. Not long afterwards came the news of the death of two dangerous men from whom Humāyūn had greatly suffered in the past. These were Muhammad Ulugh Beg Mirza and his brother Muhammad Shah Mirza. The former was killed in an encounter with the Hazāras whom he had attacked at the instigation of Khwājah Muazzam, and the latter was put to death by Shah Muhammad, brother of Hājī Muhammad, in order to avenge the death of the latter's paternal uncle. With his mind at ease owing to a succession of favourable events Humāyūn decided on the Balkh expedition. He did not realise that, with Kāmrān sullen and hostile, it was a hazardous enterprise. Without a doubt the risk had been considerably increased by Kāmrān's refusal to wait upon the Emperor at Kābul and receive a fresh *jāgīr*.

CHAPTER XIV

THE BALKH CAMPAIGN AND THE BATTLE OF QIPCHAQ

THE OBJECT of Humāyūn in leading an expedition to Balkh was to chastise the Uzbek Prince Pīr Muhammad for the help he had given to Kāmrān. But this was not all. The province was fertile and extended over a large area and its possession would greatly fortify Humāyūn against future trouble. According to Jauhar it was the king's desire to make Balkh over to Kāmrān who was not satisfied with the grant of Kūlāb. It may have been Humāyūn's ultimate objective, but at the moment he was influenced by the idea of conquest. He thought, and not without reason, that a victory over the Uzbeks would make a great impression upon his enemies and would effectively silence their opposition. It is curious to see how the Emperor reposed faith in Kāmrān's protestations of loyalty and sent Bāltū Beg to ask the Mirza to join with his forces in accordance with the terms of the treaty that was made through Mīr Makkī.

Humāyūn left Kābul in the spring¹ and issued orders to his brother and Sulaimān and his son to join him with their auxiliaries. He had to wait for Hājī Muhammad for a month at Yuret Chālāk near Kābul and was joined by Ibrāhīm Mirza from Badakhshān. The army proceeded to Istālīf and then through the Panjshīr valley *via* Anderāb and Taliqān to Nārī and encamped in the Nīlbar valley. Mirza Hindāl and Sulaimān joined, but Kāmrān did not arrive.²

¹ Gulbadan says that the Emperor stayed for a year in Kābul and then resolved to go to Balkh. According to Bāyazīd the Emperor spent the whole winter at Kābul preparing for the expedition. Abul Fazl writes that Humāyūn started in the beginning of A.H. 956, which began on January 30, 1549. (*H.N.*, p. 188. *A.N.* I, p. 543.) According to Nizāmuddīn Humāyūn left Kābul at the end of the year with the intention of proceeding against Balkh. *Tabqāt, Bibliotheca Indica*, p. 73.

² Gulbadan says 'Askarī joined. (*H.N.*, p. 191.) Kāmrān's character is revealed in the indecent overtures he made, while at Kūlāb, to Sulaimān's wife. Gulbadan relates the interesting story of how Kāmrān tried to seduce this lady. He sent a crafty and cunning woman called Tarkhān Begā to Haram Begam, wife of Sulaimān, with a letter and kerchief, asking her to come into his *harem*. This spirited lady was much annoyed at these infamous overtures and when Sulaimān came home, she showed Kāmrān's letter to him and her son and charged them both with cowardice. The Begā was hacked to pieces and Haram Begam added: 'Let this be a warning to others that no man may cast the evil eye of sinful thought upon another man's womenfolk. What does such a man (Kāmrān) deserve who, the son of a mother, yet does such monstrous things, and who fears neither me nor my son.' *H. N.*, p. 193; *Text*, p. 89.

He had concealed his true intentions and tried to deceive Humāyūn by repeated assurances of loyalty and good faith. This boded future trouble : the Mirza was sent back to look after the safety of Badakhshān while the royal army, passing through Baglān¹ pushed on to Aibak, a dependency of Balkh, famous for its salubrious climate, fruits and cultivation. Pīr Muhammad had sent a force under his tutor Khwājah Beg along with other experienced soldiers to occupy the fort.² Humāyūn laid siege to the fortress and the garrison had to capitulate for want of provisions and further help from Pīr Muhammad. Had Humāyūn pressed on at once, there seems little doubt that Balkh would have fallen, but he was unwilling to give the enemy an opportunity of engaging until he had reorganized his forces. Unmindful of the fact that dilatory tactics would neutralise the advantage gained by a sudden dash, he held a council of war at which Khwājah Beg was also present to discuss the ways and means of capturing Balkh. The Khwājah suggested two plans—one of which was that Humāyūn should kill all the Uzbegs in his camp and then hasten to Balkh which could be easily captured and the other was to arrange a treaty with Pīr Muhammad by which the country on this side of Khulm should be ceded to the Emperor, his name read in the *Khutbah* and coins struck in his name in the territories under him, and when the time came, a thousand chosen warriors should accompany the Emperor to assist him in the conquest of Hindustān.³ Humāyūn demurred to both proposals and decided to push on. Several Uzbek officers were sent to Kābul; the only person detained in camp was the Atālīq of Pīr Muhammad.⁴

The delay made by Humāyūn enabled the Uzbegs to organise themselves betimes and to call for reinforcements from other places. Passing by Khulm the Emperor reached Bābā Shāmū⁵ and from there went to visit the shrine of Shah Auliya. While the troops were off their guard, the Uzbegs made a sudden attack under Shah Muhammad Sultān Hisārī, Burandag Sultān and others. Kābulī, an officer,

¹ It is west of Nārīn and south of Qunduz.

² Haibak in our modern maps. It is on the Kābul-Balkh route. *Memoirs* I, p. 186; Vol. II, p. 546, note 2.

³ According to Abul Fazl, the Uzbek force and the imperial army reached Aibak at the same time. Bāyazīd, who is an eye-witness gives a different account. According to him, the Uzbegs reached the fort earlier and entrenched themselves in it. Jauhar also says that it was garrisoned by the Uzbegs. *A.N.* I, p. 546.

⁴ Their names are given by Bāyazīd. They were sent with Khwājah Qāsim Makhlis to Kābul. *A.N.* I, 547.

⁵ Bābā Shāhīr in Abul Fazl.

was killed in this raid, and his head was carried to Balkh.¹ This preliminary skirmish being over, Humāyūn resumed his march and reached the neighbourhood of Balkh. Kāmrān had not yet joined. Speculation was rife in the army that he might seize Kābul in the meanwhile and ruin the families left behind. The Emperor too had serious misgivings about his intentions and movements.

Next day the Uzbegs, under their generals 'Abdullah Sultān,² Pīr Muhammad Khan and Sultān-i-Hisār, advanced to give battle to the imperialists. The imperial army was organised in the traditional manner of the east—the right was commanded by Sulaimān Mirza, the left by Hindāl, the centre by the Emperor himself; the vanguard by Qarāchah Khan Hājī Muhammad, Tārdī Beg, Mun'im Khan and Sultān Husain Beg Jalair with his brothers. At midday the armies engaged each other, and so powerful was the Mughal onset that the Uzbegs were driven back across Takhtpool to Balkh. For his bravery in battle Hājī Muhammad was given the title of Khān. The whole army reached the bank of the river and encamped for the night at a distance of half a *kros* from the town of Balkh.³ A war council was held to decide the course of future action. The general feeling was that the imperial army should not fight and a retreat was suggested. Jauhar writes that the news that Kāmrān had made a sudden march to surprise Kābul made the chiefs and soldiers anxious about the safety of their families and they desired to get back to their homes.⁴ Bāyazīd, who is an eye-witness of the scene, says that the army was influenced by two considerations—the fear of Kāmrān and the rumoured advent of 'Abdul 'Azīz, the son of Ubaid Khan, who had left Bokhāra to reinforce Pīr Muhammad.⁵

Gulbadan Begam writes that just at the time, when Pīr Muhammad was despairing of fighting against the Chaghatāis, the royal officers represented to the Emperor that the camp had become filthy and that it would be better on sanitary grounds to shift to a healthier place. Orders were given that this should be done. But no sooner were hands laid on the baggage than the cry, 'we are not strong enough' was raised.⁶ A panic seized the army which fled shamelessly. The

¹ Bāyazīd says that, in the battle, Kābulī brother of Qāsim Maujī, Saiyyad Muhammad Paknah, Muhammed Jān Turkomān, and others took part. Abul Fazl follows Bāyazīd. *A.N.* I, p. 547.

² Abul Fazl writes 'Abdul 'Azīz Khan son of Ubaid Khan. But this is a mistake (*A.N.* I, p. 548.) 'Abdul 'Azīz had not yet arrived.

³ There was a bridge on this river and the Mughals had also passed it towards the Balkh side.

⁴ Jauhar, *I.O.MS.*, p. 104

⁵ Bāyazīd, *I.O. MS.*

⁶ *H.N.*, p. 192.

royal authoress clearly affirms : 'Since such was the Divine will, the royal army took the road without cause from a foe, without reason or motive.'¹ Against this we have Bāyazīd's positive testimony that the fear of Kāmrān so unnerved the army that it decided to beat a hasty retreat. Abul Fazl, who copies Bāyazīd, writes that the soldiers put forward several excuses to avoid an engagement with the enemy.² From a perusal of the accounts given by various authorities it is clear that the retreat was not due merely to sanitary considerations. The fear of Kāmrān seems to have been the determining factor in the situation. It was decided to halt at the pass of Derā Ghaz from where they could march against Kāmrān if he became formidable and also swoop down upon the Uzbegs when a convenient opportunity presented itself. At midnight the council broke up and the Amīrs repaired to their camps. The retreat was ordered and the rear was entrusted to Hindāl, Sulaimān and Husain Qulī, the bearer of the royal seal. The Uzbegs followed close upon the heels of the royal army and plundered the camp. They gave a hot chase to Hindāl who had a hair-breadth escape. Some of the Uzbegs discharged their arrows at Humāyūn whose horse was hit in the breast. When the Emperor had crossed the river, he asked Bāyazīd to follow the officers and persuade them to return. But all remonstrances and entreaties proved unavailing and even such men as Khizr Khwājah Sultān, Musāhib Beg, Muhammad Qāsim Maujī and Shahīm Beg Jālair refused to retrace their steps. There was an unedifying scramble for horses, and friends behaved towards one another like foes. Humāyūn seems to have retained his presence of mind; he continued to drive the Uzbegs back and, as Nizāmuddīn Ahmad says, 'cut his way out of the confusion.' His native geniality did not desert him even in this hour of distress. To one of his runaway officers,³ who appeared before him 'downcast and depressed' he said : 'It is a field of battle. Here is nothing like disgrace.' Fighting his way all along the route, tormented by hunger and thirst the Emperor with quite a small following, the remnant of his large and imposing armament, at last reached Kābul on the first of Ramzān, (September 23).⁴ Hindāl and

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

² *A.N.* I, p. 548.

³ Bāyazīd says that the officer concerned was Husain Qulī Sultān.

⁴ Bāyazīd gives interesting and graphic details of the retreat. The soldiers refused to give water even to the Emperor and Bāyazīd had to help him. He badly needed sleep. On one occasion the Emperor was so hungry that Bāyazīd cooked some meat in a shield which was used for giving water to horses. Humāyūn ate this meat with great relish.

It was during his stay at Kābul that the famous painters Khwājah

Sulaimān had already left for their respective charges. Pīr Muḥammad Atālīq and other Uzbek prisoners captured at Aibak were allowed to return to Balkh and this act of magnanimity was greatly appreciated. The Uzbek chief reciprocated the sentiments of the Emperor by sending to Kābul all the Mughal prisoners.

The loss of prestige, which resulted from this extraordinary failure, had the worst possible effect upon his fortunes. Kāmrān, restless as ever, determined to take full advantage of his brother's reverse. He turned out Chakar Beg with whom he had quarrelled and, while Humāyūn was engaged in the Balkh expedition, he judged it a good opportunity to make a venture again. He contrived to gather a few of his old adherents, left Khutlān (Kūlāb) and marched into Badakhshān. Sulaimān left Taliqān and fled to Qilah Zafar. Kāmrān entered Taliqān and, having entrusted it to Bābūs, proceeded to Qilah Zafar to which he laid siege, but could make no impression upon its extraordinary strength. Evidently Sulaimān was not prepared to give battle; he left Qilah Zafar in charge of Ishāq and went off to the defiles of Badakhshān to watch the turn of events. Kāmrān then turned to Qunduz but was stoutly opposed by Hindāl. He tried to seduce the Prince from his loyalty to the Emperor and offered to make common cause with him, but Hindāl resolutely resisted his overtures and adhered to his plighted faith. Realising that alone he was almost powerless, he appealed again to the Uzbeks, from whom he had derived so much assistance on a previous occasion. Once again they responded to his overtures and sent a formidable force to his help. Hindāl was soon reduced to considerable straits, but artfully contrived to get rid of the Uzbeks by forging letters which read as though he and Kāmrān had come to an agreement to combine against the foreigners.¹ Despite the protests of Kāmrān, the Uzbeks became so suspicious that the siege had to be abandoned.

Just at this time the news came that Chakar 'Alī Beg had advanced upon Kūlāb and besieged 'Askarī, whom he had defeated, and forced to seek refuge in the fortress. Kāmrān raised the siege of Qunduz and hurriedly sent Yāsīn Dawlat and Bābūs with a force and himself proceeded in the same direction. On his approach Chakar abandoned

'Abdus-Sainad and Mīr Saiyyad 'Alī came with Khwājah Jalāluddīn Mahmūd who had been sent on an embassy to Persia, and waited upon the Emperor. *A.N.*, I, p. 552.

¹ Bāyazīd does not mention Hindāl's trick. But this seems to have been common in India. Sher Shah employed it against Māldeo and later Aurangzeb had recourse to it when his son Akbar had joined the Rājput̃s.

the siege and retired. But as Kāmrān was retreating from Qunduz, a touch of poetic justice befell him. His camp was plundered by the Uzbegs under Sa'id Beg, who mistook it for part of Hindāl's forces. The result was that he lost all his treasure and his army dispersed. Along with 'Askarī, 'Abdullah Mughal and a few adherents, he betook himself to the fort of Taliqān. Sulaimān and Hindāl marched against him. Despairing of achieving any results in Badakhshān, he determined to pass into the Hazāra country by the route of Zuhāq and Bāmiān. There he hoped to decide his future course of action; whether he should go to Kābul or Bhakkar was a matter to be determined by the turn of circumstances.

Before he could do this, however, he received an invitation from the party of Qarāchah Khan to come to Kābul.¹ These disloyal Amīrs had not recovered their former power and were desirous of turning Humāyūn off the throne. They were in secret communication with Kāmrān and kept him informed of every thing that went on at the imperial court. They offered him help and co-operation, if he would march in their direction. Kāmrān sent his ambassadors to Humāyūn to beg forgiveness, but in reality he wished to put him off his guard.² Nothing, of course, could have suited Kāmrān better. He had long been wishing for the opportunity of interfering once more in Kābul politics, and now that opportunity had presented itself. Accordingly, he advanced boldly. Humāyūn, hearing of his brother's movements, left Kābul in charge of Akbar and Qāsim Barlās and started for the Ghorband pass.³ The disaffected Amīrs still clandestinely plotted and intrigued to encompass the ruin of their master. Passing through Qarābāgh and Chārī Karān, Humāyūn

¹ Humāyūn's leading officers Qarāchah Khan, Musāhib Beg and Qāsim Husain Sultān Uzbeg were in league with Kāmrān.

² A.N. I, pp. 554-55. Abul Fazl writes that the loyal officers of Humāyūn gave him a warning that he should be strict in dealing with his brother and he seems to have appreciated the advice.

³ Humāyūn started in the middle of A.H. 957 i.e. June and July, 1550. (A.N. I, p. 556.) Gulbadan says (H.N., p. 188) that on his return from Badakhshān the Emperor spent a year and a half at Kābul and then resolved to go to Balkh. According to Bāyazīd, the Emperor passed the winter in Kābul and in the beginning of spring, he went to Avartah Bāgh with all the Begams. Nizāmuddīn says that at the end of the year Humāyūn left Kābul to proceed against Balkh and, after the failure of the Balkh campaign, he came to Kābul in safety. He remained there for the rest of the year. *Bibliotheca Indica*, pp. 73-74.

Bāyazīd's date the beginning of Ramzān A.H. 959 in the A.U.M.S. for Humāyūn's arrival at Kābul is clearly a mistake. It is an error of the scribe, for later Bāyazīd gives the correct year in which the battle of Qipchāq was fought.

reached the river Bārān which he swam alone on horseback, his soldiers having gone up the bank to seek a ford to cross to the other side without imperilling their lives.¹ The Emperor administered to them a well-deserved rebuke, but nothing illustrates his amazing optimism better than his continued faith in the efficacy of the material with which he was going to give battle to Kāmrān.

Humāyūn did not realise the power of the disaffected Amīrs, and the number of men Kāmrān had got with him. In consequence, he took things far too calmly, and acting on Hājī Muhammad's advice, perhaps treacherously given, he divided his forces so as to be sure of engaging Kāmrān whichever way he came. Hājī Muhammad Khan Kūkī and Khwājah Jalāluddīn Mahmūd and a few others were sent towards Zuhāq and Bāmiān; Mun'im Beg Atāvah was sent to guard Sāl Aulang; Tārdī Beg along with a few others was to post himself at Panchhar; Mīr Asghar Munshi, Bāltū Beg and Takhchi Beg Kashgarī were appointed to guard the Qipchāq pass.² The Emperor himself encamped near the pass of Qipchāq with a comparatively weak escort. Kāmrān slowly advanced with his force divided into two parts—the advance guard being led by Yāsīn Dawlat, Makhdūm Kokah and Bābā Sa'id. When a servant of Mīr Munshi raised the alarm that the Mirza was coming, there was confusion in the camp.³ If Abul Fazl is to be believed, even at this time Qarāchah Khan did not desist from his treacherous designs and averred that Kāmrān was coming to pay homage and that any armed demonstration on the

¹ Humāyūn was much offended at the conduct of his chiefs and said, 'Oh ye blockheads! When Shah Ismā'il of Persia threw his handkerchief down a precipice, twelve thousand of his followers immediately precipitated themselves after it, and were dashed to pieces: you have allowed me, your king, to pass alone, and not a single soldier has followed me; what good can I expect from such troops?' Here two pages are missing in the I.O. MS. of Jauhar's *Tazkirāt*. Stewart's translation agrees with another MS. in the library of the Allahabad University. Stewart, p. 94.

² Bāyazīd says Qarāchah Khan, Musāhib Beg and others were detained in camp, for they were still in disgrace. Abul Fazl clearly says that in suggesting a division of the forces the intention of the officers was to weaken Humāyūn's strength. Bāyazīd does not say so. According to Abul Fazl the disloyal officers constantly told the Emperor that Kāmrān repented of his conduct and intended to render service. *A.N.* I, p. 558.

The pass of Qipchāq is also called Chārdār or Chohardar and lies south-east of Dandānshikan pass.

³ Mīr Munshi was an officer who was sent by Humāyūn to guard the pass. Bāyazīd says the man was punished while Erskine writes that he was put to death. (*History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p. 381.) It was at afternoon time, according to Bāyazīd, that the alarm was raised. Abul Fazl says midday and Erskine writes about nine in the morning. *A.N.* I, p. 558.

part of the imperialists would frighten him and cause doubts in his mind about the intentions of the Emperor. Soon after the report of Kāmrān's coming was confirmed, Humāyūn mounted his horse at once and ordered his men to advance towards the valley. In front they could see Kāmrān's van taking a position behind a hill at a short distance under his son-in-law Āq Sultān.¹ The imperialists led by Husain Qulī Sultān Muḥardār, Suvandag Sultān, Qulī Cholī, Pīr Muhammad Ākhtah and others advanced to drive them off but they did not succeed in their attempt. Kāmrān's men discharged arrows and Pīr Muhammad was killed. Husain Qulī's horse tumbled down and he was hurt in the leg. His son Imām Qulī made an attempt to rush to his father's rescue but was killed.² The Muḥardār was thrown off his horse in the *mêlée* that ensued and was supplied with another horse by Bāyazīd who happened to be present on the field of battle. Kāmrān posted himself on the edge of the rock from where he shot arrows which wounded Humāyūn's soldiers and horses.

The miserable plight of the army stirred Humāyūn to action and, beneath Abul Fazl's fulsome adulation, we may perceive the simple fact that he now saw that he had been deceived by his officers. He advanced, but he was dismayed to see his men inactive. Mast 'Alī Qurchī impertinently retorted when the Emperor charged him with inaction. Qāsim Husain Khan, who was on the other side of the river, and who could have easily rushed forward to make an assault, did not do so, and Bāyazīd clearly says that he failed in his duty. Other officers were not adequately equipped with forces to offer resistance to Kāmrān. On seeing the distracted condition of the imperial army, Kāmrān came down from the hill where he had posted himself, and before his advance the imperialists took to flight in fear leaving behind their ensigns and banners. The cowardly Qāsim Husain Khan also retreated with his men.

The battle of Qipchāq was turned into a rout by the surprising inaction of the imperial force. Humāyūn himself fled from the field, and as he was retracing his steps on the road by which the royal army had come Bābāi³ of Kūlāb came from behind and struck a blow on his

¹ Bāyazīd says Kāmrān's wives and daughters were also seen among the soldiers wearing turbans.

² This is Bāyazīd's account. Abul Fazl's account is different. According to him Husain Qulī was killed and his son Dost Muhammad disappeared in making an attempt to rescue his father. *A. N.* I, p. 559.

³ Abul Fazl's account is sheer flattery. He says that Humāyūn's valour was stirred up and seizing a lance he rushed towards the foe. They were scattered before him, but an arrow struck his horse and Bābāi came from behind and, knowingly or unknowingly, struck him a blow with his sword. (*A.N.* I, pp.

*tāj*¹ (cap) with his sword. It broke the skin although it did not cut the cap and helmet cloth. He was about to repeat the blow when the Emperor looked him angrily in the face and said, 'O wretch of a Qalquchī, thou canst not strike thy sword again because of the Royal Majesty.' Affrighted at the demeanour of the wounded Emperor, the man desisted and he was driven off by Mehtar Sukkhā (known as Farhat Khan) who was the Emperor's *Toshakchī*. Muhammad Nijāt offered his horse to Humāyūn who was borne away from the field of battle by his officers.² He bled profusely on account of the serious wound; and became so weak that he threw off his coat (*jubbah*³) and gave it to an Abyssinian servant Safdar Khan⁴ who, being hotly pursued by Kāmran's men, threw it away to lighten his burden. It was picked up by the enemy and it was on the basis of this that Kāmran declared that the Emperor was killed in battle.

Humāyūn marched towards Zuhāq and Bāmiān with a slender retinue of eleven persons, among whom Jauhar was included.⁵ He was so weak from loss of blood that he had to be supported on a small horse, specially procured for him, by two men, Mīr Barqah and Khwājah Khizr, on either side. The two officers cheered up the Emperor *en route* by recounting to him the brave deeds of royal personages in the past who had bravely battled with adversity, and by asking him to accelerate the pace lest the enemy should overtake them.

559-60.) Bāyazīd says that Bābā, the scoundrel, a servant of Muqaddam Beg, came from behind and hit the Emperor. Jauhar uses the word *namak harām* (untrue to salt) which Stewart translates by 'one of the scoundrels of the enemy'. Gulbadan says a barbarian inflicted a blow upon the Emperor. *H.N.*, p. 195.

¹ Bāyazīd writes *tāj* (cap). He says that the auspicious car of His Majesty was wounded.

² He was escorted by 'Abdul Wahāb, Farhat Khan, Muhammad Amīn, Sabdal Khan and others. Muhammad Amīn and 'Abdul Wahāb formed the rear-guard. Erskine writes Muhammad Amīr for Muhammad Amīn. *A.N.* I, p. 560. *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p. 383.

³ *Jūbbah* is defined by Steingass as a coat of mail, a cuirass, any kind of iron armour, an upper coat or cloak, a surtout. *Persian Dictionary*, p. 356.

⁴ In the *A.N.* Safdar Khan is Sabday Khan. The *I.O.MS.* of Jauhar's *Tazkirāt* has Safdar Khan.

⁵ The royal army according to Bāyazīd was broken up into three parties : (a) the Emperor going towards Ghorband with a few followers; (b) some men going to Kābul; (c) a third party going to the district of Istālīf. Bāyazīd was with the third party. There were several other officers whose names he mentions. He describes the sufferings of the retreating army. The Hazāras barred their way, and robbed them of their clothes and horses. Bāyazīd was in a miserable plight. To protect himself against hot winds he covered his body with the leaves of the sorrel tree which he stitched with thorns. It was with difficulty that he reached Kābul.

Encouraged in this manner, Humāyūn proceeded towards the Sirtun pass and was joined by a small number of men. He reached there at nightfall and, as it was very cold, he fainted through weakness and was wrapped up in a sheepskin cloth given to him by Mīr Barqah. When the royal party reached the top of the pass, they felt the warmth of the sun and on the river bank the Emperor got his wound washed and dressed. A piece of scarlet cloth was spread on the ground and Humāyūn, after performing the ceremonial ablutions, said his prayers. At this place he was joined by Sultān Muhammad who was followed by Hājī Muhammad at the head of 300 horse.¹

Relieved to a great extent by the presence of his men and officers, Humāyūn held a council of war to decide the future course of action. Hājī Muhammad suggested marching to Qandhār, some urged a march to Badakhshān and from there an attack on Kābul, with the help of Sulaimān, Ibrāhīm and Hindāl. Another group was of opinion that Kāmrān was too elated with success to offer effective opposition, if they marched upon Kābul immediately without frittering their energies away.

Humāyūn had his own suspicions about this sort of counsel, and therefore it was at last decided to go to Badakhshān. Shah Muhammad, Hājī Muhammad's brother, was sent to guard Ghaznī and given a letter for Prince Akbar to convey to the men at Kābul the news of defeat.² After this Humāyūn proceeded to Kahmard and on the way he received the homage of certain chiefs of the Aimaqs³ who brought

¹ Even during these days treachery was not unknown in the Mughal camp. Abul Fazl writes that after the battle several officers had been sent to reconnoitre the road, but only one of them returned. The same writer says that Hājī Muhammad was treacherous. That Hājī's conduct was not free from blame is clear also from Jauhar's narrative. When Humāyūn was about to cross the river, Hājī Muhammad left him alone and went to seek a convenient ford. At this the Emperor was much offended. On a previous occasion too he had suggested the division of the forces and Abul Fazl positively asserts that he had done so to weaken the Emperor. Yet the latter confided in him. The letter to Akbar after the battle of Qipchāq was sent to Kābul by Hājī Muhammad's brother. Humāyūn was a man of generous disposition, ever ready to forgive and forget. It is only on this ground that his attitude towards traitors can be explained. *A.N.* I, p. 561.

² According to Abul Fazl the Emperor was told that Hājī Muhammad was sending his brother to Kāmrān and that he himself was acting as a spy, but he paid no heed to these suspicions. (*A.N.* I, p. 561.) Abul Fazl says that the letter was sent by Hājī's brother, but Jauhar says that both were sent away with a letter for Akbar.

³ Abul Fazl writes that Tūlakjī and Sanqajī, chiefs of the Aimaq tribes, waited upon the king. Beveridge thinks these were the names of tribes and not of individuals. I have not been able to find these tribes in the *Memoirs*. Kahmard

rich presents. It was here that a stroke of good luck brought into Humāyūn's possession 2000 horses, belonging to certain merchants, who were given bonds for payment when he had obtained a victory over his enemies.¹

Having strengthened his retinue, Humāyūn resumed his march and reached Sar Alang where he stayed for a week and received presents from the tribal chief of that area. On the bank of the Qunduz river a man was heard shouting across to ask if the Emperor was alive. He was summoned to the royal presence and asked to proclaim the fact as widely as possible.² Crossing the river by a ford, Humāyūn reached the village of Khanjān,³ where he was met by Hindāl, and then the party proceeded to Anderāb. Mirza Sulaimān and Ibrāhīm also joined and Humāyūn busied himself in making preparations for an advance upon Kābul. This took altogether about three months.

Kāmrān was a happy man after the disaster of Qipchāq. While still on the field of battle, the wounded Qarāchah Khan was brought before him and was treated well. Bābā Dost Yasawal presented Husain Qulī Muḥardār, a faithful adherent of Humāyūn, who was instantly ordered to be cut to pieces. Tākḥji Beg, a Chaghatāi officer, was also killed and then came Bābāi of Kūlāb who related to Kāmrān the story of Humāyūn's wound. He was delighted to hear the news and at once despatched Yāsīn Dawlat and Makhdūm Kokah in pursuit of the fugitives. Marching from Derā Qipchāq he proceeded to Chārī Kārān where a man brought to him his brother's bloodstained coat

is mentioned in the *Memoirs* on the Kabul-Balkh route. (I, pp. 189-91.) Bābur stayed here for some time and it was here that Jehāngīr Mirza married the daughter of Sultān Mahmūd Mirza and Khānzādah Begam. According to Jauhar, before reaching Kahmard, Humāyūn stayed at Purwān which is mentioned by Holdich as a commercial site more ancient than Kābul. The pass which bears from that point is often called the Parwan. The head of the pass was known as Sar Alang. *The Gates of India*, p. 414. Jarrett, II, 400.

Jauhar, who was at this time with the Emperor, relates several anecdotes which go to show in what a miserable condition he was. He was given a used coat (*jāmāh*) by Bahādur Khan which was gladly accepted. The bloodstained clothes were given to Jauhar who was asked to wear them only on holidays. At Kahmard an old woman offered her own silk trousers to the Emperor and although they were not intended to be worn by men, he accepted them and to signify his gratitude remitted her taxes.

¹ Jauhar mentions two caravans—one consisting of 300 horses and the other of 1700.

² This was sent by Nazārī of the Sar Alang and belonged to the Meshi tribe. *A.N.* I, p. 563.

³ Khanjān of the maps, W.S.W. of Anderāb. In Thornton's map Khanjān is shown to the east of the Qunduz river. Bangī is further north-east. Jauhar may have forgotten the name of the river, and substituted Bangī for Qunduz.

which had been picked up during the retreat. He was at once convinced that the Emperor was dead. Believing that he had now got rid of his principal opponent, he advanced in leisurely fashion to Kābul. He exhibited the gruesome relic and thus managed to persuade Humāyūn's officers that their master was really dead. The faithful commandant, Qāsim Khan Barlās, refused to the last to believe the report, but was at last sorrowfully convinced by the evidence of his own eyes.¹ Town and citadel surrendered and Kāmrān, master of all, divided the different dependencies among his own partisans, seized Humāyūn's treasure, and imprisoned his officials. Jūi Shāhī known as Jalālābād was given to 'Askarī; Ghaznī and its dependencies were given to Qarāchah Khan and Ghorband was assigned to Yāsīn Dawlat. Fiefs and *jāgīrs* were granted to other followers to obtain their support. The adherents of Humāyūn were severely punished. Khwājah Sultān 'Alī, the *dewān*, was thrown into prison and the treasures were seized. The chief supporters of Kāmrān at this time were Qarāchah Khan and Khwājah Qāsim Buyūtāt who were exerting themselves to the utmost to find men and money for their chief. The Mirza's mind was at rest, and he had recovered all his old confidence. Suddenly like a clap of thunder out of a clear sky, came the news that the Emperor was alive and well, and was advancing upon Kābul at the head of a powerful force.

¹ Abul Fazl's statement that the fortress was taken by hundreds of false promises and lying tales is an exaggeration. (*A.N.* I, pp. 564-65.) According to Bāyazīd, Qāsim Barlās defended the fort for a few days and at last surrendered it 'on certain conditions and promises'. Prince Akbar once again became a prisoner of his uncle. Jauhar clearly says that Qāsim surrendered on seeing the coat of mail. *A.N.* I, p. 565.

CHAPTER XV

THE FALL OF KAMRAN

THIS LAST rebellion and treachery of Kāmṛān may fairly be said to mark the beginning of a new epoch in Humāyūn's history. Hitherto, he had been content to tolerate the intrigues of his brother with patience, meeting them as best he could, but never dreaming of exacting any personal revenge for the injuries he had suffered. It now seems suddenly to have dawned upon Humāyūn that his promise to his dead father ought not to blind him to the interests of his living son. Kāmṛān by his conduct had shown plainly that he had no regard for the larger fortunes of the dynasty; so far as he was concerned, Hindustān might look after itself. But with Humāyūn the case was different. He had ruled from Delhi, and he never forgot that the kingdom, over which the Afghans now held sway, had been handed down to him by his father. Never for one instant had he regarded Kābul and Qandhār as anything more than stepping-stones for Hindustān, points of vantage from which a quick dash might be made when the currents of Indian politics seemed to be setting in a favourable direction. The Emperor suddenly saw clearly that the great obstacle in his path was his irreconcilable brother; and from the year 1550 onwards he made up his mind that the obstacle must be removed.

This, however, was not all. Tired of the constant desertions to which he had been subjected, and apprehensive of a renewal of the dangers to which he had been exposed by the unreliability of the great Amīrs he attempted at Anderāb to bind his men more securely to him by administering an oath of allegiance to each body of troops in the form which should subject them most effectually to the heaviest religious sanction in the case of any breach of the obligation.¹

This had an interesting sequel. When the oath was proposed, Hājī Muhammad Khan suggested that in order to complete the tie between master and men, the Emperor might well take an oath in the following form: 'That whatever we, his well-wishers, recommend with a view to his interest, and deem indispensable to that purpose, he will consent to and perform.'² Hindāl, fiery as ever, strongly

¹ Jauhar mentions this oath-taking ceremony and comments upon Hājī Muhammad's impertinence in suggesting that the Emperor should also take the oath. Abul Fazl clearly charges Hājī Muhammad with disrespect and insincerity. (*A.N.* I, pp. 567-68.) Hindāl protested against Hājī's suggestion by saying that masters never took such oaths to their servants and slaves. He was surprised at the singularity of the suggestion. *I.O.M.S.*, p. 112.

² *A.N.* I, p. 568. This was not liked by Hindāl. Beveridge writes that the

objected to the proposal, as derogatory to the King's dignity, but to Humāyūn, who was always urbane and sincere, it seemed no bad thing and he readily agreed. This suggestion of Hājī Muhammad, whether impertinent or otherwise, clearly shows that the imperial officers wanted Humāyūn to be firmer in purpose and more prompt in the execution of his plans. It points unmistakably to the atmosphere of suspicion and distrust in which the Emperor and his Amīrs lived during this period.¹

This definite recognition of the reciprocity of obligation between ruler and subject is a thing of rare occurrence in Eastern history, where the current theory of the Divine Right of Kings has effectually precluded all idea of constitutional limitations upon the power of the sovereign. But here, in the case of Humāyūn, we see that, in response to a demand on the part of his great nobles, an absolute sovereign acquiesces without resistance in an acknowledgment that their expressed opinion has a binding force upon his choice of action—a spectacle which may well lead us to doubt whether the traditional absolutism of an oriental despot is not in practice an illusion, at least in matters of real moment. Be this as it may, there is no doubt that this compact between Humāyūn and his great Amīrs, like his changed view of Kāmrān, marks a new era in the history of the reign. The Emperor henceforth found himself in a position which was at once stronger and less independent; he could rely upon the support of his nobles, but he had bound himself to respect their opinion in matters of importance. The resulting combination was to prove sufficiently formidable to attempt the expulsion of the Afghans.

Before any steps could be taken to recover Hindustān, the conquest of Kābul and the removal of Kāmrān must be accomplished. Humāyūn had marshalled his forces in Anderāb,² and he now determined to cross the mountains and attack his brother. Accordingly, he surmounted the northern slopes of the Hindūkūsh and arrived at

compact was effective. The Amīrs were the long-suffering victims of Humāyūn's folly and their present turning was justifiable. (Gulbadan, p. 195.) Both sides were to blame. Humāyūn was unsteady; but the Amīrs were treacherous and felt no hesitation in shifting their allegiance from one chief to another. They needed the oath much more than the Emperor.

¹ It is not possible to agree in *toto* with the view expressed by Erskine. Hājī Muhammad was an efficient officer but quite capable of treachery and desertion. Abul Fazl, of course, had a deep dislike for him. But from Jauhar's account also it is clear that Hājī Muhammad had misbehaved more than once. Erskine, *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn II*, pp. 388-9. Jauhar, *I.O.MS.*

² According to the *Tabqāt*, Humāyūn stayed at Anderāb for forty days and then marched towards Kābul. This time was spent in reorganising the army.

Shutar Garden; here he found Kāmran, with a large army waiting to oppose him, fully determined to prevent him from approaching nearer the city. At the last moment, the Emperor, who wished to avoid shedding human blood, remembered once more his father's dying injunction, and sent Mīr Shah Sultān, a relation of Mīr Barkah, who belonged to the family of the Sayyids of Termiz, to ask him to submit and join him loyally in an expedition for the conquest of Hindustān. The Mirza, who considered himself in the stronger position, required, as an indispensable preliminary for any negotiations, that Kābul must remain in his hands and that Humāyūn should be content with the possession of Qandhār. Needless to say, this could not be granted; but Humāyūn tried again to test Kāmran's sincerity. Would his brother join him if Kābul were held by the little Akbar in such a way that it should be common ground to both parties and this could be done by marrying the Mirza's daughter to the Prince.¹ Something of the Emperor's extraordinary generosity seems to have awakened an echo in Kāmran's heart, for he seemed on the point of falling in with the suggestion. But the Amīrs who had fled from the Emperor could not afford to risk a reconciliation which might be attended by well-merited punishment for traitors. Qarāchah Khan in particular, scoffed at all idea of peacemaking, now that Humāyūn was well in range of battle.² So, overpersuaded by interested councillors, the Mirza broke off negotiations. It was his last chance, had he but known it. Humāyūn was now inflexible in his determination to remove his brother from the path which led to Delhi.

The Amīrs were lying close to one another, at a place called 'Ushtarkarām'.³ The very day after negotiations were broken off, Humāyūn was informed by 'Abdus-Samad Mansūr and several

¹ Abul Fazl speaks of this alliance (*A.N.* I, p. 569), but Jauhar does not. According to him the Emperor's message was: 'The district of Kābul is not worth fighting for; let us leave our families in the fort and let us join and invade Hindustān through the Lamghānāt.'

² The *I.O.MS.* of Jauhar's *Tazkirāt* has: *Sar-i-mā wa darwāzah-i-Kābul* which literally means 'my head and the gate of Kābul'. What he meant to say was that he would lose his head rather than the gate of Kābul. Beveridge says it means that their heads and Kābul were equally dear and that neither could be given up or perhaps that the only two conditions of peace were that they should save their heads and also keep Kābul. *A.N.* I, p. 569. Jauhar *I.O.MS.*, p. 112.

³ The exact date of the battle is not given by our authorities. Bāyazīd writes: 'The defeat of Qipchāq and the victory of 'Ushtarkarām occurred in A.H. 957 (A.D. 1550), the interval between the two being 60 or 70 days.' 'Ushtarkarām or 'Ushtargram is a pass near the Panjshīr valley. The *Memoirs* (p. 540) speak of Bābur encamping on the bank of the Panjshīr river near the pass of 'Ushtarkarām'.

others, who had now joined him, that there was great confusion in Kāmrān's camp, which seemed to show that an immediate attack was meditated. As usual, desertions began in Kāmrān's ranks and Mehtar Sahbaka, followed by a number of others, came over to the Emperor's side. The latter determined to anticipate his brother and ordered an advance. The van was led by Ibrāhīm, the young Prince of Badakhshān; Sulaimān, his father, was on the right; while the left was commanded by Hindāl. Humāyūn himself commanded the centre and Hājī Muhammad with a stronger force, was posted in the reserve. The enemy was drawn up in a similar formation, but was obliged to act on the defensive. His van was led by the gallant Qarāchah Khan, the right by 'Askarī, the left by Āq Sultān, his son-in-law, while the Mirza posted himself in the centre. When the two armies drew themselves up in battle array like this, Hājī Muhammad Khān, whom Jauhar accuses of complicity with Kāmrān, advised postponement of the action till the next day but his advice was opposed by the other Amīrs. Thus the imperialists resolved upon attack. The key of Kāmrān's position was a slight eminence which he had occupied in person. The combat began with a gallant charge by the imperial van, as a result of which after desperate fighting, Ibrāhīm succeeded in capturing the eminence. Battle was then joined all along the line and, according to all accounts, was well contested for some time. Qarāchah Khan, at the head of Kāmrān's right, succeeded, by desperate efforts, in breaking the Emperor's left, but was checked and defeated by a timely charge on the part of the reserve when he advanced against the right wing. He was wounded by a bullet, captured and executed on the spot for his disgraceful treachery to Humāyūn.¹ His head was cut off and taken to the Emperor who ordered it to be hung upon the gate of Kābul.

¹ Gulbadan says that in the battle of Chārī Karān Qarāchah Khan and many other officers were killed. (*H.N.*, p. 196). Abul Fazl heard from a reliable source that Qarāchah's head was struck off by Qambar 'Alī Sahārī, a servant of Hindāl's, whose brother had been killed at Qandhār by the traitor. 'He took off his cap and struck him on the crown of the head with his sword, splitting it and then, cutting off the head, brought it to His Majesty.' (*A. N. I.*, p. 570.) According to the *Tabqāt*, Qarāchah Khan was taken prisoner and was being conducted to the presence of Humāyūn when he was killed by Qambar 'Alī Sahārī whose brother had been previously put to death by his orders. In Elliot's translation it is Bahārī, but Sahārī seems to be preferable. (*Tabqāt, Bibliotheca Indica*, p. 78. Elliot, V, p. 233.) Jauhar clearly says that Qarāchah fell lifeless on the field. Seeing him in this condition a soldier of Mirza Hindal's party galloped up to him and cut off his head and carried it to the King. Stewart, p. 101. *I.O.MS.*, p. 114.

The obstinate resistance of Kāmrān's men only made their losses more serious, so that at last they broke and fled. The victory was singularly complete. Kāmrān was compelled to fly in disguise to the savage country of Kābul and Ghaznī by the pass of Bādpāj¹ accompanied by a very small following. Many of his men were captured and put to death and his baggage was plundered. Prince 'Askarī fell into the hands of the imperialists. The demoralisation of Kāmrān's army was complete and the Emperor at once admitted into his service those who surrendered.

Before entering Kābul Humāyūn met Akbar who was brought to him by Hasan Ākhtah and he expressed his delight at the Prince's safety by conferring gifts upon the poor and the destitute. What further added to his joy was the recovery of the boxes containing the books which had been lost at the battle of Qipchāq.² Once again in possession of Kābul he repaired to the Urtah Bāgh in order to refresh himself and there brought about a fresh arrangement of his affairs. Sulaimān was sent away to Badakhshān while Ibrāhīm was asked to stay on and the imperial Princess Bakshi Bānū³ was betrothed to him. The village of Charkh in the Tūmān of Lahugar was given to Akbar in *jāgīr*.⁴ Hājī Muhammad was elevated to the office of *Vakīl-i-darkhānah* though not without an admonition 'to mend his ways'. Yet in spite of royal favours he persisted in his evil designs obviously counting upon the difficult circumstances in which the Emperor was placed. Active war having ceased for the time, Humāyūn stayed in Kābul for nearly a year and devoted himself heart and soul to the

¹ Bādpāj is mentioned in the *Memoirs*, p. 209. The name has several variants. Bābur writes it as Bād-i-pich. See Beveridge's note 5, p. 209.

Another (road) goes through Qarātū below Quruqsai, crosses the Bārān-water at Aūlgh-nūr (Great Rock) and goes into Lamghānā by the pass of Bād-i-pich.

² Two camels loaded with boxes were found loitering near the camp. They were seized and, when the boxes were opened, they were found to contain books. Humāyūn was delighted to have these precious finds, a fact which goes to show how cultured and refined he was.

³ She was Akbar's half-sister. In Gulbadan's *H.N.* her name is Yakhshi or Ikhshi Bānū which is a Tūrkī word meaning good or beautiful. She was born of Gunwar Bībī in Jamad I, 947 (September 1540). She fell into the hands of 'Askarī with Akbar in 1543. In 1545 she was sent along with the Prince from Qandhār to Kābul. In 1550 at the age of ten she was betrothed to Ibrāhīm. When the latter died in 1560, she was given by Akbar in marriage to Mirza Sharafuddīn Husain Ahrāri. Gulbadan, p. 214. *A. N. I.*, p. 572.

⁴ It is mentioned in the *Memoirs*, p. 217. Luhgur (modern Logar) is a *tūmān* of Kābul. Chirkh is a large village in it from which came Maulānā Yābūb and Mullā-Zādah 'Usmān.

preparations for his attack on India. But he was not yet able to ignore Kāmrān.

After the defeat at 'Ushtarkarām Kāmrān fled, accompanied by eight followers, towards the Dih-i-Sabz and joined the Afghans. The imperialists, who were sent in pursuit of him, did not fully exert themselves and returned without any success. The wily Afghans plundered his camp and deprived him of his goods. Reduced to sore straits, Kāmrān, in order to escape detection, shaved off his hair and beard and in the guise of a mendicant betook himself to Mandrūr¹ to seek shelter with Malik Muhammad, a distinguished chieftain, in the Lamghānāt country, who had some obligations to repay.² These misfortunes produced no effect on Kāmrān's irrepressible nature and it is indeed surprising that he should have ventured to cross swords with his victorious brother again and make a bold bid for power. That ambition was the ruling passion with these princes is amply borne out by facts, and their never-ending skirmishes show to what extent knight-errantry was carried in the central Asian and Afghan regions. Soon Kāmrān collected a following for himself; the roving blades of the countryside joined him in large numbers and his force numbered 15,000 men. He had in his usual manner tried to detach Humāyūn's chief officers from him and this time it was Hājī Muhammad, whose loyalty had been suspect more than once, who was seduced by him. Hājī left without leave for Ghaznī and the Emperor, who knew his worth, did nothing beyond expressing mild disapproval of his conduct. Probably he deemed it impolitic at this time to accuse Hājī of defection while his faithless brother was still at large and, as Erskine observes, he 'affected to talk of this insult as merely a piece of humour'. Hearing that with his band of adventurers Kāmrān was roaming up and down the eastern marches of Kābul, Humāyūn at once sent a force under Bahādur Khan, Muhammad Qulī Barlās and others against him and, finding it impossible to resist, he fled to the defiles of the 'Alīnagar³ and 'Alishang. The imperialists still followed him and drove him to seek refuge with the

¹ Koh Mandrūd in Nizāmuddīn. Mandrāwar is described as the third *tūmān* of the Lamghānāt in the *Memoirs* I, p. 210.

² Lamghānāt is one of the fourteen *tūmāns* of Kābul described in the *Memoirs*. According to Bābur, it contained 5 *tūmāns* and 2 *bulūks* of cultivated lands. *Ibid.*, p. 207.

³ 'Alīngar called also the Kow is a river of Afghānistān rising in the Hindūkūsh and flowing south-west, a distance of about 100 miles, until it joins another river called 'Alishang in the district of Lughmān. The confluence is at Tīrgaree in the province of Lamghān. Thornton, *Gazetteer of the Countries Adjacent to India*, pp. 51-2.

Mohmands, the Khalils and the Dāwadzai. Having given him a chase as far as the village of Ghaz Shahīdān,¹ the royal force returned to Kābul. The danger was averted for the moment but not finally ended and Kāmrān exerted himself to the utmost to find ways and means of once again making a dash upon Kābul.

Having obtained an interval of repose, Humāyūn hit upon a device of attaching Mirza Sulaimān of Badakhshān more firmly to his cause. He sent Khwājah Jalāluddīn Mahmūd and Bibī Fātimah to Sulaimān to ask for the hand of his daughter. The Mirza, his son and wife had so far all been loyal to the Emperor, but it seems that the general atmosphere was so full of suspicion, and men changed sides with such frequency that it was deemed necessary to bind Sulaimān to himself by stronger ties. Bāyazīd has related the story of this mission in an interesting manner, though Abul Fazl omits the inconvenient details of the negotiations. The daughter's name was Shāhzādī Khānum. Ear-rings, a complete robe, silk and sugar-candy and other things were sent through Bibī Fātimah to complete the act of betrothal. It appears from Bāyazīd's narrative that, when the embassy reached near Kisham, it was found that Muhammad Ibrāhīm and his mother, the spirited Haram Begam, were on their way to take possession of Qunduz which had been offered to them by Muhammad Tāhir Mīrark. Bāyazīd was in the mission and, therefore, his statement cannot be wholly brushed aside. An assault was suggested, but through the Khwājah's cowardice the plan did not materialise.² Haram Begam was a spirited woman who had previously sent a contingent to Humāyūn's help and treated with scorn Kāmrān's offer to marry her.³ She did not approve of the manner in which the Emperor had conducted the negotiations and rebuked Fātimah as the seducer of other

¹ Erskine writes as Ghaz and Shahīdān. It is Ghazu-i-Shahīdān in the *Ain-i-Akbarī*. *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p. 397. *A.N.* I, p. 575.

² Abul Fazl says (I, p. 575) that Haram Begam paid respects to the embassy, but this is wrong. The story is related by Bāyazīd. The lady secured possession of Qunduz and placed her son Ibrāhīm in charge of it. Bāyazīd says, when the news reached the Emperor, he assigned Ghaznī, Gardez and its dependencies to Hindāl in lieu of Qunduz. Evidently, he did not mind Ibrāhīm's taking possession of Qunduz without his permission. Hindāl too seems to have passed over this aggression.

³ Gulbadan speaks of the help which the Begam sent to Humāyūn after the battle of Qipchaq: 'In a few days—a very short time—the Begam had given horses and arms to some thousands of men. She herself superintended and took thought and she came with the troops as far as the pass. From here she sent them forward, and while she went back they went on and joined the Emperor.' *H.N.*, p. 195.

people's daughters and told her that, if the Emperor was serious, he must send some of the royal Begams and Aghachis. Sulaimān in his letter begged to be excused on the ground that the matter was entirely in the hands of his wife and the Begam added a separate note.¹ It was at this time that Mirza 'Askarī was sent to Badakhshān to be kept under close surveillance and after some time allowed to go to Mecca, but on the way between the holy city and Damascus he died in A.H. 965 (1557-58).²

Kāmrān did not give up his hostile intentions. He collected a number of Afghans who ravaged the country, and soon became strong enough to besiege the fort near Chārbāgh in the province of Jalālābād. Humāyūn determined to take action against him. Marching to raise the siege, the Emperor found that his brother had retreated to Peshāwar. He was unaware of the fact that Kāmrān, taking a circuitous route through Bangash and Gardez, was marching quickly to surprise Kābul. When Humāyūn returned, he found reason to believe that Hājī Muhammad was disaffected. Abul Fazl may be a partisan writer, but his detailed narrative, which mentions even the procedure followed by Humāyūn in inflicting punishment on the renegade general and his brother, cannot be regarded as a mere concoction, for it is in agreement with Jauhar's account. He is supported by Nizāmuddīn Ahmad who clearly states that Hājī Muhammad was clandestinely carrying on negotiations with Kāmrān and had offered to recognise him as King of Kābul.³ It is not possible to determine with precision the magnitude of Hājī's guilt, but behind Abul Fazl's extravagance of phrase lies the solid fact that his loyalty was

¹ This is what she wrote: 'Mirza Sulaimān is your slave and I am your slave. Thus my son and daughter are the offspring of your slaves. We happen to be near the Uzbegs and command some respect. You are a great king. If you want to marry my daughter, please come over from the hills of Hindūkūsh accompanied by the Begams and Amīrs of Kābul. I shall arrange to provide every one of them a good Badakhshānī steed and goats and silk for their dress. I shall give my daughter in marriage to you which will be a source of honour to us, and the enemies, who are near us, will know that you have done us this favour.' Bāyazīd. I.O.MS.

² This is the date in the *Akbarnāmāh* I, p. 575. Firishtah's date 961 (1554) is incorrect. Badāonī's chronogram '*Askarī pādshāh-i-daryādīl*' yields the date 922, which is impossible. (Ranking, *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 585.) Badāonī says: 'Mirza Sulaimān despatched him to Balkh by which route he proposed journeying to the two sacred cities.' When he reached a valley, which lies between Sham (Syria) and the sacred city of Mecca, without accomplishing his object, he hastened from that desert to the true Kabah which is the bourne of all mankind. *Ibid.*, p. 585.

³ *Tabqāt, Bibliotheca Indica*, p. 77.

nconstant, and that Kāmrān had spared no pains to win him over and was hoping for his co-operation in the enterprise on foot. Fortunately for the Emperor, at this moment arrived Bairam Khan from Qandhār. On his way to Kābul he met Hājī Muhammad at Ghaznī and persuaded him by his diplomatic skill to return to the Emperor. Kāmrān came close to Kābul, but, finding the guards on the alert, and seeing no appearance of any movement in his favour, abandoned the project of attacking the town and hastened to Lamghān.

Hājī Muhammad had come to Kābul at the instance of Bairam Khan, but his suspicions were again roused by the treatment which was meted out to him. His entry into the capital was barred by the imperial governor and, thus slighted, the high-spirited general fled again towards Ghaznī and this time adopted a circuitous route to disarm all suspicions. Humāyūn now realised the necessity of regaining the allegiance of all malcontents and Bairam was ordered to bring Hājī Muhammad again to the court. He could ill afford to allow a single capable commander or soldier to keep away at such a time, for he was convinced of Kāmrān's singular talent for seduction. By his pleasing address and honeyed words, the adroit general succeeded in his mission and once again a reconciliation was effected and the misunderstanding, whatever it was, was effectively removed. Thus, freed from a great anxiety, Humāyūn marched back to the Lamghān region in pursuit of his rival. He determined to drive him out altogether and detached Bairam Khan, now made Khān-i-Khānān and the most powerful nobleman at court, to pursue him. The expedition was conducted with such vigour that Kāmrān, despairing of effecting anything useful, fled beyond the Indus.

The arrival of Bairam Khan at Kābul was attended by extremely fortunate results. A man of the newer nobility, a Turk, who had spent much time in Persia, he was one of those who owed their position, not to their high descent or large estates, but the pleasure of the monarch to whom they had rendered distinguished services. It was, therefore, no part of Bairam's plan to keep the throne weak; there was no danger of his entertaining Kāmrān's proposals if Humāyūn seemed to be winning the day. The Emperor found in Bairam what he had hitherto lacked, an able and energetic minister of high rank, whose loyalty was beyond question, who ably seconded his master's plans with his heart and soul, and who was well calculated, by his bold and determined character, to support the Emperor in those new notions of firmness and self-reliance which had now supplanted the easy, merciful, unstable policy of former days. When the danger from Kāmrān was for the moment settled by his retirement

beyond the Indus, Humāyūn suddenly turned upon two of his most powerful nobles, Hājī Muhammad Khan and Shah Muhammad. Both these brothers were gallant fighters who had done notable service in many a hard-fought field. But at their lowest ebb, they were corresponding with Kāmrān, inspiring him with fresh hope, and doing their best to set him on his feet in readiness for the next round. Now Humāyūn had further reasons for believing that they were guilty of an attempt to engineer disturbances in favour of Kāmrān in the neighbourhood of Kābul. He therefore determined to make a severe example of them. With a man like Bairam Khan to support him, he no longer feared the power of any of the great nobles. Suddenly, accusing the traitors of disloyalty and lack of faith, he deprived them at a stroke of all their offices and *jāgīrs* and executed them out of hand.¹ This salutary lesson seems to have had a great effect in teaching the Amīrs of the court circle to behave themselves in a more seemly manner. About this time, Bairam Khan seems to have returned once more to assume charge of Qandhār. With him was sent Khwājah Ghāzī with gifts and presents for the Shah of Persia. It was at this time that Ghaznī, Gardez, Bangash and Lohgar were given to Mirza Hindāl, Qunduz was conferred upon Mīr Barkah and Mīr Hasan, and Jūi Shāhī was entrusted to Khizr Khwājah Jahān. But, before Mīr Barkah could take possession of Qunduz, Mirza Ibrāhīm and his mother had marched into the country and brought it under their sway. The Emperor could ill afford to quarrel with Sulaimān and kept quiet, though Abul Fazl flatteringly says that he 'allowed the good services of the Mirza to be an atonement for his action'. During his stay at Kābul he was much impressed by Shah Abul

¹ Abul Fazl's diatribe on Hājī Muhammad and his brother is prompted by a strong partisan bias. But it is interesting to see the procedure followed by the Emperor. He ordered a list of their services, voluntary and involuntary, and their offences. These were to be put into the balance of justice, so that the real facts might be known to mankind. Their good deeds remained unwritten, but their offences numbered 102. The verdict was a foregone conclusion. They were condemned and executed. Ghaznī was given to Bahādur Khan and his other fiefs were distributed among the royal officers. Hājī Muhammad had misbehaved on several occasions and it was his repeated misconduct which made the Emperor firm in his determination to punish him. Nizāmuddīn also writes that he was executed 'in punishment for his many offences.' (*A.N.* I, pp. 578-79.) Abul Fazl follows Jauhar. The latter gives the procedure followed by Humāyūn, but his statement about the time when Hājī Muhammad was put to death, is not correct. In describing the movements of the Emperor after the disposal of Kāmrān Jauhar says that it was about this time that Hājī Muhammad's case was taken up. This is wrong. Hājī Muhammad's execution took place earlier than the blinding of Kāmrān.

Ma'ālī's personal charm and good qualities, and allowed him to enter the imperial service.

Meanwhile, Kāmrān, indefatigable and irreconcilable as ever, was busy raising a fresh force from the swarms of adventurers and mercenaries who, at that time and place, were always ready to put their swords at the disposal of a prince who could make lavish promises and bestow a modest largesse. Towards the beginning of 1551, he suddenly made his appearance near Kābul, accompanied by a new band. He, however, received very little help from the tribes of the neighbourhood, for deputations from most of the important chiefs had waited upon the Emperor just previously, and had given hostages for their loyalty. The winter had been perfectly quiet, and Humāyūn had had plenty of time to give his brother's affairs anxious consideration. Accordingly, no sooner had the Mirza arrived within Humāyūn's sphere of influence, than the Emperor marched against him with a powerful force. He was found by Hindāl, who alone among the princes had rendered him faithful service, and other fief-holders who were still true to their salt. The imperialists encamped on the banks of the Siyāh Ab¹ (black stream) which flowed between the Surkhāb and Gandmak. Kāmrān, wishing to avoid an open engagement, delivered a surprise attack on the vanguard at night with the result that a large number was killed and the baggage was plundered. Humāyūn resumed his march and passing through Jalālābād reached Jiryār (Japriar)² where he ordered a temporary fort to be constructed and trenches to be made in order to guard against surprise attacks of the enemy. Kāmrān was in the neighbourhood, accompanied by the Khalīl and Mohmad Afghan, who had enlisted under his banner, and news was brought by two Afghans that he meditated a night attack. On the 21st Zu'l Hijja, 952 (November 23, 1551), when a quarter of the night had passed, the Mirza attacked the imperialists at the head of an Afghan force and created a tremendous confusion in Humāyūn's camp. As it was pitch dark, it was impossible to distinguish friends from foes and the Afghan onslaught was so terrible that Mirza Hindāl was slain in the *mêlée* and many others lost their lives. A valiant soldier, reckless of

¹ Siyāh-Ab (Qarā-sū) in *Memoirs* I, pp. 78-82. There is more than one river of this name mentioned in the *Memoirs* I, p. 450. The *Surkh-Ab* (Qizil Sū) is also mentioned (*Ibid.*, p. 321.) Bābur on one occasion crossed it with 70 or 80 followers. Both rivers are shown in Thornton's map.

² Erskine writes Jirbār and in Raverty's notes on Afghanistan (p. 55) it is Jiryār. It is a small town in the district of Namginghār beyond Behsūd. It lies south of the Kābul River.

life and scornful of danger, Hindāl had gone about the camp in the dark, superintending the fortifications, and, with nothing but a bow and arrow in his hand, he countered the sudden attacks of the enemy singlehanded. It appears that his men were so bewildered by the Afghan onset that they did not render him full assistance. A certain Mohamad Afghan¹ rushed upon the Mirza with a 'poisoned spear' and killed him. Gulbadan, Hindāl's own sister, who might be expected to have ascertained from trustworthy persons the manner of her brother's death, writes that he bravely resisted the foe, 'sallied twice from the trenches and in this endeavour became a martyr.'² Bāyazīd supports Gulbadan in saying that the attack was furious and the Afghans inflicted terrible cuts on his body. He writes: 'When the rascally cut-throat Afghans struck at the Mirza with their swords, he lifted up his left hand like a shield. It was clearly a *barki* sword. It cut him through right up to the naval, and falling like a pair of compasses on the middle finger of the left hand cut it in two. Another cut him across his face between the ears.'³

When the battle was over, Humāyūn enquired about Hindāl, but no one had the courage to convey to him the melancholy news. He shouted for him, but there was no response. Then he sent Abul Wahāb to search for him, but he was shot dead by one of the royal army who mistook him for an Afghan. He was followed by 'Abdul Hai who brought the ominous tidings.⁴ Humāyūn was deeply moved

¹ The name of this man is variously written in the texts.

² It appears from Gulbadan's account that the Mirza's men did not render him sufficient help. His servant was attacked and, on hearing his voice, the Mirza dismounted and cried: 'Friends, it is far from brave to give no help when my servant is at the point of the sword.' He himself went down into the trench, but not one of his followers dismounted. (*H.N.*, p. 198). Gulbadan does not give the name of the person who slew her brother. She writes: 'I do not know what pitiless oppressor slew that harmless youth with his tyrant sword. Would to heaven that merciless sword had touched my heart and eyes, or Sa'ādatyar my son's, or Khizr Khwājah Khan's.' She was overwhelmed with grief as the following lines in the *H.N.* (p. 199) show:

O well-a-day! O well-a-day! O well-a-day!

My sun is sunk behind a cloud.

Jauhar also speaks of Hindāl's gallant fight and says he 'became a martyr in defence of His Majesty.' Stewart, p. 101.

³ Bāyazīd, *I.O.MS.*

⁴ 'Abdul Hai did not say that Hindāl was dead. He repeated the following verse :

Agar nūr-i-'ālam raft barbād

Gul-i-sadbarg wa sūrī rā baqā bād.

[If the light of the world has been extinguished,
May *sadbarg* and *sūrī* (flowers) flourish for ever.]

to hear of the tragic end of one who alone among his brothers had stood by him in his vicissitudes for some time and who had not allowed his loyalty to be affected either by the Emperor's reverses, or Kāmrān's seductive offers or the general corruption of the atmosphere which prevailed around him.¹ His thumb-stall was brought before Kāmrān and it is said he was touched at the sight of it and Abul Fazl writes that he threw his turban on the ground in order to express his grief. The prince's body was carried to Jūi Shāhī and from thence to Kābul where it was buried by the side of Bābur.² His *entourage* and *jāgīr* were transferred to Akbar.

Humāyūn bore up against this sorrow with his usual fortitude, and the depth of his feeling can be gauged from the strong language used by him against Kāmrān on this occasion. Experience had taught him the value of prudence and he concealed his emotions. For the nonce his thoughts were concentrated on the future action to be taken against his 'bloodthirsty and tyrannical foe.'³ Winter drew close, and Humāyūn determined to remain in the field to exercise supervision over the dangerous activities of his brother. His position was far from enviable. He had suffered an irreparable loss in the death of Hindāl who, after his return from Irān, had bravely stood by him in all his vicissitudes. He was in a mountainous country surrounded by

The exact date of the night attack in which Hindāl perished is given by Abul Fazl as the 21st Zu'l Qa'da, 952 (November 23, 1551).

¹ Bāyazīd relates an interesting anecdote. On seeing the Emperor weeping, Mun'im Khan came up to him in haste and enquired the cause of his grief. Humāyūn replied: 'Did not you hear Mirza Hindāl is dead.' Mun'im Beg said: 'Let your enemies shed tears. You have now one enemy less.' It is said the Emperor stopped weeping.

² Hindāl's body was recognised by a certain Khwājah Ibrāhīm, one of his servants, from the black cuirass he had worn on the previous night. He was badly wounded. His right hand was cut off and, in defending his head, he had lost some fingers of the left hand; a blow on the mouth had severed the head from one ear to the other. Gulbadan says Mīr Bābā Dost lifted up his body and carried it to his tent. Abul Fazl writes disparagingly of Bābā Dost and says that he was not allowed to join the imperial service after Hindāl's death on account of his bad conduct. Abu'n-nāsir Muhammad Hindāl was born in 1519 (before March 4) and died on November 20, 1551. He was in his thirty-third year at the time of his death. Gulbadan, p 199. *A.N.* I, pp. 583, 587.

³ This expression is used by Gulbadan. Her natural grief and indignation can be easily understood: 'If that slayer of a brother, that stranger's friend, the monster, Mirza Kāmrān had not come that night, this calamity would not have descended from the heavens.' (*H. N.*, p. 199). The subsequent fate of Kāmrān is to Gulbadan an act of divine retribution, for she says that after Hindāl's death his affairs never prospered; on the contrary they grew worse day by day. *Ibid.*, p. 200.

heartless and predatory foes who raided his camp and killed his men. What particularly galled the proud Mughal soldiers was the impudence which the Afghans showed in levelling the charge of cowardice against them. Humāyūn treated their contumelious expressions with placid indifference, but his men protested against his inaction. Kāmrān for his part was making desperate attempts to seduce the Afghan tribes from their loyalty and was going from clan to clan enjoying their hospitality for a week by turns. He had opened negotiations with Malik Muhammad of Mandrūr and though he did not succeed in his ventures to any appreciable extent, his peregrinations perplexed the Emperor who at last determined that the situation called for decisive action. The fortitude and patience with which Humāyūn acted in trying times is worthy of the highest praise. Prone to overlook men's faults even when they occurred with astonishing frequency, he had learnt to look upon life as a game in which everything could be accomplished by perseverance, forbearance and moderation. He resolved to be prompt and energetic. He fortified a camp at Behsūd¹ and remained there all the winter. The fact that the imperial army had stood for so long upon the defensive had thrown Kāmrān completely off his guard. Accordingly, when the spring of 1552 broke, Humāyūn determined to attack his brother's camp. Starting from Behsūd, he marched along a dreary road in bad weather and at last succeeded in obtaining a clue to his whereabouts from two soldiers of the Mirza himself who were going on a mission to the chief of Mandrūr.² A strong force managed to get within striking distance before Kāmrān knew that any offensive movement was contemplated, and a determined attack at dawn gave the imperialists a victory about the decisiveness of which there could be no two opinions. The Afghans who numbered, according to Jauhar, 12,000 were utterly defeated and, besides their women and children, left behind three lakhs of cows and sheep which were seized by the imperialists.³ The tribes who had been hesitating so far were completely gained

¹ Behsūd is in the Hozāra country.

² On hearing the report that Kāmrān was with the Afghan tribes, Jauhar says, the Emperor, Prince Akbar and Abul Ma'ālī washed their hands, said their Friday prayers and then mounted their horses. Stewart's translation does not agree with the *I.O. MS.* From Abul Fazl's account it appears that the Prince was left in Kābul. *A. N. I.*, p. 594.

³ The *I.O.MS.* has three lakhs of cattle—cows and sheep. Stewart's translation has an immense number of cattle (p. 103). In some authorities the number of Afghans is 14,000. Three lakhs seem to be an overestimated figure. Bāyazīd writes that the Afghans were disheartened and Kāmrān had no large following. They did not dare oppose the imperialists.

over to the Emperor. On seeing Humāyūn's increased strength they probably formed a poor estimate of Kāmran's generalship and realised that to espouse his cause was to imperil their own lives. He escaped from the field, though his favourite Beg Mulūk was captured. Reduced to despair, he felt so convinced that all was lost that he played his last card, unmindful alike of the cold enmity which existed between the house of Sūr and his own dynasty. Ignoring the sinister reports, which had come to his ears of the cold and suspicious temperament of Salīm of Delhi, Kāmran fled to that monarch's court and cast himself upon his protection. Humāyūn returned to Kābul and celebrated his victory in a befitting manner in the Bāgh-i-Safā¹ by holding festivities and bestowing largesses upon his chiefs and nobles. Anyone but a desperate man like Kāmran would have foreseen that his welcome would not be such as to inspire any confidence and that Salīm had no desire to see or hear anything of the hated Chaghatāis and had not the slightest intention of interfering in their quarrels. Convinced as he was of the necessity of repressing his own relations and nobles, he utterly declined to assist a rebel even for the purpose of weakening the house of Tīmūr. The Niyāzī revolt had just ended, and Salīm happened to be at Bān² (Bin in Erskine) on the Chenāb in the Punjāb. According to Gulbadan Salīm sent him a thousand rupees and when Kāmran asked for help, he expressed in private an opinion by no means favourable. He said he could not help a fratricide—a decision heartily endorsed by Gulbadan who was Hindāl's own sister.³ Abul Fazl, who shows greater dislike for Salīm than for Kāmran, writes that, though Salīm judged Kāmran's success beyond his resources, he sent him money and promised to assign him the revenue of certain districts if he remained where he was.⁴ Evidently, Kāmran did not give up the idea of seeking his help and proceeded onwards. Salīm sent his son Awāz Khan with some nobles to accord a welcome to him. Badāonī, who gives more details of this episode in Kāmran's life than other writers, also speaks of this preliminary reception.

¹ Bāgh-i-Safā is near Chārbāgh. It is mentioned in Raverty's notes on Afghānistān on page 53 and Jarrett's *Ain* II on page 405. It is not the same as Bāgh-i-Wafā. Abul Fazl's account shows that from here the Emperor sent 'Alī Qulī of Anderāb to Kābul to bring Akbar together with the ladies of the harem. After their arrival he started for Kābul. *A. N. I*, pp. 594-5.

² Bān is in the Punjāb. It is mentioned in the *Ain* as a *mahal* in the Rachnā Doāb. Raverty mentions Bān as 19 miles north-east of Siālкот and 8 miles south-west of Jammu. It is on the east bank of the Chenāb. Jarrett, II, p. 320.

³ Gulbadan, p. 200.

⁴ *A. N. I*, p. 600.

According to him, Hemū Baqqāl was sent with a body of Afghans to meet the Mirza, but the latter hesitated to put faith in Salīm's promises.¹ In dire necessity men do not reason much about the line of action they wish to follow and Kāmrān hoped that Salīm would somehow be induced to give him support. When he came, he found Salīm seated proudly on his throne, surrounded by his nobles with all the pomp and pageantry of power. The Mīr Tuzak Sarmast Khan ushered him into the royal presence and when Kāmrān performed the *kornish* as directed, the Afghans seized him by the nape of the neck² and made him show such reverence as is due only from common men and shouted several times: 'Be pleased to bestow a glance this side for Kāmrān ; the son of the *muqaddam* of Kābul has come to invoke your blessings.' The haughty Afghan potentate seemed to take no notice of the fugitive prince, and it was when Sarmast Khan had called out thrice in a loud voice that he cast a condescending glance upon Kāmrān. A tent and canopy were provided for the Mirza near the royal residence and an order was given to confer upon him a horse, a robe of honour, a slave girl and a eunuch, the last two being obviously intended to act as spies on the suspected guest. The high-spirited Kāmrān, who had lately exercised sway over a large dominion and crossed swords with his brother, the erstwhile lord and inheritor of Bābur's dominions, was deeply mortified by this treatment and administered a rebuke to his friend Shah Bidāgh Khan for having advised him to seek refuge with the boorish Afghan.³ This was not all. A keen edge was lent to his sense of humiliation by the frequent visits he was obliged to pay to the Sultān when he entered into a discussion with him about the merits and excellences of various poets. Kāmrān well stood the test of his impudent host and received praise at his

¹ *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 501. The author of the *Khulāsat-ut-Tawārīkh*, who generally follows Abul Fazl, writes (p. 314) that Salīm sent his son Awāz Khan and Maulānā 'Abdullah Sultānpurī and others for the reception of Kāmrān.

² 'Sarmast Khan who was *Sāhib-i-Ihatmām* and Mīr Tuzak seized the Mirza by the hand and shouted that the son of the *muqaddam* of Kābul paid homage. Salīm did not even rise to receive him. Abul Fazl says the Mirza was received in a manner unfitting for enemies or street dogs. Badāonī writes that those diabolical men seized the Mirza roughly by the neck and shouted several times to draw the attention of the proud Salīm to him. It is difficult to accept the statement of the author of the *Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī* that Salīm meant well by the Mirza and continued to treat him with befitting distinction. He does not think Kāmrān's flight was due to Salīm's bad treatment. *A. N. I*, pp. 600-1. *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 501. *Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī*, A.U.M.S.

³ *A.N. I*, p. 601.

hands.¹ Besides, the Afghans, whom Abul Fazl in his disgust calls an 'ignorant crew', mocked at him and when he came to the *darbar* they cried loudly '*mor mīāyad*' in the Hindi language, which means 'here comes the peacock.' Puzzled to know the meaning of this somewhat quixotic exclamation, he was told by one of his attendants that the phrase was used for persons of great dignity. If that was so, replied Kāmrān, whose pride was hurt by this incivility, Salim was a first-rate *mor* (peacock) and Sher Shah still better. This rebuff seems to have silenced Salīm, for henceforth he forbade all kinds of jokes at the expense of the Mirza. But a serious cause for misunderstanding arose shortly afterwards when, at the request of Salīm, Kāmrān recited a verse which deeply offended him.² He was placed under arrest. He now realised that it was impossible to secure any help from a man who had hewn down the trusted nobles of his father, whose valour and devotion had built up the empire over which he ruled. He also learnt of the Afghan's intention to confine him in a fort in order to set at rest all fears of a possible war for the crown of Hindustān. Kāmrān was thoroughly disgusted and sought refuge in flight.

Having settled the affairs of the Punjāb, Salīm marched towards Delhi and took Kāmrān along with him virtually as a prisoner, though he still tried to lull him into security by soft words. Kāmrān in his hands would be an excellent trump card against Humāyūn in case he proceeded towards India to recover his lost dominion. Through a trusted servant, Jogi Khan, the prince secretly put himself in touch with Rājā Bakhu (Rājā Kambhu in Erskine) whose country was at a distance of 12 *kros* from Macchiwārā.³ He disguised himself as a woman, drawing a veil (*burqah*) over his face and body and escaped.⁴ Driven from pillar to post, at last he reached the Gakkar

¹ The *Tārikh-i-Dāūdī* relates the story of one of these earlier tests. At the first interview Salīm with a view to testing Kāmrān's poetical skill recited three couplets of three different poets—an Irāqī, a Hindustānī and an Afghānī. Kāmrān named the poets and received praise from Salīm. *A.U.MS.*, pp. 250-1.

² Badāonī has quoted the verse:

Gardish-i-gardūn-i-gardān gardnānra gard kard
Bar sar-i-ahl-i-tamīzān nāqisānrā mard kard.

[The Revolutions of the circling heaven have brought low the mighty, and have made worthless men lord it over men of intelligence.] *Al-Badāonī*, Persian, I, p. 390. Ranking, *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 502.

³ Macchiwārā is mentioned in the *Aīn* as a *parganā* in the *Sarkār* of Sirhind. It had a small fort. It lies on a ridge over the Būdhanālā 20 miles east of Ludhiānā on the old Rugar road. *Ludhiana District Gazetteer*, p. 237. *Aīn* II, pp. 105, 296.

⁴ The details of Kāmrān's flight are given by historians with slight variations.

country disguised as a female and accompanied by a horse-dealer. The Gakkar chief detained him and promised to secure pardon from Humāyūn. He sent a petition to the latter and pleaded for generous treatment.¹ Kāmrān, who was an adept in the art of seducing men from their loyalty, tried to win over the Gakkar chief, but failed in his attempt. He was induced to stay, writes Abul Fazl, by 'various pretexts' and then put under guard. When he found that it was impossible to get out of the clutches of the Gakkar chieftain, he sent a petition to Humāyūn betokening good will and peaceful intentions. But Kāmrān's day, which had been, as most of us will agree, unnecessarily long, had come to a close.

As we have seen, Humāyūn after his decisive victory had returned to Kābul to celebrate his triumph and to recruit his army for further enterprises. Later in the year about November 1552 he sallied forth to lay waste Bangash,² the tribes of which region had in the past

Abul Fazl makes him go from Macchiwārā to the Rājā of Kahlūr on hearing of the approach of an army and from there to the Rājā of Jammu. He too was frightened and the Prince fled to Mankot where he was very nearly caught. Again he disguised himself as a woman and went into the Gakkar country where he revealed his identity to Sultān Adam. Jauhar and Bāyazīd, whom Abul Fazl has copiously consulted, are brief. Bāyazīd says that he escaped and went towards the Tibetan border to pass into Kāshgar, but later changed his mind and went to Sultān Adam's house in Pirhāla. The *Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī*, the *Makhzan* and the *Tabqāt* say that he fled into the Sewālik hills and thence into the Gakkar country. According to Firishtah, he fled to the Rājā of Naggar-kot and when Salīm threatened the hill chiefs of the Punjāb, he went into the Gakkar country. The *Khulāsāt-ut-Tawārīkh* gives more details. At first he fled to the Rājā of Makhāt or Makhmāt; then to the Rājā of Kahlūr, then to Nagarkot and Jammu and finally to Sultān Adam who put him under guard and sent an *arzdašt* (petition) to Humāyūn. *A.N.* I, p. 601. Bāyazīd, *I.O. MS.* Firishtah, *Lucknow Ed.*, p. 240. *Khulāsāt-ut-Tawārīkh*, p. 314. *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 503.

Kahlor is mentioned in the *Aīn* as a hill state in the Punjāb yielding a revenue of 1,800,000 *dāms*. (Jarrett, II, p. 325) It is mentioned in the *Memoirs* II, p. 699 that the Rājā of Kahlor had waited upon Bābur. Mankot is mentioned in the *Sarkār* of Siālkot. In Akbar's day it included four towns each with a stone fort. It lies in the hills between the Rāvī and the Chenāb. Jarrett, II, pp. 110. 321.

¹ Sultān Adam out of kindness interceded for the Mirza and received some encouragement. Mun'im Beg was sent to console the Mirza and fetch him. Bāyazīd, *I.O. MS.*

² Bangash was a *tūmān* of Kābul. Bābur gives an interesting account of it. 'All round about it are Afghan highwaymen, such as the Khūgiānī, Khirilchī, Tūri and Landar. Lying out of the way as it does, its people do not pay taxes willingly. There has been no time to bring it to obedience; greater tasks have fallen to me,—the conquests of Qandhār, Balkh, Badakhshān and Hindustān! But God willing! When I get the chance, I most assuredly will have a reckoning

afforded his brother some assistance. According to Abul Fazl the motive was to chastise the Afghans and organise his army. The Mughal soldiers harried the country and seized the goods belonging to the Afghans. The recalcitrant tribes were attacked and severely dealt with and among them prominent mention must be made of the 'Abdur Rahmāni and Barmzidi which were thoroughly subdued. Mun'im Khan was directed to march against Fath Shah Afghan who, according to Abul Fazl, 'thought himself wise and led others astray.'¹ He was defeated and wounded in battle and his property was seized. While Humāyūn was thus engaged in reducing the local tribes to order and submission, ambassadors came to him from Sultān Adam Gakkar with the message that Kāmrān was detained in their territory, and would be surrendered if the Emperor would march thither. The Gakkar chief expressed the hope that Kāmrān would make amends for his past misdeeds and, assured of royal clemency, would join the imperial service again. Humāyūn naturally decided to accept their offer; he marched to the Indus and crossed the river at Dīnkot² and made his way to the country of the Gakkars. Sultān Adam, who, after his recent troubles with the Afghans, was most anxious to gain the goodwill of Humāyūn, was, nevertheless, somewhat alarmed when the Emperor brought a large army to his borders. But he was quickly reassured by Mun'im Khan of the entire good faith of Humāyūn, and of his recognition of the friendly office which Sultān Adam was performing in laying hands upon Kāmrān. The Gakkar ruler came and waited on the Emperor in the territory of Pīrhāla.³ Here shortly afterwards the Mirza was compelled to come and make his submission to the brother he had injured so desperately and so often. The time of his punishment was at hand.

Even at this time Humāyūn's natural kindness did not desert him. Kāmrān delayed to come and the Emperor moved two stages

with these Bangash thieves. (*Memoirs* I, p. 220) The *tūmān* of Bangash is mentioned in the *Ain*. It occupied the lower grounds from Gardez to Kohat. Jarrett, II, p. 407.

¹ This is Abul Fazl's account (*A. N. I*, p. 598). Jauhar does not mention the name, but says that the Emperor on hearing that a false prophet was leading men astray marched against him and put him to death. (*I.O. MS.*) Very probably Fath Shah is the man referred to in Jauhar. Erskine thinks he belonged to the Chirāghkūsh sect. *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p. 407.

² Dīnkot is the same as Dhānkot mentioned in the *Ain*. It is situated on the bank of the Indus. Jarrett, II, p. 323.

³ Pīrhāla is mentioned in the *Memoirs* I, p. 387. It is a place in the Gakkar country a good deal below the snow-mountains. Gulbadan says, when he drew near to Rohtās, the Emperor gave an order to Saiyyad Muhammad : 'Blind Mirza Kāmrān in both eyes.' *Ibid.*, p. 201.

beyond Pīrhāla, according to the former's wish, to allay all apprehensions. He reached the bank of the river Rud and encamped there. Kāmrān came here, when two *sāits*¹ of the night had passed, and was received graciously. The Emperor offered him a seat on the right hand while the young Akbar was seated on the left and chiefs and nobles like Adam, Abul Ma'ālī, Tārdī Beg and others were offered places according to their respective ranks.² Kāmrān apologised for the absence of some of his chiefs and said they would make obeisance the next day. The whole night was passed in enjoyment and Humāyūn too drowned care in carouse, forgetting for a while the misdeeds of the brother who had so cruelly wronged him. Sultān Adam was fitly honoured; the Emperor bestowed upon him a robe of honour, an ensign, kettledrums and other insignia of royalty to signify his appreciation of the services which that chief had rendered to him.

As may well be imagined, the liveliest discussions took place as to the Mirza's fate. He had hardly a single friend, and the consensus of opinion seemed to be that justice required the infliction of capital punishment. It is a striking testimony to the view which contemporaries took of Kāmrān's conduct, that not merely the great Amīrs and men of note petitioned that the Emperor should put his brother to death; but also that the *Muftīs*, doctors of the law, and the *Imāms* earnestly endorsed the petition. Gulbadan's account is detailed and she has reproduced the words uttered by the chiefs on this occasion.³ The

¹ Two *sāits* would be about an hour.

² According to Jauhar, several nobles joined the service of the Emperor. Thereupon Mahmūd Khan Niyāzī, Kamāl Khan, son of Sultān Sair, Islām Khan Niyāzī and Lashkarī, son of Sultān Adam also joined. The meeting of the brothers was a pleasant one. Humāyūn cut a *pūrī* (loaf baked in butter), one third of which he kept for himself and Kāmrān, one third he gave to Akbar and Abul Ma'ālī, and the remainder to Tārdī Beg and Sultān Adam. Stewart's MS. probably had 'melon,' but the I.O.MS. has *pūrī*. According to Jauhar, this meeting lasted four days: First day—Spent in pleasure. Kāmrān's meeting with the Emperor at night. Second day—The officers demanded what he proposed to do with Kāmrān. Third Day—Entertainment given to Sultān Adam. Fourth Day—The affair of Kāmrān was taken in hand. On the fifth day the Emperor marched towards Hindustān, but before his departure it was decided to blind Kāmrān. I.O.MS., p. 119.

³ The chiefs said to Humāyūn: 'Brotherly custom has nothing to do with ruling and reigning. If you wish to act as a brother, abandon the throne. If you wish to be king, put aside brotherly sentiment. What kind of wound was it that befell your blessed head in the Qipchāq defile through this same Mirza Kāmrān? He it was whose traitorous and crafty conspiracy with the Afghans killed Mirza Hindāl. Many a Chaghatāi has perished through him; women and children have been made captive and lost honour. It is impossible that our

Amīrs of the right and left gave their opinion in writing that it was well to lower the head of the breacher of the kingdom and Humāyūn's answer to this was : 'Though my head inclines to your words, my heart does not.' According to Bāyazīd also, the Amīrs suggested capital punishment and so strong seems to have been the feeling against the Mirza that Hāmid, the Qāzī of the camp, also endorsed the petition. But Humāyūn, swayed as ever by the remembrance of his father's dying wish, obstinately refused to take his brother's life. Jauhar, who was an eye-witness of these scenes, has given a detailed account not of the discussion, but of the manner in which Kāmran was finally dealt with. It is clear that Humāyūn was anxious to exculpate himself from the charge of wanton cruelty. He caused legal opinions to be reduced to writing and duly attested by the Qāzī and then sent the documents to Kāmran who returned them saying that those who were now thirsting for his life were the very men who had brought him to such a pass. In the face of this emphatic expression of opinion Humāyūn had no option but to announce that he would take measures against his brother that would effectually incapacitate him from taking any further part in the political struggle. It was finally decided that Kāmran should be blinded. Mirza Khanjar Beg, 'Arif Beg, Ghulām 'Alī Dost (who was six-fingered), Saiyyad Muhammad Paknah and Jauhar were commissioned to do the ghastly deed.¹ Anxious about his fate, Kāmran enquired of Jauhar whether they intended to kill him and the latter gave the appropriate reply that it was impossible to fathom the hearts of princes, but he assured him of Humāyūn's kind-heartedness. If Jauhar is to be believed, the royal emissaries debated among themselves as to who should do the deed, but at last the Emperor commanded 'Alī Dost to do it. A brave and high-spirited Turk, Kāmran would not die without offering a stout resistance, but when he was told that they did not intend to take his life, he submitted and laid himself down for the atrocious operation. The

wives and children should suffer in the future the thrall and torture of captivity. With the fear of hell before our eyes (we say that) our lives, our goods, our wives, our children are all a sacrifice for a single hair of Your Majesty's head. This is no brother! This is Your Majesty's foe!' Gulbadan, pp. 200-1; Text, 95-6.

¹ These are names given by Jauhar (*I.O. MS.*). Bāyazīd gives the following names: Saiyyad Muhammad Paknah, 'Alī Dost Ishaq Aghā, Ghulām 'Alī, *Daroghā* of Farrash Khānā, a man with six fingers, and Muhammad Qulī Shaikh Kāmran. 'Alī Dost was to apply the lancet to one eye, Muhammad Paknah to the other, and the rest were to hold fast the Mirza's hands. Gulbadan only says that His Majesty gave orders to Saiyyad Muhammad to blind the Mirza. *H.N.*, p. 201.

Daroghā twisted a handkerchief into a ball and gagged his mouth and then applied the lancet to his eyes fifty times to leave no manner of doubt that his vision was effectively destroyed.¹

This being done they poured the juice of some acid fruit and applied salt to his eyes which made him utter a cry and groan and pray for divine forgiveness.² All this happened in Ramzān A.H. 960³

¹ According to Jauhar, the lancet was used fifty times and then salt was applied. The *I.O.MS.* has *Ki-Kūrdī mewahdār namak dar chashmānash andākht*. This means that the fruit-keeper *Kūrdī* (probably the name of the fruit-keeper of the king) applied salt to his eyes. Another text of the *Tazkirāt* in the library of the Allahabad University has *mewahdār dar chashmhā-yi-īshān namak andākht*, which means the same thing. In Stewart's translation we have 'till they squeezed some (lemon) juice and salt into the sockets of his eyes.' Bāyazīd's account is slightly different from Jauhar's, but he was not an eye-witness of these occurrences. He writes that *Kāmrān* prepared for resistance, but when he learnt that his life was to be spared, he sent for a pillow, placed it under his head and said, 'Do it'. He sent for *Mun'im Beg* and did not want to go to *Kābul* in such a condition. Otherwise, he said, he would commit suicide on the way. After this *Humāyūn* was persuaded to grant him an interview on the condition that he would not weep. *Abul Fazl* follows Bāyazīd. 'Alī Dost is said to have reminded *Kāmrān* of having blinded *Saiyyad 'Alī* and many other innocent persons. According to him, *Kāmrān* was to be punished in a like manner. *A.N. I*, p. 604. Bāyazīd, *I.O.MS.*

² *Kāmrān* uttered the following words as the lancet was applied to his eyes. 'O Lord, O Lord, my God, whatever sins I may have committed, have been amply punished in this world; have compassion on me in the next.' Stewart, p. 106.

³ The exact date when *Kāmrān* was blinded is not given by any writer. The year A.H. 960 is calculated from the chronogram *Nishtar* which was composed by *Khawājah Muhammad Mūman* of *Farankhūd* (a village near *Samarqand*). *Abul Fazl* says the catastrophe occurred at the end of A.H. 960. (November-December 1553). *Erskine* on the basis of a statement made by *Jauhar* calculates the date to be the 7th Ramzān, 960 (August 17, 1553). To test the accuracy of *Erskine's* inference it is necessary to examine the actual passage in *Jauhar's Tazkirāt*: *Bāz farmūdand ki dar māl-i-Ramzān al-mubārak, shish roz az mā qazā shudah ast, mī-tawānī ki'iwāz mā rozah nigāhdārī? 'Arz kardam ki āri mī-tawānam, amimā Mirza rozah qazā-yi-khud khud khwāhad nigāhdāsh*. [Then (*Kāmrān*) said: I have been deprived of six days during the fast of Ramzān. Will you act as a substitute for me.' I said, 'Yes, but it will be better if the *Mirza* observed the fast himself'] *Stewart's* translation is as follows: 'He then said, "I have fasted six days, during this holy month of Ramzān; can you be my deputy for the remainder of the month?" I replied, "I can, but your highness will do it yourself".' This is quite different from the two texts I have utilised. *Stewart's MS.* may have contained these words. If that is so, *Erskine's* inference is correct. But the *I.O. MS.* conveys a different meaning. It only says *Kāmrān* had lost six days of Ramzān. Whether he said this to *Jauhar* *actually* on the 6th day of Ramzān cannot be inferred from this passage. *Abul Fazl's* statement that *Kāmrān* was blinded at the end of A.H. 960 is not correct. *Kāmrān* was blinded the next day and so, if *Stewart's* translation is correct, the date of blinding will

Jauhar was distressed at the wretched plight of Kāmrān and retired to his tent, melancholy and grieved. The Emperor was also perhaps deeply touched but he did nothing beyond making an enquiry from the ewer-bearer whether the duty entrusted to him had been satisfactorily discharged. To console the Mirza his favourite Mulūk Beg was sent to him. He was delighted to hear of his arrival and grasping his hands pressed them to his visionless eyes.¹

The subsequent fate of Kāmrān need not detain us long. He refused to go to Kābul in such a miserable condition and expressed a desire to Mun'im Beg that he should be permitted to go to Mecca. The army moved westwards and reached the Indus where after an interview with the unnecessarily remorseful Humāyūn he was granted leave to depart after a good deal of hesitation. Perhaps Humāyūn's natural clemency forbade sending his brother to a distant land in a state of blindness. Through the mediation of the chiefs an interview was arranged on the condition that Kāmrān should not betray the least emotion or remonstrate with Humāyūn over the fate that had overtaken him. The blind Prince with his eyes tied with a kerchief was ushered into the royal presence by Yūsuf Qorchi; the Emperor burst out into tears while Kāmrān, according to promise, behaved with imperturbable composure. Humāyūn overwhelmed him with kindness in spite of the sting contained in the poem which he recited and the allusion to the chances and changes of fortune.²

be the 7th Ramzān A.H. 960 (August 17, 1553). But the MSS. that I have used do not convey the meaning which Stewart puts upon the passage. Possibly the MSS. used by Erskine and Stewart agreed on this point. Erskine writes clearly that Kāmrān told Jauhar that he had fasted six days. Erskine, *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p. 413. I.O. MS., p. 119. A.N. I, p. 604. Ranking and Lowe, *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 583, n. 3. *Tabqāt, Bibliotheca Indica*, pp. 68-9. Firishtah, *Lucknow Ed.*, p. 241.

¹ As he did this, he recited the following verse:

*Har chand ki chashman bi-rukhat pardah kashīdah ast,
Bīnāst bi-chashmī ki shabī rūh-i-tū dīdah-ast.*

[Although my eye has drawn a veil on thy face, it is still seeing with the eye which saw thy face one night.] Mulūk Beg seems to have been a catamite of Kāmrān after the Turkish fashion.

² The verse repeated by Kāmrān is given by Bāyazīd:

*Kulāh gūshah-i-darvesh bar falak farsūd
Ki sāyah-i-misl-i-tū shahī figand bar sar-i-ū.*

[The corner of the cap of the darwīsh rules against the sky, for a King like thee has cast shadow on his head.]

*Bar jānam az tū har chi rasad jāy-i-minnat-ast,
Gar nāwak-i-jafāst wa gar khanjar-i-sitam.*

[Whether it be the arrow of oppression or the dagger of tyranny, if it reaches my soul from thee, it is a favour.]

Addressing the nobles present he asked them to bear witness to the fact that the fate that had overtaken him was due to his own wickedness and perfidy and that he had completely exonerated the Emperor from blame for all that had happened.¹ Humāyūn was choked with emotion and abruptly ending the conversation said, 'Let us now read the *Fāthiha*.'

Kāmrān's last request was that his children and dependents should be well taken care of, whereupon the Emperor assured him that he need have no anxiety on that account. The meeting broke up and as soon as the Emperor departed, the fallen brother burst into hysterical cries bewailing the misfortune that had befallen him. Of the many servants of Kāmrān only Chalmah Kūkah, who received the title of Khān Alami in the reign of Akbar, offered to follow the Mirza into exile. His conduct won the appreciation of the Emperor and he entrusted him with the necessary funds to defray the expenses of the journey. The handsome Mulūk Beg, on whom the Mirza had lavished his affection, proved, like many others of his kind, a broken reed; he accompanied him a few stages and then returned, and his conduct was strongly animadverted upon by all in the camp and even the Emperor was offended to hear of his ingratitude. Kāmrān journeyed down the Indus to Bhakkar where his father-in-law Shah Husain treated

¹ The nobles present on the occasion were: Mīr Tārdī Beg, Mun'im Beg, Bābūs Beg, Khwājah Husain Marvi, Mīr 'Abdul Hai, Mīr 'Abdullah Khanjar Beg, and 'Arif Beg.

This confession of Kāmrān is mentioned by Bāyazīd. Abul Fazl who copies him puts more words into the mouth of Kāmrān than are given in Bāyazīd. He makes the Mirza say: 'Friends, be ye all witness that, if I knew myself innocent, I would assert the fact at this time of distinction when His Majesty visits me; but I am certain I was worthy of death. He has granted me life and has given me leave to depart to Hejaz. For the beneficence and favour of His Majesty, I offer a thousand thanks because he has not exacted retribution commensurate with my wickedness and misconduct.' Bāyazīd's text is clear and *bahal kardam*, for which Beveridge reads *sijil kardam*, seems to be correct. It means 'I have pardoned' and this fits in with the context. Bāyazīd was not an eye-witness of these events and he must have derived his information from others. The passage in Bāyazīd may be thus translated: 'Bear ye all witness that whatever hardship I have suffered has befallen me because of my wickedness and faithlessness. If people think that the King has caused this misery, I pardon him. Thereupon the King said weeping, 'Let us read the *Fāthiha*.' Bāyazīd, I.O. MS. A.N. I, p. 606; Beveridge's note (1) 607. A.N., *Bibliotheca Indica* I, p. 330.

Erskine's reading of the passage is different. He writes: 'If it be known that His Majesty had shown favour to me, let it also be known how little I have deserved it.' This is not to be found in Bāyazīd's text. Erskine has obviously followed Abul Fazl. *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p. 417.

him well and assigned to him a *jāgīr* and a residence.¹ What afforded Kāmran solace in this hour of distress was the conduct of his wife Chūchak Begam, who declared her resolve to share her husband's misfortunes despite her father's expostulations to the contrary.² With unusual promptness the devoted lady took her seat in the Mirza's boat and leave for the holy place.³ There are few examples in Mughal history of such devotion and sacrifice and the names of Hamīdah and Chūchak Begam will always stand out in the forefront of royal women who endured much misery and hardship for the sake of their husbands.

Such was the tragic end of the public career of Kāmran, the faithless brother and perjured traitor, who had ceaselessly troubled Humāyūn for close upon two decades.⁴ Lest we should misjudge him or overestimate his faults, it will be well to attempt a correct appraisal of his conduct and to review the principal acts of his life which constitute

¹ The place of residence was in the hilly country Shādpūla and the *parganā* of Bhitūrah was given to meet the expenses of the kitchen.

² The *Tārīkh-i-M'asūmī* describes how earnestly Chūchak Begam desired to go with her husband. When she quietly went into the Mirza's boat, Sultān Mahmūd informed Shah Husain who asked her to remain with him. The dutiful Begam replied, 'You gave me to the Mirza when he was a king. The world will say, the Shah's daughter refused to follow her husband in the days of his misfortune and my fair name will be besmirched.' Shah Husain was pleased at this and allowed her to go. *A.U. MS.*

Māh Chūchak Begam was the only child of Shah Husain Arghūn. She was married to Kāmran in 953 (1546).

The text has now been published by the Bhandārkar Institute and this episode is described on pages 182 and 183.

³ Kāmran died at Mecca on the 11th Zu'l Hijja, 964 (October 5, 1557). He performed three pilgrimages to the holy city. Chūchak Begam died seven months later. They left a son Abul Qāsim and two daughters. Abul Qāsim was imprisoned in the Gwālior fortress by Akbar in 964 (1557) when he marched against Khanzamān and was killed at his command. He had inherited poetical talent from his father. One of Kāmran's daughters was married to Mirza Ibrāhīm Husain bin Sultān Muhammad and the other to 'Abdur Rahmān Mughal and then to Shah Fakhruddīn Mashedi.

⁴ Dr. S. K. Bannerjee contends that the relations between Humāyūn and Kāmran were friendly till 1538. In support of his view he says: (a) When Humāyūn came to the throne, it was expected that Kāmran's *jāgīr*, which in 1530 was less than half the present size of Afghanistan, would be increased. He quotes Bābur's words, 'As thou (Humāyūn) knowest, the rule has always been that when thou hadst six parts, Kāmran had five; this having been constant make no change.' (b) Kāmran did not covet the throne. It was his impatience to increase his *jāgīr* which led him to apply force against the governor of Lahore. In doing so he acted in accordance with his father's instructions. (c) Kāmran's ode which he presented to his brother soon after the latter's accession to the throne indicated friendly feelings between the two. Humāyūn on his return to

the basis of the indictment against him. Born in the year 1508-9 of Gulrukh Begam, of whom Gulbadan speaks with respect, he seems to have impressed Bābur early with his talents so that, when he was only eighteen, the country of Kābul was entrusted to him. He was given a good education and his father wrote the Mubīn for his instruction, and later forwarded to him his verses and fragments in the Bāburī script.¹ There is evidence in the *Bāburnāmah* of the fact that Kāmrān coveted Kābul from his early days, and as he advanced in years, he developed a strong desire for political power. His character was in general accord with his ambitions. It was a blend of elements both good and bad. Badāonī's estimate, though somewhat overdrawn, represents him as a man 'brave, ambitious, liberal, good-natured, sound of religion and clear of faith.'² It is true that he was a brave and intrepid soldier and had given proof of his valour on more than one occasion. In 1534 he marched towards Bhatnir with a view to inflicting a blow on Bikānir, and although the Mughals were driven back by the Rāthors, Kāmrān succeeded in seizing the fort of Bhatnir and

Agra made amends for the delay, confirmed him in his *jāgīr* and granted him Hissār Fīrozah.

The authorities on which Bannerjee relies do not support his contention. It is clear that Kāmrān came down from Kābul and drove out the governor Mīr Yūnis 'Alī and seized Lahore by force. Abul Fazl says that the ode presented by Kāmrān was a mere outward show. Humāyūn who was confronted with serious difficulties could not afford to fight with him and therefore acquiesced in his high-handedness. Kāmrān's conduct was not straightforward, and from the very beginning he wished to take advantage of the Emperor's difficulties. In reviewing Bannerjee's book Sir Richard Burn very rightly observed that his argument that Kāmrān's coinage shows that he had no desire to encroach on Humāyūn's sovereignty in India is based on a faulty description of the actual coins. The reader's attention is invited to a *dirham* of Kābul which bears the names of both brothers and was probably struck in A.H. 955. *Humāyūn Bādshāh*, pp. 52-7. *Memoirs*, pp. 625-7. *A.N.* I, pp. 290-1. *J.R.A.S.*, 1942, pp. 144-5.

¹ Mubīn is the name of Bābur's famous *Masnavī* which is mentioned as a famous composition. According to Badāonī, it was a versified treatise on Muhammadan law or theology according to the Hanafi school and Shaikh Zain wrote a commentary on it which he called Mubīn. *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 343. *A.N.* I, p. 276.

For *Risālah-i-Walidiyyah* of Khwājah Ahrār see Beveridge's note in the *Memoirs* I, p. 278. The *Walidiyyah* was a treatise in honour of Khwājah Ahrār's parents. Bābur versified it two years before his death in the hope that the Khwājah would cure him of his fever, in the same way as the author of a *Qasīda* had been cured of his paralysis. Before seeing the *Risālah* Bābur had congratulated Kāmrān on his marriage and sent Mullā Tabrezi and Mirza Beg Tagār with ten thousand Shāhrukhīs, a coat which he had himself worn and a belt with clasps. *Memoirs* II, p. 642.

² *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 585.

held it for several years as an outpost on the Punjāb frontier.¹ When Humāyūn was fighting against his foes in India, Kāmrān was engaged in a struggle with the Persians. In 1535 he marched from Lahore against Sām Mirza and his tutor (*atālīq*) Aghziwār Khan, at the head of 20,000 men and defeated them. About the same time he repulsed with heavy loss Muhammad Zamān Mirza, who, taking advantage of his absence, had invaded the Punjāb and laid siege to Lahore. Again, when Shah Tahmāsp, after expelling the Uzbegs from Herāt, proceeded against Qandhār, he marched against him and compelled the Shah's deputy Bidāgh Khan to surrender on condition that he should be allowed to return to his country with his men.² Such were the exploits of Kāmrān's early life and they had brought him fame as a general and warrior. But he was not a mere military man who longed for the laurels of the battle-field. He had, like his father, cultivated the *belles lettres* and attained a considerable proficiency in them. He was a poet of no mean order and his verses were admired by practised masters of the art.³ The *Tārīkh-i-Dāūdī* credits him with real insight into the merits of verse—a fact which deeply impressed Salīm, the Afghan ruler and his courtiers. Unlike other princes of Tīmūrid descent he abhorred drink in his early life, so much so indeed, that he ordered the destruction of grapes throughout his kingdom, but afterwards became a confirmed drunkard and plunged into debauch, reckless of its consequences. He was selfish and greedy, wanting in filial obligation and fraternal regard, ready to sacrifice both to secure some advantage for himself. Prone to suspicion, ever ready to seduce the followers of his brother, he did not feel any scruples in breaking his plighted faith. Indeed his whole character may be summed up in the word, perfidious. In a strait he would promise anything; but he went back upon his word as soon as a convenient opportunity presented itself. The contrast between the two brothers explains the

¹ *Chanda rān jeta-si ro Vithu Sūje ro kiyo* edited by Dr. L. P. Tessitori, *Bibliotheca Indica*, pp. 38-41.

² Before Kāmrān reached there the Shah had returned to his country leaving the place in charge of his general Bidāgh Khan. He capitulated and Kāmrān became master of Qandhār.

³ A *Diwān* of Kāmrān Mirza is mentioned in the catalogue of the *Khudābaksh Library* (Vol. II). This *Diwān* was once in the imperial library of Delhi and bears autographs of Jahāngīr and Shāhjahān and other famous persons. Kāmrān was well-versed in Tūrki and Persian and composed poetry in both. His short lyrics and ballads are of a high order, worthy of a gifted poet. A copy of Kāmrān's Tūrki poems is to be found in the library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. See Maulvi 'Abdul Walī's article in the *Indian Antiquary* XLIII (1914), pp. 219-224.

ultimate result of the dreary struggle in which they were engaged in the Kābul region for a number of years. Humāyūn was gentle and forgiving, ever mindful of his father's dying charge, though such a course was fraught with dire consequences to himself. Misfortune never disturbed the equanimity of his temper soothed by frequent doses of opium, nor did success make him proud and vindictive. Anyone who reads the story of his life will see that he passed through it braving hardships and miseries which have seldom fallen to the lot of a prince born in the purple, with a courage and resignation which has few parallels in the history of the Mughal dynasty. He was wronged again and again, but he never lost that nobility of soul without which man sinks to the level of the brute. When after his surrender, Kāmrān was brought before him—and none had done him a greater injury—he shed tears profusely and his heart was moved.¹ Even after blinding him, he had a fit of remorse and like Pompey and Cromwell deplored the cruel necessity which had driven him to such a ghastly step. Soon after the occurrence he had expressed regret for what had been done. Kāmrān, though superior to his brother in firmness of will and steadiness of purpose, was a Turkish terrorist, who, when roused to fury, was entirely devoid of human feelings. Faithful service was no protection against his wrath and even his devoted followers feared his uncertain temper. From the very beginning the relations between the two brothers were far from cordial.

Since Humāyūn's accession to the throne in 1530 Kāmrān had behaved in an unfriendly manner. Though outwardly he feigned loyalty towards him, composed odes in his honour, at heart he desired to profit by the difficulties with which he was confronted at this time. Not satisfied with his kingdom of Kābul and Qandhār, he had seized Peshāwar and Lamghān and brought the whole of the Punjāb under his sway. Humāyūn, who had his own difficulties, acquiesced in this seizure and confirmed his possession of the newly acquired territories. He gave him Hissār Firozah²—an important possession because it lay on the road between Delhi and the Punjāb. But nothing availed to win Kāmrān's permanent fealty. When the Afghan revival took place under Sher Shah and Humāyūn was detained with his troops in the east, Hindāl revolted at Agra and was

¹ The reader will remember the condition on which he granted an interview to Kāmrān after he was blinded. Kāmrān did not betray any emotion, but the Emperor could not restrain himself.

² This well-known town and fort was the capital of one of Akbar's *Sarkārs* in *Sūbah* Delhi.

supported by petty zamindars in his treasonable designs. Kāmran who had ample resources and whose kingdom stretched from Hissār Fīrozah to Zamīndāwar and Badakhshān, was asked to come to his brother's rescue. He responded and came, but the Amīrs told him that to destroy Sher Shah and release the Emperor would result in his own ruin. This unfounded apprehension led to his return to Agra with his army and the Emperor was left to his fate. The Afghans reduced Humāyūn to sore straits at Chausā but Kāmran did not stir a finger to help him. Humāyūn behaved magnanimously even on this occasion, and when the brothers met at Agra, he did not let fall a word about the recent happenings. Hindāl was pardoned, and the Emperor again resolved on a campaign to avenge his humiliation at Chausā. Kāmran offered to go himself and asked the Emperor to remain at the capital obviously to make things too difficult for him. He had come with 12,000 mail-clad horsemen, writes Mirza Haider, to seize the throne of Hindustān and, but for Humāyūn's survival at Chausā, he would have succeeded in the attempt.¹ He haggled for seven months and when he contracted fever owing to the tropical heat, he desired to go back to Kābul. In vain did Mirza Haider and other well-wishers of the empire endeavour to convince the Prince of the necessity of his co-operation but he turned a deaf ear to their entreaties. The retreat of Kāmran, according to Mirza Haider, was the most 'efficient' cause of the rise of Sher Shah and the fall of the Chaghatāi dynasty. Kāmran's intentions were clear. While Humāyūn was engaged in the east, he would proclaim himself king of Delhi and Agra and satisfy his long-cherished ambition. Not only did he withdraw all his men but seduced the Emperor's soldiers and according to Mirza Haider 'acted like an enemy'. The battle of Qanauj proved fatal to Humāyūn's interests; it made him a homeless wanderer and once again when the brothers met at Lahore, they showed an amazing want of political wisdom and devised no plan to save the dynasty from ruin. Kāmran felt more anxious to preserve his own dominion and deliberately preferred a selfish advantage to dynastic interests. He still hoped to profit by his brother's difficulties. A treaty was solemnly assented to by the brothers, but Kāmran secretly opened negotiations with Sher Shah and offered him his services if he was left free in the Punjab. He tried to deceive Humāyūn again when the projected Kashmir

¹ This is Mirza Haider's view. He was present in Agra and was persuaded by Humāyūn to stay. He knew what a crisis it was for the Emperor and characterises Kāmran's conduct as 'shameful'. Elias and Ross, *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī*, p. 472.

expedition was discussed and thwarted his plans. At Bhīra he again forestalled him and weaned Khwājah Kalān from his loyalty to his master. Exasperated at this treacherous conduct, Jabal Qulī Qurchī offered to kill him, but Humāyūn said, 'No I refused to slay him at Lahore and I will not do it here.' What Humāyūn really dreaded was the possibility of falling into Kāmran's clutches, for he was himself master of a large dominion and near him was his father-in-law, Shah Husain Arghūn whose resources were by no means inconsiderable. He was forced to leave for Persia where he had to bear patiently the darts and slings of outrageous fortune. In the campaigns which he fought after his return he suffered much hardship and misery and it was all due to Kāmran. It is during this period that Kāmran's conduct presents itself in a most odious light. He broke his word again and again alternating submission with resistance and never following the straight path. A strange moral perversity led him to perpetrate outrages which in our times even a depraved person could not but look upon with a shudder. He ordered the wife of Bābūs, who was at one time in his service, to be dishonoured by the bazar rabble and his three sons to be killed without ruth.¹ The sons of Musāhib and Qarāchah were suspended by ropes from the castle wall, but his inhumanity exceeded all bounds when he ordered the wife of Qāsim Khan Maujī with some other ladies to be suspended by the breasts from the battlements. Even if the guilt of these officers is admitted, there can be no palliation for these enormities which shocked even those with whose help he hoped to secure the throne of Hindustān. More than once he offered submission, but he was never sincere. When the Emperor was badly wounded in the battle of Qipchāq, Kāmran was pleased to hear that he was dead. Even after all this Humāyūn treated him well, never spoke an unkind word and refused to inflict the penalty of death upon him.

When these facts are borne in mind, the verdict of the impartial historian will be that the sentence inflicted on Kāmran was entirely disproportionate to his faults. There is little that can be pleaded in extenuation of his guilt. True, he was able and possessed courage of a sort, but he did not possess qualities which would have fitted him to be a better substitute for Humāyūn. He lacked a sense of reality in politics; his perspective was blurred by selfish designs; his

¹ The *Tārīkh-i-Khāndān-i-Timūriyah* says that the three sons were first confined in the fort and then thrown from the battlements. The people were greatly offended at this conduct of Kāmran.

hold on the Kābul region was weak and his own adherents wavered in their loyalty and never felt certain about this temper. He did not possess administrative capacity of a high order for there is no mention of any measures devised by him for the better governance of the countries in his possession. Even the example of Sher Shah, who was planning great reforms at Delhi, produced no effect on him and he wasted his time in barren enterprises. He lacked a statesmanlike vision and found it utterly impossible to look beyond the interests of the moment. Even in the matter of military organisation he did not show any superiority over Humāyūn. Much of his manœuvring was improvised, his strategy was defective and his tactics on the field of battle seldom brought him a permanent advantage. There is nothing to show that the roots of his dominion were struck deep in the hearts of his subjects nor does it appear that a movement on a large scale was ever organised in his favour. Even if he had succeeded in defeating Humāyūn, it would have been impossible for him to snatch the sceptre from the Afghans. Turkish loyalty still went to the first-born and Kāmran would have soon alienated the sympathies of the chiefs and nobles. With Persian help Humāyūn was in a much stronger position to deal with him. He was no longer regarded as a weak man forsaken by destiny. The decline of the Sūr dynasty had broken the spell of Sher Shah's might and the people had come to believe in the possibility of Humāyūn having a chance again. For one thing Kāmran deserves credit and that is his treatment of the young Akbar. Even in the days when there was the bitterest enmity between the brothers he never withdrew his protection from the nephew and did nothing to harm him. Even hostile writers admit that during the prince's childhood he made adequate arrangements for his upbringing.

If Kāmran had been far-sighted, he would have helped Humāyūn and saved the fortunes of his house from disaster. That he would have been allowed to enjoy his sovereignty at Kābul is indubitable. But a strange nemesis dogged his steps and again and again he showed how unworthy of trust he was. Had it not been for the untimely death of Sher Shah, the Mughal Dynasty would not have been restored to Hindustān and history would have recorded that the real destroyer of Bābur's empire was Kāmran and not the Afghan ruler.

It may be urged in Kāmran's defence that the Persian danger made him so harsh and relentless in his methods. His desire to safeguard the Kābul kingdom made him resort to drastic ways. There is little force in this argument. What prevented him from befriending

Humāyūn when he was wandering as an exile in Sind: There was nothing to fear, for he had had ample evidence of his goodwill and generous nature. He would not have risked a jot or tittle of his position by showing kindness to his brother in the hour of misfortune. He ought to have made common cause with him and fought shoulder to shoulder for the defence of the empire. But Kāmrān suffered from a singular lack of political insight; the larger interest was ever concealed from his vision and this led him to seek the fulfilment of his ambition in wrong directions. Selfish and unprincipled, he recklessly pursued a course, the unwisdom of which would have become apparent before long to a man who could look about him and understand the trend of events. Against these was the moral superiority of his rival which was an asset of great value to him. While Kāmrān ignored the principle that men rise and fall according to their moral worth, Humāyūn never lost sight of those attributes of human nature without which power is a curse and wealth a source of evil. That Kāmrān would have been a successful ruler of Hindustān is more than doubtful and there is no warrant for the assumption that he would have averted the Afghan danger and kept together the jarring elements of his father's empire.

Having now rid himself of the incubus which had fettered his activities almost from the first moment he ascended the throne, Humāyūn felt himself free to organise his resources and to embark upon larger schemes. He marched against Bairānā, chief of the Jānūhā tribe, who was defeated, but, on the recommendation of Sultān Adam, his country was restored to him.¹ The next chief to be overpowered was Rājā Sankar in whose country fifty villages were laid waste and many prisoners captured though they were released after the payment of a ransom. Having thus strengthened himself,

¹ Jauhar's *Tazkirāt* (I.O.MS.) has Bairānā Jānūhā. It is Piraneh in Stewart and Erskine. The *Tārīkh-i-'Alfī* has Baiānā. Abul Fazl writes Jānūhā which is mentioned as a tribe. The members of this tribe are described by Abul Fazl as 'vagabonds and impediments of the road'. Bābur makes mention of these: 'Fourteen miles (7 kros) north of Bhira lies the mountain range written of in the *Zafarnāmah* and other books as the *Koh-i-jūd*. On it dwell two tribes, descended from one parent source, one is called Jūd, the other Janjūhā.' Bābur says their headman gets the title of Rāi and his younger brothers are styled Maliks.

The *Tabqāt-i-Akbarī* speaks of Bairānā, as the name of a zamindar who had built a strong fort in the hills to prevent Humāyūn's passage into Kashmir and make the conquest of that country difficult. (*Bibliotheca Indica* p. 79.) Jahāngīr also mentions a large predatory band of 'Jānuwāns' as far north as the Chach plain near Attock. For an account of the decay of Jānjūhā power see Brandreth's *Settlement Report*, pp. 51-3 and *Jhelam Gazetteer Punjab*, pp. 93-6.

Humāyūn determined to march to Kashmir, but he found the chiefs opposed to such an enterprise. Sultān Adam was asked by the Mughal warriors to explain the inadvisability of the expedition at that moment, for Salīm Shah was advancing into the Punjāb and it was feared that the Afghans might take possession of the fort of Rohtās. It would be folly, they said, to do any such thing, for directly the Emperor had passed into the valley, the tribes who inhabited the passes being in Salīm Shah's pay, would certainly hold the defiles against his return. In short the country would become a prison. The chiefs advised marching to Kābul and then, having organised his forces, to advance upon Hindustān and Kashmir next year. But Humāyūn did not heed their protests and started for Kashmir. The chiefs followed him, but the foot-soldiers in a body turned towards Kābul.¹ Some of them were put to death, but when Qurbān Qarāwal pleaded for mercy, the Emperor decided, though with no good grace, to retrace his steps. Qarāwal told the Emperor that it was necessary for the conquest of Hindustān that the Yūsufzāis of Bajour and Swāt should be conciliated, for they were brave men and could render effective service in the invasion. Humāyūn agreed and the project was abandoned. It was suggested that safety and prudence demanded that the river Indus should be placed between him and his enemies. They recrossed it and reached the fort of Bīkrām, known as Peshāwar, which was fortified, and Jauhar writes that the work was so speedily done that it was finished in a week's time. The crops in the fields were harvested and abundant provisions were stored in the fortress. The *Khutbah* was read in the Emperor's name and an adequate garrison, commanded by Sikandar Khan Uzbek, was placed inside. Then the march towards Kābul was resumed and the Emperor reached there in the beginning of A.H. 961 (December 1553).² His conscience still reproached him for the penalty he had inflicted upon the miserable Kāmran, and he took considerable pains by letters, proclamations and speeches, to exculpate himself from any

¹ Bāyazīd's account is somewhat different from that of Jauhar who is very brief. Apparently Abul Fazl had copied Bāyazīd. According to Bāyazīd when the King was encamped between Kajoh and Swāt the Kashmir project was discussed. The Amirs decided to enter the country by the Minhār route, but, when the march began, the foot-soldiers in a body turned their faces towards Kābul. Humāyūn ordered some of them to be put to death, but desisted when Mun'im Khan told him that it was useless to kill them.

² Bāyazīd's dates are confused here. He has lost the sequence of events. He places Humāyūn's visit to Qandhār in A.H. 959 (1552) which is incorrect. Jauhar mentions the coming of the Emperor to Kābul among the events of the year A.H. 961 (1553) and he is right.

charge of undue severity. When the royal ladies offered him congratulations on the riddance of his most formidable antagonist he replied it was no time for rejoicings, for 'to strike him (Kāmrān) was like striking his own eyes'.¹ He sent a letter to 'Abdur Rashīd of Kāshgar explaining what had happened. To the chiefs of Samarqand and Bokhārā he sent messages requesting their help in the Indian expedition.

¹ Humāyūn deplored the cruel necessity that had led him to deal with his brother in such a manner. He felt sorry for what had been done.

CHAPTER XVI

THE RESTORATION

IN ORDER to follow with clearness the events which now occurred, it will be necessary to return to that portion of our narrative which contains an account of the affairs of Hindustān immediately after the death of Salīm. We have already seen how, shortly after the accession of 'Adalī, the Afghan empire broke up into five distinct parts. The titular sovereign was now recognised only in Bihār, Jaunpur and the countries east of the Ganges; while in Delhi, Agra and the Doāb Ibrāhīm Khan Sūr had assumed the title of Sultān Ibrāhīm. The Punjāb had asserted its independence under Ahmad Khān Sūr, who called himself Sikandar Shāh, while Bengal had thrown off all allegiance to the court of Delhi, under Muhammad Shah Sūr who had found a formidable rival in Tāj Khan Karrānī. It is plain that even in the disruption of the Afghan empire there were ample resources, both in men and leaders, to have made the reconquest of India by the Mughals a virtual impossibility; but with the decline of the central authority, the old separatist tendencies of the nation once more asserted themselves and the heads of the respective provinces promptly flew at one another's throats. We have seen how Sikandar Shah, leaving the Punjāb to take care of itself, marched on Delhi, and expelled the amiable but unfortunate Ibrāhīm. At the same time, 'Adalī was marching from Bihār to regain Delhi, and Sultān Muhammad Shah of Bengal was marching westward to fall upon 'Adalī's territory. In this way it came about that the Afghans deliberately, as it were, threw away the advantage of their superior resources, and did all in their power to smooth the path for Humāyūn.

While the Afghan elements were fighting among themselves, the rest of Hindustān seemed to be indifferent to what was passing in the north. In the north-west, Sind was in a state of disorder. After Shah Husain's death in 1554 the government was shared by two rivals—Mahmūd, governor of Bhakkar and Mirza 'Isā Tukhān, governor of Thatta. Both assumed the title of king and fought several battles to decide the question of supremacy. In the central region Shujā'at Khan of Mālwa had, before his death (1554), divided his kingdom among his sons. Ujjain and its dependencies were given to his youngest son Mustafā Khan; Hindia, Sewās and its dependencies to Malik Bāyazīd, while Sārangpur he retained for himself. After his death the sons fought bitterly among themselves and in 1555 the eldest, Malik Bāyazīd, succeeded in getting rid of

Daulat Khan and crowned himself under the title of Bāz Bahādur. Then he turned against Mustafā and expelled him from Raisin and Bhilsa, making himself master of his territory. He was opposed by his father's officers, who probably felt disgusted at his unfilial conduct, but he ordered them to be thrown alive into deep wells. Bāz Bahādur paid no attention to the politics of northern India and marched towards Gondwana to reduce the fort of Garh. He encountered a stubborn resistance at the hands of Rānī Durgāvati, the widowed queen of Krishna Singh, the ruler of the country. The Gonds rallied round their queen; the Mālwa troops were drawn into an ambushade and were utterly routed. Disheartened by this defeat, Bāz Bahādur plunged himself into pleasure, acquired great proficiency in music like 'Adalī and spent his time in the company of Rūpmatī, a beautiful woman who captivated him by her charms and incapacitated him for the duties of war and administration.

The kingdom of Gujarāt had been in a distracted condition since the death of Bahādur Shah. The nobles had become independent in their districts and exercised unfettered authority. The entry of Afghan adventurers into the province after the break-up of the Sūr empire had further aggravated the confusion and Mahmūd III was not a little troubled by the machinations of these malcontents. After his death the nobles of Gujarāt, among whom the names of 'Itmād Khan, Saiyyad Mubarak and Imād-ul-Mulk Arslān Rūmī deserve to be specially mentioned, placed upon the throne Ahmad Shah III (1554-61) with 'Itmād Khan as the *major domo* of the palace who kept the king as a captive in Ahmedābād and exercised the authority of a *de facto* sovereign.¹

The Rājput interest in the affairs of northern India had grown somewhat slack after the defeat of Khānuā. Mewār had passed into insignificance; she had lost heavily in men and the moral effect of Sanga's flight from the field of battle had been disastrous. The misfortunes of Mewār were aggravated by the evil conduct of Ratna and Bikramājīt. The struggles with Bahādur Shah of Gujarāt and the Khilji kings of Mālwa had greatly sapped her strength and taxed her resources. Rānā Udai Singh who succeeded to the *gaddi* in 1537 was a weak man who possessed nothing of the fire and undaunted vigour of Rānā Sanga. He had surrendered the keys of the fort of Chittor in 1543 to Sher Shah who left Ahmad Sarwānī,

¹ The year 1553 is an important year. Three Indian rulers died in this year: (1) Mahmūd Shah of Gujarāt, (2) Islām Shah Sūr, and (3) Nizām-ul-Mulk Bahari of the Deccan.

younger brother of Khawās Khan, in charge of it as his deputy.¹ The decline of Mewār had helped the rise of Jodhpur to a position of pre-eminence. The Rāthors had offered a stout resistance to Sher Shah and quickly recovered from the effect of his invasion. But to all appearance, Māldeo had ceased to take an interest in the affairs of Hindustān. It is true, he was the only prince in Rājasthān who could rally Hindū India against the Mughals or Afghans, but perhaps he saw clearly enough the risks of a campaign so far away from the seat of his power. Jesalmīr had impeded the progress of Humāyūn in 1541, and the Muslim chronicler indignantly describes this as an 'unmanly course.' Bikānir was hostile to Māldeo and had indeed intrigued with Sher Shah to bring about the former's discomfiture. None of these small states were in a position to resist the re-entry of the Mughals. They had neither the resources nor the will to embark upon such a hazardous enterprise. Self-interest clearly pointed to aloofness from the politics of Delhi as the best means of safeguarding their small dominions. Nothing could be done without a confederacy of states and this had been rendered impossible by the national disaster of 1527.

Such was the condition of Hindustān on the eve of Humāyūn's restoration. Already on the death of Salīm Shah, the Mughal Prince had begun to act. Throughout the end of 1553 and the beginning of 1554 he was hard at work in Kābul gathering supplies and equipping his army for the expedition against Hindustān. At last all was ready. Unfortunately at that moment certain Amīrs who surrounded the Emperor at Kābul made accusations of treachery against Bairam at this time still in distant Qandhār. Abul Fazl clearly says : 'His Majesty determined to go to Qandhār rather than to India as a number of strife-mongers had made false representations about Bairam Khan.'² Jauhar does not give the cause of the Emperor's departure to Qandhār, but from Bāyazīd's account it appears that certain complaints against Bairam Khan had reached the Emperor and that he had gone there to acquaint himself with matters at first-hand and to replace Bairam Khan by another commandant.³ It will be recalled that Humāyūn

¹ This was a nominal surrender, for Udai Singh regained possession of Chittor soon afterwards. Our authorities are silent as regards the reasons which led the Afghans to leave Chittor.

² A.N. I, p. 610; Text, p. 332.

³ When the Emperor offered the governorship of Qandhār to Mun'im Khan, the latter is reported to have said : 'People might suspect that Bairam had been removed from Qandhār, and that you came here simply to appoint someone in his place and take him to Kābul. When you proceed to Hindustān in the

had seized Qandhār from the Persians and compelled Bidāgh Khan to betake himself to Persia where his master accepted the official report sent by Humāyūn about the high-handedness of the Persian soldiers. According to the *Ahsān-ut-tawārīkh* the Persians after four days had marched off to their country in spite of the Shah's command that they should remain there to help Humāyūn in securing Kābul.¹ The fortress was made over to Bairam Khan, a Shiah nobleman and a dependent of the Shah.² This was what Erskine calls a 'double relation' enough to create difficulties for both sovereigns.³

The position was not clear; Humāyūn surely did not give out that he had seized the fortress for himself and as Erskine rightly observes to pacify the Shah—for the capture of the fortress amounted to the violation of the treaty between the two monarchs—he pretended that he held it only for a time with the implication that ultimately it would be made over to his friend and ally. Bāyazīd who had the means of knowing the truth writes that it was clear that ultimately Qandhār was to pass into the hands of the Qazalbāshes and that His Majesty had also told the Shah that he did not intend to retain Qandhār for himself.⁴ Humāyūn had acted under a powerful necessity. He was advised by his generals that the possession of Qandhār was

winter of 960 (1553-54), you may take Bairam with you. When you prepare at Kābul for an expedition to India, the Khan will come there. Then it will be in the fitness of things to appoint me or someone else.'

¹ Humayun was advised by Ulugh Mirza that the fortress of Qandhār should be seized and the families lodged there securely before they advanced upon Kābul. (*Ahsān-ut-Tawārīkh*, pp. 140-1.) Abul Fazl says this advice was given by Hājī Muhammad and Bidāgh Khān had agreed to leave the fortress. *A.N. I*, p. 473.

² Abul Fazl writes: *Qandhār rā az-ū giriftah bah Bairām Khān sipurdīmīta'aluq-i-Shāh dārad*. The last phrase means that he (Bairam Khan) was attached to the Shah. (*A.N. I, Bibliotheca Indica*, p. 241.) Beveridge in his note (Vol. I, p. 475) says that Bairam was a Shiah and in favour with the Shah. The meaning of the words used in the text is that the city remained dependent on the Shah. The reference is to Bairam and not to the city.

³ Bairam held Qandhār with nearly absolute power in correspondence with Humāyūn as his sovereign, though, as it would appear, he also represented himself to the Shah of Persia as his servant. *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn II*, p. 507.

⁴ Bāyazīd says Mun'im Khan said to the Emperor: 'And it is also patent that Qandhār is a weak point and ultimately it will pass into the hands of the Qazalbāsh. You too during your interview with the Shah had expressed the intention of not retaining Qandhār.' (*A.U. MS.*, p. 137.) Bāyazīd's account is corroborated by the fact that the relations between Humāyūn and the Shah continued to be friendly. At the end of 961 after his return from Qandhār Humāyūn received Ulugh Beg, son of Halhal Sultān, as the Shah's envoy at his court with costly gifts and presents from his master. *A.N. I*, p. 612; Text p. 335.

necessary for the conquest of Kābul and this had led him to seize the fort by a *coup d'état*. Bairam was in a position in which an ambitious and warlike person could be accused with reason of harbouring notions of independence. Treachery was so rife in that age that it was not difficult to believe the insinuations of 'strife-mongers' against the distinguished nobleman.

There is no reason to suppose that these accusations had any foundation beyond the natural jealousy which the representatives of the old Chaghatāi families felt at the promotion above their heads of a man of new blood and a Shiah to boot. But they were of sufficient weight to cause Humāyūn to march with his army in the direction of Qandhār to assure himself with his own eyes that his deputy was not playing him false. To embark upon an expedition against Hindustān, leaving a servant of doubtful fidelity in Qandhār, would have been extremely dangerous. So at the beginning of the cold weather of 1554, having placed Kābul in charge of 'Alī Qulī Khan Anderābī, Humāyūn proceeded to Qandhār to deal with Bairam.¹

The latter took the wisest course to dissipate his master's suspicions. When the Emperor approached Qandhār, the governor marched forty miles (ten *farsakhs*) out to meet him.² The meeting took place at the village of Shorandām. Bairam paid homage and displayed so much zeal and loyalty that it became patent to Humāyūn that the accusations were false. No pains were spared to make the visit thoroughly enjoyable and there was a ceaseless round of festivities in which learned and pious men as well as warriors took part.³ Money was lavishly spent by Bairam from his own pocket to heighten the splendour of the occasion. Among the notable persons with whom the Emperor conversed during his stay at Kābul is mentioned Maulānā Zainuddīn Mahmūd Kamāngar who had a great reputation for the purity of his character.⁴ The elasticity of Humāyūn's mind is shown by his ability to alternate conviviality with philosophical and religious

¹ Bāyazīd's date 959 is incorrect. Abul Fazl says the Emperor went to Qandhār in the beginning of the winter of 961. The first of Muharram, 961 is equivalent to December 7, 1553. It was, therefore, the winter of 1554 which the Emperor spent at Qandhār. *A.N.* I, 610.

² Some texts of the *Akbarnāmā* have two *farsakhs*.

³ Abul Fazl mentions several names : Khwājah Ghāzī who had gone to Persia joined the Emperor and was made *Dewān*. Muazzam came from Zamīndāwar and was similarly honoured. Mihtar Qarā who came with presents from the governor of Herāt was also admitted into service. *A.N.*, *Bibliotheca Indica*, pp. 333-4.

⁴ A full account of this holy man is given by Badāonī. He was a saint of the Naqshabandī sect. Ranking, *Al-Badāonī* I, pp. 588-90. Jarrett, *Ain* II, p. 310, and III, p. 69.

discussions. The visit was an extremely happy one except for one unfortunate incident which greatly displeased the Emperor. It was the murder of Sher 'Alī Beg, a Shiah officer in the royal service, by the presumptuous Abul Ma'ālī in a fit of religious fanaticism.¹ This exhibition of bigotry throws light upon the manners of the court and the religious life of the times. Abul Ma'ālī had swaggeringly declared in open *darbar* that he would kill the Rāfizī officer and he succeeded with impunity in carrying out his atrocious design.

The Emperor remained all the winter of 1554 as Bairam's guest in Qandhār and then set off again to Kābul after three months to put the finishing touches to his preparations for the Indian campaign. Apparently, because he needed his services, he thought of superseding Bairam in Qandhār. The post was offered to Mun'im Khan, but the latter pointed out the inexpediency of such a step at a time when his ears had been poisoned against the Shiah nobleman. Besides, it was highly inopportune, urged the faithful minister, to make a change just then on the eve of the invasion of Hindustān. The advice was accepted and the Emperor was finally persuaded to allow Bairam to return to Kābul after making adequate arrangements for the administration of Qandhār.² Bairam was confirmed in his charge with instructions to join the Emperor as early as possible. Khwājah Muazzam was deprived of Zamīndāwar which was conferred upon Bahādur Khan Sistān, brother of 'Alī Qulī Khan.³ No pains were spared to root out disaffection at a time like this and Walī Beg and Hājī Muhammad Sistānī, who were constantly fomenting strife, were placed under surveillance and taken to Kābul along with the imperial *entourage*.

Humāyūn reached Kābul at the end of the year (October 1554) and busied himself in collecting a formidable force. Bairam Khan also joined him after the completion of the fast of Ramzān and the Emperor gave a sumptuous entertainment in his honour.⁴ Fêtes and

¹ Abul Ma'ālī was an insolent youth. He escaped scot-free and Abul Fazl writes that the Emperor was displeased, but 'the close, though superficial, relationship' prevented him from meting out condign punishment to him. *A.N.* II, p. 611.

² He was allowed to appoint a deputy to carry on the government of Qandhār.

³ This is Abul Fazl's version. Bāyazīd says, Tārdī Khan was deprived of Zamīndāwar and it was conferred upon Bahādur Khan. Erskine says the same thing. Tārdī Beg was transferred to Anderāb and other districts to the north of the Hindūkūsh. *A.N.* I, p. 612; Text, p. 334. Bāyazīd, *A.U. MS.*, p. 138. *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p. 508.

⁴ Abul Fazl writes : '*doyam 'Id Ramzān būd*'. The date 2nd Shawwāl does not fit in with the chronology of these events. (*A.N.*, p. 335). Earlier on p. 612 (Vol. I) Abul Fazl says that Humāyūn returned from Kābul at the end of 961

tournaments were held at which archers displayed their skill and the young Akbar also learnt to take delight in feats of strength and valour. Bairam reciprocated the Emperor's hospitality by composing an ode in his praise and giving him every help that was needed in making preparations for the coming campaign. In addition to gathering round himself every man who could be obtained from the territories of Kābul, Qandhār and their dependencies, he had sent letters to Samargand, Bokhāra and all the great cities of central Asia, inviting the roving blades of the countryside to flock to his standard under lavish promises of pay and promotion. Arrangements were made for the proper government of Kābul territories and the collection of arms and ammunitions. It was at this time that petitions came from loyal persons in Hindustān informing the Emperor of the death of Salīm Shah and the consequent disorder in the country.¹ Having made all preparations, the Emperor left his infant son Mirza Muhammad Hakīm as nominal governor of Kābul, with Mun'im Khan as the active regent invested with the authority of carrying on the government in his absence, and set out on his march to Hindustān.² He was accompanied by his eldest son Akbar who was at this time a little more than twelve years of age.³ This was in the middle of November 1554. With a force amounting to less than 3000, the Emperor proceeded by Surkhāb and Lamghānāt to Jalālābād and from there floated down the river on a raft and in December 1554 encamped at Peshāwar. Bairam was left behind at Kābul and asked to bring on the main body of the army and artillery and ammunition etc.⁴ The Emperor stayed here for two days and rewarded Sikandar

(October 1554). On p. 613 he says Bairam Khan arrived on the day following the fast of Ramzān. This date seems to be incorrect.

¹ The persons from whom the petition came are described in the *Akbarnāmah* as *arbāb-i-ikhlas*. Jauhar says one Shaikh Mūsa Ahangar from the Punjāb had sent word to Humāyūn that he should come and that Hindustān would be conquered. According to the same authority one Malik-ul-Tujjār Khwājah Daulat Parāchach had come from Hindustān to wait upon the King. He presented to him a canopy (*bārgāh*) which had been refused by the Sultān of Hind. Humāyūn accepted it and regarded it as a happy omen.

² Bāyazīd writes that in Zu'l-Hijja of this year the Emperor alighted in Munshi Mīr Asghar's garden which is near the caravanserai of Mehtar Dost and on the 10th Muharram, 961 he appointed Mun'im Beg as governor of Kābul. This date is incorrect.

³ Akbar was born on Sunday, the 5th Rajab, 941 (October 15, 1542). He was a little more than twelve years old at this time according to the Christian calendar.

⁴ Bāyazīd gives a list of officers and servants who came to India with Humāyūn. *A.U. MS.*, pp. 143-52.

A list of 57 officers is given in the *Akbarnāmah* but this is much smaller than that of Bāyazīd. *A.N. I*, p. 623.

Khan Uzbek for the meritorious services he had rendered. On December 15, 1554 the Indus was reached; here he was joined by Bairam and all the Kābul force who encamped on the bank of the river. The whole army crossed the Indus and invaded the Punjāb.

The moment was most opportune. All the fighting men of the province were in Delhi with Sultān Sikandar, who had not yet been able to consolidate his position. Accordingly, there was for some time no organised resistance at all to the passage of the Mughal forces. The strong advance guard, commanded by men like Bairam Khan, Khizr Khwājah Khan, Sikandar Khan, Tārdī Beg Sultān and Lāl Beg rushed on quickly, and everywhere found the country at their mercy. The strong new fort, Rohtās, which Sher Shah had built for just such an emergency as this, was abandoned without an attempt at defence by Tātār Khan Kāshi, Sikandar Shah's governor of the northern Punjāb. Adam Gakkar who had been friendly to the imperial family and had rendered great service to Humāyūn was invited to come, but he made what Abul Fazl calls 'landholder-like excuses', and urged that he was prevented from joining the imperialists by the treaty which he had been obliged to enter into with Sikandar Shah who had taken his son Lashkari as a hostage for his good behaviour.¹

In reality Adam was under the impression that Humāyūn was not likely to succeed in his struggle with the Afghans and he judged it impolitic to help the Mughals to win a victory over their opponents. It was suggested to Humāyūn that Adam should be overpowered, but he pointed out the Gakkar chief's insignificance and his past services as an excuse for overlooking his present faults. The fort of Rohtās, the chief citadel of Afghan power in that part of the country, was captured without striking a blow and the imperial army advanced fast through the Gakkar country, crossed the Jhelum and the Chenāb and reached Kalānūr,² between the Rāvi and the Beās. From here the advance guard, consisting of Bairam Khan, Sikandar Khan Uzbek, Tārdī Beg Khan, Lāl Beg and others,³ was asked to overrun the submontane region, push into the interior and occupy Jalandhar and Sirhind. They were asked to deal with Nasīb Khan, an Afghan general, who was encamped with his troops at Hariānā.⁴ Another

¹ A.N. I, p. 622.

² A town in the Gurdāspur district in the Punjāb.

³ According to Abul Fazl, the advance guard consisted of Bairam Khan, Tārdī Beg Khan, Iskandar Khan, Khizr Khan Hazāra and Ismaīl Beg Dūldāi. A.N. I, p. 624.

⁴ Hariānā is a tract of country in the Punjāb chiefly in the eastern half of Hissār district, but also comprising part of Rohtak district and what was formerly

party consisting of Mīr Munshī Ashraf Khan, Shihābuddīn Ahmad Khan, Farhāt Khan, *Dāroghah-i-Toshākhānah* and Mehtar Sabīh Aftābchī and others was sent towards Lahore to proclaim the *Khutbah* in Humāyūn's name and to protect the citizens from the nefarious activities of mischief-mongers. The Afghan rule must have been thoroughly discredited by this time in Lahore for the chief men of the country came forward to welcome Humāyūn when he reached there. He entered the town on the 2nd Rabi II (February 24, 1555) without encountering any resistance. During his journey to Lahore the Emperor was the recipient of congratulatory messages from influential persons. At Tappā Barhalī, a place 10 *krohs* from Lahore, the Shaikhs, Qāzīs and other big men waited upon the Emperor and were hospitably entertained by him.¹ While at Lahore, the Emperor took steps to settle the country and make arrangements for the collection of revenue. The *parganā* of Patti Haibatpur was assigned to Jauhar who immediately exerted himself to redeem the debts of the Afghans who had pledged their goods to Hindū bankers (*baqqāls*).² From the ewer-bearer (*āftābchī*) to the collector of revenue was an easy transition in the 16th century and the prompt and energetic performance of his duties by Jauhar seems to have thoroughly satisfied the Emperor who shortly afterwards entrusted him with the custody and management of the entire treasury of Tātār Khan Lodi's charge.³ Not long

the States of Jhīnd and Patiālā. The name is probably derived from *hari* (green) and is reminiscent of a time when it was a rich and fertile tract. It is mentioned in the old inscriptions. In Sanskrit the country is called Hariyānak in an inscription of Balban's time. *Imperial Gazetteer* XIII, p. 54. *Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica*, 1913-14, p. 35.

¹ Jauhar, *I.O. MS.* Tappā Barhalī is mentioned in the *Aīn-i-Akbarī* among the 16 *mahals* of the Punjāb. Jarrett, II, p. 110.

² In Stewart's translation we find: 'When arrived in the *Pargunnah*, I found that it had been the custom of the Afghan farmers to give their wives or children in pledge to the bankers for money advanced on account of the collections.' (p. 113.) The word 'wives' does not occur in any of the texts that I have seen. In the India Office and other *MSS.*, the term used is *zah wa zād* and not *zan wa zād*.

It appears from the text that these money-lenders had advanced money to the Afghan farmers to pay their land tax. The words are : *bar baqqālān badlah mahsūl garo dāshtah*.

Patti Haibatpur is mentioned in the *Aīn* as having six *mahals*. This is 27 miles north-east of Kasūr and ten miles west of the Biyās. (Jarrett, III, p. 110.) According to Cunningham the antiquity of the town is proved by the burnt bricks and old wells which are still to be seen there. *A.G.I.*, p. 201.

³ Jauhar's view of the qualifications required in a successful administrator of public revenue will amuse the modern reader. When Humāyūn gave him a warning he (Jauhar) said : 'I am aware of my own unfitness for public

afterwards came the news that Shahbāz Khan and Nasīr Khan,¹ the Afghans, with 20,000 men had gathered at Depālpur to give battle to the imperialists. Humāyūn sent Shah Abul Ma'ālī, the vainglorious Saiyyad of Turmuz and a favourite of his at the head of a force of 700 horsemen. He was assisted by 'Alī Qulī Khan Shaibānī, 'Alī Qulī Khan Anderābī, Muhammad Khan Jalair and several other undaunted warriors. The Afghans charged the Mughals with such valour that Abul Ma'ālī was about to fall from his horse, when Amīr Sādān Shah rushed forward to his rescue and saved him from disaster. 'Alī Qulī Khan and others fought with great courage and overpowered the enemy. But the laurels of victory went somewhat unfairly to adorn the brow of Abul Ma'ālī increasing his vanity still further. The heads of the captives and the property seized were sent to the Emperor.

The Afghans were demoralised by this defeat to such an extent that 'Abdul Qādir Badāonī writes that 'so great was the terror inspired by the Mughals that thousands upon thousands of Afghans would flee at the sight of ten of the large-turbaned horsemen (even though they were Lahoris) and never looked behind them.'² When Bairam Khan advanced near Hariānā, Nasīb Khan Afghan offered a feeble resistance and his men fled from the field, leaving their goods to be captured by the enemy. The women and children whom the Afghans had left behind were not imprisoned according to Humāyūn's vow and were safely escorted to Nasīb's camp. After this victory the imperialists proceeded to Jalandhar, but the Afghans fled without making even a show of resistance and succeeded in carrying away their goods and baggage owing to the desertions that prevailed in the Mughal camp at the time. The cause of the dispute was the

employment, but trust that through your Majesty's favour and having had the honour for so many years of pouring water on the royal hands, I shall not discredit the appointment to which I have been nominated.' The Emperor replied : 'Good results in good and evil results in evil.'

¹ According to Jauhar, this preliminary skirmish was with Omar Khan Gakkar who had come with 12000 Afghans from Multān and wanted to meet Sikandar Khan. Bāyazīd writes that the Afghan force was led by Shahbāz Khan and Nasīr Khan. Erskine in his note (II, p. 511) is inclined to accept Jauhar's testimony. He says that the orthodox Muslim historians may have dropped the name of the Gakkar as a semi-barbarian. Abul Fazl mentions Shahbāz Khan alone. But Badāonī, Ahmed Yādgār and Firishtah mention both generals. The strength of the Afghan force according to Jauhar was 12,000 and according to Bāyazīd 20,000.

² Bāyazīd writes that when the news came that Tātār Khan Kāshī had entered the Punjāb at the head of 30,000 horse, Humāyūn sent Bairam, Iskandar Khan Qazzāq, Mirza Khizr Khan Hazāra, Lālkhan Badakhshī Haider Muhammad Akhtab Begī, Mirak Kolāmbi and Khāliq Burdi from Lahore. *A.U. MS.*, p. 156.

difference of opinion that prevailed about the tactics to be employed in dealing effectively with the enemy. Tārdī Beg Khan believed in the efficacy of a hot pursuit and wanted to press hard upon the Afghans so as to compel them to fight. Bairam thought otherwise and wanted to defer action. The disappointed general asked Bāltū Khan to use his good offices with Bairam to secure the required permission, but when the latter went to execute his mission, he was insulted by Khwājah Mauzzam Sultān and wounded in the arm. That the Mughal soldiers scorned the behests of prudence and disregarded unity of action even in such a crisis goes to show the impetuosity with which they entered on personal quarrels, and in this case nothing short of a royal reprimand sufficed to pacify the headstrong Amīrs. Bairam encamped in Jalandhar and distributed his troops over the contiguous tracts of land, charging them to hold their positions with firmness. Sikandar Uzbeg who was sent to Macchiwārā on the Sutlej pushed further and occupied Sirhind. He was encouraged to do so by the lack of Afghan opposition. But soon reinforcements from Delhi arrived under Tāhār Khan, Haibat Khan, Nasīb Khan, Mubarak Khan and others. These were sent by Sikandar Sūr who had defeated Ibrāhīm and acquired possession of Delhi. He was engaged in a contest with 'Adalī, another rival, and his difficulties were aggravated by the advent of Humāyūn on the Punjāb frontier.

The Afghans were so frightened that despite their numerical superiority they began to think of devising plans to save their wives and children and if Badāonī is to be believed 'each one occupied himself with his own necessities.' They felt convinced of the impossibility of withstanding the Mughal onset. This panicky state of the Afghans accounts for the dismal defeat which they sustained afterwards. Sikandar divided his army into two parts: with the main body he continued his operations against 'Adalī and the remaining force he despatched to Tātār Khan Kāshī who advanced upon Sirhind at the head of 30,000 men.

Sikandar Uzbeg was alarmed at the approach of such a large army. The King himself, unable to hold his ground, retreated to Jalandhar, led in all probability by considerations of personal safety. Bairam disapproved of this action which was likely to have a bad effect on the army and held it as a mistaken step in strategy.¹ It was a mistake on Sikandar's part; he ought not to have left his place without the

¹ This is Abul Fazl's view (*A.N.* I, p. 625). Erskine calls this an ill-timed move. Bairam's view was that he ought to have maintained his position at Sirhind and asked for his instructions. *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p. 574.

permission of the chief general and ought to have avoided the impression that the retreat was necessitated by the superiority of the Afghan forces.

The Mughal forces moved from Jalandhar towards Macchiwārā on the Sutlej. To the miscellaneous army of Humāyūn which contained generals of different nationalities—Bairam Khan, a Persian Turk, Khizr Khan Hazāra, an Afghan, Tārdī Beg, a Central Asian Turk and Sikandar Khan, an Uzbek—unity of plan was something foreign and soon a debate ensued as to the next step that was to be taken.

Tārdī Beg opposed the crossing of the river at a time when the rainy season was near and advised that the ferries and fords should be held so as to prevent the passage of the enemy across the river. The offensive was to be assumed when the rains were over. Bairam, who perceived the dangers of delay, advised immediate transfer to the other bank and with the support of his adherents, whose number was fairly large, and by his own strength of will, he persuaded the chiefs and soldiers to cross. He was strongly supported by men like Mullā Pīr Muhammad, Muhammad Qāsim Khan Nishāpurī, Walī Beg and Haider Qulī Beg Shāmlū. When nearly the whole army had crossed to the other side, Tārdī Beg and others who agreed with him gave in and followed the lead of Bairam Khan without protest or murmur. This was about 2 p.m., at the time of the second prayer.

As soon as the army had crossed, Bairam saw that there was no time to be lost. The Afghans were preparing to cross the river, but, when they learnt of the smallness of the Mughal army, they decided to give battle.¹ The imperial army was organised in battle array. The right was commanded by Khizr Khan Hazāra, the left by Tārdī Beg Khan, the van by Sikandar Khan Uzbek, while Bairam Khan himself occupied the centre. Bairam had informed Humāyūn of the inadequacy of the Mughal force, but he was sharply reminded of Abul Ma'ālī's exploit in defeating the Afghans with a contingent of 700 horsemen.² The battle began towards sunset, near a village of thatched huts, and arrows began to be discharged on both sides. When it became dark, the Afghans took shelter behind the village and a fire broke out and quickly spread 'producing a light equal to that of a thousand lamps.' It transpired that the Afghans had lighted a fire in order to have a clear

¹ A.N. I, p. 626. The river is called in all texts the river of Macchiwārā. It is the Sutlej.

² Stewart's translation has 800 horse (p. 114), but the texts that I have used have 700.

view of the enemy, but the effect was just the opposite.¹ The Mughals could now see the Afghans clearly in the glare of the fire and subjected them to an incessant shower of arrows. The Afghans were prevented by darkness from aiming at the Mughals and though they held the ground stubbornly for some time, they were at last overwhelmed and began to flee from the field of battle. This occurred when three watches of the night had passed. On all sides there was confusion. The number of the Mughals slain was not large, but the enemy suffered heavy losses. Their elephants, horses and treasure fell into the hands of the Mughals. A complete victory was obtained and the next day Bairam marched to Sirhind which he occupied without encountering resistance and was followed up in the rear by 'Alī Qulī at the head of a considerable force. The whole of the Punjāb, Sirhind and Hissār Fīrozah came into his possession and also some of the dependencies of Delhi.²

Humāyūn was delighted at the tidings of victory and rejoiced to see the spoils of war conveyed to him by Muhabbat Khan Ghaznavī.³ To signify his appreciation of Bairam's services the Emperor gave him the titles of *Khān-i-Khānān* and *Yār wafādār* (faithful friend),⁴ and began to make arrangements for sending reinforcements. The

¹ The name of the village behind which the Afghans took shelter is not mentioned by our authorities. In the English translation of the *Akbarnāmah* (I, p. 626) it is stated that the far-seeing soldiers chose a place near Bijana for the battle-field and stood firm. In the *Bibliotheca Indica* (text, p. 345) we have the following passage: *Dānish beshahā-yi-durbīn-i-lashkar-i-fatāh nazdīk-i-Bajarri jā-yi-jungrā bakhud qarār dadāh, pāy sabāt istihakām kardah būdand*. This means, the wise and far-sighted men of the victorious army chose a place for themselves near Bajarri and firmly fixed themselves there.

Our authorities do not agree as to the cause of the fire which quickly spread to the whole village. Most of them say a fire broke out and soon enveloped the huts in the village and lighted up the field of battle. Badāonī writes that the Afghans encamped in a ruined village and with the object of gaining a better view of the Mughal troops set fire to the roofs. The result was the reverse of what they had desired. (*Al-Badāonī*, Persian, p. 460.) Ahmad Yādgār also says the Afghans deliberately set fire to the village. *Tārīkh-i-Shāhī*, p. 337.

² *Tabqāt*, p. 82.

³ Muhabbat Khan Ghaznavī had separated from the Emperor during his flight from Hindustān. He had lived among the Afghans and now rejoined service. He related to the Emperor what had happened to the Afghans. Bāyazīd, *I.O. MS.*

⁴ According to Firishtah, the other titles conferred upon Bairam by the Emperor were *Hamdam* and *Gham Gusār* (sympathiser in sorrow). *Lucknow Ed.*, p. 242.

In the *Ma'āsir-ul—Umra* (Beveridge, I, pp. 370-71) we have *Yār wafādār*, *Birādar Nekūsiyar* and *Farzand Sa'adatmand*.

Emperor promoted to higher ranks the Turks and Tājiks in the service of Bairam and handsomely rewarded even his menial servants. Thus was fidelity recognised and under the stimulus afforded by royal munificence, many young men rose in aftertimes to the position of Khans and Sultāns and achieved glory and renown for themselves.

Sultān Sikandar, now seriously alarmed, gathered his whole force and advanced to meet the invaders. He had at this time under his command eighty thousand horse and was well-equipped with munitions to engage in battle with the Mughals who according to Jauhar numbered only seven or eight thousand.¹ Disconcerted by the superior numbers of the enemy, Bairam Khan sent expresses to Lahore informing the Emperor of the formidable strength of the Afghan army and asked him either to join immediately or allow them to return to him with a view to making a combined effort to defeat the enemy. Humāyūn who had lately suffered from colic (*qolanj*) and had become very weak at once despatched Akbar towards Sirhind and sent word to the Khān-i-Khānān that he would follow himself as soon as he had regained sufficient strength to enable him to undertake the journey. Quickly he made arrangements for the government of Lahore; the offices of *amīn* and *faujdār*² were conferred upon Shah Sultān and Bābūs Khan respectively; Farhād Khan was appointed as *Hākim* of the Punjab and Tātār Khan *alias* Muhammad Tāhīr as *Dewān* of Lahore and Jauhar was entrusted with the treasurership (*khazānchī*) of the Punjāb and Multan.

Having done this Humāyūn set out for Sirhind but soon after he left, nearly 400 Afghans under the leadership of Khalīl, raided the city of Lahore. Jalāl Sambali and Mehtar Sabīh marched against them at the head of 400 horse and encountered them near Patti Bharhalī and obtained a complete victory over them. The Emperor was delighted to hear of this success.

When Humāyūn reached Sirhind on the night of Tuesday, May 28, 1555, the imperial force had increased to 5000 according to Jauhar and nearly 10,000 according to Bāyazīd. It was obviously an unequal fight and Sikandar expressed amazement at the foolhardiness of the imperialists. The latter derived much encouragement

¹ The *I.O. MS.* of Jauhar's *Tazkirāt* gives 100,000 as the number of the Afghans. Bāyazīd says the same thing. Some texts of Jauhar have 70,000 or 80,000. The strength of the Mughal army was not much. When Bairam Khan sent expresses, he had only 700 or 800 horse. It was only when the Emperor had joined that the Mughal force amounted to 5000 according to Jauhar and 10,000 (or less) according to Bāyazīd. Nizāmuddīn says the Afghan army was four times more numerous than the Mughals. *A.N. I*, p. 627. *Tabqāt*, p. 82.

² Abul Fazl writes *Shiqdār*. *A.N. I*, p. 627.

from the presence of the Emperor and firmly held their ground in spite of the heavy odds against them. The Afghans constructed a fortified camp after the manner brought into fashion by Sher Shah, and planted themselves in such a way as to block the road to Delhi. The Mughals on the other hand made themselves secure in the town of Sirhind. For a month and a half neither party would move although there were many skirmishes in which the Mughals had a decided advantage.¹ The Emperor wisely sent out large bodies of light horse which cut off the enemy's supplies, intercepted their convoys and kept them in a perpetual state of alarm. At length Tārdī Beg, by a dashing raid, captured an important supply train and slew Sikandar's brother Kālāpahār who was in command of it. In their rage and grief at this occurrence the Afghans decided to attack. The Mughal army was drawn up in battle array according to the Chinghezi plan; it was divided into four sections : the first was assigned to Humāyūn, the second to Bairam Khan, the third to Abul Ma'ālī and the fourth was entrusted to Sikandar Khan Uzbek, 'Alī Qūlī Anderābī and other Amīrs.² On the 2nd Shaban, A.H. 962, i.e., Thursday, June 22, 1555 the decisive battle took place. Bairam's division which was in advance had to withstand the full fury of the enemy's attack for some time, it being arranged that while he held them in front, Tārdī Beg and Abul Ma'ālī should attack them in flank and rear.³ The Afghans, as Badāonī says, 'behaved with due bravery and valour' and the horses of the Irānīs began to take flight at the onset of their mad elephants. For a long while Bairam's men gallantly resisted the pressure of overwhelming numbers, giving their comrades time to work round to the flank and rear of the enemy. When obliged to retreat they carried out the movement in good order, and manned strong defensive works which they had previously prepared. The Afghans hurled themselves against these works again and again, only to be repelled each time with heavy losses. At length the Emperor gave the prearranged signal, the Mughals in ambush charged fiercely and the enemy broke and fled. The entire force of Sikandar

¹ Abul Fazl says that for forty days Humāyūn waged a masterly war before decisive battle took place. *A.N.* I, p. 631.

² According to Abul Fazl the first was assigned to the Emperor, the second to Akbar, the third to Abul Ma'ālī and the fourth to Bairam Khan.

Abul Fazl writes that on June 22 Kālāpahār came forward to give battle. This seems to be incorrect, for Kālāpahār was already killed prior to the decisive engagement. *A.N.* I, p. 631.

³ For some time there was no trace of Bairam Khan. The Emperor enquired whether he was dead or alive. From all accounts it appears that the Afghan charge was extremely violent.

was dispersed with terrible loss and the pursuit was so pushed by the victors that the vanquished had no time or opportunity to rally. They were slaughtered in large numbers. Vast booty fell into the hands of the Mughals—elephants and baggage—and to commemorate his victory Bairam Khan ordered a tower of skulls to be erected and named it *Sar-i-Manzil*. Sikandar fled from the field and took refuge in the Sewālīk hills.

The battle of Sirhind, like the other decisive battles of Indian history, seriously altered the political situation. The Afghans were beaten disastrously and were very nearly expelled from the Punjāb. The success of the Mughals was chiefly due to superior generalship, better military tactics and rapidity of movement. Although numerically inferior to their opponents, they succeeded in giving them short shrift mainly by reason of their strategical skill, better organisation and discipline. They were united in their purpose and were devoted to the Emperor who, rendered wiser by the sad experiences of life, had acquired much firmness of will and power of quick decision. The Afghans were no longer what they had been in the time of Sher Shah. They had dissipated their energies in mutual quarrels and their leaders were no match for tried generals like Bairam Khan, Tārdī Beg, 'Abdullah Khan Uzbek and others who fully grasped the weak points of the enemy and foresaw the efficacy of quick action. The position which they had taken up before the battle was not calculated to advance their interests. The fire which broke out on the eve of the battle frustrated their plan and what they had regarded as an advantage for themselves was turned into a serious handicap. In the darkness of the night they could not aim their missiles effectively at the Mughals and were bewildered by the fury of their sudden attack. Sikandar could get no help from his compatriots in Hindustān. If Hemū and the Afghans had sunk their differences and marched towards the Punjāb, they might have barred the entry of the invaders into Delhi and the advantages of the victory of Sirhind might have been neutralised. Sikandar's flight was a signal for a general stampede from the field. It caused panic and led to the break-up of the huge army. The hot winds and rain further added to their difficulties and although they escaped from the rigours of a close pursuit, they could not hold together and make a determined stand against the enemy.

The Afghans made a serious mistake in leaving the seat of the empire defenceless in a crisis like this and did nothing to guard the route from the Punjāb to Delhi. The result was that Sikandar Uzbek effected an easy entry into the heart of the empire and began to

consolidate his position without encountering any resistance. The Afghans had blundered egregiously; the ruin of their empire was imminent and as time was to show Sirhind proved to be the prelude to Pānīpat (1556).

The Mughals were restored to Hindustān. Great things lay in the womb of the future—political unity, administrative uniformity, a new orientation of imperial policy and a bold and original essay in the government of peoples divided by race and religion. From the disorder and anarchy of the later Afghan regime we turn with relief to the constructive statesmanship of Humāyūn's successor. Henceforward India was to reap the benefit of a liberal and enlightened policy, the like of which she had not seen for nearly 350 years.

Soon after the battle Humāyūn had to decide in whose name the proclamation of victory was to be issued. The two generals who competed for the honour were Bairam Khan and Abul Ma'ālī. The former was a seasoned soldier, a trusted friend and commander who had proved his loyalty in the most trying times; the latter was a presumptuous, insolent young man who had by his good looks risen into royal favour and begun to take liberties with the Emperor who addressed him as son (*farzand*) and accorded him preferential treatment which was denied to his most distinguished generals.¹ His gravest faults, including the most violent exhibitions of Shiah bigotry, were overlooked by the Emperor. He pressed his claim on the ground that he was the first to engage in a successful encounter with the Afghans and had fully participated in the later campaigns. Whatever the secret inclinations of Humāyūn, he found it extremely difficult to overrule the claims of the veteran general who had been in charge of the campaign from the beginning and who had pushed into the interior of the country with great intrepidity and courage. But once again Humāyūn's natural irresolution stood in his way. He failed to give a just decision—perhaps it was difficult for him to do so at such a critical juncture—and merely evaded the difficulty by ordering the proclamation to be issued in the name of Akbar, whose title to honour, he knew no one would dispute.


The victory entailed not merely the conquest of the entire Punjāb, but also the dispersal of the one force which might have barred the way to Delhi. We have already seen that Sikandar had employed

¹ The new MS. of A.N. referred to by Beveridge speaks of a letter from Humāyūn to Abul Ma'ālī who is addressed as son. It is one of advice and remonstrance for not co-operating with Akbar and Bairam Khan. *J.R.A.S.*, 1903, p. 120.

the resources of the Punjāb to conquer the Doāb, and in the very act of doing so, had enabled the Mughals to enter Hindustān almost unresisted. The ruin of Sikandar entailed the fall of the Afghan government both in the Punjāb and in the two capitals of Delhi and Agra. Hence, after making all arrangements for securing the line of communications against any local revolt that might break out in the Punjāb, the Mughals had nothing to do except to advance at their leisure and occupy the two capitals.

Sikandar Uzbek was despatched towards Delhi in advance to clear the road and report that there was no likelihood of Afghan resistance being offered at the capital. The Emperor himself followed behind and owing to the violence of the rains stayed for a short time at Samana, the climate of which he found beneficial for his health. Meanwhile a report came from India from Sikandar Uzbek that he had encountered resistance from the Afghans and that the Emperor should proceed without further delay to occupy the throne. Thus, after resting and recruiting his army, Humāyūn determined to set his troops in motion again. In order to make sure of the Punjāb, he appointed Shaikh Abul Ma'ālī as his deputy in the province. The Shaikh was stationed at Jalandhar with a strong force, and the strictest orders to make it his first business to preserve uninterrupted the line of communication between Kābul and Delhi. The Emperor then advanced, and on Tuesday, July 23, 1555 ascended his fathers' throne in the capital.¹

¹ Abul Fazl writes that Humāyūn marched from Samana and on the 1st of Ramzan, 962 (Saturday, July 20, 1555) alighted at Salīmgarh and on the fourth of the same month entered the city and sat on the throne. *A.N.* I, p. 634.



HUMAYUN'S RETURN IN 1555

CHAPTER XVII

LAST DAYS OF HUMAYUN

THE THRONE of Delhi was secured, but Humāyūn's hold over the country was not yet firmly established. This had to be done by bringing about a settlement of the territories which had passed under his control. The *parganā* of Mustafābād which yielded about 30 or 40 lakhs of *tankas* a year was set apart as an offering to God in thankfulness for the victory that had been vouchsafed to him.¹ Hissār Fīrozah was given to Prince Akbar as a *jāgīr* and Sirhind to Bairam Khan; Tārdī Khan was appointed to Mewāt, Sikandar Khan to Agra, 'Alī Qulī Khan to Sambhal and Meerut, and Haider Muhammad Khan Akhta Begī to Biyānā. The Punjāb was entrusted to Shah Abul Ma'ālī and he was deputed to deal with Sikandar Afghan. It was at this time that news came from Kābul that Māh Chūchak Begam had given birth to a son. Humāyūn named him Farrukhfāl and conferred the title of Sultān upon the messenger Shah Walī.

Hissār Fīrozah did not submit without resistance. When the imperialists proceeded to take charge of the place, Rustam Khan Afghan along with others offered battle. Though small in numbers, the Mughals forced the rebel to take refuge in the fortress. They besieged it for 23 days and forced him to make peace. Rustam was sent to court with the leading associates and was granted a *jāgīr* on the condition that his sons should be placed under surveillance at Peshāwar. But he did not agree to this condition and was finally imprisoned and made over to the custody of Beg Muhammad Ishaq Aqā.

More serious was the rebellion of Qambar Diwānā, a man of low origin, but of highly ambitious nature, who had established himself at Sambhal after the battle of Sirhind by defeating one Rukn Afghan.² His son proceeded to Badāon, seized the city and freely practised oppression upon the people and plundered them. The Afghan governor, Rāi Husain Jalwānī, was over-powered without resistance and Qambar himself ravaged the country of Kant Gola now comprised in the Shāhjahānpur district. 'Alī Qulī Sīstānī to whom the fief of Sambhal was assigned marched against him: he laid siege to the town and constructed mines under the fort in which Qambar had entrenched himself. The latter had taken good care to fortify battlements

¹ Mustafābād is mentioned in the *Ain* in the *Sarkār* of Sirhind. *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 596. Jarrett, II, p. 105.

² Badāonī says Qambar was appointed to the fief of Badāon. (I, p. 597). It appears from the *Akbarnāmā* also that he was invested with some sort of authority in that part of the country.

and personally went from bastion to bastion to see that the defences were in proper order. His constant vigilance and his measures to defend himself made the task of the Mughal commander difficult. But the citizens of Badāon, who had grown sick of his tyranny, sent information to 'Alī Qulī about the manner in which the rebel was to be dealt with. Shaikh Habīb Badāonī placed himself at the head of 'Alī Qulī's soldiers and led them to the place where the attack was to be launched and set fire to one of the bastions. Qambar was reduced to sore straits but nothing could break his spirit. He refused to submit to 'Alī Qulī who ordered his head to be cut off. In response to petitions from the rebel, Humāyūn had sent Qāsim Mukhils with instructions to use gentler methods in subduing him, but he arrived too late. The culprit's head was sent to court. When Humāyūn learnt of these proceedings, he expressed his disapproval of 'Alī Qulī's conduct and observed that harsh treatment was unnecessary.¹ Qambar was looked upon as a martyr by the common people who treated his tomb as a place of pilgrimage.

This was not the only instance of the contumaciousness of Humāyūn's officers. It appears there was a general desire to get riches and disobey the orders of the central government. Haider Muhammad was sent to Biyānā which was at the time of Humāyūn's coming in the hands of Ghāzī Khān Sūr, a powerful Afghan chief, whose son Ibrāhīm Sūr, as we have seen before, was a competitor along with four other princes for the throne of Hindustān. He had fought with Sikandar Sūr and was dislodged by him from Delhi and Agra. In two years prior to the battle of Midakur, which has been mentioned in a previous chapter, Ibrāhīm had fought sixteen or seventeen battles and lost all of them. Disheartened by these repeated failures, he bade farewell to his father and other relations and went to Bhatta (in Mālwa). Being involved in a war with Rājā Rām Chand he was defeated and taken prisoner. But the Rājā treated him well and offered him suitable presents.² Ghāzī Khan remained in Biyānā

¹ Probably Humāyūn was willing to pardon him, but his agent felt convinced that drastic punishment was needed.

Badāonī writes that his tomb was well known in Badāon in his day. Qambar used to give sumptuous feasts and say to his guests, 'Eat, for wealth is the wealth of God and life is the life of God and Qambar Diwānā is the cook of God.' *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 600.

² Ibrāhīm remained here for some time. When the Miyānī Afghans rose against Bāz Bahādur, the ruler of Mālwa, they made him commander of the forces. Rānī Durgāvati of Gondwana also helped Ibrāhīm, but she was asked to keep away by Bāz Bahādur. After her withdrawal Ibrāhīm did not judge it prudent to remain in the country. He went towards Orissa where he lived

during all this period. When Haider marched against him, Ghāzī Khan did not fight an open battle. He withdrew into the fort and entrenched himself there. Haider laid siege to the fortress and, in Badāonī's words, 'as the good fortune of the Afghans was like their good sense on the decline,' Ghāzī Khan did not listen to the Afghans who advised him to go to Ranthambhor and thence proceed to Gujarāt. The zamindars of Biyānā, who had opened negotiations with Haider and settled the conditions of the treaty, persuaded Ghāzī Khan to come out of the fortress on assurance of personal safety being given. As soon as this was done the rapacious commandant examined the treasures of the Afghan chief and being seized with a desire to possess them he caused Ghāzī Khan and his men to be put to death 'from the full-grown man to the babe at the breast.'¹ Humāyūn being informed of the atrocious conduct of his general, sent Mīr Shihābuddīn, Mīr Būyatāt, and another officer to take charge of the wealth of Ghāzī Khan and replace Haider in the government of Biyānā. Haider's property was sequestered, but before the arrival of the new governor he had removed the precious jewels and 'showed only ordinary things.' Such were the ways of the Mughal generals, who, when they were away from the headquarters of the central government, were not slow to take advantage of their master's indulgent and forgiving nature.²

Humāyūn's absence caused him the loss of some territories in the Kābul region and he promptly turned his attention in that quarter. It will be recalled that when the Mughal army started for the Indian invasion, Tārdī Beg, who held the *jāgīr* of Anderāb and Ishkamish, was ordered to join it. He left Muqīm Khan in charge of his affairs. Sulaimān who had already added Qunduz and certain other territories to his dominion, wanted to take possession of Tārdī Beg's lands. At first he tried to seduce Muqīm Khan to his side, but when these overtures failed he 'threw off the mask' and laid siege to Anderāb. Unable to offer resistance, Muqīm Khan came out of the fortress with his family and fighting his way to the hills finally sought refuge at Kābul.

on friendly terms with the zamindars. But he was afterwards treacherously slain by Sulaimān Karrāni in 1567. *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 554.

¹ *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 598.

² Abul Fazl rightly says : 'As Humāyūn was at a distance, and had only recently come to India, he refrained from punishing him but he declared that Haider would never again bind on his belt.' This was something like an imprecation which suggested that his arm would wither and become useless. Humāyūn was credited with such supernatural powers by his contemporaries. *A.N.* I, p. 638; Text, p. 354.

The most important affair with which the Emperor had to deal during this period was that of Abul Ma'ālī whom he had appointed after the battle of Sirhind to deal with Sikandar Afghan who had fled towards the Siwālik hills. The Shah was commanded to post himself in Jalandhar to watch Sikandar's movements and to prevent his entry into the country. But as Badāonī says 'the crow of conceit made its nest in his brain', and he began to show signs of disobedience and rebellion. He ill-treated the officers and maintained himself in princely state at Lahore. He deprived Farhād Khan of the governorship of Lahore and appointed in his place a creature of his own. He seized the treasure and laid his hands upon the estates of the nobles and appropriated to his own use the income of the crown lands. The imperial officers decided to bar his entry into the fort, but, on account of the special relation in which he stood to the Emperor, they could not carry out their resolution.¹

Abul Ma'ālī's misconduct produced serious results. Sikandar gathered more strength and came out of the fort of Mankot in which he had sought refuge and encamped in its vicinity. He had seized the treasure of Haibat Khan Sultānī amounting to 5 crores and slain him along with his officers. With the money thus acquired he collected a large army and advanced into the Punjāb.

Jauhar communicated this news to Abul Ma'ālī who had it confirmed by military scouts. He took counsel with his chiefs Muhammad Qulī Barlās, Ismāil Sultānī Khwājah Jalāluddīn Mahmūd, Musāhib Beg and Farhād Khan and they decided to march against Sikandar. But as the Mughal force was inferior to that of the enemy, Jauhar suggested the use of the carts (*arābahs*) and of raw hides in place of iron to fasten them together. Strenuous efforts were made to procure materials of war and it appears that in a short time, principally through Jauhar's exertions, 120 carts, 300 bows, 300 arrows, 300 spears, 250 shields, 50 maunds of gunpowder, 30 maunds of lead for making bullets and a sackful of arms were obtained and placed at the disposal of Abul Ma'ālī.² The imperial forces were luckily reinforced at this time by the advent of about 500 Mughals who had come on foot from beyond the Oxus to seek employment. They were equipped with arms and accoutrements and in addition to these each was given 200 *tankas* at the suggestion of Jauhar.³ Having made

¹ Humāyūn addressed him as '*farzand*' and '*barkhurdār*' and was very fond of him.

² Jauhar, *I.O.MS., A.U. Transcript*, p. 139. Stewart, p. 117.

³ Jauhar seems to have been a clever fellow. He discussed with Abul Ma'ālī the requirements of a soldier of which he gives the details in the *Tazkirāt*, and his

these preparations, Abul Ma'ālī marched towards the enemy by easy stages. At every stage *arābahs* were chained together and earth-works were constructed. Sikandar was once again driven into the hills.

But here Abul Ma'ālī's progress was unexpectedly interrupted. While he was at Lahore some officers of that place complained to Humāyūn of his presumption and indiscretion and informed him that if he wanted the campaign to be efficiently conducted, he should recall Abul Ma'ālī and appoint someone else in his place. The Emperor had a great regard for him. To dismiss him peremptorily would lower the prestige of the favourite and, therefore, Humāyūn got out of the difficult situation by appointing Akbar as governor of the Punjāb and Bairam Khan as the prince's tutor (*atālīq*) to accompany him to his new charge. Abul Ma'ālī was transferred to Hissār Fīrozah, a fief held by Akbar. Such was Humāyūn's ridiculous desire to avoid giving offence to the favourite. The reason given out for this action was that royal ladies were coming from Kābul and therefore at such a time the Punjāb should be in possession of the Prince.

When the Prince and the Khān-i-Khānān reached Sirhind, they were joined by Muhammad Qulī Bārlas, Khwājah Jalāluddīn Mahmūd, Farhād Khan, Khwājah Tahir Muhammad and Timūr Sharbatī who formed the army of Abul Ma'ālī. These defections considerably weakened the latter's position and he wrote to Humāyūn that Sikandar was cooped up in the hills and if his officers had not deserted him, he would have overpowered him without much difficulty.

Abul Ma'ālī was sorely perplexed at the turn affairs had taken. Sikandar was still at large, and the proud general was deprived of the opportunity of crushing him. He wrote to the Prince and the Khān-i-Khānān asking them to come immediately but they replied that he must withdraw from the campaign and proceed forthwith to wait upon the Emperor. He had no option but to obey. He hastily retreated to Lahore where the Khān-i-Khānān had already sent his agent Bandah 'Alī Qūrbegī to ascertain the real intentions of Abul Ma'ālī and from there proceeded to Sultānpur to meet the Prince and his *atālīq*.

As Abul Ma'ālī was held in esteem by his father, Akbar received him with due courtesy and pointed out to him his seat in the assembly advice was accepted. All texts agree in giving these details. Stewart has omitted them. They are : 40 *tankas* for a servant, 60 *tankas* for rations, and 100 *tankas* for the uniform, washing charges etc. I.O. MS., p. 139.

of Mughal Amīrs and nobles who had been invited to dinner. A separate table-cloth was spread for the Saiyyad-Zādah which greatly hurt his pride. To a man of Abul Ma'ālī's arrogant nature, the humiliation was unbearable. On returning home he sent a message to the Prince¹ reminding him of the relation in which he stood to the Emperor and had the insolence to tell him that on the occasion of the *Qamargah* (royal hunt) in Jūi Shāhī, he sat beside the Emperor and ate of the same plate with him, while the Prince, who was present, was not so favoured. He expressed his surprise at the Prince's behaviour and possibly expected some amends for the indignity that was shown to him. Akbar was put on his mettle by this overbearing conduct; he informed him through Hājī Muhammad Sistānī that a distinction had to be drawn between the laws of the state and the laws of private love and somewhat sarcastically added that his relations with him were not the same as with the Emperor. Abul Ma'ālī was deeply ashamed, but he seems to have prudently pocketed the insult.² Soon after the Prince's army began to march and proceeded to deal with Sikandar who had again fled into the hills and encamped his forces near the fort of Mankot.

When the army moved from here to Kalānūr, an express was received from Delhi that the Emperor had died of an accident.

Simultaneously with the resettlement of the country and the suppression of disaffected governors, Humāyūn had given anxious thought to the problem of administrative organisation. It was nearly fifteen years since he had set foot in the imperial city, and by the end of this weary period many changes had come over India as well as over himself. A great empire had been built up by the genius of one man and had crumbled to fragments in the hands of that man's successors. Into the building of that empire the Afghans had put all the vigour of their race, and when, through their discords, their own hands tore down the structure so carefully erected, there fell with it all hope of a permanent Afghan empire in Hindustān. The Afghans were exhausted by their sustained effort; their exhaustion was completed by the internecine quarrels that brought this effort to

¹ The letters which Humāyūn wrote at this time to Abul Ma'ālī and to the Khān-i-Khānān show his indecision. He could not take up a firm attitude. He addressed Abul Ma'ālī as *farzand* and *barkhurdār* and said that he was very eager to see him. *I.O.MS.*, p. 140.

² *A.N.* I, p. 662. For an account of Abul Ma'ālī see *Ma'āsir-ul-Umrah*, vol. I. (English translation by Beveridge, pp. 132-36.) His career ended tragically; he was ordered to be hanged on May 13, 1564 by the orders of Mirza Hakīm at Kābul.

naught; in fact for the time virtue had gone out of them leaving them far less formidable than they had ever been since Bābur's victory of Pānipat. None the less, while the Afghans had failed hopelessly to conduct the business of empire, they had, through the administrative genius of Sher Shah and Salīm Shah, made important contributions to the practice of government. As we have already seen, Sher Shah introduced a new method of revenue collection, a new means of safeguarding the state from loss and the cultivator from extortion. He also organised the system of provincial governments, keeping a firm hold upon the general policy of the viceroys of the provinces, but allowing them considerable latitude in matters of detail. But perhaps the most far-reaching of all the reforms of the house of Sūr was the introduction of what would now be called efficiency methods into the conduct of state business. Sher Shah took great care that no one could cast in his teeth the accusation of supineness and complacency which he brought against the Mughal attitude towards administrative details. While he was living at Bābur's court he had, as we have seen, placed his finger at once upon this weak point in the fabric of the Mughal policy, saying that the ruler was far too content to take his minister's word for everything, that he looked into nothing himself; and that from this would result the ruin of the empire. In this he was perfectly right; he seized and possessed the heritage of Bābur because he was able to perceive the weak points of the existing system, and select them for attack. In point of fact, the Mughal empire before the expulsion of Humāyūn was less a state than an army of permanent occupation. The Mughals could fight as they had proved and were yet to prove, on a hundred battlefields, but they attempted to import into the delicate administrative structure of a great state the casual, rough-and-ready methods of a society governed by martial law. After Bābur's victory of Pānipat, the administration of the country broke down, and the Mughals instead of devising a system to meet the needs of the case, were compelled by their own lack of skill in governance to make what they could out of the shattered fragments of the old regime. In warfare, statecraft and the arts of civilisation, the Mughals were men indeed, but as administrators they were the veriest children. It was left to Sher Shah to give them the beginnings of a revenue system, the foundations of a provincial administration, the conception of the state as a business controlled by one man at the head of affairs. With the weak points of Sher Shah's work we are not for the moment concerned; it is merely necessary to point out with clearness how that work became the foundation of the new Mughal empire under

Humāyūn's successors. The Mughals, as was their wont, took over the whole system as they found it, improving in detail, but never seriously altering in essentials. For all their brilliant achievements in state-building, they were not possessed of a real genius for governing; and had it not been their fortune to find the foundation of an efficient administrative system ready prepared for them by Sher Shah, they would probably have been content to go on in the same haphazard style which had brought Humāyūn to shipwreck.

Humāyūn must have perceived this, more or less clearly, when he commenced the last activities of his varied life. Although a little under fifty years of age, he was now an old man, worn out by hardship, worry and indulgence in opium. But as his body weakened, so his mind became stronger and clearer, his character more determined. We have already seen how, in his administration of the affairs of Kābul, as well as in the management of the Hindustān expedition, he displayed characteristics of energy and prudence which present a great contrast to his behaviour in India.¹ If ever a man learned wisdom from misfortune, without at the same time learning bitterness and cruelty, that man was certainly Humāyūn. He came back to India in feeble health it is true, but in mind and disposition better fitted to be a ruler over his kingdom than ever he had been when in the full pride of bodily and mental vigour. He devoted himself at once to superintending the affairs of the administration, and set himself to devise a plan whereby so large a tract of territory might be ruled successfully from a single centre. Finally, he evolved a scheme which in its broad outlines was based upon the practice of Sher Shah, and became, with slight modification, the principle of the later Mughal empire. It was impossible, with so vast an area to be controlled, to avoid the existence of provincial administrations; the main end was to make these administrations thoroughly efficient, and at the same time to keep them in such subordination to the central power that separation was avoided and a common policy made possible. By this means it would be practicable to instal strong vice-roys, without risking the existence of the empire, should ambition tempt the provincial ruler to cut himself loose from Delhi. In former times this had always been the difficulty of the older system. As communications were tedious and difficult, there had always been a tendency for an efficient provincial governor to get out of touch with the central administration, to become more and more self-

¹After his restoration he encouraged his nobles to marry into the families of the zamindars of Hindustān. Consequently Bairam Khan married the daughter of Hasan Khan Mewātī.

centred, until finally he was led to declare his independence. The remedy, as Sher Shah found, lay in the hands of the central power. As long as the Sultān ruled merely from Delhi, never moving out except when such urgent affairs as external aggression or internal invasion demanded his presence, so long was it impossible that there should be any real interconnection between the central and the local governments. He, therefore, put into practice the system, which was now formally laid down in the new scheme of Humāyūn, that the Emperor must not be content to sit in Delhi in ease and dignity, but must make regular circuits or tours, going from province to province, keeping himself in touch with local conditions, and supervising the work of the local governments. In this way, not only would the central and local administrations be enabled to work in harmony, but in addition, both the viceroys and the lower officials of the provincial governments would be kept in proper subjection to the Emperor, being constantly reminded of his position of ultimate superiority. As applied to the districts which now acknowledged Humāyūn's superiority, the new scheme worked out somewhat as follows: Delhi, Agra, Qanauj, Jaunpur, Māndū and Lahore were to be recognised as local capitals. In each there was to be a governor, a high military official, appointed by the crown and supported by a force that was adequate to every demand which might be made upon it. The governor was to be assisted by an administrative board, which was to comprise the influential men of the province and was intended to act as a check upon his caprice by registering protests and offering advice. Further he intended to provide embroidered gold and silver chains which were to be used in public assemblies by princes, governors and others whom the King especially delighted to honour, for he held that there were always in society some men who were more likely to be won over by distinction than by the grant of lands and estates. As the connecting link between the provinces, the Emperor was to visit each capital in turn inspecting and supervising the work of the government. He was to have a standing force of 12,000 men under his immediate command, which would make him considerably superior in resources to any refractory governor, but which at the same time would not constitute an intolerable burden upon the province where it was quartered or to the districts through which it marched.

Before the Emperor had had time to get this scheme into working order, he met his death by a curious accident. He had actually conferred the government of Delhi upon Tārdī Beg, and had given orders for the removal of Abul Ma'ālī, who had been misconducting

himself, from the governorship of the Punjāb, and had set out to regulate the affairs of Agra. On the way thither he stopped at his library in the Dīnpanah fortress and here occurred the fatal accident which put an end to his life. How all this happened will be described in some detail.

After Akbar had left for the Punjāb, Humāyūn often spoke of death, though such conduct was unbecoming in a Prince who had to administer the affairs of a large empire. The sight of old graves and sepulchres, in and about Delhi, often brought to his mind the thought of the Great Beyond and he felt an inclination to depart from the world. From Bāyazīd's account it appears that he had come to form a poor opinion of the world and was much pained by human wickedness and ingratitude. He had vowed that if he succeeded in reconquering his ancestral dominion, he would retire from the world, leaving everything to the care of his son and spend the remaining days of his life in the company of pious and learned men. He had begun to reduce his dose of opium too. He wanted to see how long it would take to reduce the dose to two or three pills. Taking seven days' supply, he wrapped it in paper and said that that was all the opium he would take. On the day of the accident, i.e., Friday, January 24, 1556 he had four pills with him; he mixed them in rose water and took a potion of them.¹ In the evening of the same day were presented to him Shah Bidāgh Khan, Ālam Shah, Beg Mulūk² and some other officers who had gone to Mecca; on the same day was also perhaps introduced to him the Turkish admiral Sīdī 'Alī Reīs who had come from Gujarāt. Someone came from Kābul also to inform him of the state of affairs there. He went up

¹ Abul Fazl does not clearly say how many pills (*habb*) he had on that day. But since it was his desire to reduce his dose, it is possible that he may have taken only one. Beveridge is right in saying that it is hardly likely that he would take four all at once. He lived for three days after the accident and perhaps thought that the quantity of opium which he had set apart would last till his death. *A.N.* I, 654; Text, p. 363. Beveridge's note 2, p. 654.

There is a difference of opinion among historians with regard to the date of the accident. Abul Fazl's text has '*ākhīr-i-roz-i-Jumma Rabi'-ul-awwal 963*.' Some of our authorities give the 7th Rabi I (Monday, January 20), as the date of the accident. But there is good evidence to show that the accident occurred on a Friday. The circumstances narrated by Abul Fazl lead to this conclusion. The 7th Rabi I was not a Friday but a Monday. The date of the accident was the 11th Rabi I (January 24, 1556). This is in agreement with Sīdī 'Alī Reīs who was present in Delhi at the time of the accident. *A.N.*, *Bibliotheca Indica*, p. 363.

² Beg Mulūk seems to have gone to Mecca after Kāmrān had left. It will be remembered that his conduct was criticised for not going with Kāmrān.

the roof of the library to enjoy the cool of the afternoon and received the homage of the people who had assembled at the chief Mosque.¹ He talked to them and made enquiries about Mecca and acquainted himself with matters relating to Kābul and Gujarāt. This being done, he sent for the mathematicians to observe the rising of Venus, for at that exact hour he wished to hold a grand assembly in which to promote his officers. Abul Fazl describes the accident in these words: 'At the beginning of the evening he wished to descend and when he came to the second step, a reciter (*muqrī*) by name *Miskīn* (wretched) raised an untimely call to prayer. His Majesty, out of respect to the call, wished to sit down where he was. As the steps (*darjāt*) of the stair (*zīnah*) were sharp (*tez*) and the stones slippery (*laghzinda*) his blessed foot caught in the skirt of his robe (*dar dāman-i-postīn*) at the moment of sitting down and his good staff slipped. He lost his footing and fell upon his head, his right temple receiving a severe blow, so that some drops of blood issued from his right ear.'²

¹ The library was according to Abul Fazl recently fitted (I, p. 656). It is the Sher Mandal, an octagonal building of granite and red sandstone and has two storeys. The stairs are narrow and steep and Erskine is wrong in saying that they were of marble. The author of the '*Asār-us-Sanādīd*' writes that after the restoration the Sher Mandal was fitted up as a library. An interesting account of this building will be found in Rodgers' article in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*. Ahmad Yādgar and Khwafī Khan write *Kabūtarkhānah* which is incorrect. The Sher Mandal was built by Sher Shah in 1541 and was according to Abul Fazl fitted up as a library for Humāyūn shortly before his death. Carr Stephen says, 'Those who have visited Sher Mandal will see the utter impossibility of Humāyūn's "rolling downstairs on to the ground".' 'On this point,' he adds, 'every description of Humāyūn's death is more or less incorrect.' *Archaeology of Delhi*, p. 194.

Rodgers has given a good account of the accident in the *J.A.S.B.* 1871, pp. 133-6. He says it could not be impossible for him to fall down the first flight of stairs and then, at the bottom of them, fall from the first storey down to the ground. He did not fall on the parapet as some writers have said. Beveridge in his elaborate note says that the stairs open out in the body of the roof, so that Humāyūn fell through the roof rather than off it. The stairs are certainly very steep and awkward, he adds, and might easily cause a nasty fall. The fall was sufficiently serious to cause irreparable damage to Humāyūn's worn-out frame.

Carr Stephen, *Archaeology and Monumental Remains of Delhi*, pp 193-4. Syed Ahmad, '*Asār-us-Sanādīd*', pp. 10-11, 52. *J.A.S.B.*, 1871, p. 135. Erskine, *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p. 528. *A.N.* I. Beveridge's note, pp. 655-7.

² *A.N.*, *Bibliotheca Indica*, p. 363; English translations, p. 657. This is supported by 'Alī Reīs who was present in Delhi. He is the Chaghataī Khan of Abul Fazl who was presented to Humāyūn on the fateful evening. He writes: 'All was ready for the start. Humāyūn had given audience on Friday evening,

What really happened was this: As Humāyūn was coming down the steps to start on his journey, he heard the call of the Muazzin and reverently knelt down on the second step. As he was getting up leaning heavily on his staff, after the manner of old men whose joints are stiff, the end of his staff slipped on the edged step, his foot failed him and he fell headlong down the steps on the ground. This account has been repeated by all later writers. Nizāmuddīn, Badāonī, Ahmad Yāgār and Firishtah say that the Emperor was picked up unconscious and carried to the palace. After a short time he rallied sufficiently to speak and regained consciousness. But he soon relapsed into a state of coma, and on the second day his weakness increased and it was feared that the end was near. The physicians tried all kinds of remedies but they proved of no avail. A *firmān* was sent through Shaikh Nazr Culī¹ or Jolī to Akbar at Kalānaur² informing him that an accident had befallen the Emperor but that he was on the way to recovery and there was no cause for anxiety.³ The *firmān* ran thus:

‘On that day I descended from the roof of my masjid. In the middle of the staircase, (*ba miyān-i-zīnah*) I heard the Azān, and sat down from motives of reverence. When the Azān was over, I rose. But the end of my staff had got entangled in the hem of my coat (*jāmah*), I slipped and fell down. The corner (*goshah*) of the staircase struck my lower ear (*bunagosh*), and several drops of blood issued from my ear. I was insensible for some time. When I

when upon leaving his castle of pleasures the Muazzin announced the Azān just as he was descending the staircase. It was his wont, whenever he heard the summons, to bow the knee in holy reverence. He did so now, but unfortunately fell down several steps and received great injuries to his head and arm.’ Vambéry, *Travels and Adventures*, p. 55.

The *Arabic History of Gujarat* III (p. 1064) gives an account of the accident and says that it is not mentioned in the *Akbarnāmah*. Probably the copy, which the author of this history consulted, did not make any mention of it.

¹ Nazr Shaikh Culī in *A.N.* I, p. 657. Bāyazīd says after the conquest of Hindustān Akbar made him Mīr Adi. His name is found in Bāyazīd’s list as Shaikh Nazr Culī Turkestānī. *A.N.I.*, p. 657.

² Kalānaur is now a small town with a population of about 5000 inhabitants in the Gurdāspur district. It was the chief place in the neighbourhood from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century. *I.G.S.V.*

³ The *Mīrāt-i-‘Ālam* B.M. Add. 7657 p. 971a reproduces this letter. What is given above is its translation, in Blochmann’s remarks on Rodgers’ paper in the *J.A.S.B.* XL, p. 137.

In all, three expresses were sent: (a) A swift courier was sent to inform Bairam of the Emperor’s fall when the army was encamped at Hariānā. (b) A second express was sent with Shaikh Culī to Kalānaur. (c) A third express was sent later conveying the news of Humāyūn’s death.

recovered consciousness I passed into the *daulat-i-khānah*. It is all well now, do not feel anxious about me.'

This was a diplomatic message drafted by politicians near Humāyūn's sick-bed and was intended to assure the public mind that there was no danger to the Emperor's life. But in reality his condition had grown worse and he expired on Sunday January 26, 1556 at about sunset.

There is a great discrepancy among our authorities about the date of Humāyūn's death as the following table will show:¹

<i>Authorities</i>	<i>Date of accident</i>	<i>Date of death</i>
Jauhar		11th Rabi I 963 This is given only in Stewart's translation. It is not given in any of the MSS.
Bāyazīd Sīdī 'Alī Reīs <i>Akbarnāmah</i>	Friday evening Rabi Friday of Rabi I In an MS. referred to by Beveridge in the <i>J.R.A.S.</i> 1903, p. 121 it is Friday the 11th Rabi I.	End of 963 Monday Rabi I Sunday 13th Rabi I
<i>Tabqāt</i>	7th Rabi I	15th Rabi I
<i>Al-Badāonī</i>	7th Rabi I	15th Rabi I
Ahmed Yādgar	7th Rabi I	11th Rabi I
Firishtah	7th Rabi I (at sunset)	11th Rabi I
Amal Salih	Evening of 11th Rabi I	13th Rabi I
<i>Bādshānāmah</i>		Sunday 13th Rabi I
<i>Nafaisu-l-Ma'āsir</i>	Friday 16th Rabi I	Sunday 18th Rabi I.
Or. 1761 (<i>J.A.S.B.</i> 1905, p. 236)		

¹ It is difficult to determine the exact date of Humāyūn's death. The *Bibliotheca Indica* edition of the *Akbarnāmah* does not specify the date. It simply says the accident occurred on a Friday evening. Other historians give the 7th Rabi I as the date of the accident. The new MS. of the *Akbarnāmah*, referred to by Beveridge in *J.R.A.S.*, 1903, pp. 115-22, gives Friday the 11th Rabi I as the date of the fall and Sunday the 13th as the date of Humāyūn's death. There seems little doubt that the accident took place on Friday the 11th Rabi I and not on the 7th which fell on Tuesday. But Abul Fazl's date of death, Sunday the 13th, causes some difficulty. In the first place Sīdī 'Alī Reīs says clearly that the Emperor died on the third day, i.e., Monday, which will be the 14th Rabi I. Sīdī 'Alī is expected to know the truth. In Vambéry's translation Monday is expressly mentioned. If the death occurred on the 13th the *Khutbah* must have been proclaimed on the 30th after 17 days, but Abul Fazl says it was proclaimed on the 28th of the same month. Calculating backwards the date of Humāyūn's death would be the 11th Rabi I (Friday), but the date of the accident would

An express was immediately sent to Akbar informing him of the calamity that had befallen the State of Delhi.¹ The Prince cried aloud with grief and, though the Khān-i-Khānān, Atka Khan and Māham Angah tried to console him, it was with great difficulty that he was comforted and his mind was diverted towards charities that were performed for the benefit of the soul of the deceased.

At the capital, the nobles, it seems, apprehended much trouble. They did not know what to do and Sīdī 'Alī Reis tells us that they were 'in the greatest consternation.'² The admiral writes: 'I tried to encourage them and told them how at the death of Sultān Salīm, the situation was saved by the wisdom of Pīrī Pāsha, who managed to prevent the news of his death being noised abroad. I suggested that by taking similar measures, they might keep the sovereign's death a secret until the Prince should return. This advice was followed.'³

It was decided by the nobles present to conceal the fact of Humāyūn's death until arrangements for the succession of the Prince were made. Devices were employed to assure the public mind that the Emperor was still alive and convalescent and even the programme of his tour was announced. This was done for seventeen days. To disarm all suspicion one Mullā Bekasi (Mullā Bi of Sīdī 'Alī, who resembled the Emperor in appearance, was dressed in the imperial robes and presented every morning in the royal gallery where the Emperor was wont to sit, to receive the homage of the populace.⁴

have to be placed earlier and then it cannot be Friday. Beveridge, Rodgers and Hodivala have accepted the 13th Rabi I as the date of the Emperor's death, but in view of the facts stated above it cannot be definitely adopted. The Emperor died either on the 13th or the 14th Rabi I.

A.N. I, pp. 654-5, 658. Sīdī 'Alī Reīs, (*Vambery's Travels and Adventures*), p. 55. Hodivala, *Historical Studies in Mughal Numismatics*, pp. 264-5 J.R.A.S. 1903, pp. 115-22. J.A.S.B., 1905, pp. 236-7.

¹Akbar was immediately informed of the event. Sīdī 'Alī Reīs (*Vambery's Travels and Adventures*), p. 56.

²*Ibid.*, p. 56.

³*Ibid.*, p. 56. This was on Tuesday according to Sīdī 'Alī Reīs, Sīdī 'Alī takes credit for suggesting this step, but we learn from Gulbadan that Bābur's death was also concealed. 'A man was dressed in red and seated on an elephant. He was made to proclaim that the Emperor Bābur had become a Darvesh and had given his throne to the Emperor Humāyūn.' (Gulbadan, p. 109.) The reason why the situation caused anxiety may be gleaned from Arāish Khan's words: 'It is not well to keep the death secret because when such misfortunes befall kings in Hindustān, it is the custom of the bazar people to rob and steal. God forbid that the Mughals not knowing, they should come and loot the houses and dwelling places.' Gulbadan, p. 109.

⁴Bekasi was a native of Ghaznī. He died at Peshāwar in 973 (1566). He was a

At last on Thursday, February 12, 1556 Tārdī Beg who had now become the *Amir-ul-Umrā* of the State, having completed the preparations for the suppression of local disturbances, proceeded in state to the *Jām-i-masjid*, and caused the *Khutbah* to be recited in the name of Jalāluddīn Muhammad Akbar. The reign of Humāyūn was at an end.

The declaration of Humāyūn's death caused a great disturbance in the country as invariably happens on the death of an eastern monarch.¹ The Amīrs did what they could to restore public confidence. They went to their respective provinces to keep the situation under control. At Delhi Tārdī Beg assumed charge of the administration and sent the insignia of sovereignty with trusty agents to Akbar along with professions of loyalty and devotion.² Humāyūn's death marks a crisis in the history of the Mughal empire. Akbar was quite young; the Doāb was desolated by famine; the army was small and its hold on the country yet insecure; and the empire was surrounded by enemies who possessed formidable strength.

Akbar was still at Kalānaur. It was there that his formal coronation took place in a garden on Friday, February 14, 1556, on an improvised throne which is still in existence.³

The remains of Humāyūn were removed to the village of Kilugharī, some 500 yards to the east of the Delhi-Muttra Road between 3 and 4 miles from Delhi where a tomb was erected in 1565, under the superintendence of Hājī Begam, at a cost of 15 lakhs.

poet and Badāonī quotes his verses. An account of the Mullā is given by Badāonī. (Vol. III, p. 192.) Sīdī 'Alī describes how this was done: 'His (Mullā Bekasi's) face and eyes were veiled. The Chamberlain, Khoshāl Beg stood behind, and the first secretary in front of him, while many officers and dignitaries as well as the people from the riverside, on seeing their sovereign made joyful obeisance to the sound of festive music.' Vambéry, *Travels and Adventures*, p. 57.

Abul Fazl writes that the people performed the *Kornish* and were, in some measure, relieved from their distress and confusion. *A.N.* I, p. 659.

¹ *A.N.* I, p. 659.

² One of them was Ghulām 'Alī Shashangasht. Abul Qāsim, the son of Kāmran, was also sent to pay homage. *A.N.* I, p. 660.

³ The date is 2nd Rabi II A.H. 963.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE CONCLUSION

SO DIED and so was buried the most quixotic figure that had ever occupied the Mughal throne in Hindustān. His character is to be gleaned from his actions, which have been described at full length in the preceding pages, from his attitude towards the problems of life and the opinions expressed by him in regard to private and public matters. The reader may be asked to forgive if there is a repetition of certain things which have been said before. (There is no monarch in Indian history whose life presents such strange contrasts of fortune.) Born in the purple, he had to pass through vicissitudes of no mean order; the metal of which he was made was subjected more than once to crucial tests; he had to put up with treachery, intrigue and ingratitude of the basest kind, but nothing seemed to disturb the equanimity of his temper or break his indomitable spirit.) Few men have endured so much misery and hardship with a heart so entirely unsoured and have retained amidst so much that was evil the noble qualities of human nature. His kindness was often requited by the direst ingratitude, but he never showed a trace of rancour or desire for revenge. No murder or massacre accompanied his succession to the throne nor was any attempt made to abandon the family policy laid down by his father. There are a hundred instances which reveal the tenderness with which he regarded the interests of the dynasty around which his strongest earthly affections were intertwined. Indeed, there is something singularly touching in the self-forgetfulness which he showed in trying to compose the differences between himself and his brothers, something fantastic in the honesty with which he directed his military operations and pathetic in the hope which he entertained about the giving up of evil designs by his enemies. He was moved to tears on occasions, and if there was a fault which, more than any other, marred his enterprises, it was the innate goodness of his nature and his unlimited capacity for forgiveness. True, he was slow to take decisions; he procrastinated when swift action was needed, but he suffered more because he failed to appraise correctly the malignity of his foes. To the love of culture, which he had inherited from his father, he added a philosophical mind, capable of rising above the bigotry of sects and creeds. To induce harmony in the state, he took a lenient view of the shortcomings of his opponents and his forbearance sometimes caused surprise among his friends and supporters. It was the defects of his qualities that brought disaster upon him, but he never lost his optimism even in the most

trying circumstances and by resolute perseverance succeeded at last in regaining his throne. Indeed, this makes Humayūn's position unique among the Indian Timūrids. From his exile, he returned an altogether different man, strong minded, energetic and practical. The good work that he wanted to do for the state was continued by his son who did not merely extend the boundaries of his empire, but struck its roots deep in the hearts of those whom he conquered by the valour of his arms.

Humāyūn was a man of medium size, neither too tall nor too short. His features were handsome and his bodily complexion was of the hue of wheat. He had developed his physical strength by vigorous exercises, was skilled in horsemanship and archery, and was a good shot and like many others of his race was fond of hunting and hawking. The *Qamargah* (hunt) was a favourite pastime with him and contemporary chroniclers tell us how actively interested he was in organising it. He had received an education befitting a Tūrkī prince and had cultivated from his early youth a taste for literature, art and science. The Timūrids were well known for their culture in Central Asia and Humāyūn shared to the fullest extent their liberality of spirit. His early tutors were his father's secretaries like Khwājah Kalān and Shaikh Zainuddīn and under their guidance he had acquired a considerable amount of knowledge. He knew Arabic, Tūrkī and Persian, and could speak in these languages. Occasionally, he spoke in Tūrkī when he did not want to be understood by the majority of those present, but usually he spoke in Persian which had by now become the language of the court.¹ He had cultivated a fondness for mathematics and astronomy in the company of men like Shaikh Abul Qāsim Astrabādi, Mullā Nūruddīn and the famous astronomer Maulānā Ilyās.² When he married Hamīdah, he consulted the astrolable himself,³ and when Akbar's horoscope was presented to him, he examined it within closed doors and Abul Fazl says he danced with joy.⁴ He himself fixed an auspicious hour in consultation with famous astrologers, but the prince played truant and was not to be found at the particular moment.⁵ He extended his patronage to those who possessed mastery over these subjects

¹ Jauhar, *I.O. MS.*, pp. 56, 120; *A.N.*, Text, pp. 280-81.

² Bāyazīd, *I.O. MS.* Nūruddīn Tarkhān was for a long time *mutvalli* of Humāyūn's tomb in Delhi. He was born in Khurāsān and educated in Mashhad. He was a private friend of Humāyūn and remained in his service for 20 years. He wrote verses under the *nom de plume* of Nūī., Blochmann, *Ain I*, pp. 541-2.

³ Gulbadan, *H.N.*, p. 54.

⁴ *A.N.*, p. 123; Text, p. 270.

⁵ *A.N.*, p. 519; Text, p. 270

and appointed them to high posts. After his restoration, he wanted to construct an observatory, selected the site and collected the necessary apparatus, but the project was cut short by his death. He believed in the influence of stars on human destiny, and took delight in converse with astrologers and soothsayers. His belief in supernaturalism and occultism led him to embark upon fantastic projects. He classified the nobles of his court according to the position of the planets, and even the dresses which the courtiers were to wear corresponded to the colour of the particular planet of that day. By his orders, a *khargah* (tent) was built, which was divided into twelve halls of audience, each of which was named after one of the twelve constellations of stars. A carpet was similarly constructed, which had nine astronomical circles marked on it, each of which was named after a star and assigned to his courtiers according to their rank. His love for astronomy he retained to the last. Shortly before his death, he summoned all the mathematicians, for it was expected that Venus would rise on that night and he would hold a grand assembly for the promotion of his officers. Sīdī 'Alī Reīs, the Turkish admiral, testifies to his interest in astronomy. He was asked by the Emperor to calculate solar and lunar eclipses, their degree of latitude and their exact date in the calendar. The Emperor said: 'Meanwhile calculate solar and lunar eclipses, their degree and their exact date in the calendar. Assist our astrologers in studying the course of the sun and instruct us concerning the points of the Equator.'¹

Learned discussions were the order of the day at his court, and he took a keen interest in them. He was fond of books from his childhood and Jauhar relates that on one occasion when his lost books were recovered, he was profoundly delighted and observed, 'Thank God, the treasure which cannot be got again is safe; other things are easy to obtain.'² He had learnt the art of composition with care and had greatly improved his epistolary style under the direction of his father.³ His love of science is shown by the fact that Maulānā Muhammad Fāzil dedicated to him his *Jawāhir-al-'ulūm* which is a treatise on history, astronomy, mathematics, logic, philosophy, ethics and jurisprudence.⁴ He was gifted with poetic talent of no

¹ *Mirāt-ul-Mamālik*, (Eng. Trans.), p. 48.

² The author of the *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī* says the King was a voracious reader. His father was constantly in attendance on him and was asked to read books to him. F. Lutfullah, p. 190.

³ *Memoirs*, p. 624-7; *Tārīkh Khāndān-i-Timūriyah*, A.U. MS., pp. 88-9. Jauhar, I.O. MS., p. 99.

⁴ This is a treatise in Arabic and was compiled in 1538. For a full account

mean order. He could write *ghazals*, *masnawīs* and *rub'aīs* which are interspersed in many of our histories. His *Diwān*, copies of which are now available, was to be found, according to Abul Fazl, in the imperial library.¹ His best poetry consists of *ghazals*, specimens of which are given in the *Nafā'īs-ul-Ma'āsir*. Occasionally he wrote verses in *Tūrki* of which only one has been traced in the work referred to above. The intervals of leisure which he was able to snatch from the routine of state business were devoted to the writing of verses. At his court, poetical discussions were frequent in which poets from Persia, Turkistan, Bokhārā and Samarqand took part.² Humāyūn's stay in Persia had greatly increased his love of Persian poetry and when he returned, he was accompanied by a number of poets, learned men and scholars.³ Among these are mentioned the names of Mullā Ilyās, Mullā Nūruddīn Tarkhān, 'Abdul Bāqī Sadr, Mīr 'Abdul Hai Bokhārī, Khwājah Hijrī Jāmī, Maulānā Bazmī, Mullā Muhammad Sālih and Mullā Jān Muhammad. The art of poetry was declining in Persia at this time for lack of court patronage and this accounts for their exodus to India. A poet of Shah Tahmāsp's time sang:

Without troubles they have made good progress,

The scribe, the painter, the Qazwīnī and the ass.⁴

At Kābul Humāyūn was joined by the poets Jahi, Yatmān and Hairati and when they presented their *ghazals* to him, he suggested improvements in them.⁵ Of the Emperor's metrical skill Sīdī 'Alī

see Ghanī's *History of Persian Literature under the Moghuls*, Vol. II.

¹ Dr. S. K. Bannerjee in his *Humāyūn Bādshāh*, Vol. II quotes extensively from the *Diwān* and in his preface writes: 'I am grateful to Mr. S. H. Askari of Patna for obtaining for me the only existing copy of Humāyūn's *Diwān*.' The author obviously mistook another poet for Humāyūn the Emperor, for in the *Journal of the Behar and Orissa Research Society* we find the following from Mr. Askari's pen: 'The author has made an amazing mistake in taking the *Diwān* of the poet Amīr Humāyūn Isfāhānī to be that of Emperor Humāyūn; the only known copy of the Emperor's *Diwān* is in the possession of the reviewer.' (*J.B.O.R.S.* XXV, 1939, p. 71.) Mr. Askari was at the time Secretary of the Khudābaksh Library and it appears from Dr. Bannerjee's remarks in the preface that he was shown not the *Diwān* of Humāyūn, the Mughal Emperor but of another poet bearing the same name. How poorly the thanks are deserved I leave to the reader to judge for himself.

² Sīdī 'Alī Reīs speaks of Humāyūn's interest in poetry. Poetical discussions were held at court in which the officials also participated. The names of Khoshal, the imperial archer and 'Abdur Rahmān Beg Aftābchī are specially mentioned. *Mīrāt*, English translation, p. 51.

³ Bāyazīd, *A.U. MS.*, p. 154.

⁴ Browne, *History of Persian Literature*, p. 97.

⁵ Ranking, *Al-Badāonī*, 618-22; Persian, p. 477. Badāonī gives a detailed

Reīs speaks with fervent admiration. Humāyūn discussed with him the merits of rival poets when he rode along with him to visit the tombs of holy men in Delhi and was much impressed by his critical acumen. On another occasion when he recited a *ghazal* after the execution of the agreement between the Emperor and Sultān Mahmūd of Bhakkar, he was much pleased and called the admiral a second 'Alī' Sher and loaded him with favours.¹ The Emperor was so fond of verses that a *ghazal* was sometimes regarded as a passport to royal favour.² He was capable of making impromptu verses and had so much knowledge at his command as to be able to make apposite quotations. He was specially interested in the religious and mystic poetry of the Persians to which he was naturally drawn by reason of his 'warm feelings and lively imagination.'

Though inferior to Bābur in the handling of words and the love of nature, he shows merit of a high order. His language is simple and clear and there is a sweet tenderness with which his poems are suffused. He often speaks of love and at times his thoughts rise to higher levels. Like many others of his time, he is influenced by the Sūfī doctrine and his poems speak of the desire to hold direct communion with the Divine Reality. Like Hāfiz, he speaks of God as his beloved, whose glorification is the chief object which the devotee, who is described as a lover, seeks to accomplish. His *Diwān* contains several lines which are illustrative of his pantheistic tendencies.³

To his knowledge of science and poetry, Humāyūn added a love of painting. When he was in Persia, he had seen Behzād's work and was greatly impressed by it. The Persian art was at its height and though the great master was dead, his pupils carried on the tradition. Mīr Saiyyad 'Alī, who had illustrated Nizāmi's *Khamsah* and Khwājah 'Abdul Samad, famous as a painter and calligraphist, joined him in

account of the poets of Humāyūn's reign. Ranking, *Al-Badāonī*, pp. 605-37; Persian, 467-92.

The Emperor had corrected Hairati's poems in Mashad. *A.N.*, Text, pp. 445-7.

¹ *Mirāt* (Vambery's Translation), p. 49. How a document was sealed the admiral describes: 'The document was drawn up, and the Emperor dipping his fist in saffron pressed it upon the paper, this being the *Tughra* or imperial signature.'

² *Ibid.*, p. 54. When the admiral wanted to go, he sought the intercession of Shabin Beg, the keeper of the imperial seal, by presenting him with two *ghazals*.

³ In Abul Fazl's day this *Diwān* was in the imperial library. Verses from the *Diwān* are cited in many Persian histories. A number of verses are reproduced in the *A.N.*, *Iqbāl-nāmah-i-Jehāngīrī* and Firishtah's history. *A.N.*, Text, p. 369. *Iqbāl-nāmah-i-Jehāngīrī*, Lithograph Ed. p. 124. Firishtah, *Lucknow Ed.*, p. 243.

Kābul and entered his service some time in 1550. They came to Hindustān and from the first the Emperor and his little son Akbar took lessons in painting and asked him to prepare a large and fully illustrated copy of *Dāstān-i-Amīr Hamzah*.¹ The two artists formed the nucleus of the Mughal school of painting which reached its high watermark during the reigns of Akbar and Jehāngīr.

He was a strong believer in Sunnī orthodoxy but like his father was free from bigotry and intolerance. He was never without ceremonial ablution (*wuzū*) and never uttered the name of God or of the Prophet without *tahārat*. One day he called Mīr 'Abdul Hai as 'Abdul and after performing his ablutions told him that he did not call him by his full name because Hai was the name of God and he could not utter it without the necessary purification.² He was particular about the observances of the faith and the accident which resulted in his death was due to his piety. In a place of worship or in his private residence he would never allow a man to place his left foot first and, if a man did so, he was asked to retrace his steps and make his entry again.³ He longed for the company of *darveshes* and passed the greater part of the night in holding religious discussions with them. He never soiled his lips with foul or calumnious utterances, controlled his temper and when he was displeased with someone all that he said was 'you silly fool.'⁴ At times, he gave up meat and lived entirely on vegetables in the hope of purifying his soul and making his body a fit vehicle for spiritual experiences. Abul Fazl writes that he abstained from animal food from the time he left Kābul until the conquest of Hindustān and lived a devout life seeking the blessings of saints for his great enterprise.⁵ He loved God passionately and abandoned himself completely to His will. In moments of depression and defeat, he was sustained by his faith in His all-pervading beneficence. He frequently associated with Sūfī saints like Muhammad Ghaus and his brother of Gwalior, paid visits to their hermitages and was much influenced by their teachings.⁶ Like his father, he possessed the spirit of a *darvesh* and while in Irān he resolved to give up all earthly possessions for the sake of his religion. He gave expression to Sūfī thoughts in his verses and spoke of the beneficence and compassion of

¹ Percy Brown, *Mogul Painting*, p. 54.

² Ranking, *Al-Badāonī*, pp. 602-4; Persian, pp. 467-8.

³ *Ibid.*, Persian, p. 468.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Persian, p. 468.

⁵ A.N., pp. 610-11; Text, pp. 333, 422.

⁶ *Al-Badāonī* III, pp. 6-10. Muhammad Ghaus was a saint of the Shattār order. Humāyūn was much attached to him and his brother Shaikh Bahlūl. A full account of the saint is given by Badāonī.

God with great fervour. His faith in His infinite goodness and mercy sustained him in the hour of trial and helped him to pass through the most terrible ordeals without his soul being embittered.¹ His *Rubāīs* cited in the *Akbarnāmah*, the *Iqbāl-nāmah-i-Jehāngīrī* and other chronicles reveal his capacity for love, devotion and friendship.² Unlike many of his contemporaries, he stood for peace and goodwill and in his practical life acted on the principle of religious tolerance. He was more tolerant than his father and in dealing with his Hindū subjects he showed forbearance and wisdom. It appears that he was influenced by the thought currents set in motion in Hindustān by Hindū and Muslim saints and reformers like Rāmānand, Kabir, Nānak and Chaitanya. Although he was firm in his faith, he was gentle in repudiating the charge of heresy brought against him by Kāmran and others.³ His catholic outlook did not sanction persecution of dissent. He respected the Shiah faith, recognised the sanctity of Shiah saints and appointed a number of Shiahs to the highest offices in the State. The most distinguished of them was Bairam Khan who never betrayed his trust.

He was gay and genial and was fond of festive gatherings. He spent lavishly on such occasions as is clear from contemporary accounts of Hindāl's marriage and Akbar's circumcision.⁴ Numerous guests were invited and there was no delicacy which art or nature could provide wanting to tempt their palate. Costly *khilāts* were given and the claims of even the poor and the indigent were not ignored. Khwāndamīr has given an elaborate description of his early pomp and pageantry. He was weighed against gold on one occasion and the entire cash, says the same writer, amounting to fifteen thousand current coins was distributed among the poor people. Mirza Haider also speaks in terms of high praise of his pomp and magnificence.⁵ Badāonī writes that the King's habits were so extra-

¹ Abul Fazl speaks of his spiritual perfection not attained by any of his brothers. *A.N.* I, p. 123.

² The poems cited are from his *Diwān*. *A.N.* I, p. 368, *Iqbāl-nāmah-i-Jehāngīrī*, Lucknow Ed., p. 124.

³ Kāmran who was an orthodox Sunnī frequently exchanged repartee with Humāyūn on religious subjects. One day as they were riding out, they saw a dog lifting its leg against a tomb-stone. Kāmran observed: 'The man who lies buried there must be a *rafizi* (heretic).' 'Yes', replied the Emperor, 'and the dog an orthodox brute.' This story is related in Firishtah's history.

⁴ Khawāndamīr has given an account of Humāyūn's festivities and the rich viands prepared in the royal kitchen. *Qānūn-i-Humāyūnī*, Eng. Trans., pp. 41, 64, 66, 68, 73, 76.

⁵ Gulbadan, pp. 126-31. *T.R.*, pp. 469-70.

vagant that the revenues of the whole of Hindustān were insufficient to meet all his needs.¹ He had no desire to hoard money and never allowed his *vakīls* to mention the word gold in his presence.² This may seem inconsistent with his breaking open of the Delhi treasure-chests but it would not be fair to frame a charge of avarice on the basis of that solitary fact against him. It is true he cared for pomp and show and loved the theatricals of power but behind all this there was a spirit of other-worldliness which was revealed in his actions. He was gentle and courteous and had a great regard for his plighted word.³ 'If an object can be attained by gentleness,' he said, 'why have recourse to harsh measures?' He was full of compassion for the distressed and sorrow-stricken. After the battles of Chausā and Qanauj he granted pensions to the widows and orphans of those who had been killed or drowned, and his sympathy dried many tears and brought solace to many afflicted hearts.⁴ On seeing the Mughals in a wretched plight at Qanauj, he said, 'I would rather be killed myself than be the cause of such misery. I will now retreat and save the lives of my fellow men.' He was moved to pity at the sight of human suffering and wished to avoid bloodshed and destruction of life. After the battle of Taliqān he wrote a letter to Kām-rān to the following effect: 'O wicked brother! O dear warrior! Desist from this act which is the cause of the slaughter of human beings and the battle of numerous men and show as far as possible mercy to men of the town and the army. The blood of men who are slain shall be on your head on the day of judgment.' But at times he was capable of being cruel and stern like Turkish despots. The historians of Gujarāt have furnished detailed accounts of the terrible atrocities which he inflicted upon the people of Māndū and Cambay during his campaigns (1532-35). He caused an 'Imām to be trampled to death by an elephant; clad in red robes, after his victory, he watched with great self-complacency the general massacre of the population. It seems in later years he became softer and more tender-hearted and took a sympathetic view of human faults and failings.

¹ Ranking, *Al-Badāonī* I, p. 604; Persian, p. 467

² *Ibid*, p. 604; Persian, p. 468

³ Jauhar, *I.O. MS.*, p. 41. Stewart, pp. 24-25.

⁴ Abbās cites one instance of Humāyūn's bad faith. After the capture of Chausā, Sher Khan sent word to Humāyūn that if he were left in possession of Bengal, he would give up Bihār and acknowledge the Emperor as his overlord. The latter accepted the proposal, but later, when the envoys of Sultān Mahmūd came, he broke his word. When Sher Shah heard this, says the chronicler, he gave up all faith in Humāyūn's promises. Jauhar, however, gives a different account. *T.S., A.U. MS.*, p. 119. Jauhar, *I.O.MS.*, p. 41.

Humāyūn's noble qualities shone to their best advantage when he was a homeless wanderer in the desert wilds of Sind. His nobles behaved meanly towards him as Tārdī Beg did when he refused to lend his horse to Hamīdah Bānū who was in an advanced state of pregnancy, but he overlooked his fault. He denied himself every convenience if by doing so he could alleviate the misery and hardship of his followers. The scarcity of water caused a scramble between his nobles and men, but Humāyūn's remonstrances were always in favour of the latter.

The sufferings of a long and arduous journey did not damp his spirit and he urged his men to push forward until they reached the haven of safety. Patient and forbearing, he knew how to take the rough and the smooth alike and resigned himself to the will of God without complaint or murmur. His faith in stars made him a fatalist and his experience of the reverses of fortune led him to take a lenient view of the faults of others. When Shah Tahmāsp rebukingly told him that the loss of his kingdom was due to his foolish vanity, he added that they were all under the control of fate and must willingly submit to the decrees of the Almighty.¹ He was a kind friend and indulgent master and always rewarded service with gratitude. Sometimes he went to extreme lengths, as when he placed Nizām Khan, the water-carrier, upon the throne despite the protests of Kāmran. After Qipchāq an old woman offered him a pair of silk trousers which the Emperor accepted with pleasure as his own were drenched with blood and issued an order to his officers not to demand any more taxes from her.² Even Shah Tahmāsp was surprised at his clemency when he recommended for mercy the culprits who had tried to foment ill-feeling between him and the Shah.³ He was free from guile and treachery and in his political dealings, whether with his Amīrs or foreign princes, he seldom had recourse to cunning or shifty stratagems. His high sense of honour drove him into difficult positions, but no thought of personal safety or selfish gain could make him swerve from the path he had chosen for himself. Prone to forgive faults, he was strict in administering justice and listened to petitions and granted redress. On one occasion, he ordered the ear of a certain culprit to be cut as punishment for some crime, but the eunuch, who was commissioned to execute the royal command, chopped off the whole ear. The Emperor was grieved to hear that his agent had exceeded his mission, and called a surgeon to set the ear right again, assisted in the operation and expressed his regret to

¹ Jauhar, I.O. MS., p. 77.

² *Ibid.*, p. 110.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 80

the injured person.¹ There are numerous anecdotes related by Jauhar, Bāyazīd and Gulbadan which supply proof of his goodness and benevolence.

Unlike many other Mughal princes, he was well disposed towards his kinsmen. He was full of respect for his father and though wronged again and again by his brothers, never forgot his dying charge. After his death, he appointed Muhammad 'Alī Asas as the guardian of his father's tomb and employed sixty reciters of the Qurān for the benefit of his soul. When the news was received of Kāmrān's intrigues with Sher Shah, he was advised by the Amīrs to kill him but he replied: 'No, never for the vanities of this perishable world will I imbrue my hands in the blood of a brother, but will never cease to remember the dying words of my revered father.'²

Kāmrān persisted in his evil ways and when the time came to settle accounts with him, Humāyūn's gentle nature shrank from inflicting upon him the extreme penalty which he so richly merited. He treated his other brothers with equal kindness though they played the traitor more than once. Hindāl's rebellion in the midst of a critical campaign was pardoned and he was restored to favour. When he died fighting for him at Qipchāq, he expressed genuine grief and observed to Khizr Khwājah Khan. 'This sorrow troubles my heart more closely than yours, but I do not give way because I think of your bloodthirsty, tyrannical foe. With him at hand, there is no help but patience.'³ As one who was singularly fortunate in possessing a devoted wife, he had a great regard for womankind and was deeply offended when they were insulted or injured. When he saw Rukayya Begam subsisting on beef, broth and curry made of the same meat with vegetables he exclaimed in wrath: 'O Kāmrān! was it the mode of your existence and did you feed the Asylum of Chastity on the flesh of cows! Could you not keep a few goats for her subsistence?'⁴

He was deeply loved by his mother and reciprocated her affection in full measure. Towards other ladies of the royal family, his treatment was invariably humane and generous. The delightful Gulbadan describes the acts of his charity and kindness and helps us have a glimpse of his real nature. He showed such tender solicitude for her welfare that she forgot that 'she was orphaned or headless'.⁵ After Māham's death he visited her several times and comforted her in her sorrow. Towards elderly ladies his attitude was respectful and dignified and

¹ Jauhar, *I.O.MS.*, p. 58.

² *Ibid.*, p. 42.

³ Gulbadan, p. 199.

⁴ Jauhar, *I.O. MS.*, p. 91. Stewart, p. 83.

⁵ Gulbadan, p. 11.

he regarded it as an imperative duty to make them happy. For their sake he would sometimes neglect the younger ladies of the harem and on one occasion, when Begā Begam lodged a somewhat firm protest, he excused himself on the ground that he was an opium-eater and therefore his delay must be overlooked. Amazingly enough, the ladies were asked to sign a declaration in writing that they would be content and thankful whether he paid them a visit or not.¹ In a polygamous household, the position of a wife is often precarious; but Humāyūn and Hamīdah lived happily together sharing their joys and sorrows with a serene confidence which invests their married life with a dignity all its own.

But these qualities of Humāyūn should not blind us to the defects which marred the success of his career. As Erskine rightly observes, he was a man of great ability but 'volatile, thoughtless and unsteady'.² His association with men of questionable character like Maulānā Parghari and his addiction to opium produced serious results and neutralised the energy and vigour of which he was capable. He was superstitious; believed in occult sciences and did nothing important without taking an omen from nature or from the *Dīwān* of Hāfiz.³ If Mirza Haider is to be believed, he had a passion for magic and incantations and looked upon them as the means of attaining his object. This habit of mind prevented him from analysing rationally the causes of failure and the conditions of success.⁴ He could make daring plans, but failed to execute them and wasted his time in ease and sensual pleasures when he ought to have been in the forefront of battle. His expeditions in Gujarāt and Mālwa afford good illustrations of this habit. He was a poor judge of men and most of his troubles were due to his incapacity for forming a correct judgment and his inability to strike down an opponent before he could gather sufficient strength to make him formidable. His overwhelming goodness was ill-suited to a ruthless age in which only hard strokes of policy were appreciated. His kindness often produced the opposite effect and his partiality for favourites bred insolence and caused distrust

¹ Jauhar, p. 131.

² *History of India under Bāber and Humāyūn* II, p. 530.

³ A.N. I, pp. 612, 620-21; Text, pp. 335, 340.

Once he took an omen at Qandhār and the following couplet decided his action.

'Azīz-i-misr bi-raghm-i-barādarān-i-ghayūr
Zi qa'r-i-chāh barāmad bi-auj-i-māh rasīd.

[Aziz of Egypt contrary to (the wishes) of (his) jealous brothers came out of the depths of the well (and) reached the zenith of the moon.]

⁴ T.R., p. 399.

among men irrevocably wedded to selfishness and intrigue. Amidst circumstances similar to these, there was no hope for a man who lacked a strong and resolute will and dealt with violent crises with a gentleness for which there was no justification or excuse.

Though not wanting in personal courage, he was not a great general like his father or a strategist like Sher Shah. His military plans were defective and were never properly executed. Sometimes he withdrew from an important campaign for fantastic reasons as he did when Bahādur Shah was laying siege to Chittor. His readiness to offer the choice between the olive branch and the sword was often mistaken for weakness. A study of his battles shows clearly his incapacity for grand strategy and a correct appraisal of the enemy's strength. His first successes were always turned into defeats, for he was never able to consolidate his gains. His want of firmness lent encouragement to the plans of his opponents. Mālwa, Gujarāt, Bengal and Bihār, the Doāb, Delhi and the Punjāb slipped out of his grasp one by one and he could neither crush the treachery of his seditious nobles nor could he raise a powerful army to contend against his foes. He was indolent and his love of pleasure in his early years hampered his efforts to maintain the empire. He pardoned rebels and traitors again and again and hesitated to deal drastically even with an insolent and bigoted court minion like Abul Ma'ālī. At times it seemed as if he was courting trouble for himself. After his return from Persia, he became more steady of purpose and showed greater energy and determination. He fought long and hard in the Afghan region and never wavered or despaired although he had to deal with treacherous officers at home and a powerful enemy abroad. The most prominent trait of his character was perseverance and this proved an inestimable blessing to him throughout his career. Without this, it would have been impossible for him to reconquer the kingdom of Hindustān.

Humāyūn's lack of statesmanship is evident in the policies he pursued during his reign. Even in Bābur's life there is nothing that entitles him to be placed among the great statesmen of Asiatic history. He had neither the time nor the capacity to deal with the practical organisation of government. Knight-errantry like that which was practised in Central Asia was scarcely a suitable school for training in statesmanship, and the early Mughals were conquerors of kingdoms rather than administrators. The Turkish warrior was averse to the dull routine of administrative business; he had no aptitude for figures or skill in handling finance and his advice was seldom of use to the monarch who administered the affairs of the empire. No great reforms

emanated from Humāyūn nor did he make laws or found institutions calculated to promote the prosperity of his subjects and the power of his kingdom. Heavy doses of opium had seriously impaired his capacity for virile political thinking and the stress of war left him no time to concentrate his energy on the actual problems of government. Peace was denied to him. The regulations which he devised early in his reign are of a fantastic nature and furnish no evidence of businesslike capacity or insight into the needs of the administration. They read like a fairy tale and the puerile character of some of them causes surprise and disgust. It was after his restoration that he tackled the problem of government seriously and made plans which were cut short by his untimely death. But even in these we look in vain for an adequate appreciation of the duties which devolve upon all crowned heads namely, the husbanding of a country's resources, the proper equipment of its military forces, the administration of justice, and the elevation of the moral and material condition of the people by establishing institutions that grow from age to age. Perhaps the times were not ripe for such far-reaching plans. Still, something might have been done, had Humāyūn possessed the genius which is needed for constructive political work. His contemporary, Sher Shah, did much during the four years he occupied the throne of Delhi. Even in the midst of war he continued the settlement of the country, founded new laws and regulations which made for better, more stable and orderly government. This creative activity does not seem to have made much impression upon Humāyūn's officers and nobles whose minds did not travel beyond the elementary needs of maintaining peace and order in the country and the cashiering of rebellious and disaffected chiefs. Humāyūn's imperfect appreciation of his responsibilities as a ruler, his inability to do the right thing at the right moment, his natural diffidence, his shaky judgment and above all his lack of firmness were serious obstacles to the growth of a sound policy which would have strengthened the foundations of his dynasty. A mere theoretical insistence on right conduct and hard routine in poetic effusions was of little avail. What the circumstances demanded was observance and not emphasis.

In passing a verdict on Humāyūn, it will not be fair to apply to him the standards of our own times. A man's conduct is largely the result of the environment in which he is placed, and no estimate of Humāyūn will do him justice which does not take into account his difficulties and also the foibles and shortcomings peculiar to kings in the Middle Ages. Statesmen are largely indebted to good luck for the success of their schemes and this was denied to Humāyūn. His

belief in the paramount claims of duty and his regard for kinship created obstacles which he could never surmount. The normal code of a king cannot be the same as that of a private individual, and Humāyūn suffered much because he never relaxed the principles that governed his conduct. Failure was inevitable with the methods he pursued and the defects he possessed. But no one can deny that he was a great gentleman, gifted in an unusual degree with the qualities of magnanimity, generosity and benevolence, and although neither a great ruler nor a leader of men, he will always remain a fascinating character in Mughal history, a man who, had he not been born on the steps of a throne 'might have been a delightful companion and a staunch friend.'¹ For a true picture of him we must turn not to modern writers, to whom we might apply Bacon's phrase 'closet penmen', but to the cultured and affectionate Gulbadan and the loyal and unsophisticated Jauhar and Bāyazīd, who have recorded the most trivial details of his life. Mirza Haider who does not conceal his faults writes:

'Humāyūn Pādshāh was the eldest, greatest, and most renowned of Bābur's sons. I have seen few persons possessed of so much natural talent and excellence as he, but in consequence of frequent intercourse with the sensual and profligate men who served him, such as Maulānā Muhammad Parghali (Parghaci) in particular, and others like him, he had contracted some bad habits; among these was his addiction to opium. All the evil that has been set down to the Emperor, and has become the common talk of the people, is attributable to this vice. Nevertheless, he was endowed with excellent qualities, being brave in battle, gay in feast and very generous. In short he was a dignified, stately and regal sovereign, who observed much state and pomp.'²

¹ Lane-Poole, *Mediaeval India*, p. 219.

² *T.R.*, pp. 469-70.

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For a history of the Indian Timūrīds there is abundant material in Persian, in India as well as Europe, and scholars who have written on the subject have made use of it. The sources for a history of Humāyūn's reign may be divided for the sake of convenience into two classes—primary and secondary. In the first category may be included the works of those who were either the eye-witnesses of events or who had heard about them from those who had taken part in them or seen them with their own eyes. The *Akbarnāmah* is a work of first-rate importance, but it is at best a compilation based upon the information supplied by others. The works written by contemporaries like the *Bāburnāmah*, Mirza Haider's *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī*, Sīdī 'Alī's *Mirāt-i-Mamālik*, Gulbadan Begam's *Humāyūnāmah*, Jauhar's *Tazkirāt-ul-Wāqī'āt*, Bāyazīd's *Tārīkh-i-Humāyūnī* and others rank as primary sources because their authors were contemporaries who had a first-hand knowledge of the events which they relate. Some of them were in close contact with Humāyūn and took a prominent part in political affairs. Their writings, based on personal observation, do not merely help us to reconstruct the political history of the time, but also throw a flood of light on the social and religious practices of the age and acquaint us with the manners, tastes and fashions which prevailed at court and among the nobles and the common people.

The Muslims were well versed in historiography and the output of their genius is so considerable that it is impossible to do justice to their work in such a short space, and all that can be done here is to give the reader a brief idea of its importance and value. The researcher and the antiquarian will have to delve himself for facts in the mines of information that have been left to us by their diligence, which is all the more admirable when we remember how handicapped they were for want of printing and travelling facilities.

A. PRIMARY SOURCES

Bāburnāmah

The most important authority on the early life of Humāyūn is the *Bāburnāmah*, an autobiography of Bābur, which is also known under the name of the *Tuzak-i-Bāburī* and the *Wāqī'āt-i-Bāburī*. It was originally written in Chaghatāi Tūrki which was Bābur's mother tongue. A Persian translation of the *Memoirs* was prepared by Abdur Rahīm Khān-i-Khānān, son of Bairam Khan, a distinguished nobleman of Akbar's court. It was completed in A.H. 998 (1589-90). Another

translation, rather ornate and rhetorical, was made by Shaikh Zain, a contemporary of Bābur, who is often mentioned in the *Memoirs*. This is earlier than Mirza Abdur Rahīm's translation. The Shaikh held the office of *Sadr* in Bābur's time. Besides preparing a translation of the *Bāburnāmah*, he also wrote a *Fathnāmah*, an account of the conquest of India, extracts from which are given in Mrs. Beveridge's translation of the *Memoirs*. It appears from a marginal note on the B.M.MS. (Add. 26,200f. 248) that Humāyūn transcribed the *Bāburnāmah* as a matter of pious duty. The note says: 'I was then eighteen years of age. Now that I am forty-six, I, Muhammad Humāyūn, am transcribing a copy of these *Memoirs* from the copy in His late Majesty's own handwriting.' Mirza Haider Daghlāt had in his possession a copy of the *Memoirs* in Tūrķī, mention of which is made in the *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī*. The *Memoirs* do not represent a complete record of Bābur's life. There are several gaps in them. Of the forty-seven years and ten months¹ which are recordable, we have only an account of eighteen years. These gaps are due to accident.

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Jauhar: *Tazkirāt-ul-Wāqi'āt*

Jauhar is a contemporary writer. He was Humāyūn's *Aftābchī* or ewer-bearer and in this menial capacity served him for twenty-five years. He wrote by the command of Akbar when materials were collected for Abul Fazl's well-known chronicle. Jauhar's work is known under several names. It is called *Kitāb-i-Jawāhir Shāhī*, *Tazkirāt-ul-Wāqi'āt*, *Tārīkh-i-Humāyūnī* and *Tārīkh-i-Humāyūn Shāhī*. On the colophon of the India Office MS. the title is given as *Kitāb-i-Jawāhir Shāhī* and on that of the Khudābaksh MS. *Tārīkh-i-Humāyūnī*. Another MS. in the British Museum is called *Humāyūn Shāhī*, which is a later rescension of the *Tazkirāt* by Ilhadād Faizi Sirhindi. The editor says he was asked by Mehtar Jauhar to put his rough draft into literary form so as to make it presentable to Akbar. The substance agrees in the main with that of the original work though the form is considerably altered.

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Being a knowledgeable contemporary, Jauhar gives us many interesting details about the Emperor's life. He is not a rhetorician like Abul Fazl and often in plain and unvarnished language he expresses the truth. The minute details relating to Humāyūn's life and conduct

reveal to us his charming personality and the equanimity of his temper under the most trying circumstances. The value of Jauhar's work is greatly enhanced by the fact that he writes from personal observation. In certain respects he supplements and corrects other writers. He is the only one who describes the unpleasant Persian episode which has been slurred over by Abul Fazl. But for him we would have never known of the differences between Humāyūn and the Shah. Jauhar was a faithful servant and his services were so appreciated by Humāyūn that he appointed him collector of several villages belonging to Tātār Khan Lodi. Towards the end of his work, he says he was appointed treasurer of the Punjāb and Multān and was evidently considered fit for this post by his royal master. Jauhar is not a historian in the modern sense. He is deficient in dates, has little topographical knowledge and mixes up facts of all kinds. He suffers from lapses of memory and at times falls into serious errors. Yet he is an interesting narrator of events and gives us a first-hand account of much of Humāyūn's reign.

A translation of the *Tazkirāt* by Charles Stewart was published by the Oriental Translation Fund in 1832. Mr. Erskine's comment on the translation is not wholly justified. It is as follows: "The translation of Major Stewart is no translation at all. It is full of errors. It adds, takes away, alters. It is not trustworthy, and one does him no injustice in pronouncing him ignorant of the geography of the country, ignorant of the language, ignorant of the duty of a translator."¹

Erskine's judgment is a bit too harsh and does little justice to Stewart's industry and historical sense. The translation does not always agree with the *India Office MS.* but I have found it, as I have said before, in remarkable agreement with another text which is in the library of Allahabad University. It is quite possible that the translation may not have agreed with the text which was consulted by Erskine. Except for a few mistakes there is not much which will justify this denunciation. It is true that many passages in the original have been omitted by Stewart and the translation is not literal.

Gulbadan: *Humāyūnāmāh*

This is a valuable authority for Humāyūn's reign. Gulbadan was a daughter of Bābur and was born somewhere about 1523. She was a little child when her father set on his last Indian expedition and was eight years old at the time of Bābur's death. She was married to

¹ Rieu, *B. M. Catalogue of Persian MSS.* 1 p. 246.

Khizr Khwājah Khan, a Chaghatāi Mughal, and it appears from her account that at the age of seventeen she was a married woman. She was a clever and attractive girl and was treated kindly by Humāyūn after Bābur's death. She enjoyed the confidence of the distinguished ladies of the court like Khānzādah Begam and Māham Begam, and she always speaks of them in terms of respect and affection. After Humāyūn's defeat at Qanauj, she remained in the Kābul country and was delighted at his return in 1545. She describes the dreary warfare between Humāyūn and Kāmrān in the Afghan region and the personal touches, which she gives to her narrative make it extremely interesting. She came to India after Humāyūn's death in 1557 and received protection and honour at Akbar's hands. In 1575 she proceeded on a pilgrimage to Mecca with other ladies, despite the Emperor's wish to the contrary, with Sultānah Khwājah as her guide and returned to Fatehpur Sikri in 1582. She lived to a ripe old age and died in February 1603 after a short illness. So great was the respect in which Akbar held her that he carried her bier a little distance and made lavish gifts for the benefit of her soul.

Gulbadan says she had received a command from Akbar to write down what she knew and remembered about the lives of Bābur and Humāyūn. As she was a child at the time of Bābur's death, she had to supplement her recollections by information received from others. It is for this reason that her account of Bābur is very brief. The bulk of her book is occupied with the story of Humāyūn's life, his victories, defeats and the hardships he had to suffer at the hands of the treacherous Kāmrān. Besides describing political events, she throws much light upon the social customs and manners of the time. Her detailed account of the mystic house shows the royal etiquette that prevailed at the Mughal court and the manner in which she describes her brother Hindāl's marriage brings vividly before the mind the social customs and usages of the Timūrīds. In the *Humāyūnāmah* we obtain a glimpse of the culture and refinement of the Timūrīds of both sexes and of their lively appreciation of political events.

The value of the *Humāyūnāmah* is considerable because Gulbadan was an eye-witness of many of the events that she relates. About those that did not come under her personal observation, she must have gathered information from persons who actually participated in them or were eye-witnesses of them.

As regards the earlier events she must have supplemented her recollections with the help of the senior ladies of the royal harem. She must have learnt many things from Khānzādah Begam, Māham Begam and Hamīdah Bānū Begam.

The *Humāyūnāmah* was written in Persian, though in this text there is an admixture of Persian and Turkish words. The authoress seems to have been a well-educated lady, fond of books and learning, and her upbringing qualified her for portraying faithfully the events of her time. She describes herself as *In Haqīr* (the insignificant) which shows her humility. Mrs. A. S. Beveridge's translation is a faithful rendering of the text and is excellently annotated. The only copy of Gulbadan's work is in the British Museum and bears on the fly leaf the following endorsement: *Ahwāl Humāyūn Pādshāh Jamahkardah Gulbadan Begam bint Bābur Pādshāh 'amma Akbar Pādshāh*.

There are errors in the book, and Gulbadan sometimes gives us very little information about important matters. The battles of Chausā and Qanauj occupy an inconsiderable space in her narrative and evidently she, a woman to the core, cares more for marriages and the gaiety of social life in the royal seraglio than about these decisive events of Humāyūn's career. The sequence of events is sometimes faulty and her brevity causes much disappointment.

While the *Humāyūnāmah* shows Gulbadan to have been a gentle, cultured and pious woman, capable of strong domestic affection, happiness and joy, it also reveals to us Humāyūn's charming personality in all its strength and weakness and portrays with a sympathetic hand his numerous qualities of head and heart.

Bāyazīd: *Tārīkh-i-Humāyūnī*

When Abul Fazl undertook the writing of the *Akbarnāmah* (so he says in his preface), efforts were made to collect materials from various quarters. Enquiries were made from the members of the royal family about the past, and servants of the court were asked to record or dictate what they remembered about the kings who had gone before. Akbar's command was as follows: 'Every one of the attendants of our court who is gifted with the talent for writing history should write one, and if anybody knows something about the reign of H. M. Humāyūn Pādshāh of heavenly abode, he should record it and finish it with our illustrious name.'

A copy of this *firmān* was sent by Shaikh Abul Fazl to Bāyazīd Bīyāt, then a *Bakāwal Begī* (Superintendent of the Royal Kitchen) working under the Mīr Bakāwal. Bāyazīd dictated to Abul Fazl's scribe from memory without any notes or memoranda. He must have been very old at this time, for he says, 'Youth has passed away and old age has come in.' Besides he was a paralytic and was incapable of writing himself. But like many mediaeval men, he had a wonderfully retentive memory and most of the observations that he makes

are corroborated from other sources. The *Memoirs* of Bāyazīd, of which only the India Office has a copy, are styled on the fly leaf of the MS. as *Tārīkh-i-Humāyūnī*. This title was not given to them by the author, who speaks of them only as a *Mukhtasar*. The *Memoirs* begin with Humāyūn's flight to Persia in 1543 and come down to the time when they were written, i.e. 1590-91. They appear to have been used very much in compiling the *Akbarnāmah* though Abul Fazl nowhere acknowledges his debt to Bāyazīd. Bāyazīd tells us that nine copies were made of the work, two of which were given to Abul Fazl. The Allahabad University copy which is a transcript from the India Office MS. has been used by me. The *Memoirs* were dictated at Lahore and the date of their completion is Sunday the 1st Ramzān (June 13, 1591). On the colophon of the India Office MS. we find the words: *Tārīkh-i-Humāyūn ki az Zabān-i-Bāyazīd maswidah shud*. It ends with an account of the coming of the news of Mirza Hakīm's death at Kābul.

There is no complete translation in English of Bāyazīd's history. Sir H. Beveridge writes that Mrs. Erskine had prepared a translation of the *Memoirs* which was nearly complete. This is the British Museum MS. Additional 26, 610. A portion of them was translated in the Allahabad University Studies Vol. VI, Pt. I, pp. 71-148. Sir H. Beveridge published a detailed summary of Bāyazīd's work in the *J.A.S.B.*, LXVII, 1898, pp. 296-316, which is very useful.

Bāyazīd was in the service of Humāyūn and had valuable opportunities of acquainting himself with the life-history of that monarch. He did not meet the Emperor till the latter had joined the Shah of Persia at Zangān. He was present at the feasts that were held in his honour and was in touch with the leading nobles of the state. He is an eye-witness of what happened in the Kābul region between Humāyūn and Kāmrān and gives a detailed account of it. He was not present at the blinding of Kāmrān and his account of the grim episode is not so detailed as Jauhār's. He was in the service of Jalāluddīn Mahmūd of Aubah as his *Sāmān* (butler) and fully describes how he went from Kābul to Jalālābād with ice, grapes, *riwāj*, lemonade and sugar-candy as presents to Akbar. After Humāyūn's death he joined Akbar's service. But he incurred the wrath of the Emperor by demolishing a Hindū temple at Banaras which contained an inscription 760 years old, and lost his appointment. He took to the life of a *darvesh* and it was only after several years that he resumed service. In A.H. 998 (1590) he was a *darogah* of the treasury and *amīn* and we are told that in 999 (1591) Akbar allowed him to sit in his presence and declared that he was an honest man who had served the state loyally for sixty years.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

For a history of the Indian Timūrids there is abundant material in Persian, in India as well as Europe, and scholars who have written on the subject have made use of it. The sources for a history of Humāyūn's reign may be divided for the sake of convenience into two classes—primary and secondary. In the first category may be included the works of those who were either the eye-witnesses of events or who had heard about them from those who had taken part in them or seen them with their own eyes. The *Akbarnāmah* is a work of first-rate importance, but it is at best a compilation based upon the information supplied by others. The works written by contemporaries like the *Bāburnāmah*, Mirza Haider's *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī*, Sidi 'Alī's *Mirāt-i-Mamālik*, Gulbadan Begam's *Humāyūnāmah*, Jauhar's *Tazkirāt-ul-Wāqī'āt*, Bāyazīd's *Tārīkh-i-Humāyūnī* and others rank as primary sources because their authors were contemporaries who had a first-hand knowledge of the events which they relate. Some of them were in close contact with Humāyūn and took a prominent part in political affairs. Their writings, based on personal observation, do not merely help us to reconstruct the political history of the time, but also throw a flood of light on the social and religious practices of the age and acquaint us with the manners, tastes and fashions which prevailed at court and among the nobles and the common people.

The Muslims were well versed in historiography and the output of their genius is so considerable that it is impossible to do justice to their work in such a short space, and all that can be done here is to give the reader a brief idea of its importance and value. The researcher and the antiquarian will have to delve himself for facts in the mines of information that have been left to us by their diligence, which is all the more admirable when we remember how handicapped they were for want of printing and travelling facilities.

A. PRIMARY SOURCES

BABURNAMAH

The most important authority on the early life of Humāyūn is the *Bāburnāmah*, an autobiography of Bābur, which is also known under the name of *Tuzak-i-Bāburī* and the *Wāqī'āt-i-Bāburī*. It was originally written in Chaghatāi Tūrkī which was Bābur's mother tongue. A Persian

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Allahabad Univerisity possesses three MSS. of the *Tazkirāt*. Two are transcripts of the India Office and the Bankipore MSS. The third MS., slightly worm-caten, is different from these and, on comparison, I have found it in remarkable agreement with Stewart's translation. It was probably this discrepancy in the MSS. which led Erskine to condemn Stewart's translation as inaccurate and useless. Jauhar tells us that on all occasions he was in attendance upon his royal master, and it occurred to him that he should put down in black and white all the events of his life, of which he had been an eye-witness. The work was commenced at the beginning of A.H. 995 (1587) i.e. thirty-two years after Humāyūn's death. The India Office MS. concludes with magniloquent verses in praise of Humāyūn.

Being a knowledgeable contemporary, Jauhar gives us many interesting details about the Emperor's life. He is not a rhetorician like Abul Fazl and often in plain and unvarnished language expresses the truth. The minute details relating to Humāyūn's life and conduct reveal to us his charming personality and the equanimity of his temper under the most trying circumstances. The value of Jauhar's work is greatly enhanced by the fact that he writes from personal observation. In certain respects he supplements and corrects other writers. He is the only one who describes the unpleasant Persian episode which has been slurred over by Abul Fazl. But for him we would have never known of the differences between Humāyūn and the Shah. Jauhar was a faithful servant and his services were so appreciated by Humāyūn that he appointed him collector of several villages belonging to Tātār Khan Lodi. Towards the end of his work, he says he was appointed treasurer of the Punjāb and Multān and was evidently considered fit for this post by his royal master. Jauhar is not a historian in the modern sense. He is deficient in dates, has little topographical knowledge and mixes up facts of all kinds. He suffers from lapses of memory and at times falls into serious errors. Yet he is an interesting narrator of events and gives us a first-hand account of much of Humāyūn's reign.

A translation of the *Tazkirāt* by Charles Stewart was published by the Oriental Translation Fund in 1832. Mr. Erskine's comment on the translation is not wholly justified. It is as follows: "The translation of Major Stewart is no translation at all. It is full of errors. It adds, takes away, alters. It is not trustworthy, and one does him no injustice in pronouncing him ignorant of the geography of the country, ignorant of the language, ignorant of the duty of a translator."¹

Erskine's judgment is a bit too harsh and does little justice to Stewart's industry and historical sense. The translation does not always agree with the India Office MS. but I have found it, as I have said before, in remarkable agreement with another text which is in the library of Allahabad University. It is quite possible that the translation may not have agreed with the text which was consulted by Erskine. Except for a few mistakes there is not much which will justify this denunciation. It is true that many passages in the original have been omitted by Stewart and the translation is not literal.

GULBADAN'S HUMAYUNAMAH

This is a valuable authority for Humāyūn's reign. Gulbadan was a daughter of Bābur and was born somewhere about 1523.

¹ Rieu (B. M. Catalogue of Persian MSS.), I. p. 246.

She was a little child when her father set on his last Indian expedition and was eight years old at the time of Bābur's death. She was married to Khizr Khwājah Khan, a Chaghatāi Mughal, and it appears from her account that at the age of seventeen she was a married woman. She was a clever and attractive girl and was treated kindly by Humāyūn after Bābur's death. She enjoyed the confidence of the distinguished ladies of the court like Khānzādah Begam and Māham Begam, and she always speaks of them in terms of respect and affection. After Humāyūn's defeat at Qanauj, she remained in the Kābul country and was delighted at his return in 1545. She describes the dreary warfare between Humāyūn and Kāmran in the Afghan region and the personal touches, which she gives to her narrative make it extremely interesting. She came to India after Humāyūn's death in 1557 and received protection and honour at Akbar's hands. In 1575 she proceeded on a pilgrimage to Mecca with other ladies, despite the Emperor's wish to the contrary, with Sultānah Khwājah as her guide and returned to Fatehpur Sikri in 1582. She lived to a ripe old age and died in February 1603 after a short illness. So great was the respect in which Akbar held her that he carried her bier a little distance and made lavish gifts for the benefit of her soul.

Gulbadan says she had received a command from Akbar to write down what she knew and remembered about the lives of Bābur and Humāyūn. As she was a child at the time of Bābur's death, she had to supplement her recollections by information received from others. It is for this reason that her account of Bābur is very brief. The bulk of her book is occupied with the story of Humāyūn's life, his victories, defeats and the hardships he had to suffer at the hands of the treacherous Kāmran. Besides describing political events, she throws much light upon the social customs and manners of the time. Her detailed account of the mystic house shows the royal etiquette that prevailed at the Mughal court and the manner in which she describes her brother Hindāl's marriage brings vividly before the mind the social customs and usages of the Timūrīds. In the *Humāyūnāmah* we obtain a glimpse of the culture and refinement of the Timūrīds of both sexes and of their lively appreciation of political events.

The value of the *Humāyūnāmah* is considerable because Gulbadan was an eye-witness of many of the events that she relates. About those that did not come under her personal observation, she must have gathered information from persons who actually participated in them or were eye-witnesses of them.

As regards the earlier events she must have supplemented

her recollections with the help of the senior ladies of the royal harem. She must have learnt many things from Khānzādah Begam, Māham Begam and Hamīdah Bānū Begam.

The *Humāyūnāmah* was written in Persian, though in this text there is an admixture of Persian and Turkish words. The authoress seems to have been a well-educated lady, fond of books and learning, and her upbringing qualified her for portraying faithfully the events of her time. She describes herself as *In Haqīr* (the insignificant) which shows her humility. Mrs. A. S. Beveridge's translation is a faithful rendering of the text and is excellently annotated. The only copy of Gulbadan's work is in the British Museum and bears on the fly leaf the following endorsement : *Ahwāl Humāyūn Pādshāh Jamahkardah Gulbadan Begam bint Bābur Pādshāh 'Umma Akbar Pādshāh*.

There are errors in the book, and Gulbadan sometimes gives us very little information about important matters. The battles of Chausā and Qanauj occupy an inconsiderable space in her narrative and evidently she, a woman to the core, cares more for marriages and the gaiety of social life in the royal seraglio than about these decisive events of Humāyūn's career. The sequence of events is sometimes faulty and her brevity causes much disappointment.

While the *Humāyūnāmah* shows Gulbadan to have been a gentle, cultured and pious woman, capable of strong domestic affection, happiness and joy, it also reveals to us Humāyūn's charming personality in all its strength and weakness and portrays with a sympathetic hand his numerous qualities of head and heart.

BAYAZID : TARIKH-I-HUMAYUNI

When Abul Fazl undertook the writing of the *Akbarnāmah* (so he says in his preface), efforts were made to collect materials from various quarters. Enquiries were made from the members of the royal family about the past, and servants of the court were asked to record or dictate what they remembered about the kings who had gone before. Akbar's command was as follows : "Every one of the attendants of our court who is gifted with the talent for writing history should write one, and if anybody knows something about the reign of H. M. Humāyūn Pādshāh of heavenly abode, he should record it and finish it with our illustrious name."

A copy of this *firmān* was sent by Shaikh Abul Fazl to Bāyazīd Bīyāt, then a *Bakāwal Begī* (Superintendent of the Royal Kitchen) working under the Mīr Bakāwal. Bāyazīd dictated to Abul Fazl's scribe from memory without any notes

or memoranda. He must have been very old at this time, for he says, "Youth has passed away and old age has come in." Besides he was a paralytic and was incapable of writing himself. But like many mediaeval men, he had a wonderfully retentive memory and most of the observations that he makes are corroborated from other sources. The *Memoirs* of Bāyazīd, of which only the India Office has a copy, are styled on the fly leaf of the MS. as *Tārīkh-i-Humāyūnī*. This title was not given to them by the author, who speaks of them only as a *Mukhtasar*. The *Memoirs* begin with Humāyūn's flight to Persia in 1543 and come down to the time when they were written, i.e. 1590-91. They appear to have been used very much in compiling the *Akbar-nāmah* though Abul Fazl nowhere acknowledges his debt to Bāyazīd. Bāyazīd tells us that nine copies were made of the work two of which were given to Abul Fazl. The Allahabad University copy which is a transcript from the India Office MS. has been used by me. The *Memoirs* were dictated at Lahore and the date of their completion is Sunday the 1st Ramzān (June 13, 1591). On the colophon of the India Office MS. we find the words : *Tārīkh-i-Humāyūn ki az Zabān-i-Bāyazīd maswidah shud*. It ends with an account of the coming of the news of Mirza Hakīm's death at Kābul.

There is no complete translation in English of Bāyazīd's history. Sir H. Beveridge writes that Mrs. Erskine had prepared a translation of the *Memoirs* which was nearly complete. This is the British Museum MS. Additional 26, 610. A portion of them was translated in the Allahabad University Studies Vol. VI, Pt. I, pp. 71-148. Sir H. Beveridge published a detailed summary of Bāyazīd's work in the *J.A.S.B.*, LXVII, 1898, pp. 296-316, which is very useful.

Bāyazīd was in the service of Humāyūn and had valuable opportunities of acquainting himself with the life-history of that monarch. He did not meet the Emperor till the latter had joined the Shah of Persia at Zangān. He was present at the feasts that were held in his honour and was in touch with the leading nobles of the state. He is an eye-witness of what happened in the Kābul region between Humāyūn and Kāmrān and gives a detailed account of it. He was not present at the blinding of Kāmrān and his account of the grim episode is not so detailed as Jauhar's. He was in the service of Jalālud-dīn Mahmūd of Auhah as his *Sāmān* (butler) and fully describes how he went from Kābul to Jalālabād with ice, grapes, *riwāj*, lemonade and sugar-candy as presents to Akbar. After Humāyūn's death he joined Akbar's service. But he incurred the wrath of the Emperor by demolishing a Hindū temple at

Banaras which contained an inscription 760 years old, and lost his appointment. He took to the life of a *darvesh* and it was only after several years that he resumed service. In A.H. 998 (1590) he was a *daroghā* of the treasury and *amīn* and we are told that in 999 (1591) Akbar allowed him to sit in his presence and declared that he was an honest man who had served the state loyally for sixty years.

There are four chapters in this book. The first begins from A.H. 949 when Humāyūn left Bhakkar and proceeded towards Irān to seek help from Shah Tahmāsp. Bāyazīd's *Memoirs* are not so well written as those of Jauhar but they contain a good deal about Humāyūn which we do not find in other contemporary works.

Bāyazīd gives a more detailed account of political events than either Jauhar or Gulbadan. He is an eye-witness of many things that he relates and the plain and simple manner in which he describes facts lends weight to his narrative. The struggle between Humāyūn and Kāmran is fully described and the part played by Mirza Sulaimān, his son, wife and other nobles is explained. Bāyazīd is not devoid of the human touch. He says many interesting things about prominent men and women and affords us a glimpse into the social life of the Mughal aristocracy. The incident relating to Haram Begam and her daughter and the marriage proposals of Humāyūn and Kāmran are instances in point. Humāyūn's invasion of Hindustān in 1555-56 is fully described. He gives a long list of officers who were in the Emperor's service at the time and describes the battles fought with the Afghans. Abul Fazl has borrowed much of his information from Bāyazīd's account, as a comparison of the texts will show. The dates are not always correct nor is the sequence of events precisely maintained. The author furnishes many facts about his own life and these have been summed up by Sir Henry Beveridge in his admirable article and by Rieu in his note in the British Museum Catalogue.

MIRZA HAIDER : *TARIKH-I-RASHIDI*

The *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī* is a valuable history of the Mughals and Turks of Central Asia by Mirza Haider Dughlāt, a cousin of Bābur. His father, Muhammad Husain Kurkān, was married to Khūb Nigār Khānim, sister of Bābur's mother Outlugh Nigār Khānim and a daughter of the Mughal chief, Yūnus Khān. Mirza Haider was born in 905 (1499-1500) at Tashkind, where his father had at one time been governor. His father conspired against Bābur but was pardoned. After a short time he was seized by the Uzbeks and was put to death by Shaibanī Khan's orders. Mirza Haider, who was only a child of nine, was taken

care of by Bābur and treated with great affection. He distinguished himself as a soldier and general and took part in many important political affairs. After Bābur's death he entered Humāyūn's service and was present in India when the battle of Qanauj was fought in A.D. 1540. The Mughals met at Lahore to decide upon a common plan of action but they failed to reach an agreement. Mirza Haider was induced by certain chiefs of Kashmir to attempt an invasion of their country. He conquered the valley without encountering any resistance in November, 1540, and brought the country under his sway. As a ruler he exercised authority for some years, established peace in the country and increased the extent of his kingdom by conquering other lands. In 1551 he was killed by the natives of Bhirbal when he went there to stabilise the position of his representative.

Mirza Haider was a man of talent and good disposition. Amīn Ahmad Rāzī says he had a rare gift for elegant composition in verse as well as in prose. Erskine calls him "a man of worth, of talent and of learning". The *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī* was dedicated to Abdur Rashīd Khan bin Abul Fath Sultān Sa'īd of Kāshghar. It consists of two parts. The first *daftar* was written in 951 and 952 (1544 and 1545) and the second, which contains a detailed account of the author's life, in 948 (1541).

The *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī* begins with an account of Tughluq Timūr, Mughal Khāqān, who was the first to embrace Islām. It gives us a vivid picture of Central Asian politics and the minute details which the author supplies help us to a complete grasp of the conditions which existed at the time, and of the plans and policies of men whose fortunes changed with kaleidoscopic rapidity. Mirza Haider writes of both Bābur and Humāyūn. He praises Bābur for his great gifts and expresses his gratitude to him. He gives more details about Humāyūn, and his account of the battle of Qanauj is that of an eye-witness who was himself in command of a wing of the imperial army. Indeed, no other contemporary writer gives such a detailed and precise account of the battle as he does. What he says about Humāyūn's character and habits is of great value because he knew him intimately and was associated with him for some time prominently in public affairs. In the midst of the greatest perfidy, Mirza Haider remained loyal to him and offered him help. The following note in Elliot's *Historians* may be read with interest : "To his honour be it recorded, he did not in prosperity forget his unfortunate kinsman, the Emperor Humāyūn, but urged him to come to Kashmir, and to make that country a *point d'appui* for the recovery of his lost Empire."

An English translation of the *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī* by Elias and Ross has been published under the title of *A History of the Moguls of Central Asia*. It contains a valuable introduction and footnotes. There is an MS. of the *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī* in the library of the Muslim University, Aligarh.

KHWANDAMIR : QANUN-I-HUMAYUNI

Ghiyāsuddīn bin Humāmuddīn Khwāndamīr is another contemporary of Humāyūn and he wrote the *Habīb-us-Siyar* which is a general history of the world up to 1523. It gives an account of Central Asian politics in Bābur's day and describes his campaigns. The work has been printed and the Allahabad University possesses a copy (Teheran edition) which was obtained by Professor Rushbrook-Williams. It is highly useful for the reign of Bābur and the conditions prevailing in Transoxiana and the methods of war of the Mughals, Turks and Uzbeks, their arms, accoutrements and the arrangement of their troops on the field of battle.

Khwāndamīr has written another work which is *Or*, 1762 in the catalogue of the British Museum. It is a voluminous work of 659 folios and is divided into four parts. One of these is the *Qanūn-i-Humāyūnī* or *Humāyūnāmāh* (ff. 121-158) containing an account of the rules and ordinances established by Humāyūn and of the buildings erected by him. A complete translation of the work made by Sadāsukh Lāl, Sir Henry Elliot's Munshi, is in the British Museum (Add. 30,774 ff. 25-114). A detailed notice of the work is given in Rieu's catalogue of Persian MSS., Vol. III, pp. 1024-1027. I was able to obtain a rotograph of the Persian MS. in the British Museum and another copy from Maharāj Kumār Dr. Raghubīr Singh of Sitāmaū. A critical study of both MSS. has been made and the facts about Humāyūn's administrative experiments and fantastic court ceremonial have been collected so as to give the reader an idea of his bizarre character.

Khwāndamīr is an eye-witness of things that he describes. He accompanied Humāyūn on some of his expeditions and was introduced to him at Gwālior some time in 1533-34. He writes in a highly ornate style of Persian full of similes and metaphors. Like Abul Fazl, he expresses himself in hyperbolical language and passes a high-flown eulogy upon the Emperor. The *Humāyūnāmāh* is not a historical treatise but a collection of observances, regulations, ordinances and descriptions of court festivities. The innovations of the Emperor which he saw with his own eyes are fully described and Khwāndamīr's account has

been adopted *in toto* by Abul Fazl. The dates given by these authors are not always correct.

Khwāndamīr began writing in March, 1533, and completed his work some time after May, 1534. He was a prolific writer and felt no difficulty in collecting information. At the end of the work there is a long satirical poem in which after pronouncing a eulogy upon Humāyūn he complains of the neglect of his patron and prays for higher blessings in future. He offers to compose a *Zafarnāmah* like Sharafuddīn's but apparently his request was not favourably received.

A translation of the *Humāyūnāmah* in English by Dr. Beni Prasad of Calcutta has been published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal recently. The text has also been edited by K. B. Hidāyat Husain. The English translation (1940) has been prepared with the help of that made by Sir Henry Elliot's Munshi, Sadāsukh Lāl, of which mention has been made before.

FRAGMENTS, I. O. MS. 224

This MS. contains extracts dealing with Humāyūn's flight to Persia and the reconquest of Qandhār. It contains among other things the following: (1) The *firmān* of Shah Tahmāsp to the Governor of Herāt, Muhammad Khan, suggesting the ceremonies and etiquette to be observed during Humāyūn's reception. (2) An account of Humāyūn's reception in Khorāsān and his interview with Shah Tahmāsp. (3) The names of all the royal Amīrs and distinguished men who came to the Kābul country with Prince Murād, the Shah's son, to help Humāyūn in recapturing Qandhār. The MS. bears no name on the title page. At my request it was obtained on loan from the India Office Library and was transcribed for the University. A comparison of the contents with the *Akbarnāmah* shows that it was utilised by Abul Fazl. The *firmān* of the Shah is reproduced *in extenso* by A. F. and also the poetical quotations which are contained in the MS. The date of composition is not mentioned.

MEMOIRS OF SHAH TAHMASP

This is a Persian MS. in the library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. Its name is *Tazkirāt-i-Safviah*, a story of Tahmāsp's life (1524-76) from beginning to end for the benefit of his friends, relations and posterity. It is difficult to say whether the autobiography was composed by Tahmāsp himself. The wars and battles of Tahmāsp are described at length, but there is nothing in the MS. about the Shah's relations with Humāyūn.

INAYATNAMAH

The *Ināyatnāmah* is a collection of letters and other historical documents of Bābur, Humāyūn, Akbar and others down to Bahādur Shah made by Ināyat Khan Rasikh, son of Shamsudowlah Lutfullah Khan (1750) when he was in his 49th year.

INSHA-I-MIRAM SHAH

These are letters of Mīram Shah of Qazwīn who was a contemporary of Humāyūn. He was living in A.D. 1550. These letters are addressed to Sultan Husain, Bābur, Humāyūn, Shah Ismail Safavi, Husain Waiz al Kashifi and to a number of other distinguished men who lived at the time. There are several letters addressed to Humāyūn but they contain a good deal of laudatory matter which is of little historical value. Both the above MSS. are in the India Office Library.

LETTERS OF HUMAYUN

This is an MS. in Persian kindly lent to me by Maharāj Kumār Dr. Raghubīr Singh of Sitāmaū. It contains three letters. The first is a *firmān* of Shah Tahmāsp to Muhammad Khan Beglār Begi of Herāt at the time when Humāyūn thought of going to Irān. The second is a letter from Humāyūn to the Shah of Persia. It is an interesting and pathetic letter full of bombastic phrases and figures of speech. The third is a letter from the Prince of Irān to Humāyūn after the Restoration. It speaks of the ingratitude of Kāmran and the other brothers. It is an affectionate letter breathing goodwill and sympathy and asks the Emperor to send news about himself. Every kind of help is offered, and Humāyūn is asked to apprise the Shah without hesitation of his need. This letter was brought by one Agharlū Beg who is described as an experienced officer.

REIS : MIRAT-UL-MAMALIK

Sidī 'Alī Reīs was a Turkish admiral who came to India in 1556. He was well received at court and a banquet was given in his honour by the Khān-i-Khānān. He was introduced to Humāyūn whom he presented with a modest gift and a chronogram upon the reconquest of India and two *Ghazals* which were very much appreciated. Sidī 'Alī Reīs was a careful observer of men, their habits, manners, customs and institutions and his account throws some light on the social history of the time. He reached Delhi just at the time when Humāyūn was preparing to hold the great *darbar*, of which Abul Fazl has given a detailed account. He is a valuable authority for matters that came directly under his notice and one of these is Humāyūn's death.

Sīdī 'Alī Reīs was a well-educated man, well-versed in mathematics, astronomy, geography, poetry, theology and general literature. He was himself a poet; wrote lyrical verses and took delight in theological disputations. He loved Turkey very much and his chauvinism is manifest in his book. He is not a minute observer of things like Ibn Batūtā, nor has he the capacity of the latter for travel and intercourse with all kinds of people. I have not been able to obtain a copy of the *Mirāt*. I have used Vambéry's translation of 'Alī Reīs's *Travels and Adventures* (Luzac & Co., 1899) which was lent to me by the Imperial Library, Calcutta.

The *Mirāt* is a small but interesting book. It gives an account of Gujarāt and Multān and writes about the people of India and their customs. 'Alī Reīs writes about the court of Delhi and the personal tastes of Humāyūn. The account of India in the translation occupies twenty pages and gives some information that is new. The detailed account of Humāyūn's death given by the admiral enables us to check the observations of Indian historians.

The narrative of his journey was completed by the admiral in Galata in Sha'ban 964 (1556) and a copy of it was made in Safar 965 (1557).

TARIKH-I-IBRAHIMI

This is an India Office MS. from which a transcript was made by the Allahabad University for my use. The manuscript bears the seal of the East India Company Library and on the colophon there are several seals. It has another title, *Tārīkh-i-Humāyūnī*, which shows that it was compiled during Humāyūn's reign.

The *Tārīkh-i-Ibrāhīmī* is a general history of the world from Adam to 956 (1549) even to 957. It gives an account of Humāyūn's reign up to the year 1545-46 but it is very brief. It describes his meeting with the Shah of Persia, the conquest of Qandhār and Kābul and ends with a number of verses. It makes no mention of Humāyūn's acceptance of the Shiah faith. Like other chroniclers the author expresses himself in laudatory verse.¹ The author's name is given as Ibrāhīm bin Harīrī (or propably Jarir) and in Beal's Dictionary his name is given as Ibrāhīm bin Harīrī and the work is said to have been dedicated to Bābur. The last entries in the book relate to the year 1549 which makes it clear that it was written in Humāyūn's time. The

¹ By the meeting of these two the crown and the throne were exalted. By the union of the two the eye of the throne and the dominion were brightened.

author is a contemporary but it is a pity that he does not give us many details about Humāyūn's reign.

B. SECONDARY SOURCES

ABUL FAZL : AKBARNAMAH

The *Akbarnāmah* of Abul Fazl is a valuable source for the history of Humāyūn's reign. It was written in obedience to Akbar's command which ran thus: "Write with the pen of sincerity the account of the glorious events and of our dominion's increasing victories." "Accordingly," writes A.F., "I spent much labour and research in collecting the records and narratives of His Majesty's actions and I was a long time interrogating the servants of the state and the old members of the illustrious family. I examined both prudent, truth-speaking old men and active-minded, right-actioned young ones, and reduced their statements to writing. The royal commands were issued to the provinces that those who from old service remembered, with certainty or with admixture of doubt, the events of the past, should copy out their notes and memoranda and transmit them to court." A.F. was engaged for seven years on this work and completed it in 1596, the forty-first year of the reign. It was continued to 1601 within a year of the author's death. Little need be said about the author who is so well known to students of Indo-Muslim history. He was a son of Shaikh Mubārak and was born at Agra on 6th Muharram, 958 (January 14, 1551) and rose to high position at court by his extraordinary intellectual gifts. He was murdered on Jehāngīr's order by the Bundela chief, Bīr Singh Deva, on the 4th Rabi 1, 1011 (August 19, 1602). Akbar was deeply grieved at the sad news and for several days refused to see anyone. He is reported to have said, "If Salīm wished to be Emperor, he might have killed me and spared Abul Fazl."

The *Akbarnāmah* gives a detailed history of Humāyūn's reign which is based upon the accounts furnished by contemporaries, many of whom lived during his day. He must have heard many things from the lips of those who had seen Humāyūn, worked and fought with him and this fact greatly enhances the value of his history. I have used the Persian edition published in the *Bibliotheca Indica* and the English translation by Sir Henry Beveridge, which is excellently annotated.

ABUL FAZL : AIN-I-AKBARI

Another important book of Abul Fazl is the *Ain-i-Akbari*, which besides being a statistical survey of the Mughal empire

under Akbar, is a mine of information about the rules, regulations, topography, revenue system, social habits and customs of the people of India and many other things. It was completed in the forty-second year of the reign and was slightly enlarged in the forty-third year on account of the conquest of Berar (1596-97). A portion of the *Ain* was translated by Francis Gladwin in 1783 but the whole work has been published in the *Bibliotheca Indica* and translated by Blochmann and Jarrett in three volumes. The *Ain* is such a valuable work that no historian of the Indian Timūrids can do without it.

NIZAMUDDIN AHMAD : TABQAT-I-AKBARI

The *Tabqāt-i-Akbarī* or the *Tārīkh-i-Nizāmī* by Nizām-uddīn Bakshī bin Muqīm Harvī is a valuable general history of India. He writes in his preface that he consulted twenty-nine histories in preparing this work and there is no doubt that he wrote with considerable care and judiciousness. The date of composition is expressed in a chronogram as A.H. 1001 (1592-93); but in the body of the work the narrative is brought down to the end of the 38th year A.H. 1002 (1593-94). The style is simple and the inaccuracies of dates and facts are not too many. The *Akbarnāmah* and the *Tabqāt* have been followed by all later writers. The text has been published in the *Bibliotheca Indica* and the history of Humāyūn and Sher Shah is to be found on pages 27-125.

In Muslim histories like the *Taj-ul-Ma'āsir*, the *Tārīkh-i-Firūz Shāhī* and several others Islam is mentioned as the only true faith and in battles and sieges when Muslims are killed they "drink the cup of martyrdom" while Hindus are invariably "despatched to hell". Nizāmuddīn is less prejudiced and does not aggressively exhibit his bigotry. He does not possess A.F.'s literary talent but he is a reliable and trustworthy historian to whom all later writers are, in large or small measure, indebted.

MULLA AHMAD : TARIKH-I-ALFI

This is a valuable general history of India by Mulla Ahmad Talawī who began it in 1585 during Akbar's reign. After his assassination (1588) it was continued by Āsaf Khan. Badāonī finally revised the first two volumes in A.H. 1000 (1591-92) and the third volume was revised by Āsaf Khan. At my request a portion of the *Tārīkh-i-'Alfī* was transcribed from the India Office MS. There is nothing new about Humāyūn. The MS. is full of inaccuracies and is badly written. The dates are incorrect.

An Arabic History of Gujarāt

The author of this history is 'Abdullah Muhammad bin 'Umar Al-Makkī, Al-Asafī 'Ulughkhanī, surnamed Hājī-ud-Dabīr. Its title is *Zafar-ul-Wālih bi Muzaffar wa Alih* though it is better known by its modern name, *An Arabic History of Gujarāt*, so called because it is written in Arabic. The author was born in Mecca in 1540 and first came to India in 1555 and settled with his father in Ahmedābād. He entered the service of noblemen in the Deccan and acquired a first-hand knowledge of political events.

The original draft was completed in 1605, but the author worked at it for a few years more. In completing his history he consulted several works, the most frequently mentioned of which is Husām Khan's *Tārīkh-i-Bahādurshāhī*. No copies of this work are, however, traceable.

The Arabic history gives a lengthy account of the reigns of Humāyūn and Bahādur Shah and some valuable information about Gujarāt. The Hājī's account of Humāyūn's death is different from that given in the *Akbarnāmah*. The index supplied by Sir Denison Ross in Vol. III is fairly full and gives a complete idea of the relations between Humāyūn and Bahādur.

Mirāt-i-Sikandari

This is a history of Gujarāt by Sikandar bin Muhammad *alias* Manjhū, who finished it in A.D. 1611 or, according to another account, in A.D. 1613. In the body of his work he mentions several histories, e.g. Azīzī's *Tārīkh-i-Muzaffar Shāhī*, Halvī Shīrāzī's *Tārīkh-i-Ahmad Shāhī*, Malālī's *Tārīkh-i-Muzaffar Shāhī*, *Tārīkh-i-Muhammad Shāhī* by another author and the *Tārīkh-i-Bahadur Shāhī*, but he does not consider them reliable. His point of view is Muslim. He condones acts of Muslim high-handedness and sometimes gives several versions of the same events. He is fond of stories and anecdotes. A very detailed account is given by him of Bahādur Shah and his struggle with Humāyūn, the Rājputs and the ruler of Mālwa. Bayley's translation in English has now become a standard work but there is another reliable translation by Fazlullah Lutfullah Farīdī printed at the Education Society's press at Dhampur. I was able to obtain the India Office copy which is one of the best MSS. that that library possesses. Allahabad University has a lithograph of the text which was published in Bombay many years ago.

The *Mirāt-i-Ahmadī* is another history of Gujarāt by Dewān Alī Muhammad Khan who began writing it in 1756. It gives a

history of Gujarāt with much statistical information. The historical information is not of very great value. In Etch's catalogue the *Mirāt-i-Ahmadī* is described as 'a very extensive and rare history of Gujarāt,' probably because of the statistical information it supplies. An English translation of the first part is given in James Bird's *History of Gujarāt*. Bayley's *Local Muhammadan Dynasties of Gujarāt* also gives a condensed translation of the earlier portion. The *Mirāt-i-Ahmadī* has been published in the Gaekwar Oriental Series.

Tārīkh-i-Ma'sūmī

This is a history of Sind composed by Muhammad Ma'sūm who wrote poetry under the *nom de plume* of Nāmī. He was born in Bhakkar where his father had settled. After his father's death he went to Gujarāt and there became very friendly with Nizāmuddīn Ahmad.

Being a man of versatile genius, he wrote on a number of subjects. He gives the history of the Arghūn dynasty and a detailed account of Humāyūn's transactions in Sind. He was in the Imperial Service for some time and retired from it in 1606. He says he completed this work after great delays for the benefit of his son. The Allahabad University MS. is worm-caten but readable. The Bhandārkar Institute, Poona, has published the *Tārīkh-i-Ma'sūmī* under the title of *Tārīkh-i-Sindh*. It has been edited by Dr. U. M. Dandpota. An English translation was made many years ago by one Mallet, an officer in the Indian army.

Riyāz-us-Salātīn

This is a modern history of Bengal by Ghulam Husain who was Dāk Munshi under Mr. George Udney at one time Commercial Resident of the East India Company's Factory at Mālda. The author says he turned his attention towards the history of Bengal in 1786 and consulted a number of works dealing with the subject. There is internal evidence of his having done so.

The *Riyāz* is a useful work and Blochmann speaks highly of it. It has been translated into English by Maulvi 'Abdus Salām of the Bengal Civil Service who has also added valuable notes to every chapter.

C. OTHER SOURCES

Chandra Rāo Jetasi Ro Vethu Sūje Ro Kiyo

This is a *dingal* poem composed by Vethu Sūje Nagarajota, a bard in the pay of Rāo Jetasi of Bikānīr about the year 1535 to celebrate his victory over Kāmraṇ who had invaded that country from

the Punjāb. There are two MSS. of the poem in the Durbar Library in the fort at Bikānīr. The one is dated Samvat 1629 (A.D. 1572) and the other 1797 (A.D. 1740). It gives an account of Kāmrān's invasion of Bhatner soon after his occupation of Lahore while Humāyūn was engaged in another expedition. The text was edited by Dr. Tessitori and has been published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal.

Muhnót Nainsi ki Khyāta

This is a Hindi work composed by Nainsi during the reign of Mahārāja Jaswant Singh of Jodhpore. A portion of the text has been published by the Kāshi Nāgari Prachārinī Sabhā. Nainsi also makes mention of Kāmrān's invasion of Bhatner and Bikānīr but a good deal of what Nainsi writes is fable and romance.

Malik Muhammad Jāyasī: *Padmāvat*

This is a long allegorical poem in Hindi composed by Malik Muhammad Jāyasī, a Muslim Sūfī, who flourished during the reign of Sher Shah Sūr. He refers to the latter in the body of the poem and praises his government in which the weak were never afraid of the strong. The work is not of much historical value except that it gives evidence of the esteem in which Sher Shah was held. The poem has been published by the Nāgari Prachārinī Sabhā, Banaras.

Guru Nanak: *Adi Granth*

This is a religious book of the Sikhs and is to be found in every Sikh household. Guru Nanak was an eye-witness of Bābur's invasion, the horrors of which are described by him at length. The Guru made a prophecy about the Mughals—about their coming and their expulsion in Humāyūn's reign of which mention has been made before in the body of this work.

Besides the sources already mentioned many modern works in European and Indian languages and journals published by learned societies have been consulted in preparing this volume.¹ The names of the important works are as follows:

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